Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The State of Nevada brought a consumer protection action against TikTok, Inc. and related entities, alleging violations of the Nevada Deceptive Trade Practices Act (NDTPA). The State claimed that TikTok knowingly designed its social media platform to addict young users, causing various harms to minors in Nevada, and made misrepresentations and material omissions about the platform’s safety. The complaint detailed TikTok’s collection and sale of young users’ personal data to advertisers, the use of design features to maximize user engagement, and public statements about youth safety that the State alleged were misleading.The case was first heard in the Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada, where TikTok moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and failure to state a claim, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction, and that the Communications Decency Act (CDA) § 230 and the First Amendment immunized it from liability. The district court denied TikTok’s motion in part, finding that it had specific personal jurisdiction over TikTok based on purposeful conduct directed at Nevada, and that the State’s NDTPA claims were not barred by CDA § 230 or the First Amendment. Other claims were dismissed without prejudice.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed TikTok’s petition for writ relief. The court held that the district court properly exercised specific personal jurisdiction over TikTok, as the State made a prima facie showing that TikTok purposefully directed its conduct at Nevada through targeted marketing and data collection. The court further held that the CDA § 230 and the First Amendment do not bar the State’s NDTPA claims at the pleading stage, as the claims target TikTok’s own alleged misrepresentations and harmful design features, not third-party content or expressive activity. The Supreme Court of Nevada denied TikTok’s petition. View "TikTok, Inc. v. District Court" on Justia Law

A violent incident stemming from a planned drug transaction led to the deaths of two individuals in Las Vegas. The victims, along with a third person, met with two men, including the appellant, at a gas station under the pretense of a drug deal, but intended to steal the drugs. After a confrontation, the victims attempted to flee in their vehicle, pursued by the appellant and his codefendant, who fired shots during the chase. Two of the victims died from their injuries. The surviving victim provided a detailed description of the assailants and later identified the appellant in a photo array after initially withholding the identification.The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County presided over the trial. The appellant filed several pretrial motions, including to suppress the identification evidence, his statements to police, and certain text messages, and to sever his trial from his codefendant’s. These motions were denied after hearings, some of which were delayed due to the COVID-19 pandemic. At trial, the jury convicted the appellant on all counts, including two counts of first-degree murder with a deadly weapon, conspiracy to commit murder, attempted murder, and related firearm offenses. The appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 36 years to life.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the case. It held that a mixed standard of review applies to the suppression of pretrial identification evidence, reviewing factual findings for clear error and legal conclusions de novo. The court found the photo array was not unnecessarily suggestive and the identification reliable. The court also upheld the denial of the motion to suppress the appellant’s statements, finding no coercion or Miranda violation. Other claims, including delayed rulings, authentication of text messages, denial of severance, and the giving of a flight instruction, were rejected or found to be harmless error. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "Camacho v. State" on Justia Law

During the COVID-19 pandemic, an employee in Nevada worked for a large retailer that required workers to undergo COVID-19 testing before each shift, following state emergency orders and workplace safety recommendations. The company did not pay employees for the time spent on these pre-shift tests. The employee filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, alleging violations of Nevada’s wage-hour statutes and the state constitution, including failure to pay for all hours worked, minimum wage, overtime, and timely payment upon termination.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada denied the employer’s motion to dismiss, which had argued that the time spent on COVID-19 testing was not compensable “work” under the federal Portal-to-Portal Act (PPA). The district court held that Nevada law had not incorporated the PPA, and thus the pre-shift screenings were compensable. The court then certified a question to the Supreme Court of Nevada, asking whether Nevada law incorporates the PPA’s exceptions to compensable work.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the certified question and determined that Nevada’s wage-hour statutes do not incorporate the PPA’s broad exceptions to compensable work. The court found that Nevada law provides only narrow, specific exceptions to work compensation, unlike the PPA’s general exclusions for preliminary and postliminary activities. The court concluded that the Nevada Legislature did not intend to adopt the PPA’s exceptions, as reflected in the statutory language and legislative history. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Nevada answered the certified question in the negative, holding that Nevada’s wage-hour laws do not incorporate the PPA’s exceptions to compensable work. View "AMAZON.COM SERVS., LLC VS. MALLOY" on Justia Law

