Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondent owned a three-acre parcel, the northernmost twenty feet of which was in a county setback within which Power Company had an existing ten-foot-wide utility easement. Power Company later sought to exercise two easements on the property for installation of high-voltage transmission lines. Respondent rejected Power Company's offer for the easements, and the issue of just compensation went to trial. During the reading of the jury instructions, Power Company objected a jury instruction telling the jury to disregard the setback in its valuation of the property on the grounds that Respondent's use of the area was limited to parking and landscaping. The district court included the instruction. The jury ultimately awarded Respondent $1.7 million in just compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the jury instruction at issue provided an overbroad reading of the Court's decision in City of North Las Vegas v. Robinson, but Power Company did not suffer prejudice because a separate jury instruction remedied the error; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Respondent's expert to testify regarding her paired sales analysis. View "Nev. Power Co. v. 3 Kids, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant filed an employment action against her former employer. Appellant initially authorized her attorney to settle with Respondent, but Appellant refused to sign the settlement agreement. Respondent filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. The district court granted the motion and entered an order setting forth the terms of the parties' settlement. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding the order was not a final judgment because it did not dismiss or formally resolve Appellant's complaint. Respondent subsequently issued a check to Appellant for the settlement amount, which Appellant refused to accept. The district court then granted Respondent's motion to deposit the settlement proceeds with the district court. The order, however, failed to enter judgment in favor of either party or otherwise resolve the case. The district court then entered an order statistically closing the case on the basis that there had been a stipulated judgment. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the district court's order was not substantively appealable because no statute or court rule authorizes an appeal from an order statistically closing a case, and the order did not constitute a final, appealable judgment, as none was entered. View "Brown v. MHC Stagecoach, LLC" on Justia Law

The City of Sparks traditionally made most personnel and budget decisions for the Sparks Municipal Court. The City and Municipal Court later entered into a dispute over the City's exercise of this authority. The district court subsequently enjoined the City from making such decisions in the future based on the Municipal Court's broad authority to manage its own affairs. The City appealed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the portion of the district court's order enjoining the City from interfering with the Municipal Court's ability to make personnel decisions, holding that the separation of powers doctrine and the Municipal Court's inherent authority barred the City from interfering with the Municipal Court's control over such decisions; and (2) reversed the district court's order as to the parties' budgetary dispute, holding (i) the Municipal Court's inherent power over its budget must be weighed against the City's authority over government finances, but (ii) the parties failed to develop the record sufficiently for the Court to determine whether the Municipal Court properly invoked its inherent powers on this point. Remanded. View " City of Sparks v. Sparks Mun. Court" on Justia Law

Homeowner attended a first Foreclosure Mediation Program (FMP) mediation with Citimortgage, after which Defendant was denied a loan modification. The district court subsequently ordered a second mediation. PennyMac Corp. later obtained beneficial interest in the deed of trust and promissory note and attended the second mediation. The mediator determined that PennyMac failed to bring the promissory note, deed of trust, and other documents to the mediation and that PennyMac's representative lacked authority to negotiate. Homeowner filed a petition for judicial review, requesting sanctions, attorney fees, and a judicially imposed loan modification. The district court imposed sanctions against PennyMac but declined to impose a loan modification or monetary sanctions beyond the amount of attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Homeowner had standing to challenge the district court's order on appeal; and (2) the district court acted within its discretion in denying an FMP certificate and in determining sanctions. View " Jacinto v. PennyMac Corp." on Justia Law

