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Exposure to a hazard can be demonstrated by facts establishing that exposure to the hazard is reasonably predictable. Appellant in this case argued that the Nevada Occupational Safety and Health Administration (NOSHA) improperly cited it for violating 29 C.F.R. 1910.132(f), which requires employers to provide training regarding the use of personal protective equipment to employees exposed to hazards requiring the use of such equipment. Specifically, Appellant argued that it was improperly cited for a violation because no facts established that its employees were actually exposed to such a hazard in the course of their work or were required to have fall protection training. The Nevada Occupational Safety and Health Review Board upheld NOSHA’s citation. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) when a statute or regulation requires NOSHA to establish employee exposure to a hazard, the Board’s decision regarding a NOSHA citation may be upheld if NOSHA presents substantial evidence demonstrating that exposure to the hazard was or would be reasonably predictable; and (2) the Board in this case relied on an incorrect standard in evaluating the citation. View "Sierra Packaging & Converting, LLC v. Chief Administrative Officer of Occupational Safety & Health Administration" on Justia Law

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Judicial marshals are “peace officers” within the meaning of Nev. Rev. Stat. 289.040, 289.057 and 298.060, which provisions are intended to provide job-related protections to peace officers employed by law enforcement agencies, but the Eighth Judicial District Court (EJDC) is not a “law enforcement agency” as statutorily defined. Appellant, who was employed by the EJDC first as a bailiff and then as an administrative marshal, was terminated for misconduct. According to the terms of a written memorandum of understanding between the Clark County Marshal’s Union and the EJDC, Appellant’s appeal resulted in arbitration. The arbitrator upheld the EJDC’s decision to terminate Appellant. Appellant petitioned the district court to set aside the arbitrator’s decision, arguing that the EJDC violated his statutory rights under Nev. Rev. Stat. Chapter 289 by disclosing and relying upon his prior disciplinary history as justification for his termination. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the provisions of Chapter 289 in this case did not apply to Appellant; and (2) Appellant failed to demonstrate that the arbitrator either exceeded his authority or manifestly disregarded the law. View "Knickmeyer v. State" on Justia Law

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Defense counsel’s affirmative misrepresentation regarding filing a postconviction petition and subsequent abandonment of Petitioner can be an impediment external to the defense to satisfy cause of the delay under Nev. Rev. Stat. 34.726(1)(a) for filing an untimely petition. Petitioner filed an untimely postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus stemming from his conviction of battery with the use of a deadly weapon resulting in substantial bodily harm. Petitioner stated that he had good cause for the delay in filing his petition because he believed his counsel had filed a petition on his behalf, his belief was reasonable, and he filed the petition within a reasonable time of discovering his petition had not been filed. The district court dismissed the petition as time-barred. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for further proceedings, holding (1) to demonstrate good cause for the delay in filing an untimely petition, a petitioner must show four factors; and (2) Petitioner demonstrated good cause for his delay under this test. View "Harris v. State" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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The Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus filed by Petitioner, the City of Las Vegas challenging an appellate court’s review of unpreserved trial error, holding that the district court, acting in its appellate capacity, considered an unpreserved claim but ignored the clear record and speculated as to facts that could demonstrate error. After the municipal court found Steven Kamide guilty of domestic battery and simple battery, Kamide appealed, alleging for the first time a violation of the witness exclusion rule, Nev. Rev. Stat. 50.155(1). The district court found that the rule had been violated and concluded that prejudice had to be presumed because the record did not clearly show the absence of prejudice. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s reversal of Kamide’s convictions, holding that the district court arbitrarily and capriciously exercised its discretion under the plain error rule to consider an issue that was not preserved for appeal. View "City of Las Vegas v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court’s judgment convicting Appellant of four counts of sexual assault, eight counts of open or gross lewdness, and one count of indecent exposure. The convictions stemmed from accusations that Appellant used his position as a certified nursing assistant to take advantage of multiple patients in his care. The court held (1) under the circumstances of this case, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the State’s motion to join the offenses under the theory that they were committed pursuant to a common scheme or plan under Nev. Rev. Stat. 173.115(2); and (2) Appellant’s rights under state and federal law were not violated before trial, during trial, or at sentencing. View "Farmer v. State" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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At issue was whether, under the statutory definitions existing in 2012, the offense of statutory sexual seduction is a lesser-included offense of sexual assault when that offense is committed against a minor under fourteen years old. In applying the elements test, the Supreme Court determined (1) a statutory element that serves only to determine the appropriate sentence for an offense but has no bearing as to the guilt for the offense is an element of the offense for purposes of a lesser-included-offense analysis; and (2) the elements of only one of the alternative means need be included in the greater, charged offense so that the defendant is entitled to an instruction on the lesser offense. Applying the above principles to the statutes at issue, the Supreme Court held (1) statutory sexual section, as defined in Neb. Rev. Stat. 200.364(5)(a), is not a lesser-included offense of sexual assault even where the victim is a minor, Neb. Rev. Stat. 200.366(1), because statutory sexual seduction contains an element not included in the greater offense; and (2) the district court did not err in refusing to give a lesser-included-offense instruction on statutory sexual seduction in this case. View "Alotaibi v. State" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the judgment on a jury’s negligence verdict awarding past and future medical damages to a former middle school student who sustained an eye injury during his physical education class. On appeal, Appellant-school district argued that the judgment should be reversed because (1) the implied assumption of risk doctrine barred Respondent’s claims; (2) Respondent’s claims should have been dismissed under the discretionary-function immunity doctrine; and (3) the evidence did not support a finding of proximate cause. The Supreme Court held (1) the implied assumption of risk doctrine did not apply in this case; (2) the doctrine of discretionary-function immunity applied to the school district’s decisions to add floor hockey as a unit of the physical education curriculum and to not provide safety equipment, but the school district was not immune for liability for allegedly negligent administration, instruction and supervision of the floor hockey class; and (3) Respondent failed, as a matter of law, to provide sufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding of proximate cause, and therefore, his negligence claim failed. View "Clark County School District v. Payo" on Justia Law

