Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Ajay, a recent immigrant from India with limited English proficiency, was investigated for alleged sexual assault and attempted sexual assault against a child under 14 in Reno, Nevada. The accusations stemmed from an incident involving a 13-year-old boy, A.P., whom Ajay met at his workplace and with whom he allegedly engaged in sexual acts. During a custodial police interrogation, Detective DeSantis read Ajay his Miranda rights in English. Ajay repeatedly expressed confusion, stated he was not good in English, and requested to speak in Hindi or have an interpreter. Despite this, DeSantis continued explaining the rights in English, using props and hypotheticals, until Ajay acquiesced and the interrogation proceeded, resulting in a confession.Ajay moved to suppress his statements before the Second Judicial District Court, Washoe County, arguing he had not knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights due to his limited English proficiency. At a pretrial hearing, Ajay testified through an interpreter, detailing his lack of formal English education and unfamiliarity with the American legal system. The district court denied his motion, finding the waiver valid and voluntary, citing DeSantis’s efforts to clarify the warnings and Ajay’s apparent understanding.On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed whether Ajay’s Miranda waiver was knowing and intelligent. The court found that Ajay's limited English skills and explicit requests for an interpreter demonstrated he did not understand his rights. The court held that law enforcement must recognize when a language barrier prevents meaningful waiver and provide an interpreter as necessary. The district court’s admission of Ajay’s confession was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt given its significance at trial. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the conviction and remanded for further proceedings. View "Ajay v. State" on Justia Law

While incarcerated at High Desert State Prison in Clark County, Brian Caperonis was killed by other inmates. His father, William Joseph Caperonis, acting individually and as the special administrator of Brian’s estate, filed a civil complaint against the Nevada Department of Corrections (NDOC) and several of its employees. The claims included civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, wrongful death, and various negligence claims related to Brian’s death.NDOC moved to dismiss the state law negligence claims, arguing that the estate had failed to exhaust administrative remedies as required by NRS 41.0322 and NRS 209.243. NDOC asserted that, as the estate stands in the shoes of the decedent, it was required to file an administrative claim before pursuing litigation. William opposed, contending that the exhaustion requirement applied only to living inmates and not to the estates of deceased prisoners. The Eighth Judicial District Court denied NDOC’s motion to dismiss, finding that the plain language of the statutes and the relevant administrative regulations did not extend the exhaustion requirement to estates of deceased inmates.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed NDOC’s petition for a writ of mandamus. The court held that the administrative exhaustion requirements in NRS 41.0322 and NRS 209.243 do not apply to the estate of a deceased prisoner. The court reasoned that the statutory language is limited to “a person who is or was” in NDOC custody and does not contemplate survival claims by estates. The court also found that the administrative regulations provide no mechanism for an estate to pursue such remedies. Accordingly, the Supreme Court of Nevada denied NDOC’s writ petition, affirming the district court’s decision. View "Department of Corrections v. District Court" on Justia Law

Steve Eggleston sued Clark County and Georgina Stuart, a social worker, alleging violations of his due process rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED). Eggleston claimed that Stuart coerced him into signing temporary guardianship papers for his children during an ongoing child abuse/neglect investigation by threatening that his children would be permanently removed from his care if he did not comply. Stuart and Clark County moved for summary judgment, arguing that their actions were protected by qualified immunity and discretionary-act immunity. The district court denied their motion.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Nevada denied the motion for summary judgment, leading Stuart and Clark County to file a petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the order. The district court found that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Stuart's conduct violated clearly established law and whether her actions were protected by discretionary-act immunity.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and granted the petition for a writ of mandamus. The court held that Stuart was entitled to qualified immunity on Eggleston's substantive and procedural due process claims because her conduct did not violate any clearly established constitutional rights. The court also held that Stuart was entitled to discretionary-act immunity on Eggleston's IIED claim, as her actions involved individual judgment and were based on considerations of social policy. The court directed the district court to vacate the order denying summary judgment and to enter an order granting summary judgment in favor of Stuart and Clark County. View "Clark County v. District Court" on Justia Law

