Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) was named as a defendant in an action alleging civil rights violations. LVMPD had an insurance policy with respondent Coregis Insurance to protect against liability for police officer actions when the damages exceeded a certain amount. Coregis denied LVMPD coverage for the civil rights claims because LVMPD did not notify Coregis of its potential liability until ten years after the incident that led to the lawsuit. After settling the action, LVMPD filed a declaratory-judgment action seeking a judicial determination that Coregis was required to defend and indemnify LVMPD for damages related to the civil rights claims. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Coregis, concluding that LVMPD's notice was clearly late and that Coregis was prejudiced by the late notice. The Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment, holding (1) when an insurer denies coverage of a claim because the insured party failed to provide timely notice of the claim, the insurer must demonstrate that notice was late and that it was prejudiced by the late notice in order to assert a late-notice defense to coverage; and (2) there were genuine issues of material fact regarding the timeliness of LVMPD's notice. Remanded. View "Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't v. Coregis Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Appellant Collie Hawkins was convicted, pursuant to a jury verdict, of conspiracy to violate the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. On appeal, Hawkins contended that the district court erred by rejecting his challenges to the State's peremptory challenges of three jurors as impermissible race discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding that the district court did not err by rejecting Hawkins' challenge because Hawkins (1) failed to show purposeful discrimination or pretext or to offer any analysis of the relevant considerations, and (2) offered no relevant argument on appeal other than a summary conclusion that the prosecutor's reasons for removing the jurors were pretextual. View "Hawkins v. State" on Justia Law

During a routine traffic stop, police officers developed what the district court found was a reasonable suspicion that the car's passenger, appellant Arturo Cortes, was armed and dangerous. The police ordered Cortes out of the car and subjected him to a patdown search, which produced the evidence underlying the conviction for possession of a controlled substance. Arturo appealed the conviction, urging the Supreme Court to reject the district court's finding of reasonable suspicion or to interpret the Nevada constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures more strictly than the Supreme Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment in Arizona v. Johnson. The Court saw no basis for departing from Johnson's application of Terry v. Ohio to traffic-stop frisks and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Cortes v. State" on Justia Law

David Saletta was found guilty by a jury of indecent exposure. After the verdict was published and in response to Saletta's request for a jury poll, the district court polled the jury. During the poll, the seventh juror dissented from the verdict, after which the district court continued its poll. The court then questioned the seventh juror about her reasons for changing her mind. Saletta moved for a mistrial, which the district court denied. The jury was ordered to resume deliberation, and a subsequent jury poll resulted in a unanimous verdict. Saletta appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that (1) the district court's polling method was not coercive under the three factors identified in U.S. v. Gambino; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by continuing to poll the jury after a juror retreated from the verdict under Nev. Rev. Stat. 175.531; and (3) the district court erred by questioning the dissenting juror, the error was plain, and it affected Saletta's substantial rights. Remanded. View "Saletta v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant Joonsong Jitnan and his wife instituted a personal injury action against Ryan Oliver for injuries arising out of an automobile accident. During the voir dire, appellants exercised a challenge for cause to a prospective juror. The district court denied the challenge for cause, and appellants subsequently exercised a peremptory challenge on the prospective juror. After the trial, Jitnan appealed, arguing (1) the district court abused its discretion denying the challenge for cause to the prospective juror, and (2) the court's erroneous denial of the challenge for cause required reversal because in using a peremptory challenge to cure the district court's error, appellants lost one of their peremptory challenges, which was prejudicial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when a prospective juror expresses a potentially disqualifying bias or prejudice and is inconsistent in his or her responses regarding that preconception upon further inquiry, the district court must set forth the reasons for its grant or denial of the challenge for cause; and (2) although the district court in this case failed to set forth its reasons for denying the challenge for cause, there was no prejudicial error requiring reversal because the jury that decided appellants' case was fair and impartial. View "Jitnan v. Oliver" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with a felony DUI, pleaded not guilty and went to trial where a jury convicted him. At issue was Nev. Rev. Stat. 484C.340, which allows a defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere to a first felony DUI to undergo treatment. The appellant argued that Nev. Rev. Stat. 484C.340 is unconstitutional because it impermissibly burdens exercise of the right to a trial and treats defendants differently based on their exercise of that right in violation of due process and equal protection. The district court determined that while there is a fundamental right to a jury trial for serious criminal offenses, there is no fundamental right to participate in an alcohol treatment diversion program. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the possibility of entering an alcohol treatment program is a form of leniency available in exchange for a guilty plea and does not penalize a defendant for exercising the fundamental right to a jury trial; and (2) all defendants charged with felony DUI are given the same protection of the law enjoyed by other classes in like circumstances, and therefore the statute does not violate equal protection. View "Aguilar-Raygoza v. State" on Justia Law