Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged by information with aggravated stalking, a felony. Defendant filed a motion to suppress text messages retrieved from his cell phone as a result of his arrest, arguing that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated when law enforcement retrieved Defendant’s GPS coordinates from Defendant’s cell phone service provider in order to locate Defendant. The district court denied the motion. Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of aggravated stalking. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights were not violated because law enforcement procured a valid arrest warrant before requesting Defendant’s phone’s GPS coordinates; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant’s request to withdraw from self-representation because his motion was made with an intent to delay the proceedings. View "Meisler v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with a felony DUI after he was pulled over for driving a vehicle with a cracked windshield. Defendant filed a motion to suppress on the ground that Deputy Wendy Jason, the investigating officer, made a mistake of law that invalidated the investigatory traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, Jason testified that she stopped Defendant because his cracked windshield violated Nev. Rev. Stat. 484D.435. The district court granted Defendant’s motion because section 484D.435 does not prohibit operating a vehicle with a cracked windshield, even though the cracked windshield could violate another statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a police officer’s citation to an incorrect statute is not a mistake of law that invalidates an investigatory stop under the Fourth Amendment if another statute nonetheless prohibits the suspected conduct. Remanded. View "State v. Cantsee" on Justia Law

Randall Angel, then an inmate, filed a civil rights complaint against corrections officer Michael Cruse, in his individual capacity, alleging that Cruse violated his civil rights by filing a disciplinary charge against him and by having him placed in administrative segregation in retaliation for Angel’s attempt to file a grievance against Cruse. The district court granted summary judgment to Cruse, finding that the evidence demonstrated that Angel had actually threatened Cruse, and in the alternative, Cruse was entitled to qualified immunity because he could not have known that the adverse action violated Angel’s constitutional rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed with regard to each of the disputed elements of the retaliation claim and with regard to Cruse’s entitlement to qualified immunity. Remanded. View "Angel v. Cruse" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Nev. Rev. Stat. 50.315, which provides that the declaration of a person who collects a criminal defendant’s blood for evidentiary testing may be admitted at trial. The City of Reno charged Respondent with misdemeanor driving under the influence. At a bench trial, the City sought to introduce into evidence the declaration of a phlebotomist who collected Respondent’s blood for evidentiary testing after Respondent’s arrest. Respondent objected, and the municipal court excluded the declaration on Confrontation Clause grounds. The district court denied the City’s subsequent petition for a writ of mandamus, determining that admitting the phlebotomist’s declaration into evidence over Respondent’s objection would have violated Respondent’s right to confrontation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts requires the Court to overrule its prior decision in City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, where it held that Nev. Rev. Stat. 50.315(6) adequately protects the rights provided by the Confrontation Clause; and (2) section 50.315(6)’s requirement that a defendant establish a substantial and bona fide dispute regarding the facts in a declaration made and offered as evidence pursuant to section 50.315(4) impermissibly burdens the right to confrontation. View "City of Reno v. Howard" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a citizen of Reno who intended to run for mayor, filed a writ petition seeking extraordinary relief preventing the city clerk and chief elections officer from taking the steps necessary include either Jessica Sferrazza or Dwight Dortch on the 2014 ballot for the mayoral race, asserting that Sferrazza and Dortch were ineligible to run for mayor under Nev. Const. art. XV, 3(2) by virtue of their twelve years of service as Reno City Council members. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether Article 15, Section 3(2) prevents an individual who has served for twelve years in one position on a local governing body from then serving additional terms in a different position on the same body. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that because the Reno City Charter makes the mayor a member of the city’s “local governing body” for all purposes, Article 15, Section 3(2) bars a term-limited council member from thereafter being elected mayor of Reno. View "Lorton v. Jones" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with first-offense battery constituting domestic violence, a misdemeanor. Defendant filed a notice for a jury trial, which the justice court denied. Defendant was subsequently convicted of the charged offense. Thereafter, Defendant filed a petition for extraordinary relief, claiming that the offense of domestic battery was serious enough to warrant a jury trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was not entitled to a jury trial on the misdemeanor charge of domestic battery because he did not demonstrate that first-offense domestic battery is a serious offense for which he was entitled to a jury trial. View "Amezcua v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter with the use of a deadly weapon. Defendant appealed, raising several issues for the Supreme Court’s review. After consideration of the issues, the Supreme Court determined that only two had merit and held (1) the district court erred in failing to record numerous bench and in-chambers conferences; (2) the district court erred in failing to excuse for cause a prospective juror who was equivocal about her impartiality; but (3) the errors in this case did not prejudice Defendant and were therefore harmless. View "Preciado v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was twice convicted in municipal courts of riding a motorcycle without wearing proper headgear. Appellant appealed, seeking a trial de novo. The prosecution subsequently dismissed the charges with prejudice. The district court issued remittiturs, returning the cases to the municipal courts. Thereafter, Appellant filed a motion for his attorney fees and court costs, arguing that Nevada's helmet law is unconstitutionally indeterminate and that his ticketing and prosecution were without probable cause and malicious, entitling him to recover attorney fees as "costs of the action" under Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.115. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeals, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Appellant's cases where, because they originated in the municipal courts and were heard on appeal by the district court, the district court's appellate jurisdiction was final. View "Stilwell v. City of N. Las Vegas" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with trafficking, possession for sale, and possession of controlled substances. Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the warrantless search of his car that uncovered illegal drugs was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. The search was conducted after a highway patrol officer saw Appellant run a red light and followed him into a parking lot to issue him a ticket. While the ticket was being processed, a drug detection dog was summoned, and the dog alerted for the presence of drugs in Appellant's car. The district court concluded that for a warrantless automobile search to pass muster under Nevada law, both probable cause and exigency beyond the exigency inherent in a car's ready mobility must be shown. Because the State did not prove exigent circumstances beyond the car's mobility, the district court suppressed the evidence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) exigency is not a separate requirement of the automobile exception to the constitutional warrant requirement; and (2) the drug detection dog's alert provided probable cause to search Appellant's car. Remanded. View "State v. Lloyd" on Justia Law

Appellant filed a request with the Administrative office of the Courts (AOC) pursuant to Nevada's Public Records Act (Act) seeking access to certain records related to Nevada's Foreclosure Mediation Program. The AOC agreed to provide some of the documents in redacted or statistical form but refused to disclose other information as either privileged or confidential. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the AOC to produce all of the requested documents in their original form. The district court denied the petition, concluding (1) the AOC was a judicial entity and thus not subject to the Act; and (2) the requested documents were otherwise confidential as a matter of law. The Supreme Court affirmed without deciding whether the Act applied to the AOC, as the records in question were confidential as a matter of law. View "Civil Rights for Seniors v. Admin. Office of Courts" on Justia Law