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In this appeal and cross-appeal from a final judgment in an action arising from the purchase of real property, the Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court, holding that Nevada law has not recognized implied restrictive covenants based on a common development scheme, and the Court declines to adopt the doctrine based on the record. Appellant purchased a residential lot adjoining Respondent’s residential lot (the Lot). The Lot also adjoined a golf course and included a small parcel of land that had previously been an out-of-bounds area between the golf course and the property. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s determination that Appellant cannot maintain an implied restrictive covenant upon the out-of-bounds parcel because the Court declines to recognize implied restrictive easements; (2) reversed the judgment of the district court that Appellant waived any claims it may have had against a real estate company, real estate agent, and developer for misrepresentations or failure to disclose information in the purchase process of the property; and (3) reversed the award of attorney fees and costs. View "Rosenberg Living Trust v. MacDonald Highlands Realty" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction for larceny from the person stemming from his act of stealing a cell phone from a woman sitting next to him at a bus stop, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction even where the woman voluntarily handed Defendant her phone. On appeal, Defendant argued that he did not take the phone “from the person of another, without [her] consent,” and therefore, the State failed to prove its case. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that the evidence was sufficient to support the conviction where the State provided evidence that Defendant asked to borrow the woman’s cell phone with the ulterior motive of stealing it, that when the woman extended her arm to hand Defendant her phone, Defendant grabbed it from her, and that after the woman stood to follow Defendant, and he ran. View "Ibarra v. State" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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In this workers’ compensation case, the Supreme Court affirmed summary judgment in favor of Employer, holding that an injury arising from Employer’s failure to provide medical assistance to Employee suffering a stroke arose out of and in the course of the employment, and therefore, Employee’s sole remedy for the injury was workers’ compensation. Employee sued Employer for failure to aid him during the “golden window” of diagnostic and treatment opportunity when he was suffering a stroke. The district court granted summary judgment for Employer, concluding that Employee’s exclusive remedy was workers’ compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Employee’s exclusive remedy against Employer was workers’ compensation because his injuries occurred in the course of his employment and arose out of his employment. View "Baiguen v. Harrah’s Las Vegas, LLC" on Justia Law

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In this quiet title dispute between the buyer at a homeowners association (HOA) lien foreclosure sale and the holder of the first deed of trust on the subject property, the Supreme Court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the buyer of the property, holding that the buyer took title subject to the first deed of trust. Following the HOA lien foreclosure sale, the district court denied summary judgment to the first deed of trust holder in this quiet title action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a first deed of trust holder’s unconditional tender of the superpriority amount due results in the buyer at foreclosure taking the property subject to the deed of trust. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court declining to enforce a no-contest clause of a 1972 Trust against Respondent, a trustee-beneficiary, holding that a trust beneficiary does not forfeit interest in the trust’s assets pursuant to a no-contest clause penalty by breaching her fiduciary duties while acting in her dual capacity as trustee. The district court found that Respondent violated her fiduciary duties as trustee of the 1972 Trust but determined that her acts as trustee did not warrant imposition of the Trust’s no-contest clause to revoke her beneficiary status. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that no-contest clauses do not apply to foreclosure beneficiary interests when the beneficiary, acting in a trustee capacity, breaches her fiduciary duty. View "Montoya v. Ahern" on Justia Law

Posted in: Trusts & Estates

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The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s determination that Appellant’s deed of trust was extinguished by a valid foreclosure sale, holding that the district court properly concluded that the foreclosure sale should not be invalidated on equitable grounds, the sale did not constitute a fraudulent transfer, and the foreclosure should not be invalidated due to an irregularity in the foreclosure deed. The case concerned the competing rights to property that was purchased at a homeowners’ association foreclosure sale. Appellant was the beneficiary of a deed of trust on that property at the time of the sale. Respondent was the winning bidder at the sale. After a bench trial to determine whether Respondent or Appellant had superior title to the property, the district court quieted title in favor of Respondent, holding that Appellant’s deed of trust was extinguished pursuant to SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 334 P.3d 408 (Nev. 2014). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was no unfairness or irregularity in the foreclosure process, and therefore, the district court correctly rejected Appellant’s equitable argument; (2) the foreclosure sale did not constitute a fraudulent transfer under the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act; and (3) an irregularity in the foreclosure deed upon sale does not invalidate the foreclosure as a whole. View "Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Radecki" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction under Nev. Rev. Stat. 205.067 of home invasion, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury and that the sentence was constitutional. Defendant’s was convicted of home invasion for entering his wife’s second home. The district court sentenced him to a maximum term of ninety-six months in prison. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the district court abused its discretion in refusing his proposed jury instruction defining the word “resides” as used in the definition of “inhabited dwelling” in Nevada’s home invasion statute, Nev. Rev. Stat. 205.067(5)(b) as requiring the “owner or other lawful occupant” to dwell permanently or continuously. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an owner need not permanently or continuously dwell in a house for the house to be an inhabited dwelling; and (2) Defendant’s sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. View "Dunham v. State" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law

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The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court to deny Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence discovered during a search of his bedroom after Defendant’s mother opened his locked bedroom door while a law enforcement officer stood nearby, holding that the mother’s decision to open Defendant’s locked bedroom door was private conduct to which the Fourth Amendment’s protections were inapplicable. In the presence of a sheriff’s deputy but without the deputy’s request that she open the door or suggestion that he wanted to see inside the bedroom, Defendant’s mother opened Defendant’s locked bedroom door. The deputy saw firearms and bomb-making materials inside the room once the door was open. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant’s mother’s actions were insufficiently connected or related to governmental action to implicate the protections of the Fourth Amendment. View "Mooney v. State" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that law enforcement officers cannot justify a warrantless search of a bedroom inside a home by relying on the consent of a third party when the third party did not have authority to consent and the officers have little to no information about that third party’s authority over the bedroom. At issue in this appeal was whether law enforcement officers cannot rely on the consent of a third party to search a room within a residence without making sufficient inquiries about the parties’ living arrangements within that residence before conducting a warrantless search. The Supreme Court answered in the negative, holding that the district court erred in denying part Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the illegal entry in this case and that the error was not harmless. The Court further directed law enforcement to gather sufficient information about the living arrangements inside the home to establish an objectively reasonable belief that the third party has authority to consent to a search before proceeding with that search without a warrant. View "Lastine v. State" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that district court cannot deny attorney fees otherwise allowed by agreement, rule, or statute because a lawyer representing a client on a contingency fee basis does not provide proof of hourly billing records. Plaintiff sought an attorney fees award under Nev. R. Civ. P. 68 after suing Defendant for negligence after she tripped and fell on Defendant’s property. Plaintiff requested $96,000 in attorney fees, which she calculated as forty percent of the reduced judgment amount based on a forty-percent contingency fee agreement with her attorneys. The district court denied her request because, in part, Plaintiff did not submit hourly billing records of the work performed by her counsel to show that the requested fee was reasonable. The Supreme Court reversed the denial of Plaintiff’s request for attorney fees and remanded for a full hearing on the request, holding (1) a lawyer who represents a client on a contingency fee basis need not submit hourly billing records before he or she can be awarded attorney fees; and (2) the district court improperly analyzed certain factors set forth in Beattie v. Thomas, 668 P.2d 268, 274 (Nev. 1983) in otherwise denying Plaintiff’s fees request. View "O’Connell v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC" on Justia Law

Posted in: Personal Injury