Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Family Law
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In a divorce case, the Supreme Court of Nevada was asked to consider whether a law firm, established by one spouse before the marriage and incorporated under a different name during the marriage, constitutes that spouse’s separate property. Robert Draskovich, a practicing criminal lawyer since 1997, married Laurinda Draskovich in 2012, at which point he had a 65% ownership stake in a firm. In 2018, that firm dissolved, and Robert incorporated the Draskovich Law Group (DLG) as his wholly owned corporation.During their divorce proceedings in 2022, DLG was the primary asset in dispute. The district court concluded that DLG was community property, based on the fact that DLG was incorporated during the marriage. The district court also rejected Laurinda’s request for alimony, in part because it determined that the share of community assets distributed to Laurinda would provide sufficient support through passive income.Upon appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada held that the district court erred in determining that the law firm was entirely community property. The court found that the law firm was a continuation of the spouse’s original, separate property law practice, and thus, the presumption of community property does not properly apply. Therefore, the Court reversed the portion of the divorce decree pertaining to the DLG interests and remanded for further proceedings. The Court also vacated the district court’s alimony determination to be reconsidered in light of the changed circumstances surrounding DLG. View "Draskovich v. Draskovich" on Justia Law

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This case arose from a contentious guardianship dispute over Kathleen June Jones. The Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division in Clark County, Nevada appointed an attorney to act as a Guardian Ad Litem (GAL) for Jones to help determine her best interests. The GAL sought fees at her standard hourly rate for legal services, which the district court granted over Jones' objections. Jones argued against the fee award, asserting that the GAL had no right to fees when the appointment order did not specify the rate, that the court improperly appointed an attorney as the GAL, and that the GAL should be compensated at the rate of a fiduciary, not an attorney.The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the lower court's decision, ruling that Jones had waived her right to argue about the form of the GAL's appointment order by failing to raise the issue earlier. The Supreme Court found that the district court did err in interpreting the law as requiring the appointment of an attorney as a GAL where there is no court-approved volunteer program. However, this error was deemed harmless because the district court had expressly appointed an experienced attorney due to the complexity of the guardianship case.The court concluded that GALs in Nevada act as fiduciaries, not as attorneys for the protected person, but if they perform services also performed by attorneys and have commensurate experience as an attorney, GALs may be compensated at an attorney rate for their work. The court determined that the GAL's requested fees were appropriate for her work as a fiduciary in this case, given her legal experience and the complexity of the guardianship dispute. View "In re Guardianship of Jones" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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In the State of Nevada, Alexander M. Falconi, operating as the press organization Our Nevada Judges, petitioned against the Eighth Judicial District Court, the Honorable Charles J. Hoskin, District Judge, and parties in interest, Troy A. Minter and Jennifer R. Easler. Falconi challenged local rules and a statute that required certain court proceedings to be closed to the public.Falconi filed a media request for camera access in a child custody proceeding between Minter and Easler. Minter opposed the request, arguing it was not in the child's best interest to have his personal information publicly available. The district court denied Falconi's request, citing that the case was sealed and thus required to be private according to local rules.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada held that the public has a constitutional right to access court proceedings. The local rules and the statute, NRS 125.080, requiring the district court to close proceedings, bypassed the exercise of judicial discretion and were not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. Thus, the court held that these local rules and NRS 125.080 were unconstitutional to the extent they permitted closed family court proceedings without exercising judicial discretion.The court instructed the district court to reverse its order denying media access in the underlying child custody case. The court emphasized the importance of public access to court proceedings, including family court proceedings, which historically have been open to the public. The court rejected the automatic closure of such proceedings and emphasized the necessity of case-by-case judicial discretion in deciding whether to close proceedings. View "Falconi v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct." on Justia Law

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In a contentious guardianship case involving Kathleen June Jones, the court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL), attorney Elizabeth Brickfield, to aid in determining Jones's best interests. The GAL filed a notice of intent to seek fees and costs at her standard hourly rate. The court awarded her those fees over Jones's objection. Jones appealed, arguing that the GAL had no right to fees when the district court order appointing her did not specify the rate, that the court improperly appointed an attorney as the GAL, and that the rate of compensation to which the GAL is entitled should be that of a fiduciary, not an attorney.