Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The gaming privilege in Nev. Rev. Stat. 463.120(6), which was enacted in 2017 through Senate Bill 376 and protects certain information and data provided to the gaming authorities, applies prospectively only and does not apply to any request made before the effective date of this act.The district court applied the gaming privilege to deny a motion to compel discovery. The information was requested through discovery before the effective date of section 463.120(6) but the motion to compel was filed after that date. The Supreme Court held that the district court erred because (1) the pertinent inquiry for determining whether the gaming privilege applied to the information was the date of the initial discovery request seeking that information and not the date the requesting party sought an order from the court to compel the opposing party to comply with that discovery request; and (2) the discovery requests were made before section 463.120(6) became effective, and therefore, the statute did not apply to the information sought by those discovery requests. View "Okada v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

At issue was whether untimely service of a petition for judicial review on the Attorney General mandates dismissal of the petition. The Supreme Court held (1) while service of a petition for judicial review on the Attorney General under Nev. Rev. Stat. 233B.130(2)(c)(1) is mandatory and jurisdictional and must be effected within the statutorily prescribed forty-five-day period, that time period can be extended when good cause is shown under section 233B.130(5); (2) the district court may exercise its authority to extend the forty-five-day period either before or after the service period has run; and (3) because the district court in this case did not determine whether good cause to extend the time to serve the Attorney General existed before declining to consider Appellant’s motion to extend the time for service, this matter must be remanded for such a determination. View "Heat & Frost Insulators and Allied Workers Local 16 v. Labor Commissioner" on Justia Law

The Nevada Supreme Court denied a petition for writ of mandamus and/or prohibition arising from a denial of a motion to dismiss in a foreclosure deficiency action. In this case, petitioners moved to dismiss the underlying case on the ground that it was time-barred by Utah's antideficiency statute. The court addressed the application of the antideficiency statutes in previous cases and held these cases provided that, in a deficiency action where the parties have an enforceable choice-of-law provision, before the district court applies the antideficiency statute from the parties' chosen jurisdiction, the court must first determine whether that statute, by its terms, has extraterritorial reach. Here, the court clarified that, if a party seeks to apply another jurisdiction's antideficiency statute to a Nevada deficiency action, and the courts of that jurisdiction have addressed the statute's extraterritorial application, the court will follow that jurisdiction's determination regarding this issue rather than independently construe the antideficiency statute to assess whether it can be applied extraterritorially. In this case, because the Utah Supreme Court already determined that Utah's antideficiency statute did not apply extraterritorially, that decision controlled. Therefore, the district court properly denied the motion to dismiss. View "Soro v. The Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

At issue was when it is appropriate for the Supreme Court to exercise its discretion to grant extraordinary relief in the form of advisory mandamus.In this petition for writ of prohibition or mandamus challenging the district court’s denial of Petitioners’ motion to dismiss, Petitioners asked the Supreme Court to direct the district court to vacate and reconsider its motion without applying the doctrine of cross-jurisdictional class-action tolling to their statute of limitations defenses. The Supreme Court declined to grant relief relief because (1) the district court did not consider the statute-based argument Petitioners made to the Supreme Court due to Petitioners’ failure to cite the statute until the hearing on their motion to dismiss; (2) this court’s clarification of the law would not alter the district court’s disposition; and (3) the district court’s decision to defer final decision on Petitioners’ statute of limitations defenses pending further factual and legal development was sound and not the proper basis for extraordinary writ relief. View "Archon Corp. v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied in part and granted in part a petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition filed by Petitioner, an attorney who was being investigated by the State Bar of Nevada for potential ethical violations after he testified at his personal bankruptcy proceedings that he had not implemented a reliable or identifiable system of accounting for his client trust account. The State Bar served Petitioner with two subpoenas duces tecum seeking production of client accounting records and tax records. Petitioner objected to the subpoenas, asserting his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The chairman of the Southern Nevada Disciplinary Board (Board) rejected Petitioner’s objections to the subpoenas. This petition for writ relief followed. The Supreme Court held (1) with regard to the requested client accounting records, this court adopts the three-prong test under Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968), to conclude that the right against self-incrimination does not protect Petitioner from disclosure; but (2) with regard to the requested tax records, the Board must hold a hearing to determine how the records are relevant and material to the State Bar’s allegations against Petitioner and whether there is a compelling need for those records. View "Agwara v. State Bar of Nevada" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed this appeal brought by Parent challenging the district court’s placement decision following the termination of Parent’s parental rights where Parent entered into a stipulation agreeing to the termination of her parental rights but reserving the right to participate in a contested pre-termination hearing regarding the child’s placement. The Supreme Court held that Parent lacked standing to challenge the placement decision because Parent’s parental rights were clearly terminated, and therefore, Parent no longer had any substantial interest that could be affected by the court’s placement decision. Further, the Supreme Court’s prior order denying writ relief did not confer standing on Parent. View "In re Parental Rights as to T.L." on Justia Law

