Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondent was in custody in county jail when officers discovered a cell phone hidden in a box beneath his bed. The State charged Respondent under Nev. Rev. Stat. 212.093(1), which, in pertinent part, prohibits prisoners, including county jail inmates, from possessing "any key, picklock, bolt cutters, wire cutters, saw, digging tool, rope, ladder, hook or any other tool or item adapted, designed or commonly used for the purpose of escaping" from custody. After being bound over to the district court, Respondent filed a pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking to dismiss the charge, arguing that section 212.093(1) was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and that, by its terms, the statute does not prohibit the possession of cell phones. The district court agreed with Respondent and dismissed the charge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that by its plain and unambiguous language, section 212.093(1) does not prohibit county jail inmates from possessing cell phones. View "Pershing County Sheriff v. Andrews" on Justia Law

In 2008, the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now, Inc. (ACORN) hired voter registration canvassers in Las Vegas. Under an incentive program, ACORN paid canvassers $5 a bonus if the canvasser returned twenty-one or more voter registration applications. The State subsequently charged ACORN and the supervisor of ACORN's field director for Nevada with several counts of violating Nev. Rev. Stat. 293.805, which prohibits providing compensation to voter registration canvassers based upon the total number of voters a canvasser registers. The supervisor entered an Alford plea to two counts of conspiracy to commit the crime of compensation for registration of voters, and was adjudged guilty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 293.805 triggers a less exacting standard of review than strict scrutiny; (2) the State demonstrated an interest sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation imposed on canvassing activities, and therefore, section 293.805 does not violate the First Amendment; and (3) section 293.805 is not unconstitutionally vague. View "Busefink v. State" on Justia Law

Respondent issued an eminent domain action against Appellants. The district court awarded Respondent possession of the property, and the jury found Respondent owned Appellants $4.4 million in just compensation. Appellants appealed and Respondent cross-appealed. While the appeals were pending, Respondent filed a notice of its intent to abandon the condemnation proceedings and a motion to vacate the judgment of condemnation. The district court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to enter an order vacating the judgment while an appeal was pending but certified its inclination to grant the motion to vacate based on its conclusion that Respondent was entitled to abandon the proceedings. The Supreme Court held (1) a public agency may abandon an eminent domain action after it has paid just compensation and the district court has entered a final order of condemnation, but before the resolution of issues pending on appeal; (2) the district court retains jurisdiction to address a notice of abandonment and motion to dismiss, even while an appeal of the matter is pending in the Supreme Court; and (3) thus, the motion to remand was denied as moot because a remand was unnecessary for the district court to decide the motion to dismiss. View "Gold Ridge Partners v. Sierra Pac. Power Co." on Justia Law

In 2002, Mandalay Corporation entered into a contract with petitioner Rolf Jensen & Associates, Inc., whereby Rolf Jensen would provide consulting services regarding construction of an expansion to the Mandalay Bay Resort and Casino (the Resort) in Las Vegas in compliance with the ADA. After the Resort expansion was constructed, the Department of Justice (DOJ) began an investigation of numerous violations of the ADA arising from a lack of handicap accessibility at the Resort. Thereafter, Mandalay entered into a comprehensive settlement agreement with the DOJ that required Mandalay to bring the Resort into compliance with the ADA. Mandalay subsequently sued Rolf Jensen in district court, seeking to recover the costs to retrofit the Resort. In its petition to the Supreme Court, Rolf Jensen sought a writ of mandamus to direct the district court to grant its motion for summary judgment to dismiss all of Mandalay's claims as preempted by the ADA. After examining the purpose and intended effects of the ADA, the Court concluded that Mandalay's claims posed an obstacle to the objectives of the ADA and therefore were preempted. Accordingly, the Court granted Rolf Jensen's petition. View "Rolf Jensen & Associates v. Dist. Ct." on Justia Law

Petitioner Jonathon Whitehead pleaded guilty to DUI causing death and DUI causing substantial bodily harm and subsequently filed a post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus. A panel of the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Whitehead's petition as untimely. Whitehead filed a petition for rehearing, which the panel denied. Whitehead subsequently petitioned for en banc reconsideration. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that reconsideration was warranted, holding (1) a judgment of conviction that imposes restitution but does not set an amount of restitution, in violation of Nevada statutes, is not final and therefore does not trigger the one-year time limit for filing a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus; and (2) Whitehead's post-conviction petition was timely under this analysis. View "Whitehead v. State" on Justia Law

