Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A grand jury indicted Nathan Chasing Horse on several felonies, including charges related to sexual offenses against a minor. This case received significant public and media attention. During both the renewed grand jury proceedings and the criminal trial, the real name of "S. Doe," an alleged victim who was a minor at the time of the offenses, was repeatedly disclosed in open court and in publicly filed documents. As the trial began, the district court issued a decorum order asking the media not to publish the victim’s full name, then clarified orally that this was a mandatory prohibition. The district court threatened contempt for noncompliance and ultimately excluded the Las Vegas Review-Journal and its journalists from the courtroom when they refused to agree to the restriction.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada imposed these restrictions and removals. The Review-Journal sought emergency relief from the Supreme Court of Nevada, arguing that the orders constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint and violated their right of access to court proceedings. The district court justified its actions by citing Nevada statutes and Marsy's Law, although there was no evidence the victim had invoked these statutory protections, and the statutes themselves did not authorize prior restraint on the press.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada held that the district court manifestly abused its discretion by imposing a prior restraint on publication of the victim’s identity after that information was already public, and by excluding the journalists from the courtroom. The court found that the restrictions did not serve an interest of the highest order, were not narrowly tailored, and failed to apply evenhandedly. The Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus, vacating the district court’s restrictions and exclusion order. View "LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, INC VS. DIST. CT." on Justia Law

Pamela Whalen was injured when she tripped over a utility box in a community owned and maintained by Lennar Communities Nevada, LLC, and Greystone Nevada, LLC. Before the accident, Pamela had signed an amendment to a Purchase and Sale Agreement (PSA) to buy a home from Lennar, which included an arbitration clause. The injury occurred during a tour of the community, not on the property she purchased. Following the accident, Pamela sued Lennar for negligence.After Pamela filed her complaint, Lennar responded with an answer and demanded a jury trial. Both parties engaged in extensive discovery over 17 months, including multiple disclosures, written discovery, and three medical examinations of Pamela at Lennar’s request. Lennar did not assert its right to arbitrate until after this lengthy discovery process. When Pamela declined to stipulate to arbitration, Lennar filed a motion to compel arbitration based on the PSA. The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, denied Lennar’s motion, determining that the dispute fell outside the scope of the arbitration clause.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the case. The court held that the district court erred in interpreting the scope of the arbitration clause, as the PSA delegated questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator. However, the Supreme Court held that Lennar had waived its right to arbitrate by actively litigating the case for 17 months before seeking arbitration. The court found this conduct inconsistent with the right to arbitrate and prejudicial to Pamela, especially given the discovery obtained that might not have been available in arbitration. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s order denying the motion to compel arbitration, albeit on the grounds of waiver rather than contract interpretation. View "LENNAR COMM. NEV., LLC VS. WHALEN" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was convicted of attempted residential burglary. The district court suspended her sentence and placed her on probation, requiring her to complete a specialty mental health court program and pay $800 in restitution. She successfully finished the mental health court program, and the specialty court found she could not pay fines and fees due to economic hardship, waiving those amounts. However, she did not pay the restitution ordered as a condition of her probation.After her program completion, she moved the district court to set aside her conviction pursuant to Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) 176A.260(6)(a), arguing that her economic hardship should excuse her failure to pay restitution. The State opposed, contending that fulfillment of all probation conditions—including restitution—was a prerequisite for setting aside the conviction. The district court denied her motion, reasoning that she had not satisfied all probation terms due to the unpaid restitution, and subsequently dishonorably discharged her from probation.On review, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada considered whether economic hardship excusing a probation violation for nonpayment of restitution under NRS 176A.430(6) also excuses the failure to fulfill the restitution condition for purposes of setting aside a conviction under NRS 176A.260(6)(a). The Supreme Court held that economic hardship does not excuse the obligation to pay restitution for purposes of setting aside the conviction; thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to set aside the judgment. However, the Supreme Court determined that economic hardship does entitle a probationer to an honorable discharge under NRS 176A.850(1), and the district court acted arbitrarily by issuing a dishonorable discharge. The Supreme Court granted mandamus in part, directing the district court to vacate the dishonorable discharge and issue an honorable discharge. View "ENGLE VS. DIST. CT." on Justia Law

