Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A mining company sought to secure water rights in the Dixie Creek-Tenmile Creek basin to support a mining operation. The Nevada State Engineer issued a decision concerning the relinquishment of groundwater rights by the Nevada Division of State Lands (NDSL), which effectively reduced the amount of water available for future appropriation in the basin. The mining company did not hold any established water rights in the basin but had filed several applications for future rights and had objected to NDSL’s filings. The State Engineer did not notify the company of his decision, and the company only learned of it months later through a third party.After learning of the decision, the company petitioned the Fourth Judicial District Court for judicial review, claiming the relinquishment adversely affected its interests and the prospects of its water rights applications. The State Engineer moved to dismiss, arguing that the company lacked standing and that the petition was untimely. The district court agreed, finding that the company was not an aggrieved party under NRS 533.450(1) and had no standing, and also found the petition was untimely.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Supreme Court determined that under NRS 533.450(1), unless a decision is made pursuant to certain enumerated statutes, the party seeking review must have a personal or property right affected by the challenged decision. The mining company had no such existing right; its interest was speculative and based only on pending applications. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order dismissing the petition for lack of standing and did not reach the issues of timeliness or equitable relief. The holding clarifies that only parties with a personal or property right affected by a State Engineer’s decision may seek judicial review under the relevant statutory provision. View "Gold Standard Ventures (US) Inc. v. Thorson" on Justia Law

The case involves a civil lawsuit in which the respondent alleges that the appellant sexually assaulted her in a Las Vegas hotel room in the late 1980s or early 1990s. The respondent claims that after being drugged, her hand was covered in lotion and she was forced to masturbate the appellant. She and other plaintiffs seek damages for various torts, including battery and assault, arguing that their claims are timely due to a Nevada statute that eliminates limitations periods for civil actions arising from sexual assault as defined under state law.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada reviewed the case and was faced with the question of whether the alleged conduct—specifically, forced masturbation without genital or anal intrusion—constitutes sexual assault under Nevada’s criminal statutes. The appellant moved to dismiss, asserting that the conduct in question does not meet the statutory definition of sexual assault and, therefore, the limitations period had expired. The federal district court certified this question to the Supreme Court of Nevada for resolution.The Supreme Court of Nevada addressed the certified question by interpreting the relevant statutes, NRS 200.364(9) and NRS 200.366. The court held that, under the plain language of these statutes, "sexual penetration" requires an intrusion into a genital or anal opening, whether by a body part or an object. The court concluded that forced masturbation, in the absence of such intrusion, does not fall within the statutory definition of sexual assault. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Nevada answered the certified question in the negative, clarifying that this specific conduct is not considered sexual assault under the relevant state law. View "Cosby v. Leslie" on Justia Law

The appellant joined two friends at a Las Vegas recording studio to make music, but an argument ensued. After being asked to leave, the appellant returned outside, and another dispute occurred. Surveillance footage showed the appellant firing nine shots at the two men, resulting in one fatality and serious injuries to the other. The appellant then demanded a vehicle and left the scene, later discarding firearms in the desert. He was charged with multiple offenses including murder, attempted murder, robbery, and grand larceny auto.The case was first heard in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County. Prior to trial, several delays occurred, including competency evaluations and changes in counsel, mostly prompted by the appellant or for his benefit. The appellant sought to suppress evidence, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, and eventually requested to represent himself. After multiple competency assessments, the district court found him competent, allowed self-representation, and provided an investigator for assistance. After an eight-day trial, a jury found the appellant guilty of all charged offenses. The district court denied his motion to dismiss for violation of speedy trial rights and sentenced him to life imprisonment with parole eligibility after twenty-eight years.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed claims that the appellant was not competent to represent himself, his waiver of counsel was not valid, his speedy trial rights were violated, evidence was improperly destroyed, compulsory process was denied, and jury instructions were erroneous. The court held that the district court properly found the appellant competent to waive counsel and represent himself, rejected claims of speedy trial violations as the delays were attributable to the appellant, found no bad faith or undue prejudice in evidence destruction, determined compulsory process was satisfied, and concluded any jury instruction error was harmless. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the convictions. View "DUCKKET VS. STATE" on Justia Law

