Articles Posted in Civil Procedure

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The district court lacks the authority to extend the deadline for filing the opening brief in a petition for judicial review of a public utilities commission. Rural Telephone Company (Appellant) filed an application with Public Utilities Commission of Nevada (PUCN) seeking a change in its telephone service rates and charges. PUCN denied the requested changes. Appellant then filed a timely petition for judicial review in the district court and subsequently requested an extension of time to file its opening memorandum of points and authorities. The district court denied the motion for an extension and dismissed the petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court lacked statutory authority to grant Appellant an extension of time to file its opening memorandum of points and authorities. View "Rural Telephone Co. v. Public Utilities Commission of Nevada" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court’s holding in SFR Investments Pool 1, LLC v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 334 P.3d 408 (Nev. 2014) that foreclosures under Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3116 extinguish first security interests applies to all foreclosures conducted since section 116.3116’s inception. Respondent in this case employed the three-factor test established by the United States Supreme Court in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971) and argued that SFR could not apply retroactively because this court established a new principle of law, a retroactive application would not further the purposes of section 116.3116, and a retroactive application would product inequitable results. The Supreme Court held (1) the Chevron Oil factors do not apply, but rather, that the court’s analysis in Nevada Yellow Cab Corp. v. Eighth Judicial District Court, 383 P.3d 246 (Nev. 2016), governs the present matter; and (2) SFR did not create new law or overrule existing precent, and therefore, that decision applies retroactively. View "K&P Homes v. Christiana Trust" on Justia Law

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In these related original petitions for extraordinary relief the Supreme Court considered the issue of whether documents otherwise protected by the attorney-client privilege must be disclosed when the business judgment rule is asserted as a defense and under what circumstances a document may be protected by the work-product privilege even if it is at issue in the litigation. In docket no. 70050, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court erred when it compelled Wynn Resorts to produce certain attorney-client privileged documents from its attorneys on the basis that Wynn Resorts invoked the business judgment rule as a defense. The court thus granted Wynn Resorts’ petition for relief. In docket no. 70452, the Supreme Court concluded that the district court correctly determined that Wynn Resorts waived the attorney-client privilege by placing a report at issue in the initial litigation. However, because the work-product privilege may apply to some of the documents compiled in the preparation of the report, the court granted in part Wynn Resorts’ petition for relief and directed the district court to consider whether the work-product privilege applied to the documents underlying the report. View "Wynn Resorts, Ltd. v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

Posted in: Civil Procedure

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A final order adjudicating a judgment debtor proceeding is appealable under Nev. R. App. P. 3A(b)(1), and such an appeal is generally a plain, speedy, and adequate remedy that precludes extraordinary writ relief. Petitioner filed this writ petition challenging the portion of the district court’s order that added her to a default judgment as a joint debtor. Petitioner failed to appeal the judgment. In challenging whether the challenged order was a final judgment from which she could have appealed, Petitioner argued that the order was interlocutory and that writ relief was appropriate because the order adding her to the default judgment was void on due process grounds. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) an order resolving a joint debtor proceeding is a final, appealable order, rendering extraordinary relief unavailable; and (2) extraordinary writ relief is not available when Petitioner View "Rawson v. Ninth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

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The Barton doctrine is extended to a court-appointed accountant in the capacity of a special master, thus requiring an individual to seek leave of the appointing court prior to filing suit in a non-appointing court against a court-appointed special master for actions taken in the scope of his court-derived authority. Larry Bertsch and his accounting firm (collectively, Bertsch) were appointed as special master in a lawsuit between Vion Operations, LLC and Jay Bloom (the Lion litigation). The district court later discharged Bertsch from his duties as special master. When the Vion litigation was dismissed, Bloom filed the underlying complaint against Bertsch alleging, inter alia, gross negligence and fraudulent concealment based on Bertsch’s allegedly wrongful actions in the Vion litigation. Bertsch filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court denied. Bertsch petitioned for a writ of mandamus arguing, in part, that Bloom’s complaint was jurisdictionally improper because Bloom did not first seek leave of the appointing court before instituting the underlying action. The Supreme Court granted the motion, holding that Bloom must first have filed a motion with the appointing court in order to sue Bertsch personally. View "Bertsch v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