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada held that Jones waived any argument pertaining to the form of the district court’s order by failing to raise the issue below. The court also held that the district court erred in interpreting NRS 159.0455(3) as requiring the court to appoint an attorney where there is no court-approved volunteer program, but this error was harmless because the district court expressly appointed an experienced attorney as the GAL due to the complexity of this matter. Lastly, the court held that the record contains substantial evidence supporting the GAL’s fee request and the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding the GAL the full amount of her requested fees. The court affirmed the district court’s order awarding the GAL fees. View "In re Guardianship of Jones" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court upheld the distribution decisions of the district court in the underlying divorce action to resolve community property disputes over property held in a revocable inter vivos trust and affirmed its decree of divorce, holding that there was no error.At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a revocable inter vivos trust holding community property must be named as a necessary party in a divorce action where the divorcing spouses are co-trustees, co-settlors, and beneficiaries. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court, holding (1) the revocable inter vivos family trust was not a necessary party to the divorce action and that the district court had the authority to distribute the trust's assets; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in distributing the trust's assets between the parties as community property. View "Lopez v. Lopez" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court in the underlying divorce action, holding that while parts of the decree were legally and factually supportable, other portions contained numerous legal and factual deficiencies.Following lengthy divorce proceedings the district court summarily adopted Respondent's proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law, and decree of divorce without making any modifications. On appeal, Appellant argued that the district court committed reversible error in doing so. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) utilizing a party's proposed order does not in and of itself constitute an abuse of discretion; and (2) the district court abused its discretion when it granted financial awards for alimony, attorney fees, and expert fees and when it unequally distributed the parties' community property and debt. View "Eivazi v. Eivazi" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court sua sponte deciding to remove a protected minor's guardian and terminate the minor's guardianship based upon an ex parte communication, holding that the proceedings and resulting order did not comport with due process.Specifically, the Supreme Court held that the district court (1) has authority to sua sponte remove a guardian and terminate a guardianship even in the absence of a petition seeking removal and termination; (2) violated Defendant's right to due process by failing to give proper notice that it was contemplating removal and termination; (3) abused its discretion by failing to apply the applicable statutes and factors for removal and termination; and (4) made unsupported and clearly erroneous factual determinations in reaching its decision. View "In re D.M.F." on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court declining to backdate the parties' marriage in this case to the date they would have been married but for Nevada's unconstitutional ban on same-sex marriage, holding that "the effective date of a marriage will not predate the solemnized marriage itself for property division purposes in a divorce, even if a party asserts that the couple would have married earlier but for the later-held-to-be-unconstitutional ban on marriage between same-sex couples."Appellant and Respondent formally married in California in 2008, when Nevada did not permit same-sex marriages or recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages. In 2021, in seeking a divorce, Appellant argued that the district court should backdate the start of his marriage to Respondent to the date their relationship became serious. The district court refused to backdate the marriage and relied on 2008 as the date of the marriage. At issue was the retroactive effect of Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Obergefell does not require Nevada courts to backdate a marriage before the couple solemnized their union; and (2) the district court's order accorded with this Court's holdings. View "Candelaria v. Kelly" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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In this appeal from a district court order denying a motion to modify alimony and to reinstate child support the Supreme Court held that the district court erred in finding the it did not have jurisdiction to reinstate support as to a handicapped child beyond the age of majority but that the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request to modify alimony in this case.Citing Nev. Rev. Stat. 125C.0045(1)(a), the district court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to award support for the parties' adult handicapped child because he had reached the age of majority and because support payments had already ceased. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court has jurisdiction to award adult child support after the age of majority under Nev. Rev. Stat. 125B.110; (2) the district court failed to make the necessary findings under section 125B.110; and (3) Appellant did not demonstrate that there was a change in circumstances to warrant modifying the parties' alimony agreement. View "Davitian-Kostanian v. Kostanian" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law
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The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's modification of physical custody in this custodial action but reversed the court's parenting time allocation and vacated its award of attorney fees and costs, holding that the district court abused its discretion in part.In this opinion, the Supreme Court (1) provided a definition of sole physical custody to ensure custodial orders are properly characterized; (2) directed district courts to retain their substantive decision-making authority over custodial modifications and parenting time allocations; and (3) clarified when reassignment of a case to a different judge on remand is appropriate due to the requisite fairness demanded in ongoing child custody proceedings. As to the case before it, the Court held (1) substantial evidence supported the district court's decision to modify physical custody; (2) the district court abused its discretion by improperly characterizing its custodial award as primary physical custody when it was in fact sole physical custody. View "Roe v. Roe" on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law