Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Procedure
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Appellants brought this action against BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, asserting fraud and consumer fraud. The district court granted BAC’s motion to dismiss but allowed Appellants leave to file an amended complaint. Thereafter, Appellants filed a first amended complaint, again asserting fraud and consumer fraud. The district court dismissed the amended complaint, allowing Appellants leave to amend. Instead of filing a second amended complaint, however, Appellants appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the district court’s order granting BAC’s second motion to dismiss was not final and appealable because it allowed Appellants leave to amend. View "Bergenfield v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff injured himself while bowling at a center operated by Defendant. After the deadline passed that had been for seeking an amendment of a pleading, Plaintiff filed a motion seeking leave to amend his complaint pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 15(a) seeking to amend his theory of liability. The district court denied Plaintiff’s motion, concluding that the motion was untimely and, furthermore, even if leave were granted, the proposed amendment would be futile “given the results of the discovery already conducted.” The district court subsequently granted summary judgment as to the theory of liability set forth in the original complaint. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) erred by failing to independently analyze whether the proposed amendment was timely under the standards of Nev. R. Civ. P. 16(b), which requires a showing of “good cause” for missing a deadline, before considering whether it was warranted under the standards of Rule 15(a); (2) incorrectly applied the futility exception to Rule 15(a): but (3) nonetheless reached the correct conclusion under the facts of this case. View "Nutton v. Sunset Station, Inc." on Justia Law

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In this insurance matter, the district court entered a final judgment and a post-judgment order. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of the district court. After the time for filing a petition for rehearing expired and no petition for rehearing was filed, the remittitur issued. Three days later, Appellants’ counsel filed a motion to recall the remittitur, claiming that he did not become aware of the order of affirmance due to technical difficulties created by a virus on counsel’s servers “as well as switching to a new case management system.” However, the court’s electronic record reflected that an official notice of the order of affirmance was sent to Appellants’ counsel’s electronic filing account, and an email was sent to two separate email addresses at Appellants’ counsel’s law firm. The Supreme Court denied the motion, holding that because Appellants’ counsel could have learned of the disposition in time to timely file a petition for rehearing, Appellants failed to demonstrate a basis on which the remittitur should be recalled. View "Fulbrook v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

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Appellant Rolland Weddell and nonparty Michael Stewart were former business partners. When disputes arose between the partners, they agreed to informally settle their disputes by presenting them to a panel of attorneys (Respondents). Respondents issued a decision resolving the parties’ disputes that was largely favorable to Stewart. Thereafter, Stewart filed suit against Appellant seeking a declaratory judgment that Respondents’ decision was valid and enforceable. Appellant proceeded to confess judgment. Appellant later filed this action against Respondents asserting causes of action stemming from Respondents’ conduct in the dispute-resolution process. Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint contending that dismissal was warranted on claim preclusion principles. The district court granted the motion, finding that the three factors for claim preclusion articulated by the Supreme Court in Five Star Capital Corp. v. Ruby had been satisfied. The Supreme Court affirmed after modifying the privity requirement established in Five Star to incorporate the principles of nonmutual claim preclusion, holding that because Respondents established that they should have been named as defendants in Stewart’s declaratory relief action and Appellant failed to provide a good reason for not doing so, claim preclusion applied in this case. View "Weddell v. Sharp" on Justia Law

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Father John Feeney was employed as a priest by the Catholic Diocese of Green Bay, a religious organization incorporated and headquartered in Wisconsin. Feeney later came to the Diocese of Reno-Las Vegas. John Doe 119 alleged that Feeney sexually assaulted him during Feeney’s time in Las Vegas and sued the Diocese of Green Bay for negligently hiring and retaining Feeney and for failing to warn others that Feeney was a danger to children. The district court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the Diocese and returned a verdict in favor of Doe on the negligence claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Feeney was not the agent of the Diocese of Green Bay during his ministry in Las Vegas; and (2) the district court did not have personal jurisdiction over the Diocese because the Diocese did not have sufficient contacts with Nevada. View "Catholic Diocese of Green Bay v. John Doe 119" on Justia Law

