Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Raymond Brown pleaded guilty to residential burglary and was sentenced to probation. The State of Nevada filed a motion to correct the sentence, arguing that Brown's prior burglary convictions made him ineligible for probation under NRS 205.060(3). The district court denied the motion after a hearing. The State then petitioned for a writ of mandamus or prohibition, challenging the district court's order.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada reviewed the case and denied the State's motion to correct Brown's sentence. The State argued that the district court abused its discretion and acted beyond its jurisdiction by placing Brown on probation. The State also contended that it could not appeal the order denying its motion, thus justifying the need for writ relief.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and determined that the State had an adequate legal remedy in the form of an appeal from the order denying the motion to correct an illegal sentence. The court concluded that the State had the right to appeal the district court's order, as motions to correct an illegal sentence are considered postconviction challenges to a judgment of conviction. The court analogized such motions to motions for a new trial, which are appealable by either party under NRS 177.015(1)(b). Consequently, the Supreme Court of Nevada denied the State's petition for writ relief, as the State had a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the form of an appeal. View "State v. District Court (Brown)" on Justia Law

The State of Nevada charged Matthew Desavio with a felony for making threats or conveying false information concerning an act of terrorism. Desavio was found incompetent to stand trial and was ordered to be transferred for competency restoration treatment. However, the State failed to transfer him, leading to a nearly 90-day delay. Desavio moved to dismiss the charge due to this delay, and the district court initially held the Nevada Division of Public and Behavioral Health in contempt and fined them, but eventually dismissed the criminal complaint without prejudice.The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County reviewed the case and dismissed the criminal complaint without prejudice due to the State's failure to transfer Desavio for competency restoration treatment. The State appealed, arguing that the district court lacked a legal basis to dismiss the case under the competency statutes and the recent decision in State v. Gonzalez. The district court found that the delay violated Desavio's due process rights, which constituted ongoing prejudice.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the dismissal without prejudice was appropriate to remedy the ongoing prejudice to Desavio's due process rights. The court noted that the district court had tried lesser sanctions, such as holding the Division in contempt and imposing fines, but these measures proved ineffective. The Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the charge without prejudice, as it was a necessary step to address the violation of Desavio's due process rights. View "State v. Desavio" on Justia Law

Brandon Urias was charged with a misdemeanor for allegedly violating NRS 484E.040 after crashing into a parked car in a Walmart parking lot and failing to leave a note with his contact information. The justice court found Urias guilty and imposed a fine. Urias appealed to the district court, arguing that NRS 484E.040 is not enforceable on private property and that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to convict him. The district court denied his appeal, concluding that the statute's language did not limit its enforceability to specific locations.Urias then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of Nevada. The Supreme Court reviewed the case to determine whether NRS 484E.040 applies to private property. The court examined the statutory language and legislative history, concluding that NRS 484E.040 does not apply to private property, such as parking lots, but is limited to highways to which the public has access or highways to which persons have access as invitees or licensees.The Supreme Court of Nevada held that NRS 484E.040 was not enforceable against Urias for the incident in the Walmart parking lot. Consequently, the court granted Urias's petition and directed the district court to vacate its order denying Urias's appeal and to proceed in a manner consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "URIAS VS. DIST. CT." on Justia Law

Oscar Hernandez allegedly sustained injuries from a RIDGID-branded nail gun purchased from Home Depot. The nail gun, designed and manufactured by other companies, was marketed and sold by Home Depot under a trademark license agreement with Ridge Tool Company. Hernandez filed a complaint against Ridge Tool Company and Home Depot, asserting claims of strict liability, negligence, breach of express warranty, and breach of implied warranty of fitness. The case was removed to the U.S. District Court for the District of Nevada.The respondents moved for summary judgment, arguing that Ridge Tool Company should not be held strictly liable as it only licensed the RIDGID trademark and did not participate in the design, manufacture, distribution, or sale of the nail gun. The U.S. District Court granted summary judgment on all claims except the strict liability claim, noting the lack of controlling precedent in Nevada on whether a trademark licensor can be held strictly liable under such circumstances. The court certified the question to the Supreme Court of Nevada.The Supreme Court of Nevada concluded that Nevada does not impose strict products liability on an entity whose only involvement with a defective product is licensing its trademark for marketing purposes. The court adopted the rule set forth in section 14 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability, which states that a trademark licensor is not subject to strict liability unless it substantially participates in the design, manufacture, or distribution of the product. The court answered the certified question in the negative, holding that a trademark licensor cannot be held strictly liable for damages caused by a defective product if its role is limited to licensing its trademark. View "HERNANDEZ VS. THE HOME DEPOT, INC." on Justia Law