A deputy marshal who worked at the Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County received a written reprimand following an internal investigation. The Clark County Deputy Marshals Association, on his behalf, sought a hearing under Nevada statutes that provide procedural protections to peace officers, arguing that deputy marshals are employees of Clark County and thus entitled to such protections. The core dispute centered on whether deputy marshals serving the court are employees of the county or of the court itself.The Nevada Local Government Employee-Management Relations Board determined that deputy marshals are employees of the court, not the county, and therefore not entitled to the protections sought. The appellants then filed a complaint in the district court seeking a declaration that deputy marshals are county employees. All Clark County district judges recused themselves, and the case was assigned to a judge from the Seventh Judicial District Court. That court granted summary judgment to Clark County and the Eighth Judicial District Court, concluding that deputy marshals are employees of the court because their duties are judicial in nature and directly support court operations, rather than general law enforcement functions.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada affirmed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court held that deputy marshals serving at the Eighth Judicial District Court are employees of the court, not Clark County. The Court reasoned that the judiciary has inherent constitutional authority to employ personnel necessary for its functions, including courtroom security and order, and that deputy marshals’ duties are fundamentally judicial. The Court also held that, although deputy marshals have peace officer powers, they are not part of a law enforcement agency and are not entitled to the procedural protections under NRS Chapter 289. The order granting summary judgment for the respondents was affirmed. View "CLARK CNTY. DEPUTY MARSHALS ASS'N. VS. CLARK CNTY." on Justia Law

A developer entered into an agreement with a city to develop a downtown district, which included provisions for three large signs identifying the area as "Reno's Neon Line District." The city council approved the agreement and adopted it by ordinance. A nonprofit organization dedicated to scenic preservation objected, arguing that the signs were actually billboards prohibited by city code and that the developers lacked the necessary interest to enter into the agreement.The Second Judicial District Court in Washoe County partially granted the nonprofit’s petition for a writ of mandamus. The court found that the nonprofit had standing to challenge the agreement. It ruled that one sign (the archway sign) was a permissible area identification sign, but determined that the other two signs (the gas station sign and the cemetery sign) were, respectively, an on-premises advertising display and a billboard, both in violation of city code. The court severed the provisions for these two signs from the agreement and issued a writ preventing their construction.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed whether the nonprofit had standing and whether the district court properly reclassified the signs. The Supreme Court held that the city’s classification of the signs as area identification signs was entitled to a presumption of validity and that substantial evidence supported this classification. The court further held that the nonprofit lacked standing to seek writ relief because it did not have a direct and substantial beneficial interest in the agreement, as the signs were not billboards and thus not covered by a prior settlement agreement with the city. The court also found that the nonprofit had waived any argument for representational standing. The Supreme Court of Nevada vacated the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "RENO REAL ESTATE DEVEL., LLC VS. SCENIC NEVADA, INC." on Justia Law

The case concerns a dispute between two parents, Molly and Bryan, over the termination of Bryan’s parental rights to their child, S.A.T. After their divorce, Molly had primary physical custody, and Bryan initially remained involved. In 2016, Bryan experienced a mental health crisis, resulting in an incident that led Molly to obtain a temporary protective order (TPO) against him, later extended to require Bryan to undergo psychological evaluation and counseling before resuming contact. Bryan, facing financial and legal barriers, did not see or communicate with the children for several years, though he made efforts to seek legal help and eventually complied with the TPO’s requirements once he had the means. In 2021, after Bryan completed the required treatment and paid child support arrears, Molly filed a petition to terminate his parental rights. The petition proceeded only as to S.A.T. after the other child, K.W.T., emancipated and subsequently passed away.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, reviewed the petition. After an evidentiary hearing, the court found that Molly failed to prove any grounds of parental fault—abandonment, neglect, or only token efforts to communicate or support—by clear and convincing evidence. The court noted that Bryan’s lack of contact was influenced by the TPO, financial hardship, and Molly’s actions to limit access, and that S.A.T. was well cared for in Molly’s custody.The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s decision. It held that in private termination actions, severing parental rights based solely on token efforts to communicate or support is disfavored, especially when the child is safe and well cared for. The court also held that a parent does not admit a parental-fault ground merely by failing to oppose it in response to a termination petition. The order denying the petition to terminate Bryan’s parental rights was affirmed. View "In re Parental Rights as to S.A.T." on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted in 2016 of conspiracy to commit robbery, burglary, robbery, and first-degree kidnapping, receiving concurrent sentences including 8 to 20 years for robbery and 5 years to life for kidnapping. In November 2022, the Nevada Board of Parole Commissioners assessed him as a high risk to reoffend, denied parole, and scheduled his next hearing for January 2025. The petitioner requested a reassessment, arguing the risk level was incorrect. The Board found an error, reassessed him as moderate risk, and held a new hearing in April 2023, but again denied parole and rescheduled the next hearing for November 2025, nine months later than originally set.The petitioner sought a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, arguing that the Board unlawfully punished him for seeking reconsideration by delaying his next parole hearing. He claimed this delay was vindictive and violated his due process rights, relying on the presumption of vindictiveness established in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), and its progeny.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada held that the presumption of vindictiveness may generally arise in parole proceedings if the Board, upon reconsideration, extends the time before a prisoner may be considered for parole again. However, the court concluded that the presumption does not apply when the Board corrects its own error without prompting from an outside tribunal. The court further found that the petitioner failed to demonstrate actual vindictiveness. The Board acted within its statutory discretion in scheduling the next hearing, and the petition for writ relief was denied. View "Stewart v. Board of Parole Commissioners" on Justia Law

