Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Civil Procedure
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The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court determining that Respondent judgment creditor timely domesticated a foreign judgment in Nevada and that Respondent's accomplishment of actual service of the domestication notice on a later date did not affect the judgment's enforceability, holding that there was no error.Respondent domesticated the foreign judgment within the rendering state's statute of limitations but did not perfect service of the domestication notice on Appellant judgment debtor under the rendering state's limitations period for judgment enforcement had passed. The district court denied Appellant's motion to set aside the judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgment Act, a foreign judgment is enforceable in Nevada if the judgment domesticates the judgment according to the provisions of the Act within the rendering state's limitations period and complies with the statutory notice provisions of the Act; and (2) enforcement of the foreign judgment did not violate due process. View "Flangas v. Perfekt Marketing, LLC" on Justia Law

Posted in: Civil Procedure
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The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's application seeking a writ of mandamus precluding the district court from requiring adherence to an unconstitutional statute, holding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 52.380 violates the separation of powers doctrine.In 2019, the Supreme Court amended Nev. R. Civ. P. 35, which governs mental and physical examinations of a party that are ordered during discovery in civil litigation. Thereafter, the Legislature enacted section 52.380, which governs conditions for such examinations. Rule 35 disallows observers at certain mental examinations, prohibits the examinee's attorney from attending any examination, and allows audio recordings only upon a showing of good cause. Section 52.380, however, allows the examinee's attorney to attend and make audio recordings of all mental and physical examinations. The district court concluded that section 52.380 supersedes Rule 35 such that the real party in interest's examinations in this case must follow the statutory procedures. The Supreme Court granted mandamus relief, holding (1) section 52.380 is unconstitutional because it attempts to abrogate an existing rule of procedure that this Court prescribed under its inherent authority to regulate the judicial process; and (2) the district court manifestly abused its discretion by allowing the examinations to proceed under section 52.380. View "Lyft, Inc. v. District Court" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed the district court's award of attorney fees and costs to Respondent against Appellant pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 68 after Appellant rejected an offer of judgment and was unsuccessful at trial, holding that the district court erred.At issue was whether the district court improperly offset Appellant's settlement funds from a third party in favor of first satisfying Appellant's judgment for attorney fees and costs. The Supreme Court held that it did and reversed the district court's order as to the offset, holding (1) a party cannot make a claim for attorney fees and costs - and thus the district court cannot offset - against settlement funds from a third party that have not been reduced to a judgment; and (2) for an equitable offset to apply, there must be competing judgments between the parties that are mutually owed and mutually demandable. View "Harrison v. Ramparts, Inc." on Justia Law

Posted in: Civil Procedure
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The Supreme Court held that divorce jurisdiction requires mere residence - not domicile - and that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction in this case under Nev. Rev. Stat. 125.020.Appellant and Respondent married in Saudi Arabia. In 2018, Respondent obtained a student visa and moved to Las Vegas. In 2020, Appellant and the child obtained dependent visas and also moved to Las Vegas. Two months later, Appellant filed a complaint for divorce. Respondent moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that Appellant could not establish domicile - or intent to remain in Nevada - so that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction under section 125.020. The district court granted the motion, finding that, because residence is synonymous with domicile under section 125.020 and neither party had established domicile as a matter of law, dismissal was necessary. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) under section 125.020, residence means mere residence - not domicile - and Nev. Rev. Stat. 10.155 defines residence as physical presence; and (2) because Appellant had been physically present in Nevada for at least six weeks before she filed her divorce complaint, the district court had subject-matter jurisdiction under 125.020. View "Senjab v. Alhulaibi" on Justia Law

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In this case examining the proper scope of compensatory fines and attorney fees imposed as sanctions in contempt proceedings the Supreme Court held that a contempt sanction requiring the condemner to pay money to the complainant is civil in nature and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by holding Edward Detwiler in contempt but erred in requiring him to pay attorney fees incurred before his contempt began.In this case challenging the fraudulent sale of a vehicle, a Bank obtained an order requiring Detwiler to turn over certain cars. When the Bank was unsuccessful at securing Detwiler's compliance with the turnover order it moved to have Detwiler held in civil contempt of court. The district court held Detwiler in contempt and ordered Detwiler to pay the Bank's attorneys fees. Detwiler petitioned for a writ of mandamus or prohibition challenging the contempt order. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court may correct a mistake in naming a party that causes no prejudice; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by holding Detwiler in contempt; (3) compensatory sanctions for contempt are civil, not criminal; and (4) the district court abused its discretion by imposing an additional $100,000 sanction. View "Detwiler v. District Court" on Justia Law

