Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

During the COVID-19 pandemic, an employee in Nevada worked for a large retailer that required workers to undergo COVID-19 testing before each shift, following state emergency orders and workplace safety recommendations. The company did not pay employees for the time spent on these pre-shift tests. The employee filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, alleging violations of Nevada’s wage-hour statutes and the state constitution, including failure to pay for all hours worked, minimum wage, overtime, and timely payment upon termination.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada denied the employer’s motion to dismiss, which had argued that the time spent on COVID-19 testing was not compensable “work” under the federal Portal-to-Portal Act (PPA). The district court held that Nevada law had not incorporated the PPA, and thus the pre-shift screenings were compensable. The court then certified a question to the Supreme Court of Nevada, asking whether Nevada law incorporates the PPA’s exceptions to compensable work.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the certified question and determined that Nevada’s wage-hour statutes do not incorporate the PPA’s broad exceptions to compensable work. The court found that Nevada law provides only narrow, specific exceptions to work compensation, unlike the PPA’s general exclusions for preliminary and postliminary activities. The court concluded that the Nevada Legislature did not intend to adopt the PPA’s exceptions, as reflected in the statutory language and legislative history. Therefore, the Supreme Court of Nevada answered the certified question in the negative, holding that Nevada’s wage-hour laws do not incorporate the PPA’s exceptions to compensable work. View "AMAZON.COM SERVS., LLC VS. MALLOY" on Justia Law

The petitioner was convicted in 2016 of conspiracy to commit robbery, burglary, robbery, and first-degree kidnapping, receiving concurrent sentences including 8 to 20 years for robbery and 5 years to life for kidnapping. In November 2022, the Nevada Board of Parole Commissioners assessed him as a high risk to reoffend, denied parole, and scheduled his next hearing for January 2025. The petitioner requested a reassessment, arguing the risk level was incorrect. The Board found an error, reassessed him as moderate risk, and held a new hearing in April 2023, but again denied parole and rescheduled the next hearing for November 2025, nine months later than originally set.The petitioner sought a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada, arguing that the Board unlawfully punished him for seeking reconsideration by delaying his next parole hearing. He claimed this delay was vindictive and violated his due process rights, relying on the presumption of vindictiveness established in North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), and its progeny.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada held that the presumption of vindictiveness may generally arise in parole proceedings if the Board, upon reconsideration, extends the time before a prisoner may be considered for parole again. However, the court concluded that the presumption does not apply when the Board corrects its own error without prompting from an outside tribunal. The court further found that the petitioner failed to demonstrate actual vindictiveness. The Board acted within its statutory discretion in scheduling the next hearing, and the petition for writ relief was denied. View "Stewart v. Board of Parole Commissioners" on Justia Law

The case concerns the fatal shooting of Angel Rodriguez outside his home. Surveillance footage showed a silver Cadillac SUV near the scene, and eyewitnesses described the shooter as matching the build of Xavier Acosta. Acosta was identified as a suspect after a domestic violence incident involving his spouse, Rebecca. During the investigation, Acosta’s mother-in-law reported that Acosta confessed to killing Rodriguez out of love for Rebecca, who was Rodriguez’s ex-boyfriend. Police seized two cell phones belonging to Acosta and, after obtaining a search warrant, extracted their contents, which included a photograph of Rodriguez’s house taken minutes before the shooting. DNA evidence also linked Acosta to a Cadillac similar to the one seen in the surveillance footage.The Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County, presided over Acosta’s trial. Acosta moved to suppress evidence obtained from his cell phones, arguing the warrant was overbroad and unsupported by probable cause, but the court denied the motion. The court also admitted certain letters between Acosta and his wife and evidence of a prior domestic violence incident. The jury found Acosta guilty of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon, and he was sentenced accordingly.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case. It held that the warrant authorizing the search of Acosta’s cell phones was constitutionally deficient because it lacked specific facts establishing probable cause that evidence of the murder would be found on the phones. The court found that the district court erred in denying the motion to suppress this evidence and that the good-faith exception did not apply. However, the court concluded that the error was harmless due to overwhelming other evidence of guilt. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "Acosta v. State" on Justia Law