The general rule of privilege between psychologist and patient set forth in Nev. Rev. Stat. 49.209 applies when a criminal defendant seeks records related to a patient who is court-ordered to partake in therapy.J.A., a minor, was placed on probation for soliciting prostitution. As a condition of probation, J.A. was required to complete counseling with Dr. Shera Bradley. Based on J.A.’s statements to the police, Dontae Hudson was charged with first-degree kidnapping, sex trafficking of a child under the age of sixteen, and related crimes. Hudson filed a motion for discovery, including requests for J.A.’s counseling records. The district court ordered that Dr. Bradley disclose J.A.’s counseling records for in camera review. Dr. Bradley filed this petition for relief in the form of a writ of mandamus or prohibition challenging the discovery order. The Supreme Court granted the petition and directed the clerk of court to issue a writ of prohibition ordering the district court to halt the production of the documents, holding that the psychologist-patient privilege applies to J.A. and Dr. Bradley’s confidential communications, and Hudson failed to show that an exception to the privilege applied or that the privilege was waived. View "Bradley v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

A post-judgment vexatious litigant determination may be considered in an appeal from an otherwise appealable order.In 2015, Appellant and Respondent were divorced via a divorce decree. Appellant subsequently filed several motions to reopen the decree and alter its terms. The district court eventually entered an order granting Respondent additional sums from certain accounts and declaring both Appellant and Respondent to be vexatious litigants. Appellant appealed. The Supreme Court questioned whether the portion of the order declaring Appellant to be a vexatious litigant was appealable where no statute or court rule appeared to authorize an appeal from such an order. The court concluded that it could consider the vexatious litigant determination in the context of this appeal because the post-judgment vexatious litigant determination was contained within an otherwise independently appealable order. View "Yu v. Yu" on Justia Law

Nev. Rev. Stat. 18.015, which provides for the enforcement of liens for attorney fees, as amended in 2013, provides for the enforcement of a retaining lien for attorney fees.Respondent represented Appellant in a paternity action. Respondent later filed and served a notice of a retaining lien against Appellant for $13,701 for unpaid legal fees. Respondent filed a motion asking the district court to adjudicate the rights of counsel, for enforcement of attorney’s lien, and for a judgment for attorney fees. Appellant argued that Respondent was asserting a charging lien, not a retaining lien, and that the purported charging lien failed as a matter of law. The district court granted Respondent’s motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the plain language of section 18.015 unambiguously permits an attorney to enforce a retaining lien; and (2) the district court did not err by enforcing Respondent’s valid retaining lien against Appellant under section 18.015. View "Fredianelli v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Both the general principles of claim preclusion and the terms in a Nev. R. Civ. P. 68 offer of judgment are implicated when a party seeks to relitigate claims after entry of a final judgment pursuant to the Rule 68 offer, even when they arise out of facts discovered during the Rule 68 offer’s ten-day irrevocable period for acceptance. Further, these subsequent claims are barred where principles of claim preclusion apply or, alternatively, where the terms of the offer of judgment indicate that such claims are barred.The district court in this case concluded that the doctrine of claim preclusion barred Appellants’ action. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellants’ claims were barred both by the doctrine of claim preclusion and by the terms of the offer of judgment between the parties. View "Mendenhall v. Tassinari" on Justia Law