Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The appellant was the caretaker for an elderly man, Lawrence Turner, and lived with him in the same trailer. Over a period of about 15 months, the caretaker withdrew a total of $76,880 from Turner’s bank account through 120 transactions, using the money for gambling rather than Turner’s care. Turner’s health deteriorated significantly during this period, culminating in a severe, life-threatening ulcer and signs of neglect when paramedics responded to an emergency. The State charged the caretaker with 15 counts each of elder exploitation and theft, corresponding to each month of the alleged criminal activity, and one count of elder neglect.The case was first reviewed by the Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, where the State aggregated the theft and exploitation charges monthly. At trial, the jury convicted the caretaker on all counts, and the district court sentenced him to a lengthy prison term. The appellant timely appealed, raising several issues, including whether multiple counts for elder exploitation and theft were proper under Nevada law, whether jury instructions for elder neglect were accurate, and whether there was sufficient evidence for conviction.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada addressed these issues on appeal. It held that, under its recent decision in Smith v. State, the unit of prosecution for elder exploitation is one count per victim, and thus vacated 14 of the 15 elder exploitation convictions. With respect to theft, the court interpreted Nevada’s aggregation statute to permit only a single count for theft committed pursuant to a single scheme or continuous course of conduct, vacating 14 of the 15 theft convictions. The court found that errors in jury instructions for elder neglect were harmless given the overwhelming evidence of neglect and affirmed that conviction. The court affirmed the remaining elder exploitation and theft convictions and remanded for entry of an amended judgment. View "ROBINSON VS. STATE" on Justia Law

A driver caused a multi-vehicle collision in Las Vegas, during which he struck another vehicle’s trailer, triggering a chain reaction. After the crash, he remained at the scene for around 35 minutes, interacted with several Nevada Highway Patrol officers, provided his identifying information, and stayed until emergency personnel had arrived and begun treating the injured. He was not detained or told to stay by police, but left the scene after medical professionals took over care of the injured. Later, he was charged with reckless driving resulting in substantial bodily harm and violating the duty to stop at the scene of a crash involving personal injury.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, presided over a jury trial. The jury acquitted the driver of driving under the influence, but found him guilty of reckless driving resulting in substantial bodily harm and violating the duty to stop at the scene of a crash involving personal injury. The district court sentenced him to concurrent prison terms of two to five years for each conviction. The driver appealed both convictions, raising issues including sufficiency of the evidence, constitutionality of the statutes, prosecutorial misconduct, and exclusion of evidence.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case. It held that Nevada’s duty-to-stop statutes require a driver to stop, provide identification, and render reasonable assistance, but do not require the driver to remain until police formally dismiss them. The court found insufficient evidence to support the duty-to-stop conviction, concluding the driver fulfilled all statutory obligations before leaving. Therefore, it reversed the conviction for violating the duty to stop and affirmed the reckless driving conviction. The court remanded the case to the district court to consider all available sentencing options for reckless driving and to enter an amended judgment of conviction. View "CARTER VS STATE" on Justia Law

Two individuals were involved in a car accident, after which one party sued for damages, alleging a traumatic brain injury and seeking nearly $2 million. The parties agreed that the plaintiff would undergo a neuropsychological examination, but they disagreed on the terms governing the examination. The defendant argued that Nevada’s Rule of Civil Procedure 35 (NRCP 35) should control the process, while the plaintiff asserted that a new statute, NRS 629.620, provided additional rights and should apply.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada ruled that NRCP 35 governed the examination but imposed several conditions, including disclosure of raw test data to the plaintiff’s counsel (with restrictions), permitting non-neuropsychologist experts to review the data, allowing the exam to be audio recorded, and permitting the presence of a court-certified interpreter. The defendant sought reconsideration, which was denied, and then petitioned for extraordinary relief from the Nevada Supreme Court.The Supreme Court of Nevada held that NRS 629.620 is unconstitutional to the extent it governs discovery in civil litigation and conflicts with NRCP 35. The court found that NRCP 35 is a procedural rule within the judiciary’s domain, and legislative attempts to alter its operation via NRS 629.620 violate the separation of powers. Regarding the specific exam conditions, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by allowing disclosure of raw data to counsel with a protective order. However, it found the district court abused its discretion by permitting audio recording and the presence of an interpreter without a showing of good cause. The court granted the writ in part, directing the district court to modify those conditions, and denied relief as to the other challenged conditions. View "POWERS VS. DIST. CT." on Justia Law

