Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After being injured in a car accident caused by Andrew Clark, who was driving a vehicle owned by his mother Tracy Clark, Nadia Marin sued Andrew for negligence and Tracy for negligent entrustment. Marin suffered multiple injuries and eventually was diagnosed with complex regional pain syndrome after undergoing extensive medical treatment and surgeries. Before trial, Marin made a $2 million offer of judgment, which the Clarks did not accept. At trial, the Clarks conceded liability, and the jury was left to determine damages, ultimately awarding Marin over $2 million.In the Eighth Judicial District Court, the Clarks challenged the outcome on several grounds. They argued that the court did not allocate enough trial time for their defense, improperly allowed Marin to withdraw deemed admissions, and issued an unsupported jury instruction. The Clarks also moved for a new trial on the basis of alleged attorney misconduct. The district court denied their motion for a new trial, upheld the jury verdict, and awarded Marin expert and attorney fees, including the full amount of her contingency fee agreement. The court also granted Marin’s motion to assign the Clarks’ claims against their insurer to her in execution of the judgment.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s judgment, denial of a new trial, award of expert fees, and the assignment of the Clarks’ claims against their insurer. The court concluded that the Clarks had a meaningful opportunity to present their defense and that the district court had not abused its discretion regarding the deemed admissions, jury instructions, or expert fee award. However, the Supreme Court reversed the attorney fee award, holding that post-offer attorney fees under NRCP 68 must be limited to work performed after the offer of judgment, not the entire contingency fee. The court remanded for reconsideration of attorney fees consistent with this clarification and overruled prior precedent to the extent it was inconsistent. View "Clark v. Marin" on Justia Law

A 12-year-old girl was sexually assaulted in her bedroom while living with her parents and half-brother, A.S., who was 21 at the time. The victim identified her father, who stayed in a guest house but had access to the main home, as the perpetrator. The father maintained his innocence and pursued a defense theory that A.S., the victim’s half-brother, was the true perpetrator. To support this alternative-suspect defense, the father sought access to juvenile records showing that A.S. had previously committed a similar sexual offense against a stepsibling when he was a minor.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, initially agreed to review A.S.’s juvenile records in camera to determine if any should be disclosed. However, after several judicial transfers, the second judge reviewed the records and summarily found nothing relevant or material, denying their release. A subsequent motion to reconsider was also denied by a third judge, who did not review the records. At trial, evidence of A.S.’s prior offense was excluded, and the jury convicted the father on all charges of sexual assault with a minor under 14 and lewdness with a child under 14. The defense’s alternative suspect theory was presented to the jury, but without the excluded evidence of A.S.’s prior misconduct.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the case and held that the district court abused its discretion by finding A.S.’s prior sexual offense irrelevant. The Supreme Court found that this evidence was relevant to the defense’s alternative-suspect theory and that its exclusion was not harmless, as it foreclosed further investigation and may have affected the verdict. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. View "Allen v. The State of Nevada" on Justia Law

Several trusts, including the Lytle Trust and September Trust, own homes in a subdivision governed by a property owners association. After the Lytle Trust secured judgments against the association, it attempted to collect from other property owners by recording abstracts of judgment against their homes. September Trust and other property owners sued for declaratory and injunctive relief, resulting in the court striking the abstracts and enjoining the Lytles from enforcing their judgments against the homes. The Lytles later sought to collect through a receivership, prompting September Trust to seek contempt sanctions. The court found the Lytles violated the injunction and held them in contempt, awarding attorney fees to September Trust for defending the contempt judgment.The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County awarded September Trust attorney fees for the contempt proceedings and for defending those awards on appeal. September Trust’s attorneys initially billed at rates of $260-$265 per hour, which the district court used in its first two fee awards. For the third fee award, September Trust requested fees at higher “market” rates, resulting in a substantial markup over the actual fees billed. The district court granted this request, awarding fees calculated at the higher rates.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the appeal. The court held that, under Nevada’s contempt statute (NRS 22.100(3)), attorney fees awarded as compensation for civil contempt must be both reasonable and actually incurred. For parties with private counsel working at an agreed-upon hourly rate, the actual billing arrangement is a significant, though not necessarily controlling, factor in determining the reasonable fee. Because September Trust did not demonstrate its attorneys charged discounted rates for public-spirited or noneconomic reasons, the court found the higher-than-billed rates unjustified. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s third fee award, remanding for recalculation at the rates actually billed, and affirmed the remainder of the order. View "LYTLE VS. SEPTEMBER TRUST, DATED MARCH 23, 1972" on Justia Law

