Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Nevada Legislature enacted Assembly Bill 519 in 2023 to promote school district capital projects. This law included specific provisions requiring counties with populations between 52,500 and 57,500 to levy a property tax to fund these projects, with a default tax imposed if such a levy was not enacted by a certain date. At the time of the latest census, only Elko County fell within this population range, making it the sole county affected by these mandatory provisions. Elko County challenged the constitutionality of these sections, arguing that they constituted a local or special law targeting a single county rather than applying statewide.The First Judicial District Court, Carson City, reviewed Elko County’s complaint and granted summary judgment in its favor. The court found that the challenged sections were unconstitutional local or special laws because they singled out Elko County. The court also concluded that these provisions violated the Nevada Constitution’s requirement for a uniform system of county government and severed the offending sections from the rest of the legislation, allowing the remainder of the law to stand. Only the Nevada Legislature appealed this ruling to the next level.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada affirmed the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court concluded that the population-based provisions of Assembly Bill 519 were not rationally related to the law’s purpose and created an improper, narrowly tailored distinction that targeted Elko County. The Court held that these sections were local or special laws and violated Article 4, Section 20 of the Nevada Constitution by impermissibly regulating county business. As a result, the Supreme Court affirmed the order granting summary judgment and held that the challenged sections of the law were unconstitutional. View "The Legislature of the State of Nevada v. Elko County" on Justia Law

A third party purchased a Las Vegas property in 2005 with a loan from Countrywide Home Loans, secured by a deed of trust. In 2012, Countrywide assigned the deed of trust to the Bank of New York Mellon (BNYM). That same year, after the borrower defaulted on homeowners’ association (HOA) payments, the HOA foreclosed, refusing Countrywide’s tender for the superpriority portion of its lien, and conveyed the property to 8933 Square Knot Trust (SKT). BNYM later initiated a federal quiet title action, resulting in a ruling that its deed of trust survived the HOA sale. After BNYM began foreclosure proceedings, SKT sent a statutory information request under NRS 107.200, did not receive a response, and sued BNYM in state court to stop foreclosure, seeking to quiet title and asserting additional claims, including under NRS 107.300 for BNYM’s failure to respond.The Eighth Judicial District Court initially dismissed SKT’s complaint for failure to state a claim. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the dismissal of the NRS 107.300 claim, remanding for further proceedings. On remand, BNYM filed a second motion to dismiss, raising new arguments about statutory standing and subject-matter jurisdiction. The district court granted this motion and dismissed the claim.The Supreme Court of Nevada held that NRCP 12(g)(2) generally prohibits a party from filing a successive motion to dismiss based on grounds that could have been raised in an earlier motion, except for challenges to subject-matter jurisdiction, which may be raised at any time. The Court concluded that BNYM’s statutory standing argument was improperly raised in the second motion, but its subject-matter jurisdiction argument was permissible. The Court further held that the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction at the outset and retained it throughout. The order of dismissal was reversed and the matter remanded. View "8933 SQUARE KNOT TRUST VS. BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON" on Justia Law

A patient sought treatment for back pain at a hospital and subsequently left partially paralyzed. He retained an attorney on a contingency fee basis to pursue claims for medical malpractice. The agreement set attorney fees at varying percentages, depending on when the case was resolved. The attorney then brought in a second law firm as co-counsel under a similar agreement. During the course of litigation, the patient’s attorneys amended the complaint to add an ordinary negligence claim alongside the professional negligence claims. The case settled for a confidential amount. After settlement, the attorneys claimed that the ordinary negligence claim removed the settlement from Nevada’s statutory cap on attorney fees in medical professional negligence cases, and they sought to collect higher fees under their agreements. The client disputed this, asserting that the statutory cap should apply.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County ruled in favor of the attorneys, finding that the ordinary negligence claim was not subject to the statutory cap on attorney fees and that the attorneys were entitled to the full contingency fee amounts. The court also found that the attorneys had properly perfected their attorney liens on the settlement proceeds, even though notice of the liens was sent after receipt of the first settlement check.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the case. It held that, under the recent decision in Limprasert v. PAM Specialty Hospital of Las Vegas LLC, the substance of the patient’s ordinary negligence claim sounded in professional negligence, so the statutory cap on attorney fees applied. The Supreme Court further held that attorney liens must be perfected (by notice to the client) before the attorney receives settlement funds, so only the lien on the second settlement check was validly perfected. The court reversed the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "CASTILLO VS. ATKINSON WATKINS & HOFFMANN, LLP" on Justia Law

