Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Due to his behavioral problems, Appellant, then a minor, signed a “behavior contract,” under which he consented to random searches of his person and property in order to attend public high school. During a subsequent search of Appellant, a teacher found marijuana on Appellant’s person. Appellant was subsequently charged with possession of a controlled substance with intent to sell. Appellant objected to the admission of evidence resulting from the search. The hearing master declined to suppress on the grounds that Appellant had consented to the search under the behavior contract. The district court then formally adjudicated Appellant a delinquent. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State failed to demonstrate that Appellant’s consent to search was voluntary, as there was no evidence on the record that additional public education options were available to Appellant, and the State could not constitutionally condition Appellant’s access to a public education on his waiver of his right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure; and (2) therefore, the district court should have suppressed the fruits of the administration’s search of Appellant. View "In re L.A.W." on Justia Law

In two separate cases, Defendant pleaded guilty to attempted lewdness with a child under the age of fourteen. In the first case, Defendant received the maximum possible sentence. In the second case, Defendant again received the maximum possible sentence. The district court ordered that the second sentence be served consecutively to the sentence previously imposed in the first case. At issue on appeal was Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.035(1), which expressly permits a district court to order that a sentence for a first felony offense when a defendant has already been sentenced to a term of imprisonment for another felony offense, be imposed either concurrently or consecutively to the first sentence. Defendant asserted that section 176.035(1) was unconstitutional because it affords “virtually unfettered discretion” to the district court to determine whether sentences for separate offenses should be imposed concurrently or consecutively. The Supreme Court affirmed the sentence, holding that section 176.035(1) is not unconstitutionally vague in violation of the Due Process Clause of the federal and state Constitutions, as the statute is comprehensible to persons of ordinary intelligence. View "Pitmon v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon and other related crimes. At trial, the jury was engaged in deliberations when the district court dismissed a juror and replaced that juror with an alternate juror. The court did not recall the jury to the courtroom or instruct it to restart deliberations. The reconstituted jury deliberated for several hours before convicting Defendant. A panel of the Supreme Court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court’s failure to instruct the jury to restart deliberations when the alternate juror replaced the original juror was of constitutional dimension; (2) the error was subject to plain error review because Defendant did not preserve the issue; and (3) Defendant failed to demonstrate that the district court’s failure to instruct the reconstituted jury to restart deliberations rose to the level of plain error. View "Martinorellan v. State" on Justia Law

The Northern Nevada Correctional Center (NNCC) convicted Appellant, an NNCC correctional officer, of providing legal services for a fee (an “MJ29” violation). Appellant challenged the MJ29 discipline through an informal grievance followed by a first-level formal grievance. After Appellant was informed by NNCC’s associate warden that he had exhausted the grievance process on this issue, Appellant filed a complaint in district court arguing that NNCC, among other things, improperly filed the MJ29 disciplinary charge and violated his due process rights by refusing to hear his grievance appeals. The district court dismissed the complaint, concluding that Appellant failed to exhaust the grievance process and that Appellant had no liberty interest in a disciplinary appeals process. The Supreme Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded, holding that the district court (1) erred in concluding that Appellant failed to exhaust his administrative remedies; but (2) correctly determined that Appellant failed to state a due process claim. View "Abarra v. State" on Justia Law

The City of North Las Vegas publicly announced its intent to condemn a portion of Appellant’s land but delayed condemning the property. Appellant sold the property before it was condemned. Appellant filed a complaint against the City for inverse condemnation and precondemnation proceedings. The district court granted the City’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. In Buzz Stew I, the Supreme Court (1) reversed as to Appellant’s precondemnation damages claim, concluding that questions of fact remained regarding whether the City’s actions were unreasoanble and injurious; and (2) affirmed the dismissal of the inverse condemnation claim because Appellant had not stated a takings claim upon which relief could be granted. On remand, the jury returned a verdict for the City, finding that the City’s delay was not unreasonable. On appeal, Appellant contended that newly discovered evidence presented at trial demonstrated that a taking of its property occurred and that a new trial was required due to errors made with regard to the precondemnation claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the evidence presented at trial did not establish that a taking occurred while Appellant maintained an interest in the property; and (2) no error made below warranted a new trial. View "Buzz Stew, LLC v. City of N. Las Vegas" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with being an ex-felon in possession of a firearm, receiving or possessing stolen goods, and carrying a concealed weapon. Defendant moved to suppress the handgun evidence and to dismiss the charges, arguing that his detention after a law enforcement officer confirmed that he was not in violation of curfew was unconstitutional and, therefore, the encounter evolved into an illegal seizure that resulted in the discovery of the firearm. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the officer’s continued detention of Defendant, after he dispelled any suspicion that Defendant was committing a crime, constituted an illegal seizure and should have been suppressed because no intervening circumstance purged the taint of the illegal seizure. View "Torres v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder. Defendant’s theory of defense was that another man, Robert Belsey, killed the victim. In furtherance of his theories, Defendant designated an expert to testify on police interrogation techniques to establish that Defendant falsely incriminated himself. Defendant also sought to introduce evidence of two incidents of domestic violence in which Belsey had previously been involved. The district court excluded the evidence. The Supreme Court affirmed with the exception of a correction ordered with respect to the appropriate restitution, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the evidence; and (2) two unobjected-to comments by the district judge that Defendant asserted improperly vouched for a police officer’s credibility and disparaged the defense did not amount to plain error. View "Brant v. State" on Justia Law

NV Energy owns and operates electricity-generating plants in Nevada. NV Energy fueled two of those plants with coal obtained from mines outside Nevada and paid a use tax for its coal consumption pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 372.185. NV Energy petitioned the State Department of Taxation for a refund for the use taxes it paid on coal purchased over a four-year period, arguing that the Nev. Rev. Stat. 372.270 exemption from the use tax for locally produced mine and mineral proceeds discriminates against interstate commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. The district court concluded that the exemption violated the Commerce Clause and struck the statute in its entirety but refused to award NV Energy any refund. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 372.270 is not severable; and (2) because NV Energy did not have any competitors who received the tax benefit, the tax scheme did not actually discriminate against interstate commerce, and therefore, NV Energy was not entitled to a refund. View "Sierra Pac. Power Co. v. State, Dep’t of Taxation" on Justia Law

Defendant was stopped for speeding and admitted to having smoked marijuana five hours before the stop. Law enforcement officers informed Defendant that they would perform a blood draw, during which Defendant struggled by striking two officers. The blood draw showed that Defendant had THC in his blood. Defendant was charged with unlawful use or being under the influence of a controlled substance, among other offenses. Defendant was convicted of all counts. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the warrantless blood draw violated the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court held (1) the natural dissipation of marijuana in the blood stream does not constitute a per se exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless search; (2) Nev. Rev. Stat. 484C.160(7), which permits officers to use force to obtain a blood sample from a person, is unconstitutional, and the blood draw in this case was unlawful because Defendant did not submit to it; but (3) because the blood draw was taken in good faith, the exclusionary rule did not apply, and the Fourth Amendment violation therefore did not warrant reversal of the judgment of conviction. View "Byars v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of first-degree kidnapping and first-degree murder of his wife. Appellant was sentenced to death for the murder. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding (1) the district court did not clearly err in concluding that the State’s use of six of its nine peremptory challenges to remove female veniremembers did not give rise to an inference of gender discrimination, and the State’s use of a peremptory challenge to exclude an African-American veniremember did not violate Batson v. Kentucky; (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion to represent himself; (4) the district court did not plainly err in instructing the jury regarding the definition of mitigation; and (5) the remainder of Appellant’s allegations of error were without merit. View "Watson v. State" on Justia Law