An employee working as a forensic supervisor at a state mental health facility was terminated following an altercation with a patient. The employee challenged his termination, requesting a hearing before the State of Nevada, Department of Administration Personnel Commission. The hearing officer reinstated the employee and ordered back pay. The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) sought reconsideration by the hearing officer, arguing for application of a different standard, but the hearing officer reaffirmed the initial decision. DHHS then petitioned the Eighth Judicial District Court for judicial review and requested a stay of the reinstatement. The district court granted a stay and partially granted the petition, remanding the matter to the hearing officer to apply the client-abuse standard. After remand, the hearing officer affirmed the employee’s termination.Following the hearing officer’s decision, the employee sought reconsideration, which was denied. He then appealed to the Supreme Court of Nevada, which dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, instructing him to obtain a final district court judgment before appealing. Subsequently, the employee filed a second petition for judicial review (PJR II), challenging the agency’s determination and raising a jurisdictional argument about the prior district court proceedings. DHHS moved to dismiss PJR II, arguing it was defective for failing to name all required respondents. The district court denied the motion and ultimately denied PJR II on the merits.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the district court’s order. It held that strict compliance with statutory requirements is necessary to invoke district court jurisdiction for petitions for judicial review. Because the employee’s petition did not name all required parties in the caption as mandated by NRS 233B.130(2)(a), the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s order and remanded with instructions to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "ROCHA VS. STATE" on Justia Law

The appellant was on probation for a felony theft conviction when he was arrested and charged with battery constituting domestic violence resulting in substantial bodily harm. After his arrest, the Division of Parole and Probation filed a report recommending revocation of his probation. At a preliminary hearing in justice court on the new charge, the arresting officers testified and were cross-examined by the appellant regarding the circumstances of the alleged battery. The victim also testified, though her recollection was limited. The justice court found probable cause for the new charges.Afterward, the State argued in the Eighth Judicial District Court that probation should be revoked based on the probable cause finding and arrest report, without a formal hearing. The district court allowed briefing on the appellant’s right to confront witnesses at a revocation hearing. Ultimately, the court reviewed the preliminary hearing transcript, the police report, and other relevant documents but did not require the arresting officers to testify again at the revocation hearing. At that hearing, no witnesses were called, but the appellant submitted evidence and objected to the use of the police report and transcript, which the court overruled. The district court revoked probation and imposed the suspended sentence.The Nevada Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the district court erred by not expressly balancing the appellant’s confrontation rights under Anaya v. State. Upon further review, the Supreme Court of Nevada held that the district court did not abuse its discretion. The Supreme Court clarified that, because the appellant cross-examined the arresting officers at the preliminary hearing, the district court was not required to conduct the Anaya balancing test or secure additional live testimony. The Supreme Court affirmed the revocation, holding that due process was satisfied and a neutral and detached hearing body was provided. View "GARCIA VS. STATE" on Justia Law

Kasie Causey was charged with twelve counts of child abuse, neglect, or endangerment under Nevada law, based on twelve distinct videos she sent to the child’s purported father. Each video depicted Causey committing a different abusive act against her infant in various locations around her home over a span of several hours. After the father alerted police, Causey was arrested and prosecuted for each incident separately.At the preliminary hearing, the Las Vegas Justice Court merged the twelve counts into a single count, reasoning that child abuse is a continuing offense and that multiple acts should not result in multiple charges. Causey was then bound over to the Eighth Judicial District Court on only one count. The State sought to reinstate the dismissed counts by moving to file an information by affidavit in the district court, pursuant to NRS 173.035(2). The district court granted the motion, finding probable cause for all twelve counts and concluding the justice court committed an egregious error by treating child abuse as a continuing offense in this context.Causey petitioned the Supreme Court of Nevada for a writ of mandamus to vacate the district court’s order. The Supreme Court of Nevada clarified that under NRS 200.508, the proper unit of prosecution is each instance of causing a child pain or suffering, so child abuse may be charged either as a single continuing offense or as multiple violations based on distinct acts, depending on the circumstances and theory pleaded. The court also held that the State was permitted to file an information by affidavit after a discharge, regardless of the justice court’s reasoning. Ultimately, the Supreme Court of Nevada denied Causey’s petition, affirming the district court’s decision. View "CAUSEY VS. DIST. CT." on Justia Law

A man with a shellfish allergy suffered an anaphylactic reaction while dining at a Las Vegas restaurant. Emergency medical services from both a private ambulance company and the county fire department responded, provided CPR, administered epinephrine, and transported him to the hospital. Despite these efforts, the man went into cardiac arrest upon arrival at the hospital and died several days later. The decedent’s parents and estate brought negligence claims against multiple parties, including the ambulance company that provided emergency medical services.The Eighth Judicial District Court for Clark County was asked to dismiss the claims against the ambulance company. The company argued that, under Nevada law, the estate was required to submit a medical expert’s affidavit supporting their claims, because the allegations sounded in professional negligence. The district court denied the motion, finding that neither the ambulance company nor its emergency medical service providers fell under the statutory definition of “providers of health care” or “clinic” for purposes of Nevada’s medical professional negligence statutes, and thus no supporting affidavit was required. After an amended complaint and a renewed motion, the district court again denied dismissal.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the ambulance company’s petition for a writ of mandamus. The court held that emergency medical service providers are not included in the statutory definition of “provider of health care” under NRS 41A.017, and that an ambulance is not a “clinic” within the meaning of the statute. Therefore, the estate’s negligence claims were not subject to the affidavit requirement that applies to professional negligence actions against enumerated health care providers. The Supreme Court denied the petition, affirming the district court’s decision not to dismiss the claims. View "RBR MGMT., LLC VS. DIST. CT." on Justia Law

