Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant, who was a juvenile at the time he committed his crimes, was sentenced to serve fourteen consecutive life terms with the possibility of parole plus a consecutive term of ninety-two years in prison. In 2011, Defendant filed a pro se post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to Graham v. Florida. The district court granted Defendant’s petition and ordered a new sentencing hearing, determining (1) Graham prohibited aggregate sentences that were the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole, and (2) Graham also provided good cause and prejudice to overcome the procedural bar of Defendant’s untimely and successive petition. Although the Supreme Court agreed that Graham precludes aggregate sentences that constitute the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole against nonhomicide juvenile offenders and that the decision in Graham provides good cause and actual prejudice for Defendant’s untimely and successive petition, the Court nonetheless vacated the district court’s order, holding that A.B. 267 remedies Defendant’s unconstitutional sentence. View "State v. Boston" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and related crimes for the death of a member of a motorcycle gang after a brawl between two motorcycle gangs. The Supreme Court reversed Appellant’s judgment of conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the district court abused its discretion when it refused to answer two questions from the jury during deliberations; (2) the district court abused its discretion when it refused to bifurcate the gang-enhancement portion of the trial from the guilt phase; and (3) the cumulative effect of these and other errors deprived Appellant of his right to a fair trial. View "Gonzalez v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of violating Carson City Municipal Code (CCMC) 3.04.050. CCMC 3.04.050(1) makes it “unlawful for any person to hinder, obstruct, resist, delay, molest or threaten to hinder, obstruct, resist, delay or molest any…member of the sheriff’s office…in the discharge of his official duties.” Petitioner appealed, arguing that CCMC 3.04.050(1) is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague because it restricts constitutional speech. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court held that CCMC 3.04.050(1) is unconstitutionally overboard because is not narrowly tailored to prohibit only disorderly conduct or fighting words and is unconstitutionally vague because it lacks sufficient guidelines and gives the sheriff too much discretion in its enforcement. Remanded to the district court with instructions to enter an order reversing Petitioner’s conviction in part on the grounds that CCMC 8.04.050(1) is unconstitutional on its face and to determine whether Petitioner may properly be charged under the remainder of CCMC 8.04.050. View "Scott v. First Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Through the adoption of Nev. Rev. Stat. 630.356(2), the Legislature gave physicians the right to contest and the district courts the power to review final decisions of the Nevada State Board of Medical Examiners. In this case, the Board suspended the license of Appellant, a surgeon licensed in Nevada, for rendering services to a patient while under the influence of alcohol and in an impaired condition. The Board also issued a public reprimand and imposed additional sanctions. Appellant petitioned for judicial review of the Board’s decision and requested a preliminary injunction to stay the sanctions and prevent the Board, while judicial review was pending, from filing a report with the National Practitioner Data Bank. The district court denied Appellant’s injunction request, concluding that section 630.356(2), which prohibits district courts from entering a stay of the Board’s decision pending judicial review, precluded such an action. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 630.356(2) impermissibly acts as a legislative encroachment on the district court’s power to do what is reasonably necessary to administer justice, and this is a violation of the separation of powers doctrine. View "Tate v. State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs" on Justia Law