An elderly man named Cornelius Hoffmans, suffering from memory problems, developed a close relationship with the appellant after meeting her at a charity event. Over several years, Hoffmans gave her significant sums of money, purchased a house naming both as joint tenants, and later transferred his interest in the property to her without compensation. The two entered into a domestic partnership, which Hoffmans believed was a step toward marriage, although he was unaware of her sexual orientation and other relationships. Hoffmans’ sons discovered these transactions and, concerned about his wellbeing, initiated a civil action that resulted in the annulment of the partnership, revocation of her power of attorney, and the transfer of contested property to Hoffmans’ sons.Following an investigation, the State charged the appellant with multiple counts of exploitation of an older or vulnerable person, theft, and fraudulent use of a credit card. The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, presided over a jury trial, which resulted in convictions on five counts of exploitation, three counts of theft, and one count of fraudulent use of a credit card, with acquittals on other counts. The appellant raised several issues on appeal, including improper jury instructions, evidentiary errors, statute of limitations challenges, and the appropriate unit of prosecution under the elder exploitation statute.The Supreme Court of Nevada held that the statutory definition of exploitation was ambiguous, and, applying the rule of lenity, determined that the unit of prosecution is one count per victim, not per act. Although the court found error in charging multiple counts of exploitation, it concluded the error was not plain under existing law and did not independently warrant reversal. However, the court found reversible error in the admission of evidence about the appellant’s misuse of charitable funds and the issuance of an erroneous jury instruction regarding undue influence. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the judgment of conviction on all counts and remanded for a new trial. View "SMITH VS. STATE" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted after a jury trial of attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon, domestic battery with use of a deadly weapon resulting in substantial bodily harm, and battery with use of a deadly weapon. These charges stemmed from an incident in which the appellant shot his ex-fiancée and struck his landlord with a gun following an altercation in his landlord’s trailer. The appellant did not testify at trial, but his theory of defense was that he acted in self-defense, relying on evidence of his own injuries and the circumstances surrounding the confrontation. He sought to introduce evidence of two prior occasions when the victim had allegedly stabbed him, arguing that this was relevant to his state of mind and the reasonableness of his belief that he needed to defend himself.The Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County, denied the appellant’s efforts to admit evidence about the prior stabbings and related text messages, ruling that such evidence was inadmissible to show the appellant’s state of mind. The trial court, however, did instruct the jury on self-defense. The jury convicted the appellant on all counts.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada concluded that the district court erred by excluding evidence of the victim’s prior specific violent acts known to the appellant, as such evidence was admissible to show the appellant’s state of mind regarding self-defense, even if the appellant did not testify. The court also held that the district court abused its discretion by preventing cross-examination and authentication of text messages about the prior stabbing. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of Nevada ruled that these errors were harmless due to the overwhelming evidence of guilt, and it found the appellant’s other arguments unpersuasive. The court affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "CHABOT VS. STATE" on Justia Law

A union member employed by a county juvenile justice agency was terminated after it was discovered that he had failed to disclose instances of prior disciplinary actions related to his behavior with residents at a previous job in another county. During a background check required by the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA), the county learned that the employee had misrepresented the circumstances of his departure from his earlier position, specifically omitting that he resigned while under investigation for inappropriate conduct. Based on PREA regulations, which mandate termination for material omissions regarding such misconduct, the county dismissed the employee.Following his termination, the union initiated a grievance on his behalf under the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with the county, which allows for arbitration of certain employment disputes. When the county denied the grievance, the union sought arbitration. The county then moved in the Eighth Judicial District Court to stay arbitration, arguing that terminations pursuant to PREA regulations were not subject to arbitration under the CBA. The district court agreed, determining that the arbitration clause was narrow and applied only to disciplinary actions defined as “corrective actions” intended to help an employee overcome deficiencies related to behavior or performance, not to terminations required by federal regulation.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the matter and affirmed the district court’s order granting the motion to stay arbitration. The court held that the arbitration clause in the CBA was narrow and could not be interpreted to cover the termination at issue, as the action was implemented pursuant to federal regulation, not as a corrective measure for employee improvement. The Supreme Court of Nevada did not address the merits of the termination, only its arbitrability under the CBA. View "JUVENILE JUSTICE PROB. OFFICERS ASSOC. VS. CLARK CNTY." on Justia Law

A nonprofit religious organization in Nevada, which owns and manages a temple, is governed by bylaws and led by an elected Management Committee. Certain general members, who previously served on the Management Committee, alleged that current management breached the organization’s bylaws. Specifically, they claimed that management formed unauthorized committees to transfer temple property into a trust without proper member approval, failed to issue membership cards and maintain records, and denied access to inspect corporate records. The members sought declaratory relief and alleged violations under Nevada corporate law.The case was first brought in the Second Judicial District Court of the State of Nevada. Management moved to dismiss, arguing that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, which generally prohibits civil courts from resolving internal church disputes involving doctrine, governance, or religious law. The district court denied the motion, concluding that the claims could be resolved using neutral legal principles without delving into religious doctrine or practice.Petitioners then sought a writ of prohibition or mandamus from the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, challenging the district court’s jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Nevada clarified that, while the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine restricts judicial intervention in religious disputes, an exception exists when courts can resolve a matter using neutral principles of law that do not require interpretation of religious doctrine, practices, or texts. The court held that this neutral-principles exception is not limited to property disputes but may apply to other matters, including corporate governance, so long as no ecclesiastical issues are implicated. Finding that the allegations in the complaint were secular and could be adjudicated on that basis, the Supreme Court denied the petition and affirmed that the district court could proceed. View "SINGH VS. DIST. CT." on Justia Law

