Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was convicted of three counts of sexual assault and three counts of sexual assault with the use of a deadly weapon causing substantial bodily harm. Appellant was sentenced to six sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for three of the counts, with each sentence to be served consecutively. Appellant subsequently filed an untimely petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his sentences and the manner in which they were imposed amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. The district court (1) granted the petition in part, determining that the petition was procedurally barred because the petition was untimely filed, but that new caselaw applied retroactively and provided good cause to excuse the procedural default; and (2) imposed three consecutive life sentences with the possibility of parole after ten years had been served. The Supreme Court reversed in part the district court's partial denial of Appellant' petition, holding that the court abused its discretion in failing to appoint counsel to assist Appellant in the post-conviction proceeding given the severity of the consequences, Appellant's indigency, and the difficulty of the issues presented related to the applicability and scope of the holding in Graham v. Florida. Remanded. View "Rogers v. State" on Justia Law

Paul Choy filed a complaint in district court alleging various tort claims against respondent Ameristar Casinos. According to the complaint, Choy was gambling at the Ameristar Casino Hotel Kansas City when he was handcuffed by casino security guards and his belongings were searched. Ameristar subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that it was not properly named as a party because Ameristar did not own or operate the Ameristar Casino Hotel Kansas City. In his opposition to Ameristar's motion, Appellant sought a continuance under Nev. R. Civ. P. 56(f) to allow discovery before granting Ameristar's motion. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Ameristar and denied Choy's request for a continuance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Choy did not comply with rule 56(f) because he did not attach an affidavit explaining why he sought a continuance of the summary judgment motion to conduct further discovery, and therefore, the district court properly denied Choy's request for a continuance; and (2) the district court properly granted Ameristar's motion for summary judgment because Choy failed to present any evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue regarding Ameristar's ownership or operation or Ameristar Casino Hotel Kansas City. View "Choy v. Ameristar Casinos, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant Edward Wilson pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and related felonies in the killing of an undercover police officer in 1979. A three-judge panel sentenced Wilson to death for the murder. In 2005, Wilson filed his third post-conviction petition, raising several claims for relief. The district court dismissed the petition, concluding that Wilson's claims was procedurally defaulted and that he failed to demonstrate good cause and prejudice. At issue on appeal was whether the Supreme Court's decision in McConnell v. State (McConnell I) in 2004 invalidated two of the aggravating circumstances used to make Wilson eligible for the death penalty. The Supreme Court concluded that McConnell I did not preclude the State from relying on the same predicate felony to support felony murder and felony aggravating circumstances when Appellant had pleaded guilty to first-degree murder based on both premeditated and deliberate murder and felony murder. Because the Court concluded that this and Wilson's remaining claims did not warrant relief, it affirmed the district court's order. View "Wilson v. State" on Justia Law

A jury found Appellant Eugene Nunnery guilty of multiple charges and sentenced him to death for a first-degree murder conviction. Nunnery appealed, raising numerous claims of error at the guilt and penalty phases of his trial and challenging his death sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding (1) the district court may allow an untimely notice of evidence in aggravation under Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 250(4)(f) upon a showing of good cause and that the relevant factors include the danger of prejudice to the defense in its preparation as a result of the untimely notice; (2) the confidentiality provision in Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.156 does not preclude the admission of presentence investigation reports at penalty hearings, and the admission of information in the reports is in the discretion of the trial judge; (3) the district court in this case did not err in declining to instruct the jury that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances before it could find Petitioner eligible for the death penalty; and (4) the death sentence in this case was not excessive. View "Nunnery v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant Stuard Stephans and a companion stole six bottles of men's cologne from a retail department store. At trial, the State relied on the store's loss prevention officer to prove both theft and value. The officer testified, over the defense's foundation, hearsay, and best evidence objections, that the stolen goods he recovered bore price tags adding up to $477. Neither the price tags nor duplicates of them were offered or admitted. In order to establish grand larceny, the State needed to prove that the stolen goods had a value of $250 or more. A jury convicted Stephans of grand larceny and burglary, both felonies, and conspiracy to commit larceny, a gross misdemeanor. The Supreme Court (1) reversed and remanded for a new trial on the grand larceny charge, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the officer's testimony, and the defense objections to the testimony should have been sustained; and (2) affirmed the judgment of conviction as to conspiracy and burglary. View "Stephans v. State" on Justia Law