Ad America owned commercial rental property. When Ad America’s tenants were informed that Ad America’s property would be acquired for Project Neon, a freeway improvement project, Ad America’s net rental income decreased, and Ad America could no longer meet its mortgage requirements. Ad America filed an inverse condemnation action against Nevada’s Department of Transportation (NDOT), the lead agency for Project Neon, seeking precondemnation damages for alleged economic harm and just compensation for the alleged taking of its property. The district court granted summary judgment for Ad America even though NDOT had not physically occupied Ad America’s property or taken any formal steps to commence eminent domain proceedings against Ad America’s property. At issue on appeal was whether a taking occurred where NDOT publicly disclosed its plan to acquire Ad America’s property to comply with federal law, the City of Las Vegas independently acquired property that was previously a part of Project Neon, and the City rendered land-use application decisions conditioned on coordination with NDOT for purposes of Project Neon. The Supreme Court issued a writ of mandamus, holding that the undisputed material facts, as a matter of law, did not demonstrate that NDOT committed a taking of Ad America’s property warranting just compensation. View "State Dep’t of Transp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary, battery with intent to commit a crime with a victim sixty years of age or older, and robbery with a victim sixty years of age or older. During jury deliberations, the jury gave the court a note indicating that it was deadlocked. The jury was instructed to come back the next day and continue deliberating. The court failed to inform the parties of the note until the next day after the jury returned its verdict. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court’s failure to notify and seek input from the parties after receiving the jury’s note that it was deadlocked constituted constitutional error. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court violated Defendant’s due process rights by responding to the note from the jury without notifying the parties or counsel; but (2) the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Manning v. State" on Justia Law

Due to his behavioral problems, Appellant, then a minor, signed a “behavior contract,” under which he consented to random searches of his person and property in order to attend public high school. During a subsequent search of Appellant, a teacher found marijuana on Appellant’s person. Appellant was subsequently charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell. Appellant objected to the admission of evidence resulting from the search. The hearing master declined to suppress on the grounds that Appellant had consented to the search under the behavior contract. The district court then formally adjudicated Appellant a delinquent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State failed to demonstrate that Appellant’s consent to search was voluntary, as there was no evidence on the record that additional public education options were available to Appellant, and the State could not constitutionally condition Appellant’s access to a public education on his waiver of his right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure; and (2) therefore, the district court should have suppressed the fruits of the administration’s search of Appellant. View "In re L.A.W." on Justia Law

In two separate cases, Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted lewdness with a child under the age of fourteen. In the first case, Defendant received the maximum possible sentence. In the second case, Defendant again received the maximum possible sentence. The district court ordered that the second sentence be served consecutively to the sentence previously imposed in the first case. At issue on appeal was Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.035(1), which expressly permits a district court to order that a sentence for a first felony offense when a defendant has already been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for another felony offense, be imposed either concurrently or consecutively to the first sentence. Defendant asserted that section 176.035(1) was unconstitutional because it affords “virtually unfettered discretion” to the district court to determine whether sentences for separate offenses should be imposed concurrently or consecutively. The Supreme Court affirmed the sentence, holding that section 176.035(1) is not unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process Clause of the federal and state Constitutions, as the statute is comprehensible to persons of ordinary intelligence. View "Pitmon v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon and other related crimes. At trial, the jury was engaged in deliberations when the district court dismissed a juror and replaced that juror with an alternate juror. The court did not recall the jury to the courtroom or instruct it to restart deliberations. The reconstituted jury deliberated for several hours before convicting Defendant. A panel of the Supreme Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court’s failure to instruct the jury to restart deliberations when the alternate juror replaced the original juror was of constitutional dimension; (2) the error was subject to plain error review because Defendant did not preserve the issue; and (3) Defendant failed to demonstrate that the district court’s failure to instruct the reconstituted jury to restart deliberations rose to the level of plain error. View "Martinorellan v. State" on Justia Law

The Northern Nevada Correctional Center (NNCC) convicted Appellant, an NNCC correctional officer, of providing legal services for a fee (an “MJ29” violation). Appellant challenged the MJ29 discipline through an informal grievance followed by a first-level formal grievance. After Appellant was informed by NNCC’s associate warden that he had exhausted the grievance process on this issue, Appellant filed a complaint in district court arguing that NNCC, among other things, improperly filed the MJ29 disciplinary charge and violated his due process rights by refusing to hear his grievance appeals. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Appellant failed to exhaust the grievance process and that Appellant had no liberty interest in a disciplinary appeals process. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that the district court (1) erred in concluding that Appellant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; but (2) correctly determined that Appellant failed to state a due process claim. View "Abarra v. State" on Justia Law