Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Rolland Weddell and nonparty Michael Stewart were former business partners. When disputes arose between the partners, they agreed to informally settle their disputes by presenting them to a panel of attorneys (Respondents). Respondents issued a decision resolving the parties’ disputes that was largely favorable to Stewart. Thereafter, Stewart filed suit against Appellant seeking a declaratory judgment that Respondents’ decision was valid and enforceable. Appellant proceeded to confess judgment. Appellant later filed this action against Respondents asserting causes of action stemming from Respondents’ conduct in the dispute-resolution process. Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint contending that dismissal was warranted on claim preclusion principles. The district court granted the motion, finding that the three factors for claim preclusion articulated by the Supreme Court in Five Star Capital Corp. v. Ruby had been satisfied. The Supreme Court affirmed after modifying the privity requirement established in Five Star to incorporate the principles of nonmutual claim preclusion, holding that because Respondents established that they should have been named as defendants in Stewart’s declaratory relief action and Appellant failed to provide a good reason for not doing so, claim preclusion applied in this case. View "Weddell v. Sharp" on Justia Law

Father John Feeney was employed as a priest by the Catholic Diocese of Green Bay, a religious organization incorporated and headquartered in Wisconsin. Feeney later came to the Diocese of Reno-Las Vegas. John Doe 119 alleged that Feeney sexually assaulted him during Feeney’s time in Las Vegas and sued the Diocese of Green Bay for negligently hiring and retaining Feeney and for failing to warn others that Feeney was a danger to children. The district court concluded that it had jurisdiction over the Diocese and returned a verdict in favor of Doe on the negligence claims. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Feeney was not the agent of the Diocese of Green Bay during his ministry in Las Vegas; and (2) the district court did not have personal jurisdiction over the Diocese because the Diocese did not have sufficient contacts with Nevada. View "Catholic Diocese of Green Bay v. John Doe 119" on Justia Law

Coyote Springs Investment, LLC and BrightSource Energy, Inc. entered into a lease. One year later, BrightSource sought to terminate the lease. Coyote Springs sued BrightSource, claiming that the lease’s termination was ineffective without payment of the termination fee. Before trial, the parties deposed Harvey Whittemore, the former co-owner and manager of Coyote Springs. During the deposition, Coyote Springs requested a recess in order to conduct a private conference with Whittemore. The trial commenced, and during cross-examination of Whittemore, BrightSource’s counsel inquired as to what was discussed at the deposition conference. Coyote Springs objected based on attorney-client privilege. The trial court overruled the objection, determining that the communication was not privileged. Coyote Springs petitioned for extraordinary writ relief on the deposition issue. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the communications between Whittemore and counsel for Coyote Springs during the break in Whittemore’s deposition were discoverable because Coyote Springs requested the recess in the deposition and failed to make a sufficient, contemporaneous record of the conference so as to preserve the attorney-client privilege. View "Coyote Springs Inv., LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

The Nevada State Board of Medical Examiners filed an administrative complaint against Appellant, a physician, alleging that Appellant aided a third party in the unauthorized practice of medicine. When Appellant failed to comply with a Board-issued subpoena, the Board petitioned the Second Judicial District Court, located in Washoe County, for an order compelling compliance with its administrative subpoena. Appellant filed a motion to change the venue of the subpoena contempt petition to the Eighth Judicial District Court, located in Clark County, on the basis that she resided and practiced medicine in Clark County. The district court denied Appellant’s motion for a change of venue. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the language of the statute governing venue for contempt petitions brought by the Board providing that venue is proper in “the district court of the county in which the proceeding is being conducted” means that venue lies in the county where the work of the Board takes place rather than the county where the conduct being investigated occurred. View "Jones v. State, Bd. of Med. Exam'rs" on Justia Law

