Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

These consolidated appeals presented specific applications of the question of whether a defendant can, in a single trial, be prosecuted and punished cumulatively for a single act that violates more than one criminal statute. Specifically, these appeals presented the following questions: When the elements of both crimes are met, can a defendant who shoots and hits but fails to kill his victim be convicted of and punished for both attempted murder and battery? Also, if the defendant shoots and misses, can he be convicted of and punished for both attempted murder and assault? The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of conviction in both appeals after repeating the rule that if each statute contains an element that the other does not, then the offenses are different. The Court held that, in this case, Defendants' multiple convictions and punishments for attempted murder, assault, and battery in this case were statutorily authorized and further, did not offend the test set forth in Blockburger v. United States, which licenses multiple punishments unless, analyzed in terms of their elements, one charged offense is the same or a lesser-included offense of the other. View "Jackson v. State" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Supreme Court addressed a district court's discretion when resolving a petition for release from a special sentence of lifetime supervision. Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.0931(3), the statutory provision governing such petitions, provides that a district court "shall grant a petition for release from a special sentence of lifetime supervision" if certain requirements are met. Based on the plain language of the statute, the Court concluded that the district court has discretion to determine whether a petitioner has met the statutory requirements but lacks discretion to deny a petition for release from lifetime supervision if that court finds the statutory requirements were met. In this case, the district court denied the petition based on victim impact testimony and made no findings as to whether Appellant had complied with the statutory requirements. Thus, the Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded. View "Goudge v. State" on Justia Law

In this opinion, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a county's code of ordinance provisions establishing coroner's inquests into an officer-involved death. Appellants, five highway patrol officers, contended that the inquest procedures and provisions violated their due process rights and that the county board of county commissioners unconstitutionally impinged on the Legislature's authority to establish the jurisdiction of justices of the peace. The Supreme Court (1) concluded that Appellants' due process arguments failed; but (2) determined that the code provision requiring that a justice of the peace serve as a presiding officer in coroner's inquest proceedings regarding officer-involved deaths intrudes on the Legislature's exclusive authority over the jurisdiction of justices of the peace. Because the code made no provision for anyone other than a justice of the peace to serve as presiding officer in such proceedings, the Court concluded that the offending provision could not be severed, which required the entire inquest scheme regarding officer-involved deaths to be struck down. View "Hernandez v. Bennett-Haron" on Justia Law

Respondent was adjudicated delinquent and committed to a state facility. While there, he allegedly battered a group supervisor. The State charged him as an adult with battery by a prisoner under Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.481(2)(f), a felony. Citing relevant statutes and Robinson v. State, which broadly holds that "prisoner" as used in section 200.481(2)(f) was meant to only apply in the criminal setting, the district court dismissed the charge, holding that because Respondent's detention was civil, not criminal, he was not a "prisoner" to whom section 200.481(2)(f) could apply. The State appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a juvenile detained for delinquency in a state facility is not a "prisoner" for purposes of section 200.481(2)(f). View "State v. Javier C." on Justia Law

Respondent was in custody in county jail when officers discovered a cell phone hidden in a box beneath his bed. The State charged Respondent under Nev. Rev. Stat. 212.093(1), which, in pertinent part, prohibits prisoners, including county jail inmates, from possessing "any key, picklock, bolt cutters, wire cutters, saw, digging tool, rope, ladder, hook or any other tool or item adapted, designed or commonly used for the purpose of escaping" from custody. After being bound over to the district court, Respondent filed a pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking to dismiss the charge, arguing that section 212.093(1) was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and that, by its terms, the statute does not prohibit the possession of cell phones. The district court agreed with Respondent and dismissed the charge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that by its plain and unambiguous language, section 212.093(1) does not prohibit county jail inmates from possessing cell phones. View "Pershing County Sheriff v. Andrews" on Justia Law

In 2008, the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now, Inc. (ACORN) hired voter registration canvassers in Las Vegas. Under an incentive program, ACORN paid canvassers $5 a bonus if the canvasser returned twenty-one or more voter registration applications. The State subsequently charged ACORN and the supervisor of ACORN's field director for Nevada with several counts of violating Nev. Rev. Stat. 293.805, which prohibits providing compensation to voter registration canvassers based upon the total number of voters a canvasser registers. The supervisor entered an Alford plea to two counts of conspiracy to commit the crime of compensation for registration of voters, and was adjudged guilty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 293.805 triggers a less exacting standard of review than strict scrutiny; (2) the State demonstrated an interest sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation imposed on canvassing activities, and therefore, section 293.805 does not violate the First Amendment; and (3) section 293.805 is not unconstitutionally vague. View "Busefink v. State" on Justia Law