A video showing a Clark County School District police officer forcefully detaining a juvenile outside a Las Vegas high school prompted public concern. The American Civil Liberties Union of Nevada requested records related to the incident from the school district. In response, the district provided only limited information, citing statutory privileges and ongoing internal investigations as grounds for withholding additional documents. The ACLU reiterated its request, seeking a detailed privilege log and specific justifications for each withheld record.After the school district produced a privilege log and maintained that certain records were exempt due to their role in an ongoing employment investigation, the ACLU filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County. Following briefing and a hearing, the district court ordered disclosure of certain records, such as body-worn camera footage, an incident report, and a dispatch log, with redactions. However, the court held that the internal affairs investigation report and the bulk of the investigative file were confidential under Nevada law and not subject to disclosure. The ACLU appealed this ruling.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the case. It interpreted the Nevada Public Records Act and NRS 289.080, concluding that an internal investigative file about a peace officer is confidential and exempt from public disclosure unless the investigating agency recommends punitive action against the officer. The Court reasoned that releasing records to the public when the subject officer does not have access would be illogical and inconsistent with legislative intent. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that such investigative files are exempt from disclosure to the same extent that their disclosure is barred under NRS 289.080. View "AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION OF NEV. VS. CLARK CNTY. SCHOOL DIST." on Justia Law

The decedent, a resident of Lyon County, Nevada, died intestate, leaving an estate valued at approximately $32 million. He was predeceased by his wife and had no children. The Lyon County Public Administrator identified the decedent’s living first cousins as potential heirs and petitioned the district court for an order confirming them as the legal heirs. Jamie Lipson, the child of one of the decedent’s predeceased first cousins (a first cousin once removed), contested this determination. Lipson argued that Nevada law should permit her and similarly situated relatives to inherit by right of representation, which would include more remote relatives in the distribution of the estate.The Third Judicial District Court of Lyon County determined that NRS 134.070 required distribution to the “next of kin in equal degree” on a per capita without representation basis. The court concluded that only the decedent’s living first cousins were entitled to inherit, thereby excluding Lipson and other first cousins once removed. The district court based its decision on the statutory language and longstanding state precedent, namely In re McKay’s Estate, which interpreted similar language as requiring per capita distribution.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the statutory interpretation de novo. The court held that NRS 134.070 unambiguously requires a per capita without representation distribution scheme. This means only those relatives of equal degree—the living first cousins—inherit equally, to the exclusion of more distant relatives such as first cousins once removed. The court reaffirmed the continuing validity of In re McKay’s Estate and found no compelling reason to depart from precedent or apply a per stirpes distribution. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s order, upholding the exclusion of more remote kin from inheritance under the statute. View "In re Estate of Ulvang" on Justia Law

An experienced sports bettor placed two winning wagers—one boxed exacta and one boxed trifecta—on the 2019 Kentucky Derby at a nonpari-mutuel sports book operated by William Hill in Reno, Nevada. The sports book had house rules capping payouts for these wager types at 150-to-1 for exacta and 500-to-1 for trifecta, significantly lower than the full track odds. Multiple signs and betting sheets at the location indicated these limits, but the bettor claimed not to have seen the notices and argued he was entitled to full track odds.After William Hill denied the full track odds payout, the bettor filed a complaint with the Nevada Gaming Control Board. A Board agent investigated and found the signage at the sports book sufficiently disclosed the limited odds. The Board affirmed this finding after a hearing, concluding the signs were conspicuous and provided adequate notice. The bettor then petitioned the Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County, for judicial review. The district court upheld the Board’s determination, finding it supported by evidence and not arbitrary or capricious.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the district court’s affirmance of the Board’s decision. Applying a deferential standard of review, the court held that the Board’s findings were supported by evidence in the record, including the signage and house rules. The court further concluded that the Board’s decision was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law, as it properly applied gaming regulations and contract principles. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the judgment, holding that the house rules, conspicuously displayed, controlled the payout terms of the bettor’s wagers, regardless of his actual knowledge. View "FRIEDLANDER VS. TAMARACK JUNCTION RACE & SPORTS BOOK" on Justia Law