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A plain reading of Nev. Rev. Stat. 174.085(5)(b) permitted the City of Henderson to file subsequent complaints in the same case numbers as the original complaints after the City voluntarily dismissed criminal complaints pursuant to the statute. The district court dismissed the amended complaints, concluding that section 174.085(5)(b) required the City to file new complaints with new case numbers. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court arbitrarily and capriciously abused its discretion when it erroneously determined that the municipal court had violated section 174.085(5)(b) and dismissed the complaints. View "City of Henderson v. Amado" on Justia Law

Posted in: Civil Procedure

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A document is filed with the district court upon acceptance for filing by the judge, and the judge’s failure to note the date of filing on the document and failure to transmit it to the office of the clerk is a ministerial error not to be held against the parties. In this case, Appellant filed a motion for a new trial in the district court. The short trial judge accepted the document for filing but did not comply with Nev. R. Civ. P. 5(e) by noting the date of the filing on the document and promptly transmitting it to the clerk of the court. The short trial judge denied the motion. Appellant appealed. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal to proceed because Appellant timely filed her motion and because the short trial judge’s error was not to be held against Appellant. View "O'Neal v. Hudson" on Justia Law

Posted in: Civil Procedure

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An amended criminal complaint was filed charging Maria Escalante and Ramiro Funez (collectively, Escalante) each with one count of trespass in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 207.200(1)(a). Escalante moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that section 207.200(1)(a) is unconstitutionally vague. The Nevada Office of the Attorney General (AG) was not notified of the constitutional challenge to the statute. The justice court granted the motion to dismiss in part, determining that the “vex or annoy” intent requirement in the statute was void for vagueness. When it received notification of the justice court’s order, the AG filed a “motion to place on calendar,” arguing that the AG was entitled to notice of the constitutional challenge under Nev. Rev. Stat. 30.130. The justice court denied the AG’s motion, concluding that section 30.130 applies only to declaratory relief actions and has no applicability to criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 30.130 does not entitle the AG to notice and opportunity to be heard in criminal cases; and (2) Escalante was not required to notify the AG of their constitutional challenge to section 207.200(1)(a). View "Office of the Attorney General v. Justice Court" on Justia Law

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Respondent filed an amended complaint asserting several claims relating to the construction of a solar electricity plant. The district court granted Appellant’s motion to dismiss the claims and certified the judgment as final under Nev. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Respondent filed a timely tolling motion asking the district court to amend or reconsider the order dismissing the complaint and allow the action to proceed. The district court granted the motion, vacated the order granting the motion to dismiss, and denied the motion to dismiss. Appellant appealed from this order, arguing that the order was appealable as a special order after final judgment under Nev. R. App. P. 3A(b)(8). The Supreme Court disagreed and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that an order granting a motion to amend or reconsider and vacating a final judgment is not appealable as a special order after final judgment. View "TRP International, Inc. v. Proimtu MMI LLC" on Justia Law

Posted in: Civil Procedure

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This appeal concerned the contested ownership of real property consisting of three lots. In 2012, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. was assigned the beneficial interest of a deed of trust recorded against the property. In 2007, the Canyon Gate Master Association (CGMA) recorded a notice of default against the property. In 2009, Susan Hannaford filed a complaint against CGMA challenging an arbitration award relating to the property. In 2013, CGMA recorded a notice of foreclosure sale against Lots 21 and 26. Saticoy Bay LLC purchased the two lots and successfully moved to intervene in the action initiated by Hannaford’s complaint. In 2013, Saticoy filed its complaint in intervention. That same year, CGMA recorded a notice of foreclosure sale of Lot 22. CGMA purchased the lot, and Saticoy purchased the lot from CGMA by way of a quitclaim deed. In 2014, JPMorgan filed an answer to Saticoy’s complaint in intervention. The district court dismissed Hannaford’s complaint and Saticoy’s complaint in intervention with prejudice for failure to prosecute pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 41(e). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) dismissal of the complaint in intervention was mandatory under Rule 41(e); but (2) the district court erred in dismissing the complaint in intervention with prejudice rather than without prejudice. Remanded. View "Saticoy Bay LLC Series 2021 Gray Eagle Way v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law