Several members of a police officers’ association, represented by their union, sought to prevent a city’s police oversight board from publicly posting police officers’ names and badge numbers on meeting notices, agendas, and in the board’s findings and recommendations. The officers and their association argued that various statutes, local ordinances, contractual agreements, and internal policies provided confidentiality protection for this information. They further contended that officers have a significant privacy interest in their names and badge numbers that outweighs the public’s interest in disclosure, especially in the context of closed board meetings concerning alleged misconduct.The case was heard by the Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County, Nevada. The police oversight board moved for judgment on the pleadings, arguing that the Nevada Open Meeting Law (OML) required disclosure of the names and that there was no legal authority prohibiting inclusion of badge numbers. The district court agreed with the board, holding that the OML required the disclosure of officer names and did not prohibit disclosure of badge numbers. The district court also concluded that the officers did not have a protectable privacy interest in this information and that contractual or other cited provisions did not override statutory disclosure requirements. The court granted the board’s motion and dismissed the case.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada affirmed the district court’s decision. The court held that the OML requires the oversight board to include officers’ names on meeting agendas for closed meetings addressing character, alleged misconduct, or professional competence, and found no authority prohibiting the inclusion of badge numbers. The court further determined that the officers did not have a nontrivial privacy interest in their names or badge numbers, given that this information is already publicly available and subject to mandatory disclosure under existing law. View "LAS VEGAS POLICE PROTECTIVE ASSOC. VS. LAS VEGAS METRO. POLICE DEP'T CITIZEN REVIEW BD." on Justia Law

The case involves a motor vehicle accident in which the plaintiff claimed to have sustained spinal injuries after being rear-ended by the defendant in 2019. The defendant admitted liability, leaving the extent and cause of the injuries, as well as the damages, for trial. During discovery, the defendant requested and received the plaintiff’s medical records from a prior, similar 2017 car accident, which the plaintiff produced. The defendant’s expert witnesses relied on these 2017 records to argue that the plaintiff’s injuries were not caused by the 2019 accident.At the Eighth Judicial District Court, the plaintiff moved to exclude the 2017 records on grounds of irrelevance and lack of proper authentication, also noting the defendant’s failure to list them in pretrial disclosures. The court agreed, excluding the records for not meeting Nevada’s statutory authentication requirements under NRS 52.325 and for incomplete disclosure, and also barred related expert testimony. The court further excluded evidence of the plaintiff’s medical liens, citing the collateral source rule, and ultimately a jury awarded the plaintiff approximately $3.8 million in damages. The district court denied the defendant’s motions for a new trial and for relief from judgment, and granted attorney fees and costs to the plaintiff.The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for a new trial. It held that NRS 52.325 is not the exclusive method of authenticating medical records when those records are produced in discovery by a party, and that the general authentication standard under NRS 52.015 applies. The exclusion of the 2017 records and related expert testimony was error, as was the exclusion of medical lien evidence based on a misapplication of the collateral source rule. The court found the defendant’s disclosure error to be harmless and directed that a new trial be held. The awards of attorney fees and costs were vacated. View "GUTIERREZ-ZACATENCO VS. HERRERA" on Justia Law

The appellant was involved in an incident at a fast food restaurant in North Las Vegas. After waiting in the drive-through line and becoming frustrated, she blocked the exit of another vehicle, engaged in a verbal altercation, and subsequently drove her car in a manner that struck two patrons, causing them serious injuries. Despite bystanders’ attempts to stop her, she backed up and ran over one victim again, then fled the scene and abandoned her vehicle. Police later located and arrested her, and she made incriminating statements regarding the victims. She was charged with two counts of attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon, two counts of battery with the use of a deadly weapon resulting in substantial bodily harm, and failure to stop at the scene of a crash involving injury.The case was heard before the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County. On the first day of trial, prior to jury selection, the appellant requested a bench trial and submitted a written waiver. The State objected, citing NRS 175.011(1), which requires the prosecutor’s consent for a jury trial waiver. The district court denied the motion, stating there is no absolute right to a bench trial. Following a jury trial, the appellant was found guilty on all charges. She appealed, arguing that the statute’s consent requirement violated the separation of powers doctrine, that the evidence was insufficient for conviction, and that cumulative error warranted reversal.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the appeal. It held that NRS 175.011(1) does not violate the separation of powers doctrine because the constitutional right to a jury trial applies to both the defendant and the State. The court also found substantial evidence supported the convictions and determined there was no cumulative error. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "Defalco v. The State of Nevada" on Justia Law

After being injured in a car accident caused by Andrew Clark, who was driving a vehicle owned by his mother Tracy Clark, Nadia Marin sued Andrew for negligence and Tracy for negligent entrustment. Marin suffered multiple injuries and eventually was diagnosed with complex regional pain syndrome after undergoing extensive medical treatment and surgeries. Before trial, Marin made a $2 million offer of judgment, which the Clarks did not accept. At trial, the Clarks conceded liability, and the jury was left to determine damages, ultimately awarding Marin over $2 million.In the Eighth Judicial District Court, the Clarks challenged the outcome on several grounds. They argued that the court did not allocate enough trial time for their defense, improperly allowed Marin to withdraw deemed admissions, and issued an unsupported jury instruction. The Clarks also moved for a new trial on the basis of alleged attorney misconduct. The district court denied their motion for a new trial, upheld the jury verdict, and awarded Marin expert and attorney fees, including the full amount of her contingency fee agreement. The court also granted Marin’s motion to assign the Clarks’ claims against their insurer to her in execution of the judgment.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s judgment, denial of a new trial, award of expert fees, and the assignment of the Clarks’ claims against their insurer. The court concluded that the Clarks had a meaningful opportunity to present their defense and that the district court had not abused its discretion regarding the deemed admissions, jury instructions, or expert fee award. However, the Supreme Court reversed the attorney fee award, holding that post-offer attorney fees under NRCP 68 must be limited to work performed after the offer of judgment, not the entire contingency fee. The court remanded for reconsideration of attorney fees consistent with this clarification and overruled prior precedent to the extent it was inconsistent. View "Clark v. Marin" on Justia Law