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Coyote Springs Investment, LLC and BrightSource Energy, Inc. entered into a lease. One year later, BrightSource sought to terminate the lease. Coyote Springs sued BrightSource, claiming that the lease’s termination was ineffective without payment of the termination fee. Before trial, the parties deposed Harvey Whittemore, the former co-owner and manager of Coyote Springs. During the deposition, Coyote Springs requested a recess in order to conduct a private conference with Whittemore. The trial commenced, and during cross-examination of Whittemore, BrightSource’s counsel inquired as to what was discussed at the deposition conference. Coyote Springs objected based on attorney-client privilege. The trial court overruled the objection, determining that the communication was not privileged. Coyote Springs petitioned for extraordinary writ relief on the deposition issue. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the communications between Whittemore and counsel for Coyote Springs during the break in Whittemore’s deposition were discoverable because Coyote Springs requested the recess in the deposition and failed to make a sufficient, contemporaneous record of the conference so as to preserve the attorney-client privilege. View "Coyote Springs Inv., LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

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The Nevada State Board of Medical Examiners filed an administrative complaint against Appellant, a physician, alleging that Appellant aided a third party in the unauthorized practice of medicine. When Appellant failed to comply with a Board-issued subpoena, the Board petitioned the Second Judicial District Court, located in Washoe County, for an order compelling compliance with its administrative subpoena. Appellant filed a motion to change the venue of the subpoena contempt petition to the Eighth Judicial District Court, located in Clark County, on the basis that she resided and practiced medicine in Clark County. The district court denied Appellant’s motion for a change of venue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the language of the statute governing venue for contempt petitions brought by the Board providing that venue is proper in “the district court of the county in which the proceeding is being conducted” means that venue lies in the county where the work of the Board takes place rather than the county where the conduct being investigated occurred. View "Jones v. State, Bd. of Med. Exam'rs" on Justia Law

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The underlying lawsuit sought redress for complications that arose in connection with a real-estate development project in Texas. Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant, a Texas-based law firm that was solicited by a Nevada client to represent the client on an out-of-state matter. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, contending that its contacts with Nevada were insufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing, inter alia, that Defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction because it agreed to represent the Nevada-based client. The district court denied the motion to dismiss. Defendant then filed this original petition for a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court (1) granted the petition insofar as it sought to vacate the district court’s order denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that Plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing that Defendant was subject to general or specific personal jurisdiction; but (2) denied the petition to the extent that it sought to direct the district court to grant their motion to dismiss because additional evidence may have been procured while this writ petition was pending that may support a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. View "Fulbright & Jaworski LLP v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Posted in: Civil Procedure
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Appellant filed an unpaid wage action against four defendants, including Video Internet Phone Installs, Inc. (VIPI). The claims against VIPI were severed from the rest of the claims and thereafter resolved. Appellant did not appeal from the order resolving the claims against VIPI but, rather, appealed from the order finally resolving the remaining unsevered claims before challenging two interlocutory orders involving VIPI. VIPI filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as to it. The Supreme Court granted the motion, holding (1) one must take an appeal from an order finally resolving severed claims, even if the unsevered claims remain pending; and (2) because Appellant failed to timely appeal from the order resolving the severed claims against VIPI, he could not now challenge the orders regarding VIPI in an appeal from the order finally resolving the unsevered claims. View "Valdez v. Cox Commc’ns" on Justia Law

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Real party in interest Michael Wiley brought a putative class action against Renown Regional Medical Center regarding its lien practices. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. After a hearing, the district court denied Renown’s motion and granted Wiley’s motion. Notably, the court found in favor of Wiley on two of his claims for relief even though the full merits of those claims were not specifically argued in the cross-motions for summary judgment or at the hearing. Renown then filed this original petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the district court’s order. The Supreme Court (1) granted the petition in part, holding that the district court erred by granting summary judgment on the two causes of action that were not argued in summary judgment briefing or in oral argument; and (2) denied the remainder of the petition. View "Renown Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law