Police discovered the body of Brandon McGaskey in petitioner Thomas Williams’s apartment after responding to a call in Sparks, Nevada. Williams admitted to shooting McGaskey during an argument, claiming self-defense. Video evidence showed Williams leaving the apartment with a black shoulder bag, which, when found, contained methamphetamines. Williams was charged with murder, illegal possession of a firearm, possession of a controlled substance, and being a habitual criminal. He moved to sever the drug possession charge from the murder charge, but the State’s opposition included a factual assertion—that the bag contained fentanyl—which was unsupported by prior testimony. The district court denied the motion to sever, adopting the State’s unsupported facts and repeatedly making findings that Williams was guilty of murder and had not acted in self-defense, even though the case had not yet been tried.Following the written order, Williams moved to disqualify the presiding judge, Judge Kathleen Sigurdson, for bias, arguing that her findings prejudged his guilt. Judge Sigurdson denied having bias. The matter was referred to Judge David Hardy, who denied the motion to disqualify after finding no evidence of “deep-seated favoritism or antagonism” under the applicable legal standard.Williams then petitioned the Supreme Court of Nevada for a writ of mandamus to require Judge Sigurdson’s disqualification or, alternatively, reassignment of the case. The Supreme Court of Nevada held that, although the standard for judicial disqualification due to bias arising from proceedings was not met, the circumstances nonetheless warranted reassignment under its supervisory authority. Specifically, the court found that the district court’s repeated, unnecessary findings of guilt compromised the appearance of justice. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Nevada denied the petition as to disqualification but granted it in part, ordering reassignment of the case to a different district judge. View "WILLIAMS VS. DIST. CT." on Justia Law

A fatal shooting occurred in 2017 at an apartment complex insured by both a primary and an excess insurer. The decedent’s estate sued the insured for negligence and related claims. The primary insurer agreed to defend and, during the litigation, rejected three settlement offers that were at or below its $1 million policy limit. Eventually, the suit settled pretrial for $5 million. The primary insurer contributed its policy limit, and the excess insurer paid the remaining $4 million under protest, reserving its right to seek reimbursement.The excess insurer then filed suit in a California federal district court, claiming equitable subrogation against the primary insurer. The excess insurer argued that the primary insurer breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing by failing to settle within policy limits and that it was entitled to stand in the shoes of the insured to recover the $4 million paid. The district court, applying Nevada law, dismissed the claim, finding that Nevada precedent barred equitable subrogation when the underlying settlement was within the combined limits of the insurers. The excess insurer appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which determined that Nevada law was unsettled on this question and certified the issue to the Supreme Court of Nevada.The Supreme Court of Nevada held that, under Nevada law, an excess insurer may state a claim for equitable subrogation against a primary insurer when the insured would have suffered a loss absent the excess insurer’s payment, regardless of whether the settlement was within the combined policy limits. The court explained that the excess insurer may assert any claims that the insured could have made against the primary insurer, including claims for failure to settle in good faith. The court answered the certified question in the affirmative. View "NORTH RIVER INS. CO. VS. JAMES RIVER INS. CO." on Justia Law

Jane Doe initiated a lawsuit against Gregory Burns, alleging sexual battery, negligence, negligent infliction of emotional distress, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Doe filed her complaint under a pseudonym due to the sensitive nature of the sexual assault allegations but did not seek prior court approval to proceed anonymously. After more than two years of litigation, including a failed removal to federal court and a related defamation action filed by Burns in Pennsylvania using Doe’s legal name, Burns moved in the Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada to require Doe to litigate under her real name. Doe opposed and filed a countermotion to continue under a pseudonym.The Eighth Judicial District Court granted Doe’s countermotion, referencing extrajurisdictional caselaw, particularly the Ninth Circuit’s balancing test from Does I thru XXIII v. Advanced Textile Corp., 214 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2000). The court found that Doe’s need for anonymity, given the sensitive subject matter, outweighed any prejudice to Burns or the public’s interest in disclosure. Burns then petitioned the Supreme Court of Nevada for a writ of mandamus challenging that decision.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the district court’s exercise of discretion for manifest abuse and adopted the Ninth Circuit’s balancing framework. It held that a party may proceed pseudonymously when the need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to the opposing party and the public’s interest in knowing the party’s identity. The court found the district court’s application of the balancing test was reasonable, that no abuse of discretion occurred, and denied Burns’s petition for writ relief. Additionally, the Supreme Court clarified procedural guidance for future pseudonymous litigation and denied Doe’s request for sanctions against Burns. View "BURNS VS. DIST. CT." on Justia Law

The appellant was previously convicted of multiple serious offenses, including attempted murder, grand larceny of a vehicle, and three counts of first-degree murder, for which he received a death sentence and additional prison terms. Decades later, federal habeas relief was granted on the basis of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding his insanity defense, resulting in the vacatur of his conviction and sentence. Upon the State’s attempt to retry him, a competency evaluation found him incompetent to stand trial. The criminal complaint was dismissed without prejudice, and the State sought his civil commitment based on evidence that he has a mental disorder and poses a danger to himself and others.Following a hearing, the Eleventh Judicial District Court of Pershing County found clear and convincing evidence supporting civil commitment and ordered the appellant to a forensic mental health facility, to remain until he either qualifies for conditional release or reaches the statutory maximum duration for such commitment. The appellant argued that he should be credited for the time he spent in prison under the vacated conviction, citing NRS 176.055, and also contended that the civil commitment should not exceed ten years. The district court rejected these arguments, determining that credit for time served under NRS 176.055 does not apply to civil commitments, as such credit is limited to sentences imposed for criminal convictions.The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s order. The court held that Nevada’s statutory scheme does not allow credit for time served in prison under a vacated criminal judgment to be applied against the duration of civil commitment, as civil commitment is a preventive and treatment-oriented measure rather than punitive. The court further held that NRS 178.463 does not provide credit in this context, as it applies only to time spent on conditional release, which the appellant has not received. View "Rogers v. State of Nevada" on Justia Law