The State of Nevada charged Matthew Desavio with a felony for making threats or conveying false information concerning an act of terrorism. Desavio was found incompetent to stand trial and was ordered to be transferred for competency restoration treatment. However, the State failed to transfer him, leading to a nearly 90-day delay. Desavio moved to dismiss the charge due to this delay, and the district court initially held the Nevada Division of Public and Behavioral Health in contempt and fined them, but eventually dismissed the criminal complaint without prejudice.The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County reviewed the case and dismissed the criminal complaint without prejudice due to the State's failure to transfer Desavio for competency restoration treatment. The State appealed, arguing that the district court lacked a legal basis to dismiss the case under the competency statutes and the recent decision in State v. Gonzalez. The district court found that the delay violated Desavio's due process rights, which constituted ongoing prejudice.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the dismissal without prejudice was appropriate to remedy the ongoing prejudice to Desavio's due process rights. The court noted that the district court had tried lesser sanctions, such as holding the Division in contempt and imposing fines, but these measures proved ineffective. The Supreme Court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the charge without prejudice, as it was a necessary step to address the violation of Desavio's due process rights. View "State v. Desavio" on Justia Law

Respondents John Arvanites and Jonathon Burdette, both peace officers employed by the City of Las Vegas, were involved in a disciplinary investigation. A City employee lodged a complaint against Arvanites, and Burdette was notified as a witness. The City referred the complaint to its Human Resources Department, and a human resources analyst conducted the interviews. Respondents, including the Las Vegas Police Protective Association, sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that NRS 289.060 required a ranked peace officer to conduct such investigations.The Eighth Judicial District Court of Clark County granted summary judgment in favor of the respondents. The court determined that the City violated the Nevada Peace Officer's Bill of Rights (POBR) by allowing a human resources employee to lead the investigation. The court declared that the City must ensure a peace officer conducts any interrogation or hearing in connection with such investigations and enjoined the City from using non-peace officers for these tasks.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that NRS 289.060(2)(d) requires a ranked peace officer to lead any investigation that could result in punitive action against another peace officer. The court found that the term "officer" in the statute refers to a peace officer, based on legislative history, statutory context, and public policy considerations. The court concluded that the City violated the statute by having a human resources employee lead the investigation and upheld the district court's order granting summary judgment for declaratory and injunctive relief. View "CITY OF LAS VEGAS VS. LAS VEGAS POLICE PROTECTIVE ASS'N." on Justia Law

The appellant, Barry Rashad Harris, was convicted of first-degree kidnapping resulting in substantial bodily harm, battery constituting domestic violence, misdemeanor assault, and battery resulting in substantial bodily harm constituting domestic violence, following a physical altercation with his girlfriend. He was sentenced to an aggregate term of 15 years to life. Harris filed a pro se petition for a postconviction writ of habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of pretrial, trial, and appellate counsel. The district court appointed postconviction counsel, who supplemented the petition with additional claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court set the matter for an evidentiary hearing.Due to a communication error, Harris, who was incarcerated, was not transported to attend the hearing. The district court proceeded with the hearing in Harris's absence, without a waiver from him of his statutory right to be present. The district court concluded that Harris had not shown ineffective assistance of counsel and denied the petition.The Supreme Court of Nevada found that the district court violated Harris's statutory right to be present at the hearing. The court clarified that counsel may not waive a petitioner’s right to be present at an evidentiary hearing on a postconviction habeas petition where the record does not indicate that the petitioner personally waived the right to be present. Because the record did not support a valid waiver of the statutory right to be present at the evidentiary hearing, the court concluded that the district court violated Harris’s statutory right to be present at the hearing. The court could not say that this error was harmless given the circumstances presented, and therefore reversed the district court’s order and remanded for a new evidentiary hearing. View "Harris v. Warden" on Justia Law

The case involves Jesse Calvin Gilbert, who was pulled over by a law enforcement deputy due to a non-operating license plate light. Gilbert was arrested on an active warrant, and the deputy conducted a warrantless search of the vehicle. During the search, the deputy found a handgun under the driver's seat. Gilbert, an ex-felon, was charged with possession of a firearm and moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the search was not a true inventory search but a ruse to conduct an investigatory search.The district court denied Gilbert's motion, finding that the deputy appropriately impounded the vehicle and the inventory search was reasonable. Gilbert appealed his subsequent conviction based on the search and the unsuppressed evidence.The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court's decision. The court clarified that an investigatory motive does not necessarily invalidate an inventory search as long as the search that occurred is the same as the inventory-based search that would have happened absent any such motivation. The court also stated that a court deciding a suppression motion must determine the search's reasonableness under the totality of the circumstances by evaluating the extent to which law enforcement departed from the standardized procedures, whether the scope of the search was as expected in light of the underlying justifications for inventory searches, and whether the inventory produced served the purposes of an inventory search. The court concluded that the search was reasonable and denied Gilbert's motion to suppress. View "GILBERT VS. STATE" on Justia Law