Charles Huebler was convicted, pursuant to a guilty plea, of lewdness with a child under fourteen years of age. Huebler subsequently filed an untimely post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he had good cause for his delay in filing the petition because the State improperly withheld surveillance videotapes that were exculpatory, which rendered his guilty plea involuntary. The district court granted relief to Huebler. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State is required under Brady v. Maryland to disclose material exculpatory evidence within its possession to the defense before the entry of a guilty plea; (2) a defendant may challenge the validity of the guilty on the basis of the State's failure to make the required disclosure, but to succeed, the defendant must demonstrate the three components of a Brady violation in the context of a guilty plea; (3) as to the materiality component, the test is whether there is a reasonable probability that but for the State's failure to disclose the evidence the defendant would have refused to plead guilty and would have gone to trial; and (4) Huebler failed to demonstrate that the evidence was material under the materiality component. View "State v. Huebler" on Justia Law

After a seven-day jury trial, Kevin Rodriguez was found guilty of multiple criminal counts. Rodriquez appealed, arguing that the district court erred (1) in overruling his objection to the admission of twelve text messages because the State failed to authenticate the messages and the messages constituted inadmissible hearsay, and (2) in overruling his objection to the admission of DNA nonexclusion evidence because the evidence was irrelevant without supporting statistical data. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) abused its discretion in admitting ten of the twelve text messages because the State failed to present sufficient evidence corroborating Appellant's identity as the person who sent the ten messages, but the error was harmless; and (2) did not abuse its discretion by admitting the relevant DNA nonexclusion evidence because, so long as it is relevant, DNA nonexclusion evidence is admissible because any danger of unfair prejudice or of misleading the jury is substantially outweighed by the defendant's ability to cross-examine or offer expert witness evidence as to probative value. View "Rodriguez v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant Beau Maestas pleaded guilty to several charges, and a jury sentenced him to death for first-degree murder. Appellant subsequently sought a new penalty trial based on allegations of juror misconduct and bias, but the district court denied the motion. In these consolidated appeals, Appellant challenged the judgment of conviction and the order denying the motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding principally that (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 175.556 does not violate the Eighth Amendment because the relevant jurisprudence focuses on whether a capital sentencing scheme sufficiently channels the sentencer's discretion to impose a death sentence and does not afford the district court the discretion to impose a death sentence; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant's motion for a new trial because no misconduct or bias was proved. View "Maestas v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant Donald Bigpond was charged with battery constituting domestic violence. Before trial, the State filed a motion to admit evidence of prior incidents of domestic violence involving Bigpond and the victim. The district court reserved judgment on the State's motion until trial. During direct examination, the victim recanted her previous statements. The district court decided to admit the victim's prior allegations of domestic violence against Bigpond, determining that they were relevant to explain the relationship between the victim and Bigpond and provide a possible explanation for her recantation. Bigpond was convicted as charged. At issue on appeal was whether evidence of "other crimes, wrongs or acts" may be admitted for a nonpropensity purpose other than those listed in Nev. Rev. Stat. 48.045(2). The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the disputed evidence, as the victim's pretrial accusations against Bigpond placed their relationship in context and provided a possible explanation for the recantation, which assisted the jury in evaluating the victim's credibility. View "Bigpond v. State" on Justia Law

Michael Pohlabel pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 202.360. In doing so, he reserved the right to argue on appeal, as he did unsuccessfully in the district court, that his conviction violated the right to keep and bear arms secured by the state and federal constitutions. At issue on appeal was whether Pohlabel, despite his felon status, had a constitutional right to possess a black powder rifle. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 202.360(1)(a) does not violate either the state or federal constitutions; (2) while federal law currently permits felons to possess black powder rifles, that does not mandate that Nevada follow suit; and (3) the Legislature used the word "citizen" in Nev. Const. art. I, 11(1) to refer to those persons who are members of the political community, and thus, unpardoned felons are not included among those to whom the Nevada Constitution guarantees the right to keep and bear arms. View "Pohlabel v. State" on Justia Law