Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the ruling of the district court that Appellant, a bank, did not comply with Nev. Rev. Stat. 17.214(3) in seeking to collect on a renewed judgment, holding that the district court did not err.In 2015, Appellant obtained a judgment against Respondents and recorded the judgment. Appellant later sued Respondents in a separate suit alleging that they fraudulently transferred assets to avoid liability. Because Appellant had not collected on the 2015 judgment, Appellant filed an affidavit of renewal of judgment, recorded the affidavit, and electronically served Respondents' counsel. Because Appellant notified Respondents by certified mail of the affidavit of renewal after the 2015 judgment expired Respondents moved to vacate the affidavit of renewal and declare the judgment void. The district court granted the motion, concluding that Appellant did not comply with Nev. Rev. Stat. 17.214(3). The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a judgment creditor must follow section 17.214(3) to renew a judgment and that a judgment creditor must strictly comply with section 17.214(3)'s certified mail method-of-notice requirement. View "BMO Harris Bank, N.A. v. Whittemore" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court determining that a deed of trust on real property continued to encumber the property, holding that there was no error.LV Debt Collect, which acquired title to the subject property in 2013, filed this quiet title action in 2016 seeking a declaration that a home homeowners' association's foreclosure sale extinguished Bank of New York Mellon's (BNYM) deed of trust and that LV Debt Collect held an unencumbered ownership interest in the property. The district court granted summary judgment for BNYM, determining that the deed of trust continued to encumber the property. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a loan secured by real property does not become "wholly due" for purposes of Nev. Rev. Stat. 106.240 when a notice of default is recorded as to the secured loan. View "LV Debt Collect, LLC v. Bank of N.Y. Mellon" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant in this foreclosure action, holding that the loan servicer timely commenced the action after the foreclosure sale and sufficiently demonstrated that a regulated entity under the Federal Housing Finance Agency's (FHFA) conservatorship owned the loan.Defendant purchased property at a foreclosure sale. Plaintiff JPMorgan Chase Bank filed a complaint seeking a declaration that the first deed of trust survived the sale and for quiet title. Plaintiff offered evidence that it was servicing the loan on behalf of Freddie Mac, which had previously been placed into an FHFA conservatorship and that the first deed of trust therefore survived under the Federal Foreclosure Bar. Applying a three-year limitations period, the district court entered summary judgment for Defendant, concluding that the foreclosure sale extinguished the deed of trust. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the claims underlying the action are best described as sounding in contract for purposes of the House and Economic Recovery Act statute of limitations, which provides for a six-year statute of limitations; and (2) the Federal Foreclosure Bar prevented the foreclosure sale from extinguishing gate first deed of trust, and therefore, Defendant took the property subject to that deed of trust. View "JPMorgan Chase Bank, National Ass'n v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the entire amount of a homeowners' association's (HOA) yearly assessment can be included in the superpriority piece of an HOA's lien under Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116 so long as the assessment became due in the nine months preceding the HOA's recording of its notice of delinquent assessments.When Homeowners did not pay their 2011 yearly assessment, the HOA, in April 2011, recorded a notice of lien for delinquent assessments. A Bank, the beneficiary of the first deed of trust on the property, requested the super priority amount from the HOA's foreclosure agent and then tendered to the foreclosure agent an amount representing nine out of twelve months of assessments. The HOA continued with the foreclosure sale, and Appellants purchased the property. Appellants filed a complaint seeking to quiet title to the property. The district court granted summary judgment for the Bank, concluding that the Bank's tender cured the default on the superpriority portion of the HOA's lien and that the foreclosure sale did not therefore extinguish the Bank's deed of trust. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that because the Bank did not tender the entire superpriority amount before the HOA foreclosed on its lien, the foreclosure sale extinguished the Bank's deed of trust on the property. View "Anthony S. Noonan IRA, LLC v. U.S. Bank National Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of U.S. Bank seeking to foreclose on a defaulted loan, holding that because U.S. Bank presented evidence to meet its burden to show that the original note was lost, it was entitled to enforce the note because the facts established that the action may proceed.U.S. Bank acquired the deed of trust secured by Appellant's residence and sought to foreclose on the defaulted loan. The original lender did not execute an assignment of the note to U.S. Bank when assigning the deed of trust to U.S. Bank. The loan servicer, however, swore an affidavit certifying that the note was lost. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of U.S. Bank. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because U.S. Bank showed by a preponderance of the evidence that it acquired ownership of the note from a party that had the right to enforce it, that the note was not lost as a result of a transfer or lawful seizure, and that the note could not be reasonably obtained, U.S. Bank satisfied the requirements of Nev. Rev. Stat. 104.3309 and was entitled to seek a judicial foreclosure on Appellant's default. View "Jones v. U.S. Bank National Ass'n" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the district court's judgment determining that a foreclosure sale extinguished a bank's deed of trust when an homeowner's association (HOA) agent told a deed of trust beneficiary's agent that it would reject a superpriority tender if made, holding that such a representation excludes the formal requirement of making a formal tender sufficient to preserve the first deed of trust under Bank of America, N.A. v. SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC, 427 P.3d 113 (2018).Here, the HOA told the deed of trust beneficiary that it would reject a superpriority tender if made. The district court ruled that the foreclosure sale extinguished Bank’s deed of trust and that the HOA's offer was insufficient to constitute a tender. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) an offer to make a payment at some point in the future cannot constitute a valid tender; (2) a formal tender is excused when the party entitled to payment represents that if a tender is made, it will be rejected; and (3) the deed of trust beneficiary’s agent was excused from making a formal tender in this case, and therefore, the foreclosure sale did not extinguish the first deed of trust. View "Bank of America, N.A. v. Thomas Jessup, LLC Series VII" on Justia Law

