Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with burglary, robbery, and abuse or neglect of an older person. After the jury venire entered the courtroom for voir dire, Defendant’s counsel sought to strike the venire on the grounds that it contained no Black prospective jurors and thus did not reach a fair cross section of the community. After granting an evidentiary hearing but before holding it, the district judge sua sponte denied Defendant’s motion, concluding that the jury-selection process did not systematically exclude Black citizens. The jury panel was subsequently selected and sworn in and Defendant was found guilty of burglary and robbery. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s convictions, holding that it is structural error for a district court to deny a motion to strike a jury venire after granting an evidentiary hearing but before completing the hearing. Remanded for a new trial. View "Buchanan v. State" on Justia Law

Appellants filed suit in federal court seeking a declaration that Nevada’s Live Entertainment Tax (NLET) was facially unconstitutional for violating the First Amendment. The federal court dismissed the suit. Appellants then filed a de novo action (Case 1) in a Nevada district court seeking similar remedies to those sought in federal court and asserting an as-applied challenge to NLET. While Case 1 was pending, Appellants filed individual tax refund requests with the Nevada Department of Taxation on the grounds that NLET is facially unconstitutional. The Department denied refunds, and the Nevada Tax Commission affirmed. Appellants then filed a second de novo action (Case 2) challenging the administrative denials of their refund requests and asserting an as-applied challenge to NLET. The district court (1) dismissed Appellants’ as-applied challenge in Case 1; and (2) dismissed the entirety of Case 2 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Appellants failed to file a petition for judicial review after the completion of their administrative proceedings. This appeal challenging the district court’s dismissal of Case 2 followed. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as Nevada law required Appellants to file a petition for judicial review. View "Deja Vu Showgirls of Las Vegas, LLC v. Nev. Dep't of Taxation" on Justia Law

In 2003, the Nevada Legislature enacted the Live Entertainment Tax (NLET), which imposes an excise tax on business transactions completed at facilities providing live entertainment. Appellants, exotic dancing establishments, filed suit arguing that NLET was unconstitutional on its face and as applied. The district court ultimately (1) dismissed the as-applied challenge for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on Appellants’ failure to exhaust their administrative remedies; and (2) concluded that NLET did not facially violate the first Amendment. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Appellants’ as-applied challenge because Appellants failed to raise their as-applied challenge to NLET before the Nevada Department of Taxation; and (2) concluded that NLET does not violate the First Amendment as related to speech (i.e., dance), and therefore affirmed the district court’s summary judgment as to this issue. View "Deja Vu Showgirls of Las Vegas, LLC v. Nev. Dep't of Taxation" on Justia Law