A married couple who appeared on a reality television series operated a YouTube channel, while another individual and her husband operated a separate channel focused on reality TV gossip. The second channel discussed the couple and made several statements about them, some of which were highly negative and specific. The couple filed a lawsuit against the channel operators, alleging defamation and civil conspiracy based on these statements. Additional claims were made regarding comments about financial fraud, racist remarks, and accusations of criminal conduct and murder.The case was reviewed by the Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County, Nevada. After the couple amended their complaint, the defendants filed a special motion to dismiss under Nevada’s anti-SLAPP statutes. The district court granted the anti-SLAPP motion in its entirety, dismissing all claims, and subsequently awarded attorney fees to the defendants. The plaintiffs appealed both the dismissal and the fee award.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case. It clarified that under the anti-SLAPP analysis, courts must independently evaluate each alleged statement to determine whether it is protected communication. The Court held that the district court erred by dismissing the complaint entirely, as defendants had not met their burden under the first prong for four specific statements (involving allegations of financial fraud, racist conduct, and murder). For the remaining statements, the defendants met their burden, and the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a probability of prevailing. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the dismissal, remanding for further proceedings on the four unprotected statements, and reversed the attorney fee award, instructing the district court to reconsider fees based on partial success. View "ROSENBROOK VS. LLOYD C/W 85175" on Justia Law

The appellant was convicted in 2012 of attempted lewdness with a child under the age of 14. As a result, he was classified as a Tier II sex offender, requiring him to register as a sex offender for 25 years under Nevada law. After being honorably discharged from probation in 2016, he was placed under lifetime supervision as mandated for certain sex offenses. Twelve years after his conviction, he petitioned for release from lifetime supervision, claiming he had satisfied statutory requirements: he had complied with registration obligations, had not been convicted of a subsequent offense for over ten years, and was assessed as low risk to reoffend.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, reviewed the petition. The State opposed release, arguing that compliance with registration requirements under NRS 176.0931(3) required completion of the full 25-year registration period for Tier II offenders. The district court accepted this interpretation and denied the petition solely on the basis that the appellant had not completed his entire registration term.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the district court’s interpretation of the relevant statutes de novo. The Court held that compliance with sex offender registration requirements under NRS 176.0931(3) does not require completion of the full statutory registration period outlined in NRS 179D.490. Instead, eligibility for release from lifetime supervision depends on conformance to registration requirements up to the time of petitioning. The statutes are not mutually exclusive; registration obligations continue even after release from lifetime supervision. The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with this interpretation. View "DEL TORO VS STATE" on Justia Law

The case involved the shooting death of Jessica Griffin by Jesce Richt, who was convicted of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. Richt and Griffin had a turbulent relationship, which included a history of domestic violence, protective orders, and threats exchanged via text and calls. In the days leading up to Griffin’s death, Richt repeatedly contacted Griffin, followed her movements, and was recorded on surveillance video entering the garage of Griffin’s mother’s house immediately before Griffin was shot multiple times. No firearm was found with Griffin. Richt fled and was later apprehended and charged.The Second Judicial District Court in Washoe County presided over the trial. Richt did not dispute shooting Griffin but claimed he acted in self-defense, arguing that Griffin had threatened him and was armed. However, Richt did not testify, and no independent evidence was introduced to support the self-defense claim. The court excluded evidence of Griffin’s threats, gun ownership, and communications, ruling that Richt failed to lay a proper foundation for a self-defense theory. The jury found Richt guilty of murder, and he pleaded guilty to the firearm charge.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed Richt’s appeal. The court held that a defendant cannot present a self-defense theory based solely on evidence of a victim’s character; foundational evidence of self-defense must first be introduced by other means. The court found no abuse of discretion in the exclusion of the proffered evidence, the admission of lay testimony regarding GPS tracking, or the omission of a jury instruction about reconvening for sentencing. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed Richt’s conviction. View "RICHT VS. STATE" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Nathan Chasing Horse on several felonies, including charges related to sexual offenses against a minor. This case received significant public and media attention. During both the renewed grand jury proceedings and the criminal trial, the real name of "S. Doe," an alleged victim who was a minor at the time of the offenses, was repeatedly disclosed in open court and in publicly filed documents. As the trial began, the district court issued a decorum order asking the media not to publish the victim’s full name, then clarified orally that this was a mandatory prohibition. The district court threatened contempt for noncompliance and ultimately excluded the Las Vegas Review-Journal and its journalists from the courtroom when they refused to agree to the restriction.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada imposed these restrictions and removals. The Review-Journal sought emergency relief from the Supreme Court of Nevada, arguing that the orders constituted an unconstitutional prior restraint and violated their right of access to court proceedings. The district court justified its actions by citing Nevada statutes and Marsy's Law, although there was no evidence the victim had invoked these statutory protections, and the statutes themselves did not authorize prior restraint on the press.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada held that the district court manifestly abused its discretion by imposing a prior restraint on publication of the victim’s identity after that information was already public, and by excluding the journalists from the courtroom. The court found that the restrictions did not serve an interest of the highest order, were not narrowly tailored, and failed to apply evenhandedly. The Supreme Court granted the petition for a writ of mandamus, vacating the district court’s restrictions and exclusion order. View "LAS VEGAS REVIEW-JOURNAL, INC VS. DIST. CT." on Justia Law

