Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Grupo Famsa, S.A. de C.V. (Grupo), a Mexican company, agreed to guarantee a commercial lease entered into between Famsa, Inc. (Famsa) and Uno LLC (Uno). When Famsa failed to comply with the terms of the lease, Uno filed a complaint against Famsa and Grupo for breach of the commercial lease and guaranty. Uno served Grupo through the procedures outlined in the Hague Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters (Hague Convention). The Mexican Central Authority issued a certificate of proof of international service of process upon Grupo. Grupo filed a motion to quash service of process, arguing that service of process was constitutionally deficient. The district court denied Grupo’s motion to quash. Grupo subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of prohibition seeking to prohibit the district court from exercising jurisdiction over Grupo. The Supreme Court granted the petition in part, holding (1) service of process on a foreign company pursuant to the Hague Convention does not satisfy constitutional due process when service depends solely upon a certificate of compliance issued by the foreign nation’s central authority; and (2) the district court failed to conduct the necessary fact-finding to determine whether service was constitutionally sufficient in this case. View "Grupo Famsa, S.A. de C.V. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

On December 4, 2009, Plaintiff filed a verified complaint asserting claims to quiet title and for adverse possession. On August 11, 2011, Defendant moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s action with prejudice for want of prosecution. Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing that dismissal was premature because the two-year time period in Nev. R. Civ. P. 41(e) had not passed. The district court granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss and granted Defendant’s motion for attorney fees and costs in full. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal and the award of attorney fees. The two appeals were subsequently consolidated. The Supreme Court reversed and vacated the subsequent order awarding attorney fees and costs, holding that the district court’s findings of fact, on which it based its conclusions of law and decision to dismiss the action with prejudice, were unsupported by the evidence in the record and that there was no evidence presented that supported a finding that dismissal with prejudice was warranted. View "Hunter v. Gang" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, on their own behalf and on behalf of their minor children, challenged the constitutionality of Senate Bill 302 (S.B. 302) by filing suit against the State Treasurer. Petitioners, parents seeking to apply for the grant established by S.B. 302, moved to intervene as defendants. Petitioners argued that they satisfied the requirements for intervention of right under Nev. R. Civ. P. 24(b) or, alternatively, that they should be permitted to intervene under Nev. R. Civ. P. 24(b). The district court denied the motion. Petitioners subsequently filed this petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the district court to grant their application to intervene. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Petitioners’ motion to intervene where Petitioners and the State shared the same goal of having the education grant program created by S.B. 302 declared constitutional. View "Hairr v. First Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a timely post-probate will contest but failed to timely issue a citation to Respondent, the executor of the estate, in accordance with Nev. Rev. Stat. 137.090. Appellant filed a petition to enlarge time for issuing citations. The probate commissioner recommended that the petition be granted, determining that Nev. R. Civ. P. 6(b) and Eighth Judicial District Court Rule 2.25 granted the court discretion to extend the time limit for issuing citations. The district court dismissed the will contest, concluding that Rule 6(b) does not apply to statutory time limits. The court did not address whether Rule 2.25 applied in this matter. The Supreme Court vacated the district court’s order, holding (1) a failure to timely issue citations to the estate’s personal representative and the will’s devisees constitutes grounds for dismissal of a will contest; (2) Rule 6(b) does not apply to statutory time limits; but (3) the district court erred in failing to determine whether Petitioner demonstrated excusable neglect under Rule 2.25 when requesting an enlargement of time to issue the citations. Remanded. View "In re Estate of Black" on Justia Law

