Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

NV Energy owns and operates electricity-generating plants in Nevada. NV Energy fueled two of those plants with coal obtained from mines outside Nevada and paid a use tax for its coal consumption pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 372.185. NV Energy petitioned the State Department of Taxation for a refund for the use taxes it paid on coal purchased over a four-year period, arguing that the Nev. Rev. Stat. 372.270 exemption from the use tax for locally produced mine and mineral proceeds discriminates against interstate commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause. The district court concluded that the exemption violated the Commerce Clause and struck the statute in its entirety but refused to award NV Energy any refund. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 372.270 is not severable; and (2) because NV Energy did not have any competitors who received the tax benefit, the tax scheme did not actually discriminate against interstate commerce, and therefore, NV Energy was not entitled to a refund. View "Sierra Pac. Power Co. v. State, Dep’t of Taxation" on Justia Law

Defendant was stopped for speeding and admitted to having smoked marijuana five hours before the stop. Law enforcement officers informed Defendant that they would perform a blood draw, during which Defendant struggled by striking two officers. The blood draw showed that Defendant had THC in his blood. Defendant was charged with unlawful use or being under the influence of a controlled substance, among other offenses. Defendant was convicted of all counts. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the warrantless blood draw violated the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court held (1) the natural dissipation of marijuana in the blood stream does not constitute a per se exigent circumstance justifying a warrantless search; (2) Nev. Rev. Stat. 484C.160(7), which permits officers to use force to obtain a blood sample from a person, is unconstitutional, and the blood draw in this case was unlawful because Defendant did not submit to it; but (3) because the blood draw was taken in good faith, the exclusionary rule did not apply, and the Fourth Amendment violation therefore did not warrant reversal of the judgment of conviction. View "Byars v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of first-degree kidnapping and first-degree murder of his wife. Appellant was sentenced to death for the murder. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding (1) the district court did not clearly err in concluding that the State’s use of six of its nine peremptory challenges to remove female veniremembers did not give rise to an inference of gender discrimination, and the State’s use of a peremptory challenge to exclude an African-American veniremember did not violate Batson v. Kentucky; (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s motion to represent himself; (4) the district court did not plainly err in instructing the jury regarding the definition of mitigation; and (5) the remainder of Appellant’s allegations of error were without merit. View "Watson v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with burglary, robbery, and abuse or neglect of an older person. After the jury venire entered the courtroom for voir dire, Defendant’s counsel sought to strike the venire on the grounds that it contained no Black prospective jurors and thus did not reach a fair cross section of the community. After granting an evidentiary hearing but before holding it, the district judge sua sponte denied Defendant’s motion, concluding that the jury-selection process did not systematically exclude Black citizens. The jury panel was subsequently selected and sworn in and Defendant was found guilty of burglary and robbery. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s convictions, holding that it is structural error for a district court to deny a motion to strike a jury venire after granting an evidentiary hearing but before completing the hearing. Remanded for a new trial. View "Buchanan v. State" on Justia Law

Appellants filed suit in federal court seeking a declaration that Nevada’s Live Entertainment Tax (NLET) was facially unconstitutional for violating the First Amendment. The federal court dismissed the suit. Appellants then filed a de novo action (Case 1) in a Nevada district court seeking similar remedies to those sought in federal court and asserting an as-applied challenge to NLET. While Case 1 was pending, Appellants filed individual tax refund requests with the Nevada Department of Taxation on the grounds that NLET is facially unconstitutional. The Department denied refunds, and the Nevada Tax Commission affirmed. Appellants then filed a second de novo action (Case 2) challenging the administrative denials of their refund requests and asserting an as-applied challenge to NLET. The district court (1) dismissed Appellants’ as-applied challenge in Case 1; and (2) dismissed the entirety of Case 2 for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because Appellants failed to file a petition for judicial review after the completion of their administrative proceedings. This appeal challenging the district court’s dismissal of Case 2 followed. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as Nevada law required Appellants to file a petition for judicial review. View "Deja Vu Showgirls of Las Vegas, LLC v. Nev. Dep't of Taxation" on Justia Law

