Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Logan D. was adjudicated delinquent for lewdness with a minor for an offense that occurred when Logan was seventeen years old. The law at the time of Logan's adjudication provided the juvenile court with discretion to require Logan to submit to adult registration and community notification if it determined that Logan was not rehabilitated. The Legislature subsequently passed a bill mandating that all juveniles ages fourteen an older adjudicated for certain sex offenses register as adult sex offenders and be subject to community notification. Logan and twenty other juveniles filed motions asking the juvenile court to find the bill unconstitutional as applied to juvenile sex offenders. The juvenile court declared the bill unconstitutional as applied to juvenile sex offenders. The State filed a petition for a writ of prohibition or mandamus. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that the retroactive application of mandatory sex offender registration and community notification requirements on juveniles adjudicated for certain sex offenses did not violate the due process and ex post facto clauses of the United States and Nevada Constitutions. View "State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Defendant in this case was in custody awaiting trial on a charge of murder with the use of a deadly weapon. Defendant successfully litigated a motion to suppress his incriminating statement to police based on his assertion that his statement was obtained through the use of extrinsic falsehoods. The State appealed the denial of the motion to suppress. The district court subsequently set a trial date and denied the State's request to stay the trial pending resolution of its appeal. The State subsequently renewed its motion with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted the State's request for a stay, holding (1) four factors govern the Court's exercise of discretion in ruling on a stay motion of a criminal proceeding pending resolution of an interlocutory suppression appeal; and (2) the factors weighed in favor of granting the state's motion in this case and staying the trial pending resolution of the State's appeal. View " State v. Robles-Nieves" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with attempted sexual assault of a child under fourteen and related charges. Defendant faced strong evidence, including his own admissions, that he had sexual contact with his daughter. During trial, defense counsel made a strategic decision to concede there had been some sexual contact between Defendant and his daughter. The jury found Defendant guilty of all the charges. Defendant appealed, asserting that the district court's canvass concerning his counsel's concession strategy was inadequate, and therefore, his consent was involuntary and unknowing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) although the district court's inquiry did not fully comply with Hernandez v. State, which provides that a court, when faced with a concession of guilt by defense counsel during trial, must canvass the defendant to determine whether he knowingly and voluntarily consented to the concession of guilt, the rationale underlying Hernandez is unsound and the opinion therefore must be overruled; (2) a concession-of-guilt strategy is not the equivalent of a guilty plea and, therefore, the trial judge has no obligation to canvass a defendant concerning a concession-of-guilt strategy; and (3) consequently, any deficiencies in the canvass conducted in this case did not warrant relief. View " Armenta-Carpio v. State" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Petitioner for two counts of child abuse and neglect stemming from incidents in which Petitioner slapped and hit his pregnant sixteen-year-old girlfriend. Petitioner filed a pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the indictment, contending (1) the State failed to prove that abuse or neglect occurred, and (2) the State failed to comply with Nev. Rev. Stat. 172.095(2) by not instructing the jury on the definition of "physical injury" as used in the child-abuse-and-neglect statute. The district court denied the petition. Petitioner subsequently filed this petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition challenging the district court's petition. The Supreme Court granted the petition as to one of the two counts of child abuse, concluding (1) when alleged "abuse or neglect" is based on a nonaccidental physical injury, the district attorney must inform the grand jurors of the statutory definition of "physical injury"; and (2) the State's failure to inform the grand jurors of the statutory definition of "physical injury" likely caused the grand jury to return an indictment on less than probable cause for one of the two counts of child abuse. View "Clay v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with trafficking, possession for sale, and possession of controlled substances. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence of contraband seized during a traffic stop. The police officer stopped Defendant for speeding, issued a warning, and then ordered Defendant to remain until a drug-sniffing dog and handler team could arrive. Defendant contended that the officer unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop, unlawfully seizing him, and that exigent circumstances did not justify the warrantless search. The district court suppressed the evidence based on the warrantless search. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a traffic stop that is legitimate when initiated becomes illegitimate when the officer detains the driver beyond the time required to process the traffic offense unless the extended detention is de minimis, consensual, or justified by a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity; and (2) the prolonged stop in this case met none of these exceptions and was therefore unconstitutional. View " State v. Beckman" on Justia Law