Posted in: Personal Injury

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The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded a district court order dismissing a complaint against a medical treatment center for failure to attach a medical expert affidavit pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 41A.071. On appeal, Appellant argued that the district court erred in dismissing his complaint because his claims were based in ordinary negligence and not medical malpractice, as determined by the district court, and therefore, an affidavit was not required. The Supreme Court held (1) Appellant’s claims for negligence, malpractice, gross negligence, negligence per se, and negligent hiring, training, and supervision were not for medical malpractice and should not have been dismissed for failure to attach the section 41A.071 affidavit; and (2) Appellant’s claim for professional negligence sounded in medical malpractice and was properly dismissed for failure to attach a medical expert affidavit. View "Szymborski v. Spring Mountain Treatment Center" on Justia Law

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A parent cannot be compelled to admit to a criminal act in order to maintain his or her parental rights. Appellant was required to admit to a crime for her to be considered in compliance with her case plan. The district court eventually terminated Appellant’s parental rights. On appeal, Appellant argued that terminating her parental rights on the sole basis that she refused to admit that she intentionally harmed her child violated her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding (1) the district court’s termination of Appellant’s parental rights constituted a violation of her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination; and (2) there was not substantial evidence supporting the district court’s findings of parental fault and that termination of Appellant’s parental rights was in the best interests of her children. View "In re Parental Rights as to A.D.L." on Justia Law

Posted in: Family Law

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When the Supreme Court reverses a death sentence on direct appeal and remands for a new penalty hearing, there is no longer a final judgment that triggers the one-year period set forth in Nev. Rev. Stat. 34.726(1) for filing a postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Appellant was convicted of multiple counts of first-degree murder and sentenced to death. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court reversed Appellant’s death sentences and remanded with instructions for the district court to conduct a new penalty hearing. On remand, the jury returned death sentences for the murder convictions, and the district court entered a judgment of conviction setting forth the death sentences. On direct appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment. Within one year after remittitur issued from that decision, Appellant filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his convictions and death sentences. The district court denied Appellant’s petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Appellant’s petition was timely filed; and (2) the district court did not err in denying the petition on the merits. View "Johnson v. State" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law