The underlying lawsuit sought redress for complications that arose in connection with a real-estate development project in Texas. Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant, a Texas-based law firm that was solicited by a Nevada client to represent the client on an out-of-state matter. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, contending that its contacts with Nevada were insufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing, inter alia, that Defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction because it agreed to represent the Nevada-based client. The district court denied the motion to dismiss. Defendant then filed this original petition for a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court (1) granted the petition insofar as it sought to vacate the district court’s order denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that Plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing that Defendant was subject to general or specific personal jurisdiction; but (2) denied the petition to the extent that it sought to direct the district court to grant their motion to dismiss because additional evidence may have been procured while this writ petition was pending that may support a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. View "Fulbright & Jaworski LLP v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Appellant filed an unpaid wage action against four defendants, including Video Internet Phone Installs, Inc. (VIPI). The claims against VIPI were severed from the rest of the claims and thereafter resolved. Appellant did not appeal from the order resolving the claims against VIPI but, rather, appealed from the order finally resolving the remaining unsevered claims before challenging two interlocutory orders involving VIPI. VIPI filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as to it. The Supreme Court granted the motion, holding (1) one must take an appeal from an order finally resolving severed claims, even if the unsevered claims remain pending; and (2) because Appellant failed to timely appeal from the order resolving the severed claims against VIPI, he could not now challenge the orders regarding VIPI in an appeal from the order finally resolving the unsevered claims. View "Valdez v. Cox Commc’ns" on Justia Law

Real party in interest Michael Wiley brought a putative class action against Renown Regional Medical Center regarding its lien practices. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. After a hearing, the district court denied Renown’s motion and granted Wiley’s motion. Notably, the court found in favor of Wiley on two of his claims for relief even though the full merits of those claims were not specifically argued in the cross-motions for summary judgment or at the hearing. Renown then filed this original petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the district court’s order. The Supreme Court (1) granted the petition in part, holding that the district court erred by granting summary judgment on the two causes of action that were not argued in summary judgment briefing or in oral argument; and (2) denied the remainder of the petition. View "Renown Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Steven Jacobs, the former chief executive officer of Sands China Ltd., filed a complaint against his former employer, alleging, among other things, breach of contract claims. Throughout discovery on the issue of whether Sands was subject to personal jurisdiction in Nevada, Sands maintained that it could not disclose any documents containing personal information that are located in Macau due to restrictions within the Macau Personal Data Protection Act (MPDPA). The district court subsequently issued an order precluding Sands from raising the MPDPA as an objection or defense to disclosure of any documents. Thereafter, Jacobs moved for Nev. R. Civ. P. 37 sanctions, arguing that Sands had violated the district court’s order by redacting personal data contained in its Macau-related document production based on MPDPA restrictions. The Supreme Court denied Sands’s petition for a writ of prohibition or mandamus, holding (1) the mere presence of a foreign international privacy statute does not itself preclude Nevada district courts from ordering litigants to comply with Nevada discovery rules; and (2) in this case, the district court properly found that the existence of a foreign international privacy statute did not excuse Petitioners from complying with the district court’s discovery order. View "Las Vegas Sands Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Petitioners, a corporation and an individual, were initially represented by an attorney at a local firm in the defense of a lawsuit. Before trial was scheduled to commence, the attorney resigned his employment with the local firm. Concerned that new counsel was not sufficiently familiar with the company’s case to represent it, Petitioners retained two out-of-state attorneys who had previously handled similar cases for the company. Petitioners then filed a motion to associate the attorneys. Although the attorneys met all of Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 42’s requirements for admission to practice, the district court summarily denied the motion on grounds that granting the request would delay the imminent start of trial and because Petitioners failed to show that out-of-state counsel were better able to handle the case than their local counsel. The Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus directing the district court to vacate its order denying the motion to associate pro hac vice counsel and to instead enter an order granting that motion, holding that the district court’s refusal to allow Petitioners to associate pro hac vice counsel who met all the requirements for admission was an arbitrary and capricious exercise of discretion. View "Imperial Credit Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

In the underlying tort action, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. The district court entered judgment on the verdict, resolving all issues except for attorney fees and costs. The district court subsequently entered an order awarding Plaintiff attorney fees and costs, which Defendant did not appeal. Thereafter, the district court entered an “amended judgment” incorporating the attorney fees and costs into the original judgment. Defendant then appealed the amended judgment. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the amended judgment was superfluous and could not be appealed because it did not in any way alter the legal rights and obligations set forth in either the original judgment or the order awarding attorney fees and costs. View "Campos-Garcia v. Johnson" on Justia Law