Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

An amended criminal complaint was filed charging Maria Escalante and Ramiro Funez (collectively, Escalante) each with one count of trespass in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 207.200(1)(a). Escalante moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that section 207.200(1)(a) is unconstitutionally vague. The Nevada Office of the Attorney General (AG) was not notified of the constitutional challenge to the statute. The justice court granted the motion to dismiss in part, determining that the “vex or annoy” intent requirement in the statute was void for vagueness. When it received notification of the justice court’s order, the AG filed a “motion to place on calendar,” arguing that the AG was entitled to notice of the constitutional challenge under Nev. Rev. Stat. 30.130. The justice court denied the AG’s motion, concluding that section 30.130 applies only to declaratory relief actions and has no applicability to criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 30.130 does not entitle the AG to notice and opportunity to be heard in criminal cases; and (2) Escalante was not required to notify the AG of their constitutional challenge to section 207.200(1)(a). View "Office of the Attorney General v. Justice Court" on Justia Law

Respondent filed an amended complaint asserting several claims relating to the construction of a solar electricity plant. The district court granted Appellant’s motion to dismiss the claims and certified the judgment as final under Nev. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Respondent filed a timely tolling motion asking the district court to amend or reconsider the order dismissing the complaint and allow the action to proceed. The district court granted the motion, vacated the order granting the motion to dismiss, and denied the motion to dismiss. Appellant appealed from this order, arguing that the order was appealable as a special order after final judgment under Nev. R. App. P. 3A(b)(8). The Supreme Court disagreed and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that an order granting a motion to amend or reconsider and vacating a final judgment is not appealable as a special order after final judgment. View "TRP International, Inc. v. Proimtu MMI LLC" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned the contested ownership of real property consisting of three lots. In 2012, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. was assigned the beneficial interest of a deed of trust recorded against the property. In 2007, the Canyon Gate Master Association (CGMA) recorded a notice of default against the property. In 2009, Susan Hannaford filed a complaint against CGMA challenging an arbitration award relating to the property. In 2013, CGMA recorded a notice of foreclosure sale against Lots 21 and 26. Saticoy Bay LLC purchased the two lots and successfully moved to intervene in the action initiated by Hannaford’s complaint. In 2013, Saticoy filed its complaint in intervention. That same year, CGMA recorded a notice of foreclosure sale of Lot 22. CGMA purchased the lot, and Saticoy purchased the lot from CGMA by way of a quitclaim deed. In 2014, JPMorgan filed an answer to Saticoy’s complaint in intervention. The district court dismissed Hannaford’s complaint and Saticoy’s complaint in intervention with prejudice for failure to prosecute pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 41(e). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) dismissal of the complaint in intervention was mandatory under Rule 41(e); but (2) the district court erred in dismissing the complaint in intervention with prejudice rather than without prejudice. Remanded. View "Saticoy Bay LLC Series 2021 Gray Eagle Way v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Michael Adams died after striking Susan Fallini’s cow while driving on a portion of highway designated as open range. Adams’ estate sued Fallini for negligence. The district court entered a final judgment against Fallini for $1,294,041. Thereafter, Fallini brought a motion pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 60(b), contending that the district court should set aside the judgment because the Estate’s counsel committed a fraud upon the court. The district court granted the motion. Fallini then filed a motion for entry of final argument, arguing that Nev. Rev. Stat. 568.360 provided a complete defense to the Estate’s claims. The district court granted the motion and dismissed the action. The Estate appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) this court had jurisdiction to consider challenges to the district court’s Rule 60(b) order in this appeal; (2) the district court did not err in addressing the merits of Fallini’s the Rule 60(b) motion; and (3) under the circumstances of this case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting relief based on fraud upon the court. View "Estate of Adams v. Fallini" on Justia Law

Petitioner loaned Debtors, including Darren Badger, approximately $10,000,000. Debtors defaulted on the loan. A California court issued a judgment against Debtors in the amount of $2,497,568. Pacific Western later domesticated the judgment in Nevada. In order to collect on the judgment, Petitioner served Wells Fargo Advisors (WFA), a company that administered three financial accounts under 26 U.S.C. 529 (529 accounts) on behalf of Badger, with a writ of execution and garnishment. Badger claimed that the 529 accounts were outside of the Nevada district court’s jurisdiction because they were located in New Mexico and that the funds held in the 529 accounts were completely exempt under New Mexico law. The district court quashed the writs of execution and garnishment served upon WFA, ruling that Petitioner must attempt to execute upon Badger’s 529 accounts in New Mexico. The Supreme Court entertained Petitioner’s petition for a writ of mandamus and granted the petition in part, holding (1) funds contained in 529 accounts are a debt, not a chattel; and (2) accordingly, the district court had the power to garnish the debt through device of a writ of garnishment upon WFA. View "Pacific Western Bank v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