The appellant, Samuel Cocking, was skateboarding in Carson City with a concealed firearm that lacked a serial number. After tripping, he was ridiculed by a group of minors, leading to a verbal altercation. The minors' father, Philip Eubanks, approached, and Cocking shot and killed him. Cocking was charged with open murder, carrying a concealed firearm without a permit, and possession of a firearm not imprinted with a serial number. He pleaded no contest to involuntary manslaughter, carrying a concealed firearm without a permit, and possession of a firearm not imprinted with a serial number, reserving the right to appeal the constitutionality of the gun charges.The First Judicial District Court in Carson City denied Cocking's motion to dismiss the gun charges, ruling that the statutes did not violate his Second Amendment rights. Cocking was sentenced to consecutive prison terms totaling 43-108 months.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case. Cocking argued that the statutes regulating concealed carry and unserialized firearms were unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, as clarified by the U.S. Supreme Court in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n, Inc. v. Bruen. The court held that the concealed carry statute did not violate the Second Amendment because it only regulated the manner of carrying firearms, not the right to carry them openly. The court also held that the statute requiring firearms to have serial numbers did not infringe on the Second Amendment, as unserialized firearms are not typically possessed by law-abiding citizens for lawful purposes.Additionally, the court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion at sentencing by relying on impalpable or highly suspect evidence. The Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "COCKING VS. STATE" on Justia Law

A Nevada limited liability company, Mass Land Acquisition, LLC, challenged the use of eminent domain by Sierra Pacific Power Company, d/b/a NV Energy, to take an easement across its property for a natural gas pipeline. NV Energy sought immediate occupancy of the property, while Mass Land argued that such a taking by a private entity violated the Nevada Constitution and requested a jury determination on whether the taking was for a public use.The First Judicial District Court of Nevada denied Mass Land's motion to dismiss and granted NV Energy's motion for immediate occupancy. The court concluded that NV Energy, as a regulated public utility, was exercising delegated eminent domain powers and acting as the government, not as a private party. The court also found that the taking was for a natural gas pipeline, a statutorily recognized public use, and thus did not require a jury determination on public use before granting occupancy.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case and denied Mass Land's petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition. The court held that the Nevada Constitution's prohibition on transferring property taken by eminent domain to another private party did not apply to NV Energy's taking for a natural gas pipeline, as it was a public use. The court also determined that there were no genuine issues of material fact requiring a jury determination on whether the taking was actually for a public use. The court concluded that NV Energy's actions were lawful and consistent with the statutory and constitutional provisions governing eminent domain in Nevada. View "MASS LAND ACQUISITION, LLC VS. DISTRICT COURT" on Justia Law

Steve Wynn, a prominent figure in Nevada gaming and politics, filed a defamation lawsuit against The Associated Press (AP) and its reporter, Regina Garcia Cano. The lawsuit stemmed from an article published by AP that reported on allegations of sexual assault against Wynn from the 1970s. The article was based on complaints obtained from the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department. Wynn claimed the allegations were false and that AP published the article with actual malice.The Eighth Judicial District Court in Clark County granted AP's special motion to dismiss under Nevada's anti-SLAPP statutes, which are designed to protect free speech and petitioning activities from meritless lawsuits. The district court found that the article was a good faith communication related to an issue of public concern and that Wynn failed to show a probability of prevailing on his defamation claim. Wynn appealed this decision.The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that AP met its burden under the first prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis by showing the article was a good faith communication on a matter of public interest. The court also clarified that under the second prong, a public figure plaintiff must provide sufficient evidence for a jury to reasonably infer, by clear and convincing evidence, that the publication was made with actual malice. Wynn failed to meet this burden, as his evidence did not demonstrate that AP published the article with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth. Consequently, the Supreme Court of Nevada affirmed the district court's order granting the special motion to dismiss. View "Wynn v. The Associated Press" on Justia Law

