Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court upheld the distribution decisions of the district court in the underlying divorce action to resolve community property disputes over property held in a revocable inter vivos trust and affirmed its decree of divorce, holding that there was no error.At issue before the Supreme Court was whether a revocable inter vivos trust holding community property must be named as a necessary party in a divorce action where the divorcing spouses are co-trustees, co-settlors, and beneficiaries. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court, holding (1) the revocable inter vivos family trust was not a necessary party to the divorce action and that the district court had the authority to distribute the trust's assets; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in distributing the trust's assets between the parties as community property. View "Lopez v. Lopez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the orders of the district court granting summary judgment and dismissal in favor of a loan servicer and trustee in this case involving a home equity line of credit agreement (HELOC) with a defined maturity date and closed draw period, holding that there was no error.At issue before the Court was whether a loan servicer and trustee were entitled to foreclose upon Borrowers' residence due to Borrowers' failure to repay the funds provided to them under the terms of their HELOC. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not err in determining that Borrowers' HELOC was both a negotiable instrument under Nev. Rev. Stat. 104.3104(1) and a promissory note under Nev. Rev. Stat. 104.3104(5), entitling the loan servicer and trustee to enforce the document under Nev. Rev. Code chapter 104 due to Borrowers' default; and (2) erred in finding that Borrowers' property was not owner-occupied and thus not subject to statutory requirements pertaining to foreclosures affecting owner-occupied housing, but the error was harmless. View "Wishengrad v. Carrington Mortgage Services" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court holding that a revocable living trust agreement signed by the decedent and the named trustee sufficiently established the decedent's house as trust property, holding that the district court did not err or abuse its discretion.At issue was whether the revocable living trust agreement was effective to establish the decedent's house, his only real property, as an asset of the trust under Nevada law and to the satisfaction of the relevant statute of frauds. The district court confirmed the trustee and the house as trust property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the trust agreement effectively funded the decedent's house to the trust; (2) the agreement satisfied the common law statute of frauds, Nev. Rev. Stat. 111.205(1); and (3) the decedent's living trust agreement funded the trust with his house. View "In re Trust Agreement of Davies" on Justia Law

In these appeals relating several statutes and issues regarding the administration of a discretionary trust the Supreme Court held that Nev. Rev. Stat. 165.1207(1)(b)(5) does not provide a beneficiary whose only distribution in a trust is discretionary with a right to an accounting and that Nev. Rev. Stat. 165.180 does not provide a district court with an independent basis on which to order an accounting.At issue on appeal was what disclosures must be made by the trustees to the beneficiaries in the administration of the trust. The district court concluded that the beneficiaries were not entitled to an accounting. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Nevada's trust statutes did not require the trustees to provide the beneficiaries with an accounting because the beneficiaries' sole distribution interests were discretionary; and (2) because the beneficiaries constituted "present" and "vested" beneficiaries, they were entitled to request and receive copies of certain trust instruments, may inspect the books of account and records of financial transactions and may receive an annual tax return, inventory, and accounting under the terms of the trust. View "In re Trust Agreement, 23 Partners Trust I" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted a trustee's petition for a writ of prohibition and reversed the order of the district court concluding that a nonresident trustee sued in a trust administration case was subject to personal jurisdiction in Nevada, holding that the district court lacked specific personal jurisdiction over the trustee.Plaintiff filed the underlying petition requesting that the district court assume jurisdiction over the trust at issue, remove the trustee and appoint a successor trustee. The trustee sought dismissal of the petition based on lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court concluded that it had jurisdiction and granted a petition to distribute the trust property on Plaintiff's behalf. The court then held the trustee in contempt for violating a temporary restraining order. The Supreme Court granted a writ of prohibition, holding that the district court lacked specific personal jurisdiction over the trustee. View "In re Trust of Burgauer" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the district court erred by disqualifying a district court judge because her impartiality could reasonably be questioned after she reviewed notes, produced in discovery, that the Supreme Court later determined to be privileged, holding that the district court erred by disqualifying Judge Sturman.Lawrence and Heidi Canarelli, along with attorney Edward Lubbers, served as former trustees of an