Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Rose, while 24 weeks pregnant with M.W., was traveling by Greyhound bus from Washington State to Las Vegas. During the journey, she boarded a bus in Redding, California, where another passenger, Asaandi Coleman, opened fire, injuring Rose. Rose was treated in California and later transferred to Las Vegas, where she suffered complications leading to an emergency C-section for M.W. M.W. has required constant medical care since birth. M.W.'s father filed a negligence lawsuit against Greyhound, alleging negligence and negligent hiring, training, retaining, supervising, and equipping.The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County, Nevada, dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction over Greyhound, applying the Calder effects test, which is used for intentional torts. The court found that Greyhound did not purposefully direct its conduct toward Nevada, the cause of action did not arise from Greyhound's contacts with Nevada, and exercising jurisdiction would be unreasonable.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and concluded that the district court erred in applying the Calder effects test, as it only applies to intentional torts, and the claims against Greyhound were based on negligence. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal, determining that even under the correct test for specific personal jurisdiction, the district court lacked jurisdiction. Greyhound's contacts with Nevada were not sufficiently related to the negligence claims, which arose from events in California. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court's order dismissing the action. View "WHITLEY VS. GREYHOUND LINES, INC." on Justia Law

Michael Kosor, Jr., a homeowner in Southern Highlands, a Las Vegas residential common-interest community, sued the Southern Highlands Community Association (HOA) and its developer, Southern Highlands Development Corporation (SHDC), for declaratory and injunctive relief regarding the homeowners' right to elect the HOA's board of directors. Kosor claimed that the community had surpassed the 75% home-sale threshold, ending the declarant control period, yet SHDC continued to appoint three of the five board members, violating homeowners' voting rights. The HOA and SHDC disputed Kosor's interpretation and calculations.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County denied Kosor's motion for a temporary restraining order, largely denied the HOA's and SHDC's motion to dismiss, and denied Kosor's motion for summary judgment. Kosor then sought to voluntarily dismiss the action without prejudice, but the court dismissed it with prejudice and awarded fees and costs to the HOA and SHDC. Kosor appealed but later withdrew his appeal, acknowledging that he could not reinstate it or raise the same issues again. Subsequently, the HOA and SHDC sought additional fees and costs incurred on appeal, prompting Kosor to file a motion under NRCP 60(b)(4), arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction due to noncompliance with NRS 38.310's pre-suit ADR requirement.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and held that NRS 38.310, which mandates pre-suit mediation or arbitration for certain HOA-related claims, is a procedural claim-processing rule, not a jurisdictional requirement. The court determined that the district court had jurisdiction despite the parties' noncompliance with NRS 38.310 and properly denied Kosor's motion to vacate its judgment and fee-award orders as jurisdictionally void. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court's decision. View "KOSOR VS. S. HIGHLANDS CMTY. ASS'N" on Justia Law

UnitedHealthCare Insurance Company and its affiliates (collectively, United) were sued by Fremont Emergency Services and other emergency medical providers (collectively, TeamHealth) for underpaying claims for emergency medical services provided to United’s members. TeamHealth alleged that United failed to adequately reimburse them for services rendered under the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA) after their contract with United expired, leaving them as out-of-network providers. TeamHealth claimed United was unjustly enriched and breached an implied-in-fact contract, also asserting statutory claims under the Prompt Pay and Unfair Claims Practices Acts.The case was initially removed to federal court, which found no ERISA preemption and remanded it to state court. The Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada ruled in favor of TeamHealth, awarding them compensatory and punitive damages, prejudgment interest, and attorney fees. United appealed the judgment and petitioned to seal certain court documents.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and found substantial evidence supporting the jury’s verdict on unjust enrichment but not on the implied-in-fact contract or statutory claims. The court held that ERISA did not preempt TeamHealth’s claims and that United was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the Unfair Claims Practices Act claim, as the statute did not provide a private right of action for medical providers. The court affirmed the compensatory damages for unjust enrichment but vacated the punitive damages award, remanding for recalculation to a 1:1 ratio of compensatory to punitive damages. The court also reversed the prejudgment interest and attorney fees awards under the Prompt Pay Act and remanded for a new determination of prejudgment interest.Additionally, the court denied United’s petition to seal certain documents, finding that United failed to meet its burden to demonstrate the necessity of sealing. The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to seal parts of the record. View "UnitedHealthCare Insurance Company v. Fremont Emergency Services" on Justia Law