Pamela Whalen was injured when she tripped over a utility box in a community owned and maintained by Lennar Communities Nevada, LLC, and Greystone Nevada, LLC. Before the accident, Pamela had signed an amendment to a Purchase and Sale Agreement (PSA) to buy a home from Lennar, which included an arbitration clause. The injury occurred during a tour of the community, not on the property she purchased. Following the accident, Pamela sued Lennar for negligence.After Pamela filed her complaint, Lennar responded with an answer and demanded a jury trial. Both parties engaged in extensive discovery over 17 months, including multiple disclosures, written discovery, and three medical examinations of Pamela at Lennar’s request. Lennar did not assert its right to arbitrate until after this lengthy discovery process. When Pamela declined to stipulate to arbitration, Lennar filed a motion to compel arbitration based on the PSA. The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, denied Lennar’s motion, determining that the dispute fell outside the scope of the arbitration clause.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reviewed the case. The court held that the district court erred in interpreting the scope of the arbitration clause, as the PSA delegated questions of arbitrability to the arbitrator. However, the Supreme Court held that Lennar had waived its right to arbitrate by actively litigating the case for 17 months before seeking arbitration. The court found this conduct inconsistent with the right to arbitrate and prejudicial to Pamela, especially given the discovery obtained that might not have been available in arbitration. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court’s order denying the motion to compel arbitration, albeit on the grounds of waiver rather than contract interpretation. View "LENNAR COMM. NEV., LLC VS. WHALEN" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who was convicted of attempted residential burglary. The district court suspended her sentence and placed her on probation, requiring her to complete a specialty mental health court program and pay $800 in restitution. She successfully finished the mental health court program, and the specialty court found she could not pay fines and fees due to economic hardship, waiving those amounts. However, she did not pay the restitution ordered as a condition of her probation.After her program completion, she moved the district court to set aside her conviction pursuant to Nevada Revised Statutes (NRS) 176A.260(6)(a), arguing that her economic hardship should excuse her failure to pay restitution. The State opposed, contending that fulfillment of all probation conditions—including restitution—was a prerequisite for setting aside the conviction. The district court denied her motion, reasoning that she had not satisfied all probation terms due to the unpaid restitution, and subsequently dishonorably discharged her from probation.On review, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada considered whether economic hardship excusing a probation violation for nonpayment of restitution under NRS 176A.430(6) also excuses the failure to fulfill the restitution condition for purposes of setting aside a conviction under NRS 176A.260(6)(a). The Supreme Court held that economic hardship does not excuse the obligation to pay restitution for purposes of setting aside the conviction; thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to set aside the judgment. However, the Supreme Court determined that economic hardship does entitle a probationer to an honorable discharge under NRS 176A.850(1), and the district court acted arbitrarily by issuing a dishonorable discharge. The Supreme Court granted mandamus in part, directing the district court to vacate the dishonorable discharge and issue an honorable discharge. View "ENGLE VS. DIST. CT." on Justia Law

An elderly man named Cornelius Hoffmans, suffering from memory problems, developed a close relationship with the appellant after meeting her at a charity event. Over several years, Hoffmans gave her significant sums of money, purchased a house naming both as joint tenants, and later transferred his interest in the property to her without compensation. The two entered into a domestic partnership, which Hoffmans believed was a step toward marriage, although he was unaware of her sexual orientation and other relationships. Hoffmans’ sons discovered these transactions and, concerned about his wellbeing, initiated a civil action that resulted in the annulment of the partnership, revocation of her power of attorney, and the transfer of contested property to Hoffmans’ sons.Following an investigation, the State charged the appellant with multiple counts of exploitation of an older or vulnerable person, theft, and fraudulent use of a credit card. The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, presided over a jury trial, which resulted in convictions on five counts of exploitation, three counts of theft, and one count of fraudulent use of a credit card, with acquittals on other counts. The appellant raised several issues on appeal, including improper jury instructions, evidentiary errors, statute of limitations challenges, and the appropriate unit of prosecution under the elder exploitation statute.The Supreme Court of Nevada held that the statutory definition of exploitation was ambiguous, and, applying the rule of lenity, determined that the unit of prosecution is one count per victim, not per act. Although the court found error in charging multiple counts of exploitation, it concluded the error was not plain under existing law and did not independently warrant reversal. However, the court found reversible error in the admission of evidence about the appellant’s misuse of charitable funds and the issuance of an erroneous jury instruction regarding undue influence. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the judgment of conviction on all counts and remanded for a new trial. View "SMITH VS. STATE" on Justia Law