irrevocable trust. Lubbers, who later became sole trustee, entered into a purchase agreement to sell the trust's ownership in the former trustees' business entities. Scott Canarelli petitioned to compel Lubbers to provide an accounting related to the purchase agreement. Lubbers died before Scott could depose Lubbers. Because the former trustees had disclosed documents containing Lubbers' notes, they attempted to claw back the documents. Judge Sturman allowed Scott to retain portions of the notes, but the Supreme Court held that the notes were privileged and undiscoverable. The former trustees moved to disqualify Judge Sturman as biased because she reviewed the privileged notes. The motion was denied. The Supreme Court granted writ relief, holding that the district court improperly disqualified Judge Sturman where the record did not show that Judge Sturman's review of the notes created bias or prejudice against the former trustees that would prevent fair judgment. View "Canarelli v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting attorney fees in this guardianship case where the guardian requested the protected person's estate to pay attorney fees, holding that the award was proper and that the court acted within its discretion in setting the amount of the award.The fees at issue stemmed from a period in 2019 when Donna Simmons and Robyn Friedman served as temporary co-guardians for their mother, Kathleen June Jones. The district court formally discharged Donna and Robyn upon the appointment of Kimberly Jones as general guardian. Donna and Robyn sought attorney fees payable from Jones's estate. The district court granted the request. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the award was proper because the district court applied the relevant Nev. Rev. Stat. 159.344 factors and reasonably found that Donna and Robyn's complex temporary guardianship warranted compensation; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining the amount of fees to award. View "In re Guardianship of Jones" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying St. Jude children's Research Hospital's petition to probate Theodore Scheide, Jr.'s lost will, holding that St. Jude met its burden to show the will was in legal existence and satisfied Nev. Rev. Stat. 136.240(3)'s requirement that two witnesses prove the will's provisions.Theodore's original will disinherited his biological son, Chip, and left his estate to St. Jude. After Theodore died, the original will could not be found, so St. Jude petitioned to probate the lost will. Chip argued that Theodore revoked the will by destruction and that St. Jude's witnesses did not satisfy section 136.240(3). The district court denied the petition, leaving Chip free to inherit the estate through intestate succession. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the evidence supported the conclusion that the will was in legal existence at Theodore's death; and (2) section 136.240(3)'s two-witness requirement was satisfied in this case. View "In re Estate of Scheide" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the decision of the district court concluding that a residual beneficiary's objection to the second and third amendments to the Ella E. Horst Revocable Trust was time-barred under Nev. Rev. Stat. 164.021(4), holding that the objection was timely.Following the settlor's death, Respondent, the trustee, sent notice of irrevocability to the Trust's beneficiaries pursuant to section 164.021. The notice included copies of the original Trust and the Trust's first three amendments. Sixteen months later, Respondent petitioned to confirm a purported fourth amendment to the Trust. Appellant, a residual beneficiary, filed an objection, alleging that the second through fourth amendments were the product of undue influence. The district court confirmed the original Trust and its first three amendments, concluding that Appellant's objection to the amendments was time-barred under section 164.021(4), which provides a window of 120 days from service of the notice of irrevocability for bringing an action to challenge a trust's validity. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) to trigger the 120-day limitation period under section 164.021(4), the trustee's notice must include all trust provisions pertaining to the beneficiary; (2) because Respondent's initial notice to beneficiaries did not include the purported fourth amendment, the notice did not trigger the 120-day limitation period; and (3) therefore, Appellant's objection was timely. View "In re Estate of Horst Revocable Trust" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that a creditor of a settlor may bring a claim against a settlor of a trust so long as the settlor's interest in the trust is not solely discretionary and there is not a spendthrift provision precluding payment of the claim and that where a trust provides broad discretion to its trustees, the trustees may approve a creditor's claim against the trust.At issue was whether a creditor may satisfy its claim against the settlor's trust where the trust does not specifically provide for payment of the claim but the trustees approve the payment. The district court ordered frozen trust funds be released to pay the creditor. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) both parties had standing to maintain this action, and the appeal is not moot; (2) the trust allowed for payment of the creditor's fees; (3) the creditor satisfied the procedural requirements to file a creditor's claim; and (4) the trustees had broad discretion to approve the creditor's claim. View "In re Christian Family Trust" on Justia Law