The State charged Respondent with misdemeanor and felony crimes stemming from a domestic violence incident. A justice of the peace, who was sitting as a district court hearing master pursuant to Eighth Judicial District Court Rule (EDCR) 1.48, which allows justices of the peace to serve as district court hearing masters, presided over Defendant's preliminary hearing. Respondent pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge of battery, and the judge sentenced him on that charge. The judge then accepted Respondent's plea to the felony charge. Respondent subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his felony plea on the ground that it was accepted by a justice of the peace, who lacks jurisdiction to accept a felony plea. The district court granted Respondent's motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that when a justice of the peace who has been appointed as a hearing master performs the duties set forth in EDCR 1.48(k), she is acting pursuant to her authority under EDCR 1.48, not as part of her jurisdiction as a justice of the peace. View " State v. Frederick" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted burglary while in possession of a firearm, robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, and coercion. Defendant moved to suppress the confession he made while at the police station, claiming that interrogation began after he invoked his right to counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that Defendant asked "Can I get an attorney?" but denied the motion to suppress, concluding that Defendant's statement was ambiguous and that there was no substantive questioning until after Defendant was given a second set of Miranda warnings at the police station and waived his right to counsel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the question "Can I get an attorney?" is an unequivocal request for the aid of counsel, triggering the requirement that all interrogation immediately cease; (2) once a suspect invokes his right to counsel, there may be no further interrogation unless the suspect reinitiates contact with the police, there is a sufficient break in custody, or the suspect is provided the aid of the counsel that he requested; and (3) Appellant's confession was inadmissible, and the error in admitting the confession was not harmless. Remanded. View " Carter v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to one count of lewdness with a child under fourteen years of age. The district court determined that restitution should be imposed as part of the sentence but did not set an amount of restitution. Instead the court ordered Appellant to appear within sixty days after his release from prison to have the court determine the restitution at that time. Appellant appealed, arguing that Nevada law requires that the district court set an amount of restitution when it determines that restitution is appropriate as part of a sentence. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that because the judgment of conviction contemplated restitution in an uncertain amount, it was not final and therefore was not appealable. View " Slaatte v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of willfully endangering a child as a result of child abuse, a gross misdemeanor, and battery by strangulation, a felony. Appellant's defense was parental discipline privilege as to the child abuse charge and self-defense as to the battery charge. Appellant challenged (1) the district court's admission of evidence that Appellant had struck one of his sons in public and that Defendant got into an argument with nursing staff about his son, and (2) the court's admission of testimony from a witness reporting that she also had a heated exchange with Appellant over his disciplining a young boy. Appellant alleged the admission of this evidence violated Nev. Rev. Stat. 48.045's prohibition against using character or prior-bad-act evidence to prove criminal propensity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) one of the episodes involving one of Defendant's sons was properly admitted to refute Appellant's claim of parental privilege; and (2) the district court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony about the incident involving Appellant's discipline of the young boy, but the error was harmless. View " Newman v. State" on Justia Law

This appeal was taken from a district court order in a quiet title action. While the appeal was pending, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) declared twenty-seven unpatented mining claims asserted by Appellant forfeit and void by operation of law because Appellant failed to comply with the statutory mining claim maintenance requirement. Consequently, Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, arguing that the appeal was rendered moot when the BLM declared Appellant's asserted claims forfeit and void. The Supreme Court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the appeal was moot because the controversy that existed at the beginning of this litigation concerning superior title was no longer at issue, and Appellant's claims did not exist as a matter of law. View "Majuba Mining, Ltd. v. Pumpkin Copper, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with sexual assault of a minor and lewdness with a child. The jury acquitted Petitioner of the lewdness count and deadlocked on the sexual assault count. The district court declared a mistrial on the sexual assault count and set a date for a new trial. Petitioner moved to dismiss the information, arguing that the double jeopardy clause and the doctrine of collateral estoppel prohibited a second trial for sexual assault because he was acquitted of lewdness, and both offenses were based upon the same event. The district court denied the motion based on the jury's inability to reach of verdict on the sexual assault count. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for writ of mandamus, holding (1) in determining whether an issue of ultimate fact has been decided and cannot be relitigated in a subsequent trial, the district court must examine the record of the first trial and determine whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict on some other issue of fact; (2) in conducting this analysis, the court may not consider the jury's inability to reach a verdict on the other counts; and (3) in this case, the district court improperly analyzed Petitioner's double jeopardy claim. View "Gonzalez v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law