Ajay, a recent immigrant from India with limited English proficiency, was investigated for alleged sexual assault and attempted sexual assault against a child under 14 in Reno, Nevada. The accusations stemmed from an incident involving a 13-year-old boy, A.P., whom Ajay met at his workplace and with whom he allegedly engaged in sexual acts. During a custodial police interrogation, Detective DeSantis read Ajay his Miranda rights in English. Ajay repeatedly expressed confusion, stated he was not good in English, and requested to speak in Hindi or have an interpreter. Despite this, DeSantis continued explaining the rights in English, using props and hypotheticals, until Ajay acquiesced and the interrogation proceeded, resulting in a confession.Ajay moved to suppress his statements before the Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County, arguing he had not knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights due to his limited English proficiency. At a pretrial hearing, Ajay testified through an interpreter, detailing his lack of formal English education and unfamiliarity with the American legal system. The district court denied his motion, finding the waiver valid and voluntary, citing DeSantis’s efforts to clarify the warnings and Ajay’s apparent understanding.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed whether Ajay’s Miranda waiver was knowing and intelligent. The court found that Ajay's limited English skills and explicit requests for an interpreter demonstrated he did not understand his rights. The court held that law enforcement must recognize when a language barrier prevents meaningful waiver and provide an interpreter as necessary. The district court’s admission of Ajay’s confession was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given its significance at trial. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the conviction and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ajay v. State" on Justia Law

A residential property was subject to two homeowners' associations (HOAs), Aliante Master Association and Autumn Ridge at Aliante Community Association. The homeowner fell behind on monthly assessments, resulting in both HOAs recording liens against the property. Only Aliante proceeded with a foreclosure sale. Prior to the sale, the homeowner made payments to Aliante which, if applied to the oldest assessments first, would have satisfied the superpriority portion of Aliante’s lien. Collegium Fund LLC Series 16 purchased the property at the foreclosure sale and sought to quiet title against Deutsche Bank National Trust Company, which held the first deed of trust.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County conducted a bench trial and ruled in favor of Collegium Fund. The district court found that Aliante applied the homeowner’s payments to the lien debt as a whole rather than to the oldest assessments, leaving a small part of the superpriority lien outstanding. Thus, it concluded the sale was a superpriority lien foreclosure that extinguished Deutsche Bank’s deed of trust. Alternatively, the court found that even if Aliante’s superpriority lien had been satisfied, the superpriority portion of Autumn Ridge’s lien also needed to be paid off to convert the sale to a subpriority foreclosure. Since no evidence showed payment to Autumn Ridge, the court held Collegium took the property free of the deed of trust.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case de novo and reversed the district court’s judgment. The Supreme Court held that, as a matter of law, the homeowner’s payments should be presumed to satisfy the superpriority portion of Aliante’s lien unless expressly directed otherwise. Additionally, the court held that payment of only the foreclosing HOA’s superpriority lien is required to convert the sale to a subpriority foreclosure; payment of the non-foreclosing HOA’s superpriority lien is not necessary. Therefore, the bank’s first deed of trust survived the foreclosure sale, and Collegium took title subject to the deed of trust. View "DEUTSCHE BANK NAT'L TR. CO. VS. COLLEGIUM FUND LLC SER. 16" on Justia Law

The Clark County Department of Family Services filed a petition under Nevada law seeking protection for three minor children, alleging they were in need of protection from their father and stepmother. The allegations against the stepmother were withdrawn prior to trial. The juvenile court in Clark County conducted a full evidentiary hearing regarding the father and ultimately found that the allegations were not proven by a preponderance of the evidence, resulting in dismissal of the petition against him.Following this dismissal, both the Department and the minor children appealed the juvenile court’s order to the Supreme Court of Nevada. However, concerns arose regarding the appealability of such an order, as prior precedent—specifically In re A.B., 128 Nev. 764—held that orders from juvenile proceedings concerning child custody were not substantively appealable under Nevada Rule of Appellate Procedure (NRAP) 3A. The Supreme Court temporarily halted the appeal and directed appellants to show cause why jurisdiction existed.Upon review, the Supreme Court of Nevada found that the jurisdictional analysis in In re A.B. was flawed. The court determined that an order completely dismissing and thus finally resolving a petition for child protection under NRS Chapter 432B meets the definition of a final judgment under NRAP 3A(b)(1), because it disposes of all issues in the case. The court overruled In re A.B. to the extent that it held such orders were unappealable, clarifying that NRAP 3A(b)(1) allows an appeal from a final judgment entered by a district court—even when it arises from juvenile proceedings involving child custody. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Nevada held that the order dismissing the petition is appealable and allowed the appeal to proceed. View "IN RE: N.D." on Justia Law