A 12-year-old girl was sexually assaulted in her bedroom while living with her parents and half-brother, A.S., who was 21 at the time. The victim identified her father, who stayed in a guest house but had access to the main home, as the perpetrator. The father maintained his innocence and pursued a defense theory that A.S., the victim’s half-brother, was the true perpetrator. To support this alternative-suspect defense, the father sought access to juvenile records showing that A.S. had previously committed a similar sexual offense against a stepsibling when he was a minor.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, initially agreed to review A.S.’s juvenile records in camera to determine if any should be disclosed. However, after several judicial transfers, the second judge reviewed the records and summarily found nothing relevant or material, denying their release. A subsequent motion to reconsider was also denied by a third judge, who did not review the records. At trial, evidence of A.S.’s prior offense was excluded, and the jury convicted the father on all charges of sexual assault with a minor under 14 and lewdness with a child under 14. The defense’s alternative suspect theory was presented to the jury, but without the excluded evidence of A.S.’s prior misconduct.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the case and held that the district court abused its discretion by finding A.S.’s prior sexual offense irrelevant. The Supreme Court found that this evidence was relevant to the defense’s alternative-suspect theory and that its exclusion was not harmless, as it foreclosed further investigation and may have affected the verdict. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Allen v. The State of Nevada" on Justia Law

Several trusts, including the Lytle Trust and September Trust, own homes in a subdivision governed by a property owners association. After the Lytle Trust secured judgments against the association, it attempted to collect from other property owners by recording abstracts of judgment against their homes. September Trust and other property owners sued for declaratory and injunctive relief, resulting in the court striking the abstracts and enjoining the Lytles from enforcing their judgments against the homes. The Lytles later sought to collect through a receivership, prompting September Trust to seek contempt sanctions. The court found the Lytles violated the injunction and held them in contempt, awarding attorney fees to September Trust for defending the contempt judgment.The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County awarded September Trust attorney fees for the contempt proceedings and for defending those awards on appeal. September Trust’s attorneys initially billed at rates of $260-$265 per hour, which the district court used in its first two fee awards. For the third fee award, September Trust requested fees at higher “market” rates, resulting in a substantial markup over the actual fees billed. The district court granted this request, awarding fees calculated at the higher rates.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the appeal. The court held that, under Nevada’s contempt statute (NRS 22.100(3)), attorney fees awarded as compensation for civil contempt must be both reasonable and actually incurred. For parties with private counsel working at an agreed-upon hourly rate, the actual billing arrangement is a significant, though not necessarily controlling, factor in determining the reasonable fee. Because September Trust did not demonstrate its attorneys charged discounted rates for public-spirited or noneconomic reasons, the court found the higher-than-billed rates unjustified. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s third fee award, remanding for recalculation at the rates actually billed, and affirmed the remainder of the order. View "LYTLE VS. SEPTEMBER TRUST, DATED MARCH 23, 1972" on Justia Law

An employee working as a forensic supervisor at a state mental health facility was terminated following an altercation with a patient. The employee challenged his termination, requesting a hearing before the State of Nevada, Department of Administration Personnel Commission. The hearing officer reinstated the employee and ordered back pay. The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) sought reconsideration by the hearing officer, arguing for application of a different standard, but the hearing officer reaffirmed the initial decision. DHHS then petitioned the Eighth Judicial District Court for judicial review and requested a stay of the reinstatement. The district court granted a stay and partially granted the petition, remanding the matter to the hearing officer to apply the client-abuse standard. After remand, the hearing officer affirmed the employee’s termination.Following the hearing officer’s decision, the employee sought reconsideration, which was denied. He then appealed to the Supreme Court of Nevada, which dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, instructing him to obtain a final district court judgment before appealing. Subsequently, the employee filed a second petition for judicial review (PJR II), challenging the agency’s determination and raising a jurisdictional argument about the prior district court proceedings. DHHS moved to dismiss PJR II, arguing it was defective for failing to name all required respondents. The district court denied the motion and ultimately denied PJR II on the merits.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the district court’s order. It held that strict compliance with statutory requirements is necessary to invoke district court jurisdiction for petitions for judicial review. Because the employee’s petition did not name all required parties in the caption as mandated by NRS 233B.130(2)(a), the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s order and remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "ROCHA VS. STATE" on Justia Law