Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The underlying lawsuit sought redress for complications that arose in connection with a real-estate development project in Texas. Plaintiff filed this action against Defendant, a Texas-based law firm that was solicited by a Nevada client to represent the client on an out-of-state matter. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, contending that its contacts with Nevada were insufficient to subject it to personal jurisdiction. Plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing, inter alia, that Defendant was subject to personal jurisdiction because it agreed to represent the Nevada-based client. The district court denied the motion to dismiss. Defendant then filed this original petition for a writ of prohibition. The Supreme Court (1) granted the petition insofar as it sought to vacate the district court’s order denying Defendant’s motion to dismiss, holding that Plaintiff failed to make a prima facie showing that Defendant was subject to general or specific personal jurisdiction; but (2) denied the petition to the extent that it sought to direct the district court to grant their motion to dismiss because additional evidence may have been procured while this writ petition was pending that may support a prima facie showing of personal jurisdiction. View "Fulbright & Jaworski LLP v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Appellant filed an unpaid wage action against four defendants, including Video Internet Phone Installs, Inc. (VIPI). The claims against VIPI were severed from the rest of the claims and thereafter resolved. Appellant did not appeal from the order resolving the claims against VIPI but, rather, appealed from the order finally resolving the remaining unsevered claims before challenging two interlocutory orders involving VIPI. VIPI filed a motion to dismiss the appeal as to it. The Supreme Court granted the motion, holding (1) one must take an appeal from an order finally resolving severed claims, even if the unsevered claims remain pending; and (2) because Appellant failed to timely appeal from the order resolving the severed claims against VIPI, he could not now challenge the orders regarding VIPI in an appeal from the order finally resolving the unsevered claims. View "Valdez v. Cox Commc’ns" on Justia Law

Real party in interest Michael Wiley brought a putative class action against Renown Regional Medical Center regarding its lien practices. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. After a hearing, the district court denied Renown’s motion and granted Wiley’s motion. Notably, the court found in favor of Wiley on two of his claims for relief even though the full merits of those claims were not specifically argued in the cross-motions for summary judgment or at the hearing. Renown then filed this original petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the district court’s order. The Supreme Court (1) granted the petition in part, holding that the district court erred by granting summary judgment on the two causes of action that were not argued in summary judgment briefing or in oral argument; and (2) denied the remainder of the petition. View "Renown Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Second Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Steven Jacobs, the former chief executive officer of Sands China Ltd., filed a complaint against his former employer, alleging, among other things, breach of contract claims. Throughout discovery on the issue of whether Sands was subject to personal jurisdiction in Nevada, Sands maintained that it could not disclose any documents containing personal information that are located in Macau due to restrictions within the Macau Personal Data Protection Act (MPDPA). The district court subsequently issued an order precluding Sands from raising the MPDPA as an objection or defense to disclosure of any documents. Thereafter, Jacobs moved for Nev. R. Civ. P. 37 sanctions, arguing that Sands had violated the district court’s order by redacting personal data contained in its Macau-related document production based on MPDPA restrictions. The Supreme Court denied Sands’s petition for a writ of prohibition or mandamus, holding (1) the mere presence of a foreign international privacy statute does not itself preclude Nevada district courts from ordering litigants to comply with Nevada discovery rules; and (2) in this case, the district court properly found that the existence of a foreign international privacy statute did not excuse Petitioners from complying with the district court’s discovery order. View "Las Vegas Sands Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Petitioners, a corporation and an individual, were initially represented by an attorney at a local firm in the defense of a lawsuit. Before trial was scheduled to commence, the attorney resigned his employment with the local firm. Concerned that new counsel was not sufficiently familiar with the company’s case to represent it, Petitioners retained two out-of-state attorneys who had previously handled similar cases for the company. Petitioners then filed a motion to associate the attorneys. Although the attorneys met all of Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 42’s requirements for admission to practice, the district court summarily denied the motion on grounds that granting the request would delay the imminent start of trial and because Petitioners failed to show that out-of-state counsel were better able to handle the case than their local counsel. The Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus directing the district court to vacate its order denying the motion to associate pro hac vice counsel and to instead enter an order granting that motion, holding that the district court’s refusal to allow Petitioners to associate pro hac vice counsel who met all the requirements for admission was an arbitrary and capricious exercise of discretion. View "Imperial Credit Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