Enacted in 2005, in response to the "debt treadmill," NRS Chapter 604A regulates the payday loan industry, including deferred deposit loans and loans with an annual interest rate greater than 40 percent. If a borrower cannot repay such a loan within 35 days, NRS 604A.480 subsection 1 allows for an extension but a licensee cannot extend the period beyond 60 days and cannot "add any unpaid interest or other charges accrued ... to the principal amount of the new deferred deposit loan or high-interest loan." However, under subsection 2, certain new deferred deposit or high-interest loans are exempt from those restrictions: A licensee may offer a new loan to satisfy an outstanding loan for a period of not less than 150 days and at an interest rate of less than 200 percent. The licensee must follow all of subsection 2's requirements for the new loan to be exempted. Subsection (2)(f) permits a loan under subsection 2 if the licensee does “not commence any civil action or process of alternative dispute resolution on a defaulted loan or any extension or repayment plan thereof." Reversing the district court, the Nevada Supreme Court held that NRS 604A.480(2)(f) bars a licensee from bringing any type of enforcement action on a refinancing loan made under NRS 604A.480(2) and is not merely a condition precedent to making a refinancing loan under the subsection. View "State of Nevada Department of Business and Industry, Financial Institutions Division v. Dollar Loan Center., LLC" on Justia Law

Two days after Silver Springs Homeowner's Association recorded a notice of foreclosure sale, First Horizon Home Loans recorded its own notice of foreclosure sale. First Horizon was the first to hold its foreclosure sale and bought the property on a credit bid. Before First Horizon recorded its trustee's deed, Silver Springs held its foreclosure sale, at which SFR purchased the same property. SFR sued to quiet title. The district court granted First Horizon summary judgment, finding that Silver Springs had not provided the statutorily required notices pursuant to NRS 116.31162 and NRS 116.311635. The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed and remanded, finding that the district court erred in finding Silver Springs' foreclosure sale invalid. Because NRS 116.31162 requires a homeowner's association (HOA) foreclosing on its interest to record its notice of foreclosure sale, any subsequent buyer purchases the property subject to that notice that a foreclosure may be imminent. Therefore, an HOA need not restart the entire foreclosure process each time the property changes ownership so long as the HOA has provided the required notices to all parties who are entitled. View "SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC v. First Horizon Home Loans" on Justia Law

Here the Supreme Court declined to apply Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.190(1)(b)’s statute of limitations for contract actions to nonjudicial foreclosures because statutes of limitations only apply to judicial actions, and a nonjudicial foreclosure by its nature is not a judicial action.After HSBC Bank USA, which was the beneficiary of a promissory note and deed of trust on Appellant’s home, recorded a notice of default and election to sell Appellant’s property “without any court action,” Appellant commenced this action to quiet title and extinguish HSBC’s interest in the property. The district court dismissed Appellant’s claim, thus rejecting Appellant’s argument that HSBC was barred from foreclosing on the mortgage property because the six-year limitation period began running with the initial notice of default and had therefore expired. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute of limitations set forth in section 11.190(1)(b) did not extinguish HSBC’s right to pursue a nonjudicial foreclosure because statutes of limitations apply only to judicial actions. View "Facklam v. HSBC Bank USA" on Justia Law

Petitioner loaned Debtors, including Darren Badger, approximately $10,000,000. Debtors defaulted on the loan. A California court issued a judgment against Debtors in the amount of $2,497,568. Pacific Western later domesticated the judgment in Nevada. In order to collect on the judgment, Petitioner served Wells Fargo Advisors (WFA), a company that administered three financial accounts under 26 U.S.C. 529 (529 accounts) on behalf of Badger, with a writ of execution and garnishment. Badger claimed that the 529 accounts were outside of the Nevada district court’s jurisdiction because they were located in New Mexico and that the funds held in the 529 accounts were completely exempt under New Mexico law. The district court quashed the writs of execution and garnishment served upon WFA, ruling that Petitioner must attempt to execute upon Badger’s 529 accounts in New Mexico. The Supreme Court entertained Petitioner’s petition for a writ of mandamus and granted the petition in part, holding (1) funds contained in 529 accounts are a debt, not a chattel; and (2) accordingly, the district court had the power to garnish the debt through device of a writ of garnishment upon WFA. View "Pacific Western Bank v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law