Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case arose out of the recent energy crisis. Appellants alleged that Respondents, in violation of Nevada antitrust laws, conspired with the now-defunct Enron Corporation to drive up the price of natural gas in the Southern Nevada and Southeastern California markets. Appellants asserted (1) Respondents engaged in rapid bursts of purchasing natural gas followed by rapid bursts of selling the same gas, which resulted in considerable profits for Respondents and significantly higher prices for natural gas consumers; and (2) Respondents' plan for manipulating the markets worked because of a secret agreement with Enron that left Respondents with greater profits from the sale of gas as well as ensured that Respondents would always have a sufficient supply of natural gas. The district court ultimately dismissed the case, holding that the claims were barred by principles of federal preemption. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Appellants' claims were barred by federal field preemption. View "State v. Reliant Energy, Inc." on Justia Law

Respondent issued an eminent domain action against Appellants. The district court awarded Respondent possession of the property, and the jury found Respondent owned Appellants $4.4 million in just compensation. Appellants appealed and Respondent cross-appealed. While the appeals were pending, Respondent filed a notice of its intent to abandon the condemnation proceedings and a motion to vacate the judgment of condemnation. The district court concluded it lacked jurisdiction to enter an order vacating the judgment while an appeal was pending but certified its inclination to grant the motion to vacate based on its conclusion that Respondent was entitled to abandon the proceedings. The Supreme Court held (1) a public agency may abandon an eminent domain action after it has paid just compensation and the district court has entered a final order of condemnation, but before the resolution of issues pending on appeal; (2) the district court retains jurisdiction to address a notice of abandonment and motion to dismiss, even while an appeal of the matter is pending in the Supreme Court; and (3) thus, the motion to remand was denied as moot because a remand was unnecessary for the district court to decide the motion to dismiss. View "Gold Ridge Partners v. Sierra Pac. Power Co." on Justia Law

Several issues came before the Supreme Court in this case concerning a termination-of-parental-rights proceeding: (1) whether an objection to the admission of the entire juvenile file as hearsay preserved the issue for appeal; (2) what the applicable burden of proof imposed upon a parent in order to rebut the parental-fault and child's-best-interest presumptions in NRS 128.109 was; (3) whether substantial evidence supported the family division of the district court's order terminating Appellants Quiana M.B.'s and Arthur L.T.'s parental rights. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that: (1) Arthur waived his hearsay arguments by failing to object to specific portions of the file at trial; (2) after it was determined that a presumption under 128.109 applied, a parent could rebut that presumption by a preponderance of the evidence; and (3) substantial evidence supported the district court's order terminating Quiana's and Arthur's parental rights. View "In re Parental Rights as to J.D.N." on Justia Law

In March 2006, the Washoe County Board of Equalization adjusted the property tax values of approximately 300 Incline Village and Crystal Bay taxpayers based on a determination that those properties' taxable values had been improperly assessed. The County Board determined that rolling back the 300 properties' taxable values had created an unequal rate of taxation for the 2006-2007 tax year and acted to fix the error. The Washoe County Assessor administratively appealed the equalization decision to the State Board of Equalization, but the State Board did not immediately consider the appeal because this court had imposed a stay temporarily enjoining the rollbacks pending a decision in a related appeal concerning the assessment methods. After the State Board ruled on Washoe County's motion, the Assessor made several objections to the taxpayers' involvement in the proceedings. Pertinent to this appeal, the Assessor argued that: (1) The Village League to Save Incline Assets, Inc., did not have standing to appear on behalf of any of the taxpayers; (2) any taxpayer not represented by counsel, absent from the State Board proceedings without an excuse, or represented by Village League should not be recognized as a party; and (3) none of the 300 taxpayers who previously obtained rollbacks should be recognized as parties. The issue before the Supreme Court pertained to the Nevada Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requirement that a petitioner name, as respondents to a petition for judicial review of an administrative decision, "all parties of record." Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that a party must strictly comply with the APA naming requirement as a prerequisite to invoking the district court's jurisdiction. Thus, when a petitioner fails to name in its petition each party of record to the underlying administrative proceedings, the petition is jurisdictionally defective and must be dismissed. Further, if the petitioner fails to invoke the district court's jurisdiction by naming the proper parties within the statutory time limit, the petition may not subsequently be amended to cure the jurisdictional defect. View "Washoe County v. Otto" on Justia Law