Landowners filed a complaint against the City of North Las Vegas for inverse condemnation and precondemnation damages. The district court awarded Landowners precondemnation damages and attorney fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s orders with the exception of the prejudgment interest award, which the Court reversed, concluding that the district court erred in failing to calculate prejudgment interest from the date on which the resulting injury arose. The City sought rehearing of that order on the prejudgment issue and on issues concerning the statute of limitations and standing. Although rehearing was not warranted, the Court took the opportunity to clarify the relevant law, holding (1) the Court’s dispositional order properly concluded that prejudgment interest should be calculated from the date of taking, which was the first date of compensable injury; (2) the City could not raise its statute of limitations argument for the first time on rehearing, and even if it could, that defense was inapplicable to the facts of this case; and (3) rehearing was not warranted to clarify whether the City can assert a standing defense on remand. View "City of N. Las Vegas v. 5th & Centennial, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant, an inmate, filed a timely post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the district court denied on the merits. Appellant later filed a second post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant’s petition was untimely and successive, but Appellant argued he had good cause to excuse the procedural bars because his first post-conviction counsel had provided ineffective assistance by failing to present these claims in his first post-conviction petition. At issue in this case was whether, in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan, the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel may constitute good cause under Nev. Rev. Stat. 34.726(1) and Nev. Rev. Stat. 34.810 to allow a noncapital petitioner to file an untimely and successive post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court dismissed Appellant’s petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Martinez does not alter the Court’s prior decisions that a petitioner has no constitutional right to post-conviction counsel and that post-conviction counsel’s performance does not constitute good cause to excuse the statutory procedural bars unless the appointment of that counsel was mandated by statute. View "Brown v. McDaniel" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with sexual assault and possession of child pornography. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence found on his computer pursuant to a search warrant because the warrant did not comply with Nev. Rev. Stat. 179.045(5)’s requirement that a warrant include a statement of probable cause or have the affidavit supporting the warrant attached. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) pursuant to State v. Allen, failure to comply with section 179.045(5) triggers exclusion despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s contrary holding in United States v. Grubbs; and (2) in this case, the search warrant’s failure to comply with section 179.045(5) mandated exclusion of the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant.View "State v. Kincade" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of one count of first-degree murder, based on both premeditated and felony murder, and two counts of sexual assault. On appeal, Appellant argued that the district court committed clear error by overruling his Batson objection and allowing the State to exercise peremptory challenges against several minority prospective jurors because the State’s explanations for striking the venirepersons were pretext for racial discrimination. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court clearly erred by allowing the State to exercise a peremptory challenge to dismiss an African-American prospective juror, as it was more likely than not that the State struck the prospective juror because of race. View "Conner v. State" on Justia Law

In Carrigan I, the Nevada Supreme Court held that city councilman Michael Carrigan's vote on the Lazy 8 hotel/casino project constituted protected speech under the First Amendment. The U.S. Supreme Court held that Carrigan's vote on the Lazy 8 project did not constitute protected speech, thus reversing the Nevada Supreme Court decision that the First Amendment overbreadth doctrine invalidated the conflict-of-interest recusal provision in Nevada's Ethics in Government Law. On remand, Carrigan challenged the constitutional validity of the core conflict-of-interest recusal provisions in Nevada's Ethics in Government Law. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the conflict-of-interest recusal provision in Nevada's Ethics in Government Law is not unconstitutionally vague; and (2) the conflict-of-interest recusal provision does not unconstitutionally burden the First Amendment freedom-of-association rights shared by Nevada's elected officials and their supporters.View "Carrigan v. Nev. Comm'n on Ethics" on Justia Law

Respondent, Reno Newspapers Inc., submitted a public records request to Appellant, Public Employees' Retirement System of Nevada (PERS), seeking information stored in the individual files of retired employees. PERS denied Respondent's request, asserting that the information was confidential pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 286.110(3), which provides that the files of individual retired employees are not public records. Respondent filed a petition for a writ of mandamus seeking the requested information. The district court granted the petition, concluding that the requested information was not confidential and that privacy concerns did not clearly outweigh the public's right to disclosure. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed in part, holding that the district court did not err in ordering PERS to provide the requested information to the extent it was maintained in a medium separate from individuals' files, as other reports generated by PERS were not protected by section 286.110(3); but (2) vacated the district court's order to the extent the court ordered PERS to create new documents or customized reports by searching for and compiling information from individuals' files, as the individual files had been declared confidential by statute and were thereby exempt from requests pursuant to the Act.View "Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys. of Nev. v. Reno Newspapers, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of conspiracy, kidnapping, and murder charges. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court committed reversible error during the jury selection phase of trial. After the parties completed briefing on the matter, Defendant died. The district court appointed Defendant’s mother ("Mother") as his personal representative, and she substituted in as a party to the appeal. After the substitution, Mother filed a motion to abate Defendant’s judgment of conviction due to his death. The Supreme Court held (1) a criminal defendant is not entitled to have his judgment of conviction vacated and the prosecution abated when he dies while his appeal from the judgment is pending, but a personal representative may be substituted as the appellant and continue the appeal when justice so requires; and (2) in this case, Mother was entitled to continue Defendant’s appeal, and because of an error during jury selection, Defendant's conviction must be reversed. View "Brass v. State" on Justia Law