This case arose out of the recent energy crisis. Appellants alleged that Respondents, in violation of Nevada antitrust laws, conspired with the now-defunct Enron Corporation to drive up the price of natural gas in the Southern Nevada and Southeastern California markets. Appellants asserted (1) Respondents engaged in rapid bursts of purchasing natural gas followed by rapid bursts of selling the same gas, which resulted in considerable profits for Respondents and significantly higher prices for natural gas consumers; and (2) Respondents' plan for manipulating the markets worked because of a secret agreement with Enron that left Respondents with greater profits from the sale of gas as well as ensured that Respondents would always have a sufficient supply of natural gas. The district court ultimately dismissed the case, holding that the claims were barred by principles of federal preemption. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellants' claims were barred by federal field preemption. View "State v. Reliant Energy, Inc." on Justia Law

Respondent issued an eminent domain action against Appellants. The district court awarded Respondent possession of the property, and the jury found Respondent owned Appellants $4.4 million in just compensation. Appellants appealed and Respondent cross-appealed. While the appeals were pending, Respondent filed a notice of its intent to abandon the condemnation proceedings and a motion to vacate the judgment of condemnation. The district court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to enter an order vacating the judgment while an appeal was pending but certified its inclination to grant the motion to vacate based on its conclusion that Respondent was entitled to abandon the proceedings. The Supreme Court held (1) a public agency may abandon an eminent domain action after it has paid just compensation and the district court has entered a final order of condemnation, but before the resolution of issues pending on appeal; (2) the district court retains jurisdiction to address a notice of abandonment and motion to dismiss, even while an appeal of the matter is pending in the Supreme Court; and (3) thus, the motion to remand was denied as moot because a remand was unnecessary for the district court to decide the motion to dismiss. View "Gold Ridge Partners v. Sierra Pac. Power Co." on Justia Law

Several issues came before the Supreme Court in this case concerning a termination-of-parental-rights proceeding: (1) whether an objection to the admission of the entire juvenile file as hearsay preserved the issue for appeal; (2) what the applicable burden of proof imposed upon a parent in order to rebut the parental-fault and child's-best-interest presumptions in NRS 128.109 was; (3) whether substantial evidence supported the family division of the district court's order terminating Appellants Quiana M.B.'s and Arthur L.T.'s parental rights. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that: (1) Arthur waived his hearsay arguments by failing to object to specific portions of the file at trial; (2) after it was determined that a presumption under 128.109 applied, a parent could rebut that presumption by a preponderance of the evidence; and (3) substantial evidence supported the district court's order terminating Quiana's and Arthur's parental rights. View "In re Parental Rights as to J.D.N." on Justia Law

In March 2006, the Washoe County Board of Equalization adjusted the property tax values of approximately 300 Incline Village and Crystal Bay taxpayers based on a determination that those properties' taxable values had been improperly assessed. The County Board determined that rolling back the 300 properties' taxable values had created an unequal rate of taxation for the 2006-2007 tax year and acted to fix the error. The Washoe County Assessor administratively appealed the equalization decision to the State Board of Equalization, but the State Board did not immediately consider the appeal because this court had imposed a stay temporarily enjoining the rollbacks pending a decision in a related appeal concerning the assessment methods. After the State Board ruled on Washoe County's motion, the Assessor made several objections to the taxpayers' involvement in the proceedings. Pertinent to this appeal, the Assessor argued that: (1) The Village League to Save Incline Assets, Inc., did not have standing to appear on behalf of any of the taxpayers; (2) any taxpayer not represented by counsel, absent from the State Board proceedings without an excuse, or represented by Village League should not be recognized as a party; and (3) none of the 300 taxpayers who previously obtained rollbacks should be recognized as parties. The issue before the Supreme Court pertained to the Nevada Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requirement that a petitioner name, as respondents to a petition for judicial review of an administrative decision, "all parties of record." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that a party must strictly comply with the APA naming requirement as a prerequisite to invoking the district court's jurisdiction. Thus, when a petitioner fails to name in its petition each party of record to the underlying administrative proceedings, the petition is jurisdictionally defective and must be dismissed. Further, if the petitioner fails to invoke the district court's jurisdiction by naming the proper parties within the statutory time limit, the petition may not subsequently be amended to cure the jurisdictional defect. View "Washoe County v. Otto" on Justia Law