Virgin Valley Water District (the District) entered into a lease agreement with Paradise Canyon, LLC (Paradise Canyon) in 2011 to provide water shares for irrigating a golf course. The lease included a right of first refusal for Paradise Canyon to renew the lease, with the District having sole discretion to set rental rates after January 1, 2020. In 2019, the District increased the rental rate, leading Paradise Canyon to sue for declaratory relief and damages, alleging bad faith breach of the lease agreement.The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County granted partial summary judgment for Paradise Canyon on certain claims and set others for a jury trial. The jury found that the District had breached the lease in bad faith and awarded damages to Paradise Canyon. The District appealed the decision.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and found that the lease agreement unambiguously granted the District sole discretion to set rental rates after January 1, 2020. The court held that the trial court erred in allowing the jury to interpret this unambiguous provision and in finding that the District breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The Supreme Court also noted several procedural errors, including the trial court's improper judicial notice of its own factfinding, admission of prejudicial evidence, and unfair trial practices that limited the District's ability to present its case.The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the portions of the trial court's judgment related to the interpretation of the lease renewal provisions and the jury's verdict on the rental rate and damages. The court affirmed the trial court's rulings on beneficial use and other uncontested matters. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Supreme Court's opinion. View "VIRGIN VALLEY WATER DIST. VS. PARADISE CANYON, LLC" on Justia Law

H.B., III, a minor, needed a guardian after his father's death. He temporarily lived with his mother, Lasandra K., on the streets of Las Vegas before moving in with his uncle, Marques B. Marques petitioned the district court to be appointed as H.B.'s guardian, disclosing his felony conviction for attempted murder. The district court ordered a criminal background check, which confirmed the conviction. During the hearing, H.B.'s paternal grandmother supported Marques's petition, and Marques claimed Lasandra also supported it via text messages.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Family Division, denied the petition, concluding that Marques's felony conviction automatically disqualified him from serving as a guardian. Additionally, the court found that Marques failed to serve the petition and citation on all required relatives and interested parties, and did not meet the notice requirements or allege facts to support a waiver of notice. The petition was denied with prejudice, and the matter was closed.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and held that a felony conviction does not automatically disqualify a potential guardian under NRS 159A.061(3). The statute requires the district court to consider various factors, including a felony conviction, but no single factor is dispositive. The district court erred by not considering all relevant factors. However, the Supreme Court affirmed the denial of the petition based on Marques's failure to properly effectuate service. The dismissal was affirmed without prejudice, and the district court was instructed to amend its order accordingly. View "IN RE: GUARDIANSHIP OF H.B. III" on Justia Law

Angalia B., the legal guardian and Educational Decision Maker (EDM) for J.B., a student at a Clark County School District (CCSD) elementary school, requested J.B.'s education records under FERPA and NRS 392.029(1). After receiving the records, Angalia suspected that certain emails were missing and requested all communications, including emails stored in CCSD's Google Vault. When CCSD did not respond, Angalia filed a motion to join CCSD to J.B.'s ongoing dependency case and to compel the production of the emails. CCSD opposed, arguing that the emails were not education records under FERPA and NRS 392.029(1) as they were not in J.B.'s permanent file. The district court ruled that the emails were education records and ordered CCSD to produce them.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case. The court determined that the emails stored in CCSD's Google Vault were maintained by CCSD, satisfying the second prong of the FERPA definition of education records. However, the court found that the district court erred in determining that the emails were directly related to J.B. without first reviewing their content. The Supreme Court of Nevada granted the petition for a writ of mandamus, directing the district court to vacate its order compelling CCSD to produce the emails.The Supreme Court of Nevada held that the district court must perform an in camera review of the emails to determine if they are directly related to J.B. If the emails are found to be directly related, they will qualify as education records under FERPA. The court emphasized that records are maintained when stored in a secure database, such as Google Vault, and that the definition of "maintained" should be interpreted broadly to accommodate future technological advancements. View "Clark County School District v. District Court" on Justia Law

Leanne Nester and Cody Gamble divorced in 2022, with custody arrangements for their two minor children outlined in the divorce decree. Gamble later moved to modify custody, and during the proceedings, a press organization requested media access, which the district court granted. Nester moved for reconsideration, seeking to close the hearing to protect sensitive information about the children, including medical and Child Protective Services records. The district court denied her motion, interpreting a previous case, Falconi v. Eighth Judicial District Court, as precluding closure of family law proceedings.The district court concluded it lacked discretion to close the hearing, stating there was no statute or rule allowing it. Nester then sought writ relief from the Supreme Court of Nevada, arguing that the district court misinterpreted Falconi and failed to consider her privacy interests and those of her children.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and found that the district court erred in its interpretation of Falconi. The court clarified that Falconi does not prohibit the closure of family law proceedings but requires a case-by-case analysis to determine if closure is warranted. The court outlined that closure is permissible if it serves a compelling interest, there is a substantial probability that the interest could be harmed without closure, and no alternatives to closure would adequately protect the interest.The Supreme Court of Nevada granted Nester's petition, directing the district court to vacate its order denying the motion to close the hearing and to reconsider the motion using the test outlined in Falconi. The court emphasized the need for the district court to properly apply the factors to determine whether closure is justified. View "NESTER VS. DIST. CT." on Justia Law