Posted in: Civil Procedure
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The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Appellants' Nev. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1) motion, holding that the district court abused its discretion by failing to address the factors announced in Yochum v. Davis, 653 P.2d 1215 (Nev. 1982), when deciding the Rule 60(b)(1) motion.In denying Appellants' motion to set aside a sanctions order based on excusable neglect the district court determined that it did not need to consider the Yochum factors to determine if Appellants established excusable neglect because Yochum concerned relief from a default judgment as opposed to relief from an order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court abused its discretion by failing to address the Yochum factors; and (2) the district court must issue express factual findings, preferably in writing, pursuant to each Yochum factor to facilitate appellate review. View "Willard v. Berry-Hinckley Industries" on Justia Law

Posted in: Civil Procedure
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The Supreme Court held that a government entity does not have "possession, custody, or control" over the content on the personal cell phones of former workers hired through a temporary employment agency so as to be required under Nev. R. Civ. P. 16.1 to disclose that material.Petitioner, the State of Nevada Department of Taxation, entered into an independent contractor relationship with a temporary employment agency to hire and train eight temporary workers to rank the applications received for recreational marijuana establishment licenses. Real party in interest Nevada Wellness Center, LLC sued the Department alleging that the Department employed unlawful and unconstitutional application procedures in awarding licenses. During discovery, Nevada Wellness moved to compel the production of the temporary workers' cell phones for inspection. The district court granted the motion. The Department petitioned for a writ of prohibition or mandamus barring enforcement of the discovery order, arguing that the Department lacked "possession, custody, or control" over the cell phones pursuant to Nev. R. Civ. P. 16.1. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that the temporary workers' cell phones were outside the Department's possession, custody or control and that the district court exceeded its authority when it compelled the Department to produce that information. View "State, Department of Taxation v. District Court" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that it does not have jurisdiction to review a district court order denying a request for a joint preliminary injunction pursuant to EDCR 5.517 in a family law matter because no court rule or statute permits an appeal of a district court order denying a request for a joint preliminary injunction.After Husband filed for divorce, the clerk of court issued a joint preliminary injunction pursuant to EDCR 5.85 prohibiting the parties from disposing of any property subject to any community interest claim. After the district court issued a divorce decree the Supreme Court remanded the case to conduct proper tracing to determine community interests. On remand, Wife moved for the district court to reaffirm its prior joint preliminary injunction pursuant to EDCR 5.517. The district court issued a preliminary injunction for two assets subject to community property claims but declined to extend the injunction to other assets in a spendthrift trust. Wife appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that joint preliminary injunctions under EDCR 5.517 are not subject to Nev. R. Civ. P. 65, and therefore, orders denying or granting injunctions under EDCR 5.517 are not appealable under Nev. R. App. P. 3A(b)(3). View "Nelson v. Nelson" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court held that service of a petition for judicial review of an agency's decision does not require personal service under Nev. R. Civ. P. 4.2(a) because a petition for judicial review is best construed as a post-complaint filing so an alternative method of service under Nev. R. Civ. P. 5(b) will suffice.After Patricia DeRosa was fired by the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC), DeRosa requested a hearing. The hearing officer reversed the NDOC's decision. NDOC filed a petition for judicial review and served the petition on DeRosa by mailing it to her counsel under Rule 5(b). DeRosa moved to dismiss the petition for lack of personal service. The district court granted the motion, concluding that personal service was necessary under Nev. Rev. Stat. 233B.130(5). The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a petition for judicial review is best construed as a post-complaint pleading and that personal service is unnecessary and an alternative method of service under Rule 5(b) will instead suffice. View "State, Department of Corrections v. DeRosa" on Justia Law

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The Supreme Court reversed one of Defendant's convictions for robbery but affirmed the judgment of conviction in all other respects after adopting factors to guide the Court in deciding whether to consider an error's harmlessness despite the State's failure to argue it, holding that the district court's error in denying Defendant's motion to suppress was harmless.Defendant was found guilty of two counts of robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, murder with the use of a deadly weapon, and other crimes. The jury sentenced Defendant to death. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress statements he made during an interview with detectives before his arrest. The Supreme Court concluded that the district court did err by denying Defendant's motion to suppress. The Court then adopted three factors to help determine whether the Court should consider an error's harmlessness when the State has not argued harmlessness in a death penalty case. After weighing those factors, the Court held (1) sua sponte harmless error review was appropriate in this matter, and the complained-of error was harmless; (2) one of the convictions for robbery was not supported by sufficient evidence; and (3) no other issue warranted relief. View "Belcher v. State" on Justia Law