Virgin Valley Water District (the District) entered into a lease agreement with Paradise Canyon, LLC (Paradise Canyon) in 2011 to provide water shares for irrigating a golf course. The lease included a right of first refusal for Paradise Canyon to renew the lease, with the District having sole discretion to set rental rates after January 1, 2020. In 2019, the District increased the rental rate, leading Paradise Canyon to sue for declaratory relief and damages, alleging bad faith breach of the lease agreement.The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County granted partial summary judgment for Paradise Canyon on certain claims and set others for a jury trial. The jury found that the District had breached the lease in bad faith and awarded damages to Paradise Canyon. The District appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and found that the lease agreement unambiguously granted the District sole discretion to set rental rates after January 1, 2020. The court held that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to interpret this unambiguous provision and in finding that the District breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Supreme Court also noted several procedural errors, including the trial court's improper judicial notice of its own factfinding, admission of prejudicial evidence, and unfair trial practices that limited the District's ability to present its case.The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the portions of the trial court's judgment related to the interpretation of the lease renewal provisions and the jury's verdict on the rental rate and damages. The court affirmed the trial court's rulings on beneficial use and other uncontested matters. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "VIRGIN VALLEY WATER DIST. VS. PARADISE CANYON, LLC" on Justia Law

Shianna G. and Logan S. were in a relationship from 2017 to 2019 and had a child, R.A.S., in 2018. After their breakup, Shianna, who struggled with substance abuse, left R.A.S. with Logan while she sought treatment. Upon completing a 30-day program in January 2020, Shianna discovered Logan had moved and changed his contact information, making it impossible for her to reach him. Shianna relapsed, was arrested, and served jail time in 2021 and 2022. After her release, she continued to seek contact with R.A.S. but was unsuccessful. Logan filed a petition to terminate Shianna's parental rights in June 2023.The Fourth Judicial District Court in Elko County held a hearing and terminated Shianna's parental rights, finding clear and convincing evidence of parental fault on grounds of abandonment, neglect, unfitness, and token efforts, and concluded that termination was in the best interest of R.A.S. Shianna appealed the decision, challenging the findings and the admission of certain evidence.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and highlighted the differences between state-initiated and privately initiated termination petitions. The court emphasized the need for district courts to carefully consider the unique circumstances of private petitions. Upon review, the Supreme Court found that the district court's findings of parental fault were not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, the court determined that Shianna had made significant efforts to contact R.A.S. and did not intend to abandon him. The court also found that R.A.S. was well cared for by Logan, negating the findings of neglect and unfitness. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the district court's order terminating Shianna's parental rights. View "IN RE: PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO R.A.S." on Justia Law

The appellant, Samuel Cocking, was skateboarding in Carson City with a concealed firearm that lacked a serial number. After tripping, he was ridiculed by a group of minors, leading to a verbal altercation. The minors' father, Philip Eubanks, approached, and Cocking shot and killed him. Cocking was charged with open murder, carrying a concealed firearm without a permit, and possession of a firearm not imprinted with a serial number. He pleaded no contest to involuntary manslaughter, carrying a concealed firearm without a permit, and possession of a firearm not imprinted with a serial number, reserving the right to appeal the constitutionality of the gun charges.The First Judicial District Court in Carson City denied Cocking's motion to dismiss the gun charges, ruling that the statutes did not violate his Second Amendment rights. Cocking was sentenced to consecutive prison terms totaling 43-108 months.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case. Cocking argued that the statutes regulating concealed carry and unserialized firearms were unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, as clarified by the U.S. Supreme Court in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen. The court held that the concealed carry statute did not violate the Second Amendment because it only regulated the manner of carrying firearms, not the right to carry them openly. The court also held that the statute requiring firearms to have serial numbers did not infringe on the Second Amendment, as unserialized firearms are not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.Additionally, the court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion at sentencing by relying on impalpable or highly suspect evidence. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "COCKING VS. STATE" on Justia Law