In 2003, the Nevada Legislature enacted the Live Entertainment Tax (NLET), which imposes an excise tax on business transactions completed at facilities providing live entertainment. Appellants, exotic dancing establishments, filed suit arguing that NLET was unconstitutional on its face and as applied. The district court ultimately (1) dismissed the as-applied challenge for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on Appellants’ failure to exhaust their administrative remedies; and (2) concluded that NLET did not facially violate the first Amendment. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Appellants’ as-applied challenge because Appellants failed to raise their as-applied challenge to NLET before the Nevada Department of Taxation; and (2) concluded that NLET does not violate the First Amendment as related to speech (i.e., dance), and therefore affirmed the district court’s summary judgment as to this issue. View "Deja Vu Showgirls of Las Vegas, LLC v. Nev. Dep't of Taxation" on Justia Law

Landowners filed a complaint against the City of North Las Vegas for inverse condemnation and precondemnation damages. The district court awarded Landowners precondemnation damages and attorney fees, costs, and prejudgment interest. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s orders with the exception of the prejudgment interest award, which the Court reversed, concluding that the district court erred in failing to calculate prejudgment interest from the date on which the resulting injury arose. The City sought rehearing of that order on the prejudgment issue and on issues concerning the statute of limitations and standing. Although rehearing was not warranted, the Court took the opportunity to clarify the relevant law, holding (1) the Court’s dispositional order properly concluded that prejudgment interest should be calculated from the date of taking, which was the first date of compensable injury; (2) the City could not raise its statute of limitations argument for the first time on rehearing, and even if it could, that defense was inapplicable to the facts of this case; and (3) rehearing was not warranted to clarify whether the City can assert a standing defense on remand. View "City of N. Las Vegas v. 5th & Centennial, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant, an inmate, filed a timely post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus, which the district court denied on the merits. Appellant later filed a second post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Appellant’s petition was untimely and successive, but Appellant argued he had good cause to excuse the procedural bars because his first post-conviction counsel had provided ineffective assistance by failing to present these claims in his first post-conviction petition. At issue in this case was whether, in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Martinez v. Ryan, the ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel may constitute good cause under Nev. Rev. Stat. 34.726(1) and Nev. Rev. Stat. 34.810 to allow a noncapital petitioner to file an untimely and successive post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court dismissed Appellant’s petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Martinez does not alter the Court’s prior decisions that a petitioner has no constitutional right to post-conviction counsel and that post-conviction counsel’s performance does not constitute good cause to excuse the statutory procedural bars unless the appointment of that counsel was mandated by statute. View "Brown v. McDaniel" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with sexual assault and possession of child pornography. Defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence found on his computer pursuant to a search warrant because the warrant did not comply with Nev. Rev. Stat. 179.045(5)’s requirement that a warrant include a statement of probable cause or have the affidavit supporting the warrant attached. The district court granted the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) pursuant to State v. Allen, failure to comply with section 179.045(5) triggers exclusion despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s contrary holding in United States v. Grubbs; and (2) in this case, the search warrant’s failure to comply with section 179.045(5) mandated exclusion of the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant.View "State v. Kincade" on Justia Law

Appellants, two taxicab drivers, brought an action against Respondents, taxicab companies, claiming damages for unpaid wages pursuant to the Minimum Wage Amendment, a constitutional amendment that revised Nevada’s then-statutory minimum wage scheme. The district court granted Respondents’ motion to dismiss, concluding that the Minimum Wage Amendment did not repeal Nev. Rev. Stat. 608.250, which excepts taxicab drivers from Nevada’s minimum wage provisions, and that the statutory exceptions could be harmonized with the constitutional amendment. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Minimum Wage Amendment, by clearly setting out some exceptions to the minimum wage law and not others, supersedes and supplants the taxicab driver exception set out in section 608.250(2). View "Thomas v. Nev. Yellow Cab Corp." on Justia Law