Laura Latimer and Egan Walker divorced in 2002 after 13 years of marriage. During their marriage, Walker earned 8.54 years of PERS credits. The divorce decree included a marital settlement agreement (MSA) that awarded Latimer half of Walker's PERS retirement benefits, secured by a qualified domestic relations order (QDRO) allowing Latimer to elect Option 2. Walker later remarried, reentered public employment as a judge, and transferred his PERS credits to JRS, designating his current wife as the beneficiary. Walker sought judicial confirmation to designate both Latimer and his current wife as Option 2 beneficiaries.The Second Judicial District Court found that Walker could designate two different Option 2 beneficiaries for his PERS and JRS accounts. The court ordered that Latimer was entitled to 4.25 years of PERS credits but not to any of Walker's JRS account. Latimer filed a motion for a new trial, which was denied. She then appealed, arguing that Nevada law permits only one Option 2 beneficiary and that her community interest in Walker's retirement benefits should not be defeated by his transfer to JRS.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and concluded that NRS 1A.450(1)(a) allows a JRS member to designate more than one Option 2 beneficiary. The court held that both Latimer and Walker's current wife could be designated as Option 2 beneficiaries, with each receiving their respective portion of the benefits if Walker predeceases them. The court affirmed the district court's decision to allow two beneficiaries but reversed and remanded the order regarding Latimer's entitlement to service credits from Walker's JRS account, ensuring her protected interest in the retirement benefits is maintained. View "WALKER VS. WALKER" on Justia Law

Sky Moore rented a car from Budget Car and Truck Rental of Las Vegas, owned by Malco Enterprises of Nevada, Inc. Sky named Daniel Moore as an additional driver, who later rear-ended Alelign Woldeyohannes while intoxicated. Alelign sued Daniel for negligence and Malco for negligent entrustment. Daniel did not respond, resulting in a default judgment against him. The case proceeded to arbitration, where Alelign was awarded $32,680.26. Malco requested a trial de novo, leading to a short trial where the judge entered a default judgment against Daniel for $37,886.82.Alelign moved to apply the default judgment against Malco under NRS 482.305(1), which holds short-term lessors liable for damages if they fail to provide minimum insurance coverage. Malco opposed, arguing that NRS 482.305 is preempted by the Graves Amendment, which prohibits states from holding vehicle lessors vicariously liable without negligence or wrongdoing. The short trial judge granted Alelign’s motion, and the district court affirmed, concluding that NRS 482.305 is a financial responsibility law preserved by the Graves Amendment’s savings clause.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that NRS 482.305 is not preempted by the Graves Amendment because it is a financial responsibility law preserved by the savings clause under 49 U.S.C. § 30106(b). The court emphasized that NRS 482.305 imposes a legal requirement for lessors to provide minimum coverage, rather than a mere financial inducement, and does not impose strict vicarious liability on lessors. View "Malco Enterprises of Nevada, Inc. vs. Woldeyohannes" on Justia Law

In 2009, a surgeon performed a shoulder replacement surgery on a patient, during which the patient suffered a fracture and subsequent nerve injury, resulting in permanent radial nerve palsy. The patient sued the surgeon and associated medical entities for professional negligence, claiming vicarious liability. The case went to trial twice; the first trial resulted in a verdict for the defendants, but the court granted a new trial due to juror misconduct. The second trial resulted in a verdict for the patient, awarding significant damages, which the court reduced according to statutory caps.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County oversaw the trials. After the second trial, the court reduced the pain and suffering damages to $350,000 pursuant to NRS 41A.035, awarded attorney fees, and capped expert witness costs. The defendants moved for a new trial based on alleged juror misconduct, which the court denied. Both parties appealed various aspects of the court's decisions, including the application of the damages cap, the res ipsa loquitur instruction, and the award of attorney fees and costs.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case. It held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving a res ipsa loquitur instruction despite expert testimony, as the relevant statutory amendments did not apply retroactively. The court affirmed the reduction of pain and suffering damages to $350,000, applying the statutory cap to both the surgeon and the medical entities. The court also upheld the denial of a new trial based on juror misconduct, finding no intentional concealment or prejudice.Regarding attorney fees, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's award but modified it to comply with NRS 7.095, capping the total recoverable amount. The court found no conflict between NRCP 68 and NRS 18.005 but remanded the case for further proceedings on expert witness fees, requiring a more detailed application of the Frazier factors. The judgment and order denying a new trial were affirmed, the attorney fees award was affirmed as modified, and the order retaxing costs was reversed in part. View "NEVINS VS. MARTYN" on Justia Law