The appellant, Quashawn Sheridan, was on probation for a category D felony related to sex offender registration. While on probation, he was convicted of two misdemeanors: obstructing or resisting an officer by flight and failure to register with law enforcement as a convicted person within 48 hours. The district court revoked his probation, concluding that these misdemeanors were nontechnical violations because they constituted crimes of violence.The Second Judicial District Court in Washoe County revoked Sheridan's probation based on the belief that his misdemeanors were nontechnical violations. The court characterized his actions as violent crimes, which under Nevada law, would justify probation revocation without the need for graduated sanctions.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and determined that the crimes Sheridan was convicted of do not categorically constitute crimes of violence. The court emphasized that specific factual findings are necessary to classify these misdemeanors as violent crimes. The court found that the district court did not provide sufficient factual support to justify its conclusion that Sheridan's actions were violent. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the district court's decision to revoke Sheridan's probation and remanded the case for further proceedings. The district court was instructed to consider the imposition of graduated sanctions for Sheridan's technical probation violations, as required by NRS 176A.510. View "SHERIDAN VS. STATE" on Justia Law

Jonathan Eluterio Martinez-Garcia, a juvenile offender, attacked his 11th-grade English teacher and subsequently pleaded guilty to attempted murder, attempted sexual assault, and battery with the use of a deadly weapon resulting in substantial bodily harm. The district court sentenced him to two consecutive prison terms of 8 to 20 years and a concurrent term of 6 to 15 years, resulting in an aggregate sentence of 40 years with parole eligibility after 16 years. Martinez-Garcia moved to reconsider the sentence, arguing it was illegal and that he was entitled to parole eligibility after 15 years under NRS 213.12135(1)(a). The district court treated the motion as one to correct an illegal sentence and denied it.Martinez-Garcia appealed the district court's decision, contending that his sentence should reflect parole eligibility after 15 years as mandated by NRS 213.12135(1)(a) for juvenile nonhomicide offenders. He argued that the sentence imposed was illegal because it provided for parole eligibility after 16 years, contrary to the statute. The State argued that the sentence complied with the statutes governing the offenses to which Martinez-Garcia pleaded guilty.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and held that NRS 213.12135(1)(a) provides for parole eligibility for juvenile nonhomicide offenders after 15 years by operation of law, without requiring resentencing or amendment of the judgment of conviction. The court concluded that the statute does not render a sentence illegal if it otherwise conforms to the sentencing statutes for the offenses committed. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's order denying Martinez-Garcia's motion to correct an illegal sentence, acknowledging that he will be eligible for parole after 15 years despite the longer parole-eligibility period stated in the judgment of conviction. View "GARCIA VS. STATE" on Justia Law

Anthony Ray Price was charged with two felonies and his cases were stayed pending a competency determination. Two doctors evaluated Price and found him likely not competent, with signs of possible malingering. The district court found Price incompetent to stand trial and ordered him to competency treatment at Lakes Crossing Center. While on the waitlist for the treatment facility, Price was held at the Washoe County Detention Center. The State requested a second evidentiary hearing, believing Price was feigning incompetence. At the hearing, two witnesses from the detention center testified that they had no concerns about Price's behavior or mental health. The district court then found Price competent to stand trial.Price filed a petition for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the district court abused its discretion by finding him competent based on jail information rather than input from the Administrator of the Division of Public and Behavioral Health, as required by NRS 178.425(4).The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and determined that NRS 178.425(4) mandates that once a defendant charged with a felony is found incompetent, only the Administrator or their designee can determine competency. The district court's decision to find Price competent without input from the Administrator was a manifest abuse of discretion. The Supreme Court granted the petition and directed the district court to vacate its order finding Price competent to stand trial. View "PRICE VS. DIST. CT." on Justia Law