The State sought an indictment against Petitioner on charges of sexual assault and lewdness involving a child. During the grand jury proceedings, the State presented the child-victim's out-of-court statements describing the alleged sexual conduct. The grand jury ultimately returned a true bill. Petitioner subsequently filed a pretrial motion for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that the indictment was based on hearsay in violation of Nevada law. After a hearing, the district court denied the petition, concluding that the victim's statements were not hearsay because they were prior inconsistent statements, and if they were hearsay, they were admissible under Nev. Rev. Stat. 51.385, which excepts from the hearsay rule trustworthy statements by a child-victim of sexual assault. Petitioner then filed this original petition for extraordinary relief. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that the grand jury could not consider the disputed statements, as (1) the statements were hearsay, and (2) the exception in section 51.385 does not apply to grand jury proceedings. Consequently, there was not sufficient legal evidence to support a finding of probable cause and the indictment could not stand. View "Rugamas v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Respondent owned a three-acre parcel, the northernmost twenty feet of which was in a county setback within which Power Company had an existing ten-foot-wide utility easement. Power Company later sought to exercise two easements on the property for installation of high-voltage transmission lines. Respondent rejected Power Company's offer for the easements, and the issue of just compensation went to trial. During the reading of the jury instructions, Power Company objected a jury instruction telling the jury to disregard the setback in its valuation of the property on the grounds that Respondent's use of the area was limited to parking and landscaping. The district court included the instruction. The jury ultimately awarded Respondent $1.7 million in just compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the jury instruction at issue provided an overbroad reading of the Court's decision in City of North Las Vegas v. Robinson, but Power Company did not suffer prejudice because a separate jury instruction remedied the error; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing Respondent's expert to testify regarding her paired sales analysis. View "Nev. Power Co. v. 3 Kids, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant filed an employment action against her former employer. Appellant initially authorized her attorney to settle with Respondent, but Appellant refused to sign the settlement agreement. Respondent filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. The district court granted the motion and entered an order setting forth the terms of the parties' settlement. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, concluding the order was not a final judgment because it did not dismiss or formally resolve Appellant's complaint. Respondent subsequently issued a check to Appellant for the settlement amount, which Appellant refused to accept. The district court then granted Respondent's motion to deposit the settlement proceeds with the district court. The order, however, failed to enter judgment in favor of either party or otherwise resolve the case. The district court then entered an order statistically closing the case on the basis that there had been a stipulated judgment. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the district court's order was not substantively appealable because no statute or court rule authorizes an appeal from an order statistically closing a case, and the order did not constitute a final, appealable judgment, as none was entered. View "Brown v. MHC Stagecoach, LLC" on Justia Law

The City of Sparks traditionally made most personnel and budget decisions for the Sparks Municipal Court. The City and Municipal Court later entered into a dispute over the City's exercise of this authority. The district court subsequently enjoined the City from making such decisions in the future based on the Municipal Court's broad authority to manage its own affairs. The City appealed. The Supreme Court (1) affirmed the portion of the district court's order enjoining the City from interfering with the Municipal Court's ability to make personnel decisions, holding that the separation of powers doctrine and the Municipal Court's inherent authority barred the City from interfering with the Municipal Court's control over such decisions; and (2) reversed the district court's order as to the parties' budgetary dispute, holding (i) the Municipal Court's inherent power over its budget must be weighed against the City's authority over government finances, but (ii) the parties failed to develop the record sufficiently for the Court to determine whether the Municipal Court properly invoked its inherent powers on this point. Remanded. View " City of Sparks v. Sparks Mun. Court" on Justia Law

Homeowner attended a first Foreclosure Mediation Program (FMP) mediation with Citimortgage, after which Defendant was denied a loan modification. The district court subsequently ordered a second mediation. PennyMac Corp. later obtained beneficial interest in the deed of trust and promissory note and attended the second mediation. The mediator determined that PennyMac failed to bring the promissory note, deed of trust, and other documents to the mediation and that PennyMac's representative lacked authority to negotiate. Homeowner filed a petition for judicial review, requesting sanctions, attorney fees, and a judicially imposed loan modification. The district court imposed sanctions against PennyMac but declined to impose a loan modification or monetary sanctions beyond the amount of attorney fees. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Homeowner had standing to challenge the district court's order on appeal; and (2) the district court acted within its discretion in denying an FMP certificate and in determining sanctions. View " Jacinto v. PennyMac Corp." on Justia Law