Two sisters became involved in a business dispute after one sister contributed $200,000 to the other for the purchase of four residential properties, expecting an equal share of profits from their rental or sale. The properties were titled solely in the recipient sister’s name, who later sold one and kept all proceeds. After attempts to secure her ownership interest failed, the contributing sister filed suit, asserting claims including breach of contract and unjust enrichment, seeking return of her investment and her share of profits.The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County initially entered a default against the defendant for failing to timely answer, but this was later set aside. As the trial approached, the defendant moved to exclude evidence of damages, arguing that the plaintiff had not provided an adequate computation of damages as required by NRCP 16.1. The court gave the plaintiff another chance to supplement her computation but she failed to comply in time. The court granted the motion to exclude all evidence of damages, then dismissed the complaint with prejudice, reasoning that without damages there was nothing left to litigate.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the case. The court held that the district court correctly required a computation of damages because the claims sought tangible, quantifiable losses. However, it found that by granting the motion to exclude all damages evidence—which resulted in dismissal with prejudice—the district court imposed a case-terminating sanction. Under Nevada law, before issuing such a sanction, the court must analyze the factors set out in Young v. Johnny Ribeiro Building, Inc. Because the district court failed to conduct this analysis, the Supreme Court vacated the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the required standards. View "ZHANG VS. ZHANG" on Justia Law

Several municipal court and deputy city marshals, represented by a police association, alleged that the City miscalculated their longevity pay, resulting in underpayment. The collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the police association and the City required a four-step grievance process culminating in arbitration for disputes about the CBA’s application or interpretation. The marshals submitted grievances claiming underpayment since 2013. The City argued that these grievances were untimely, as they were filed years after the alleged underpayment was or should have been discovered, and insisted on a bifurcated arbitration process to resolve timeliness before addressing the merits of the longevity pay issue. Additional grievances were filed and rejected by the City as untimely.The police association filed two complaints in the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, seeking declaratory relief: one to have the City pay alleged backpay and another to require the City to comply with the CBA’s arbitration provision and submit timeliness disputes to arbitration. The parties consolidated these actions, and the City moved for summary judgment. The district court granted the motion, accepting the City's interpretation that it could unilaterally reject grievances as untimely and dictate the arbitration format, and it ruled on the merits of the longevity pay dispute.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. It held that, unless a contract specifies otherwise, procedural questions such as timeliness and the format of arbitration are reserved for the arbitrator, not a party or the court. The City was not entitled to unilaterally decide the timeliness of grievances or require a bifurcated arbitration process. Further, since the longevity pay dispute was arbitrable, the district court should not have ruled on its merits. The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case. View "LAS VEGAS POLICE PROTECTIVE ASSOC. VS. CITY OF LAS VEGAS" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization was formed to privately fund, design, develop, and construct a state-of-the-art medical education building for a public university’s medical school in Nevada. The organization, established by a coalition of charitable foundations and individuals, entered into an agreement with the university and the Nevada System of Higher Education to manage the project using private donations. The arrangement included transferring land to the nonprofit, which would oversee construction and, upon completion, lease the facility back to the university for a nominal fee before transferring ownership outright. The nonprofit received federal and state property tax-exempt status and then applied to the Nevada Department of Taxation for a state sales and use tax exemption, initially as an educational organization, later clarifying it was seeking exemption as a charitable organization.The Nevada Department of Taxation denied the application, reasoning that the nonprofit did not meet the criteria for an educational organization and, under its interpretation of NRS 372.340, was ineligible as a charitable organization because it was a government contractor. The Nevada Tax Commission upheld this denial, and the Eighth Judicial District Court affirmed, agreeing with the Department’s reliance on NRS 372.340 to deny tax-exempt status.The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed and remanded, holding that the Department erred by failing to evaluate the application under the statutory criteria for charitable organizations in NRS 372.3261. The court clarified that NRS 372.340 does not disqualify otherwise-eligible charitable organizations from receiving tax-exempt status merely because they contract with the government. The court directed that the nonprofit qualifies for the sales and use tax exemption as a charitable organization and ordered the district court to instruct the Department to approve the application and issue a letter of exemption. View "NEV. HEALTH AND BIOSCIENCE ASSET CORP. VS. STATE" on Justia Law