Ayden A., a sixteen-year-old minor, was admitted to West Hills Hospital because he was deemed to be emotional disturbed and a danger to himself. One week later, the State filed a petition for involuntary placement in a locked facility after emergency admission, arguing that its petition was timely because five days as prescribed in Nev. Rev. Stat. 432B.6075(2) means judicial days. The district court ruled in favor of Ayden, concluding that “five days” in the statute means calendar days. The State subsequently filed this original petition for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court granted the State’s petition and directed the district court to vacate its order denying the State’s petition to extend the placement, holding (1) although Ayden was released from involuntary placement and this matter is moot, this particular issue is presents an issue that is capable of repetition yet evading review and thus fits within an exception to the mootness doctrine; and (2) the five days in section 432B.6075 must be judicial days based on Nev. R. Civ. P. 6(a)’s instructions on computing time. View "State v. Second Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

This lawsuit arose after Diane Collins rear-ended Ja Cynta McClendon’s car. Collins designated Dr. Eugene Appel as a testifying medical expert and filed an expert witness report. Before McClendon was able to depose Appel, Collins de-designated him as a testifying expert witness. Collins moved for a protective order to prevent McClendon from deposing Appel or calling him to testify at trial. McClendon subsequently moved to designate Appel as her own expert witness. The district court granted Collins’ motion for a protective order and denied McClendon’s motion. The jury subsequently entered judgment in favor of Collins. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) after an expert report has been disclosed, a testifying expert witness cannot regain the confidentiality protections of Nev. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(B) by de-designating that witness to the status of a nontestifying expert; (2) after the expert witness has lost Rule 26(b)(4)(B)’s protections, the district court has the discretion whether to allow the witness to be further deposed or called to testify at trial by an opposing party; and (3) the district court abused its discretion by basing its decision on the fact that Appel had not yet been deposed, but the error was harmless. View "McClendon v. Collins" on Justia Law

Grupo Famsa, S.A. de C.V. (Grupo), a Mexican company, agreed to guarantee a commercial lease entered into between Famsa, Inc. (Famsa) and Uno LLC (Uno). When Famsa failed to comply with the terms of the lease, Uno filed a complaint against Famsa and Grupo for breach of the commercial lease and guaranty. Uno served Grupo through the procedures outlined in the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (Hague Convention). The Mexican Central Authority issued a certificate of proof of international service of process upon Grupo. Grupo filed a motion to quash service of process, arguing that service of process was constitutionally deficient. The district court denied Grupo’s motion to quash. Grupo subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition seeking to prohibit the district court from exercising jurisdiction over Grupo. The Supreme Court granted the petition in part, holding (1) service of process on a foreign company pursuant to the Hague Convention does not satisfy constitutional due process when service depends solely upon a certificate of compliance issued by the foreign nation’s central authority; and (2) the district court failed to conduct the necessary fact-finding to determine whether service was constitutionally sufficient in this case. View "Grupo Famsa, S.A. de C.V. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

On December 4, 2009, Plaintiff filed a verified complaint asserting claims to quiet title and for adverse possession. On August 11, 2011, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s action with prejudice for want of prosecution. Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that dismissal was premature because the two-year time period in Nev. R. Civ. P. 41(e) had not passed. The district court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss and granted Defendant’s motion for attorney fees and costs in full. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal and the award of attorney fees. The two appeals were subsequently consolidated. The Supreme Court reversed and vacated the subsequent order awarding attorney fees and costs, holding that the district court’s findings of fact, on which it based its conclusions of law and decision to dismiss the action with prejudice, were unsupported by the evidence in the record and that there was no evidence presented that supported a finding that dismissal with prejudice was warranted. View "Hunter v. Gang" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, on their own behalf and on behalf of their minor children, challenged the constitutionality of Senate Bill 302 (S.B. 302) by filing suit against the State Treasurer. Petitioners, parents seeking to apply for the grant established by S.B. 302, moved to intervene as defendants. Petitioners argued that they satisfied the requirements for intervention of right under Nev. R. Civ. P. 24(b) or, alternatively, that they should be permitted to intervene under Nev. R. Civ. P. 24(b). The district court denied the motion. Petitioners subsequently filed this petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the district court to grant their application to intervene. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion to intervene where Petitioners and the State shared the same goal of having the education grant program created by S.B. 302 declared constitutional. View "Hairr v. First Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law