In the case before the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, the plaintiff, Steve Wynn, a prominent figure in Nevada gaming and politics, filed a defamation claim against the defendants, The Associated Press and its reporter, Regina Garcia Cano. The claim arose from an article that reported on two separate citizens' complaints alleging sexual assault by Wynn in the 1970s. The defendants responded with a special motion to dismiss the claim under Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes, which aim to protect the right to free speech and prevent meritless lawsuits intended to chill the exercise of these rights.The district court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that the article was a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to free speech in connection with an issue of public concern and that Wynn failed to establish a probability of prevailing on the merits of his claim. Wynn appealed this decision, arguing that the district court erred in its analysis under the two-prong anti-SLAPP framework.The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision. Under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis, the court found that the defendants had established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the claim was based on a good faith communication in furtherance of the right to free speech in direct connection with an issue of public concern.Under the second prong, the court clarified that a public figure defamation plaintiff must provide sufficient evidence for a jury, by clear and convincing evidence, to reasonably infer that the publication was made with actual malice. In this case, the court determined that Wynn failed to meet this burden. Hence, he could not establish with prima facie evidence a probability of prevailing on his claim, leading to the affirmation of the district court's order granting the defendants' special motion to dismiss the complaint. View "Wynn v. The Associated Press" on Justia Law

In the State of Nevada, Alexander M. Falconi, operating as the press organization Our Nevada Judges, petitioned against the Eighth Judicial District Court, the Honorable Charles J. Hoskin, District Judge, and parties in interest, Troy A. Minter and Jennifer R. Easler. Falconi challenged local rules and a statute that required certain court proceedings to be closed to the public.Falconi filed a media request for camera access in a child custody proceeding between Minter and Easler. Minter opposed the request, arguing it was not in the child's best interest to have his personal information publicly available. The district court denied Falconi's request, citing that the case was sealed and thus required to be private according to local rules.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada held that the public has a constitutional right to access court proceedings. The local rules and the statute, NRS 125.080, requiring the district court to close proceedings, bypassed the exercise of judicial discretion and were not narrowly tailored to serve a compelling interest. Thus, the court held that these local rules and NRS 125.080 were unconstitutional to the extent they permitted closed family court proceedings without exercising judicial discretion.The court instructed the district court to reverse its order denying media access in the underlying child custody case. The court emphasized the importance of public access to court proceedings, including family court proceedings, which historically have been open to the public. The court rejected the automatic closure of such proceedings and emphasized the necessity of case-by-case judicial discretion in deciding whether to close proceedings. View "Falconi v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct." on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada considered whether the Nevada State Engineer had the authority to combine multiple existing hydrographic basins into one "superbasin" for the purposes of water administration and management based on a shared source of water. The State Engineer had combined seven basins into one superbasin, the Lower White River Flow System (LWRFS), after determining that the waters of these basins were interconnected such that withdrawals from one basin affected the amount of water in the other basins. The State Engineer also found that the previously granted appropriations of water exceeded the rate of recharge in the LWRFS. Various entities who owned water rights throughout the new superbasin challenged the State Engineer's decision, claiming that he lacked the authority to manage surface waters and groundwater jointly and that his decision violated their due process rights.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada held that the State Engineer indeed had the authority to manage surface waters and groundwater conjunctively and to jointly administer multiple basins. The court also found that the State Engineer did not violate the rights holders' due process rights because they received notice and had an opportunity to be heard. The court reversed the lower court's decision that had granted the rights holders' petitions for judicial review and remanded the matter back to the lower court for further proceedings to determine whether substantial evidence supported the State Engineer's factual determinations. View "Sullivan v. Lincoln County Water District" on Justia Law