The appellant was indicted on 22 counts of theft after embezzling nearly $600,000 from his employer over several years. He sought treatment at an addiction center, where he was diagnosed as a pathological gambler and was provisionally approved as a candidate for gambler’s diversion court, a specialty court for defendants whose crimes are related to gambling addiction. He pleaded guilty to all counts and moved for admission into the diversion program, arguing that his crimes were committed to fund his gambling addiction. At an evidentiary hearing, he testified to this effect, but the State presented financial records showing that only a small fraction of the stolen funds was actually used for gambling.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County held an evidentiary hearing and ultimately denied the motion for admission into gambler’s diversion court. The court found that the majority of the embezzled money was used to support a lavish lifestyle rather than to further a gambling addiction. The court determined that the State had met its burden of proof under a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, showing that the crimes were not committed in furtherance of or as a result of problem gambling. The appellant was sentenced to concurrent prison terms and appealed the denial of admission to the specialty court.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and clarified the standard for admission into gambler’s diversion court under NRS 458A.220. The court held that district courts have wide discretion in deciding whether to admit a defendant, and the defendant bears the burden of proving eligibility by showing a rational nexus between the crime and problem gambling. The court found that, although the district court had incorrectly assigned the burden of proof to the State, this error did not prejudice the appellant. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s denial of admission to gambler’s diversion court. View "PIZARRO VS STATE" on Justia Law

A Nevada resident, Richard Goldstein, is the sole lifetime beneficiary of a discretionary trust created in Missouri and administered by Bank of America (BOA) from its St. Louis office. The trust was established by Goldstein’s father, and the contingent remainder beneficiaries are Goldstein’s sister and her children, none of whom reside in Nevada. Goldstein requested that BOA transfer the trust’s situs from Missouri to Nevada, but BOA denied the request after consulting its St. Louis team. Goldstein then filed a petition in the Ninth Judicial District Court in Douglas County, Nevada, seeking the court’s jurisdiction over the trust and a construction of the trust’s no-contest clause to allow him to challenge the situs without forfeiting his interest.The district court granted BOA’s motion to dismiss, finding it lacked personal jurisdiction over the nonresident trustee. The court determined that, although statutory in rem jurisdiction under NRS 164.010 was satisfied, BOA was a necessary and indispensable party to the proceeding, and personal jurisdiction was required. The court found that Goldstein failed to allege facts supporting either general or specific personal jurisdiction over BOA, and that BOA’s compliance with Nevada’s registered agent statute did not constitute consent to jurisdiction.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that the statutory grant of in rem jurisdiction under NRS 164.010 does not override the constitutional due process requirements for personal jurisdiction. Because BOA, as trustee, was a necessary and indispensable party, personal jurisdiction was required. Goldstein failed to make a prima facie showing that BOA had sufficient minimum contacts with Nevada related to the petition, and BOA’s business presence in Nevada was unrelated to the trust administration at issue. Thus, dismissal was proper. View "In re Goldstein Irrevocable Trust" on Justia Law

A newborn child, A.R., was removed from her parents’ custody by the Clark County Department of Family Services (DFS) due to neglect and abuse. Two relatives, a paternal aunt (Aunt Mary) and a maternal grandmother (Grandma Ericka), each sought to care for A.R. Initially, A.R. was placed with Aunt Mary, with Grandma Ericka’s cooperation, and later spent alternating weeks with each relative. After parental rights were terminated, both relatives sought to adopt A.R. DFS recommended placement with Aunt Mary, citing the child’s strong bond with her cousin in that household and the benefits of a “nuclear family” environment, though it acknowledged both homes were loving and appropriate.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada held evidentiary hearings and found that both Aunt Mary and Grandma Ericka were equally capable of providing for A.R.’s needs. The court ultimately placed A.R. with Aunt Mary, giving “due weight” to DFS’s recommendation, and incorporated a post-adoption contact agreement to ensure ongoing contact between A.R. and Grandma Ericka. The court clarified that while it considered DFS’s preference, it retained authority to override that recommendation if it was not in the child’s best interest.Grandma Ericka petitioned the Supreme Court of Nevada for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the district court improperly relied on DFS’s recommendation, failed to make sufficient findings, and prioritized a nuclear family contrary to public policy. The Supreme Court of Nevada denied the petition, holding that the district court did not manifestly abuse its discretion. The court reaffirmed that, under Nevada law, the district court must consider but is not bound by the agency’s placement preference, and the child’s best interest remains paramount. The court found the district court’s written findings and process sufficient and consistent with applicable law. View "Destin v. District Court" on Justia Law