In the underlying tort action, the jury rendered a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. The district court entered judgment on the verdict, resolving all issues except for attorney fees and costs. The district court subsequently entered an order awarding Plaintiff attorney fees and costs, which Defendant did not appeal. Thereafter, the district court entered an “amended judgment” incorporating the attorney fees and costs into the original judgment. Defendant then appealed the amended judgment. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the amended judgment was superfluous and could not be appealed because it did not in any way alter the legal rights and obligations set forth in either the original judgment or the order awarding attorney fees and costs. View "Campos-Garcia v. Johnson" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Nev. Rev. Stat. 11.207’s limitations period, which the Supreme Court has stated in the past does not commence for a malpractice action until the conclusion of the litigation in which the malpractice occured. Claimants filed suit against New Albertson’s, Inc. for damages. New Albertson’s hired Brady, Vorwerck, Ryder & Caspino (BVRC) for legal representation, and BVRC assigned attorney W. Dennis Richardson to the case. New Albertson’s eventually settled the case. Over two years after New Albertson’s settlement with the claimants, New Albertson’s filed an attorney malpractice action against BVRC and Richardson. The suit was removed to the federal district court, which concluded that New Albertson’s action against BVRC was timely. The federal district court then granted BVRC’s motion to certify the question to the Supreme Court of whether 1997 amendments to section 11.207(1) rendered the litigation malpractice tolling rule obsolete. The Supreme Court answered that the two-year statute of limitations in section 11.207, as revised by the Legislature in 1997, is tolled against a cause of action for attorney malpractice pending the outcome of the underlying lawsuit in which the malpractice allegedly occurred. View "Brady, Vorwerck, Ryder & Caspino v. New Albertson’s, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioners found allegedly defective plumbing parts in their residences. Petitioners provided Nev. Rev. Stat. Ch. 40 prelitigation notice to the general contractor/developer, Centex Homes, informing it of the alleged defect. Centex forwarded the notice to various subcontractors and suppliers, including Uponor, Inc. Uponor declined to make repairs. Petitioners filed a complaint against Centex, and Centex filed a third-party complaint against numerous subcontractors, including RCR Plumbing & Mechanical, Inc. RCR filed a fourth-party complaint against Uponor. The district court stayed the proceedings and directed RCR to provide Uponor notice of the construction defectsafter Uponor moved to dismiss the fourth-party complaint against it based on lack of notice. Once RCR provided notice, Uponor made repairs. Petitioners sought an extraordinary writ arguing that neither they nor RCR were required to give Uponor Chapter 40 notice and an opportunity to repair prior to RCR’s filing of its fourth-party complaint. The Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus, holding that claimant homeowners or subcontractors are not required to give notice to other subcontractors, suppliers, or design professionals prior to commencing or adding an action against them. View "Barrett v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court " on Justia Law

Catherine Doan and Craig Doan divorced in 2003. The divorce decree did not include Craig’s Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) retirement benefit despite the fact that the retirement benefit was disclosed and discussed during the divorce proceedings. In 2009, Catherine filed a motion for division of an omitted asset after her attorney discovered that she was not receiving Craig’s FAA retirement benefits. The district court modified the final decree of divorce, concluding that Craig’s retirement benefits were omitted from the divorce decree because of a mutual mistake. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) an ex-spouse who does not file a motion for relief from a divorce decree within the six month period under Nev. R. Civ. P. 60(b) is not entitled to partition absent exceptional circumstances justifying equitable relief; and (2) under the facts of this case, Catherine was not entitled to equitable relief because the retirement benefit was adjudicated in the divorce proceedings. View "Doan v. Wilkerson" on Justia Law

Petitioners were two German limited liability corporations who were sued by a homeowners association for alleged construction defects in plumbing parts. Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaints, arguing that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over them because they had no direct connection to Nevada, did not manufacture or distribute the allegedly faulty plumbing parts, and had no responsibility or control over their American subsidiaries such that the subsidiaries’ contacts with Nevada could be imputed to Petitioners. The district court asserted jurisdiction over Petitioners, determining that the companies’ American subsidiaries acted as Petitioners’ agents and concluding that the subsidiaries’ contacts with Nevada could be imputed to Petitioners. Petitioners filed a petition for writ of prohibition challenging the validity of the district court’s exercise of jurisdiction over them. The district court granted the petition, holding that no agency relationship was shown in this case, and accordingly, the district court exceeded its jurisdiction in imputing the subsidiaries’ contacts to Petitioners. View "Viega GmbH v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law