Respondent Aaron Hughes faced several criminal charges for allegedly creating three digital videos of himself engaging in sexual intercourse with a seventeen-year-old. The district court granted Hughes' motion to dismiss one of the charges against him for child pornography, pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.710, after finding that the statute was vague and that it only applied to production of pornography involving individuals under sixteen years of age. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the term "minor" in the statute is not constitutionally vague because it has a well-settled and ordinarily understood meaning as an individual under eighteen years of age; and (2) under section 200.710, it is unlawful to use a person under eighteen years of age in producing a pornographic performance. Remanded. View "State v. Hughes" on Justia Law

Jerome Ford was convicted of pandering of prostitution pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 201.300(1)(a), which criminalizes the act of soliciting another person with the specific intent that, in response to the solicitation, she become a prostitute or continue to engage in prostitution. Ford appealed, contending that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the statute does not criminalize such a substantial amount of protected expressive activity as to be unconstitutionally overbroad, and statute is not impermissibly vague; (2) the statute applies even when the target is an undercover police officer who disavows having been or intending to become a prostitute; but (3) the jury instructions in this case did not adequately describe the specific intent required for pandering, and the error affected Ford's substantial rights. Remanded for a new trial. View "Ford v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant Ramon Adam was convicted of trafficking in a controlled substance. During trial, Appellant sought a jury instruction on the procuring agent defense, which generally provides that if a defendant is an agent of the purchaser, then the defendant should only be held as culpable as the purchaser. The district court rejected the instruction. The Supreme Court affirmed after reviewing the trafficking statute and prior caselaw, holding that the district court reached the correct result, albeit for the wrong reasons, when it refused to instruct the jury on the procuring agent defense. The Court further held (1) the procuring agent defense is inapplicable to trafficking charges, regardless of the theory the defendant is charged under, whether sale, manufacture, delivery, or actual constructive possession; and (2) any prior precedent inconsistent with this opinion was overruled. View "Adam v. State" on Justia Law

Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) was named as a defendant in an action alleging civil rights violations. LVMPD had an insurance policy with respondent Coregis Insurance to protect against liability for police officer actions when the damages exceeded a certain amount. Coregis denied LVMPD coverage for the civil rights claims because LVMPD did not notify Coregis of its potential liability until ten years after the incident that led to the lawsuit. After settling the action, LVMPD filed a declaratory-judgment action seeking a judicial determination that Coregis was required to defend and indemnify LVMPD for damages related to the civil rights claims. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Coregis, concluding that LVMPD's notice was clearly late and that Coregis was prejudiced by the late notice. The Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment, holding (1) when an insurer denies coverage of a claim because the insured party failed to provide timely notice of the claim, the insurer must demonstrate that notice was late and that it was prejudiced by the late notice in order to assert a late-notice defense to coverage; and (2) there were genuine issues of material fact regarding the timeliness of LVMPD's notice. Remanded. View "Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't v. Coregis Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Appellant Collie Hawkins was convicted, pursuant to a jury verdict, of conspiracy to violate the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. On appeal, Hawkins contended that the district court erred by rejecting his challenges to the State's peremptory challenges of three jurors as impermissible race discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding that the district court did not err by rejecting Hawkins' challenge because Hawkins (1) failed to show purposeful discrimination or pretext or to offer any analysis of the relevant considerations, and (2) offered no relevant argument on appeal other than a summary conclusion that the prosecutor's reasons for removing the jurors were pretextual. View "Hawkins v. State" on Justia Law