The case involves a challenge to the constitutionality of several Nevada statutes regulating "ghost guns," or unfinished firearm frames or receivers. The respondent, Polymer80, Inc., a manufacturer of gun-related products, argued that the definition of "unfinished frame or receiver" in the statutes was impermissibly vague, making the statutes unconstitutional. The district court agreed with Polymer80, concluding that the definition did not clearly explain key terms or notify individuals when raw materials would become an unfinished frame or receiver. The court also found that the definition allowed for arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.The Supreme Court of the State of Nevada disagreed with the lower court's findings. The court found that the terms used to define "unfinished frame or receiver" had ordinary meanings that provided sufficient notice of what the statutes prohibited. The court also concluded that the statutes were general intent statutes that did not lack a scienter requirement and did not pose a risk of arbitrary or discriminatory enforcement. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's decision, holding that the statutes were not unconstitutionally vague. View "Sisolak v. Polymer80, Inc." on Justia Law

The case revolves around an initiative petition proposed by Nevadans for Reproductive Freedom (NRF) to establish a constitutional right to reproductive freedom. The petition would grant every individual the right to make decisions regarding all matters related to pregnancy, including prenatal care, childbirth, postpartum care, birth control, vasectomy, tubal ligation, abortion, abortion care, management of a miscarriage, and infertility care. Respondents Donna Washington and Coalition for Parents and Children challenged the petition in district court, alleging that it failed to meet statutory and constitutional requirements and sought to prevent the Secretary of State from placing the initiative on the ballot. They argued that the initiative petition violated the single-subject requirement because it considered multiple medical procedures, instead of being limited to only pregnancy or abortion. The district court granted the injunction, finding the initiative petition invalid for three reasons: it does not contain a single subject, its description of effect is misleading, and it requires an expenditure of money without raising the necessary revenue.The Supreme Court of Nevada reversed the district court's decision. The court found that all the medical procedures considered in the initiative petition concern reproduction and are germane to each other and the initiative's single subject of establishing a right to reproductive freedom. The court also concluded that the description of effect was legally sufficient and the initiative petition does not require an expenditure of funds. Therefore, the court held that the district court erred in preventing the Secretary of State from placing the initiative petition on the ballot. View "Nevadans for Reprod. Freedom v. Washington" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Nevada addressed whether the provision under NRS 62C.200(1)(b) violates the separation of powers doctrine. This provision requires the district attorney's written approval before a juvenile court may dismiss a delinquency petition and refer a juvenile to informal supervision. The appellant, a juvenile referred to as I.S., was adjudicated a delinquent and placed on formal probation. I.S. appealed, arguing that the provision infringed upon the court's sentencing discretion, essentially granting an unconstitutional prosecutorial veto.The court concluded that I.S.'s appeal was not moot, despite the completion of his juvenile supervision, due to the presumption of collateral consequences of such an adjudication until the juvenile reaches age 18 and/or their juvenile record is sealed.On the main issue, the court held that the requirement under NRS 62C.200(1)(b) does not contravene the separation of powers doctrine. The court reasoned that this provision does not involve a sentencing decision. Rather, the court perceived it as akin to a charging decision, which is within the executive realm. The court further noted that, unlike adult courts, the juvenile court's authority is not derived from the constitution but is limited to the authority expressly prescribed to it by statute. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's order, holding that the requirement for the district attorney's written approval before a juvenile court can dismiss a petition does not violate the separation of powers doctrine. View "In re I.S." on Justia Law

In this case, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada dealt with the issue of the scope of a valid search warrant and its implications under the Fourth Amendment. The appellant, Deva One Smith, was convicted of two counts of possession of a visual presentation depicting sexual conduct of a person under sixteen years of age. The case centered on the validity of a search warrant that officers used to seize and conduct a forensic search of Smith's cell phone.The court clarified that under Nevada law, an affidavit may be incorporated into a warrant to establish probable cause, but that affidavit cannot expand the scope of the search and seizure permitted under the warrant's specific language. Officers must search only the places authorized on the face of the warrant. In Smith's case, the officers had a valid warrant for his residence only; however, they seized his cell phone while he was outside his residence.The court found that the imminent destruction of evidence exigency justified the seizure of the cell phone. However, no other exigent circumstance allowed for the subsequent forensic search of the cell phone. The court concluded that because officers failed to obtain a warrant to search the cell phone, the search of that device violated Smith's Fourth Amendment rights. Therefore, the district court erred in denying Smith's motion to suppress the evidence found on the phone. As a result, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada reversed the judgment of conviction. View "Smith v. State" on Justia Law