Robert Cooper retained McDonald Carano Wilson LLP (Appellant) to represented him in a personal injury action. Three years into the representation, the district court granted Appellant’s motion to withdraw. Appellant perfected a charging lien for more than $100,000 in attorney fees and costs. Thereafter, Cooper retained another law firm, which obtained a $55,000 settlement for Cooper. The district court concluded that Appellant could not enforce its charging lien because it withdrew before settlement occurred. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in its judgment because Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.015’s language unambiguously allows any counsel that worked on a claim to enforce a charging lien against any affirmative recovery. Remanded for additional findings to determine whether Appellant was entitled to a disbursement and, if it is, the amount of that disbursement. View "Wilson v. Bourassa Law Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Real parties in interest (collectively, Seaver) filed a complaint against Petitioners (collectively, the Helfsteins) and against Uninet Imaging, Inc., alleging claims arising out of agreements between the Helfsteins and Seaver following Uninet’s purchase of the Helfsteins’ companies. The Helfsteisn settled with Seaver, and Seaver voluntarily dismissed their claims against the Helfsteins. Seaver later filed a notice of rescission, alleging that the Helfsteisn fraudulently induced them to settle. Meanwhile, the district court resolved the claims between Seaver and Uninet. Seaver later filed a Nev. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion to set aside the settlement agreement and voluntary dismissal, seeking to proceed on their claims against the Helfsteins. The Helfsteisn filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction over them and that the Rule 60(b) motion was procedurally improper. The district court denied the motion. The Helfsteins then filed this original writ petition asking the Supreme Court to consider whether Rule 60(b) can be used to set aside a voluntary dismissal or a settlement agreement. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that even if Rule 60(b) applied in this case, the motion was time-barred. View "Helfstein v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Wynn Resorts filed a lawsuit against Kazuo Okada, a former member of the board of directors of Wynn Resorts. As part of the discovery process, Wynn Resorts noticed Okada’s deposition for over the course of ten days in Las Vegas even though Okada resides in Hong Kong and owns businesses in Tokyo, Japan. Okada filed a motion for a protective order, asserting that his deposition should presumptively be conducted in Hong Kong or in Tokyo and that the deposition should not exceed three days. The district court denied his motion. Okada filed this writ petition, contending that the district court ignored a common-law presumption that his deposition should take place where he resides that that the district court erred in departing from Nev. R. Civ. P. 30(d)(1)’s presumption that depositions should be limited to one day. The Supreme Court denied Okada’s request for writ relief, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in (1) rejecting Okada’s argument regarding the common-law presumption and in determining that Okada failed to demonstrate good cause for having his deposition moved to a location other than Las Vegas; and (2) departing from Rule 30(d)(1)’s presumptive one-day time frame and adopting Wynn Resorts’ ten-day proposal. View "Okada v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Appellants guaranteed a promissory note executed in favor of Respondent, which was secured by land in Arizona. The guaranties were executed in Nevada and contained a Nevada choice-of-law provision. After default on the note, Respondent filed a complaint in Nevada and then initiated foreclosure proceedings in Arizona. Respondent sought a deficiency judgment on the guaranty through its initially filed complaint. The district court concluded that because the property was located in Arizona and sold pursuant to Arizona law, neither Arizona’s nor Nevada’s limitations period applied for seeking a deficiency judgment, and therefore, the deficiency judgment could proceed. Judgment was entered in Respondent’s favor for $929,224. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because of the choice-of-law provision in the promissory note, Nevada law - particularly Nevada’s limitations period - applied in this case; and (2) Respondent failed to comply with Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.455(1) because it did not apply for a deficiency judgment within six months of the foreclosure sale, and therefore, the district court erred when it denied Appellants’ motion to dismiss the complaint as time-barred. View "Mardian v. Greenberg Family Trust" on Justia Law

Appellant, a Utah-based credit union, loaned an amount of money secured by real property in Mesquite Nevada to Respondents. Respondents later defaulted. Appellant held a trustee’s sale, resulting in a deficiency on the loan balance. Appellant sued Respondents in Clark County to recover the deficiency. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the action under Nev. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), alleging that Appellant could not sue to recover the deficiency in Nevada. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that the note and loan agreement contained language clearly expressing the parties’ intent to submit litigation relating to the note and agreement to the jurisdiction of the State of Utah. At issue on appeal was whether forum selection clauses in the loan agreement and note were mandatory or permissive. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the contract clauses stating that the parties shall “submit themselves to the jurisdiction of” Utah were permissive forum selection clauses, and therefore, the district court erred when it found that Utah was the sole forum for any controversy and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Am. First Fed. Credit Union v. Soro" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a law firm, was retained as counsel for a gaming company (“the company”) in a lawsuit against the company’s former employees and an entity they created. Petitioner prepared a second amended complaint adding real parties in interest (collectively, “Himelfarb”) as defendants. The jury rejected the company’s claims against Himelfarb and found for Himelfarb on its counterclaims. The district court eventually determined that the company would be liable for Himelfarb’s attorney fees and costs and determined that Petitioner was jointly and severally liable with the company for those fees and costs pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 7.085. Petitioner subsequently sought a writ of mandamus vacating the portion of the district court’s order making Petitioner jointly and severally liable for Himelfarb’s attorney fees. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding (1) Nev. R. Civ. P. 11 does not supersede section 7.085 because each represents a distinct, independent mechanism for sanctioning attorney misconduct, and therefore, the award against Petitioner was not improper; but (2) the district court abused its discretion in sanctioning Petitioner under section 7.085 without making adequate findings. View "Watson Rounds v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law