In 2002, Mandalay Corporation entered into a contract with petitioner Rolf Jensen & Associates, Inc., whereby Rolf Jensen would provide consulting services regarding construction of an expansion to the Mandalay Bay Resort and Casino (the Resort) in Las Vegas in compliance with the ADA. After the Resort expansion was constructed, the Department of Justice (DOJ) began an investigation of numerous violations of the ADA arising from a lack of handicap accessibility at the Resort. Thereafter, Mandalay entered into a comprehensive settlement agreement with the DOJ that required Mandalay to bring the Resort into compliance with the ADA. Mandalay subsequently sued Rolf Jensen in district court, seeking to recover the costs to retrofit the Resort. In its petition to the Supreme Court, Rolf Jensen sought a writ of mandamus to direct the district court to grant its motion for summary judgment to dismiss all of Mandalay's claims as preempted by the ADA. After examining the purpose and intended effects of the ADA, the Court concluded that Mandalay's claims posed an obstacle to the objectives of the ADA and therefore were preempted. Accordingly, the Court granted Rolf Jensen's petition. View "Rolf Jensen & Associates v. Dist. Ct." on Justia Law

Respondent Arthur E. Mallory was Churchill County's district attorney. Appellant John O'Connor is an elector and registered voter within Churchill County. In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was the narrow question of whether the office of district attorney is a state office for the purpose of determining whether district attorneys are subject to term limits under the "state office" portion of Article 15, Section 3(2) of the Nevada Constitution. Reviewing the Constitution as a whole, the Supreme Court's resolution of this inquiry was controlled by Article 4, Section 32 of the Constitution, which plainly declares district attorneys to be "county officers." Because Article 4, Section 32 identifies district attorneys as county officers, it follows that the office of district attorney cannot be considered a "state office" for term-limits purposes, and thus, district attorneys are not subject to term limits under the "state office" portion of Article 15, Section 3(2). Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district court's order denying appellant's petition to set aside respondent's election to a consecutive term as the Churchill County District Attorney. View "In re Contested Election of Mallory" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed a district court order granting a preliminary injunction prohibiting appellants State of Nevada Department of Business and Industry, the Financial Institutions Division, and its Commissioner George Burns (collectively, the Department), from enforcing its declaratory order and advisory opinion regarding the appropriate amount of homeowners' association lien fees respondents Nevada Association Services, Inc.; RMI Management, LLC; and Angius & Terry Collections, Inc. (collectively, NAS) can collect. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the Department did not have jurisdiction to issue an advisory opinion regarding NRS Chapter 116 and that NAS would suffer irreparable harm if the Department enforced its opinion, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order granting NAS's request for injunctive relief. View "State, Bus. & Indus. v. Nev. Ass'n Servs." on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was the relationship between two statutory provisions, enacted in 2009, that govern the extent of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction: NRS 62B.330(3)(e)(1) and NRS 62B.335. Both provisions address a person who has been charged with committing an offense when the person was between 16 and 18 years of age that would be a category A or B felony if committed by an adult. In those circumstances, NRS 62B.330(3)(e)(1) provides that the act is not a "delinquent act" and divests the juvenile court of jurisdiction if the person is identified and charged between the ages of 20 years, 3 months and 21 years. Pursuant to NRS 62B.335, if a person charged with a delinquent act that would have been a category A or B felony if committed by an adult is identified before reaching 21 years of age but is not apprehended until after reaching 21 years of age, then the juvenile court retains jurisdiction to conduct a hearing. The matter came before the Court in the case of "George J." who was seventeen years old when he allegedly committed: (1) home invasion, (2) burglary, (3) grand larceny, (4) grand larceny of an automobile, and (5) burglary of an automobile. Reading the statutes together, the Supreme Court concluded that NRS 62B.335 only applied to delinquent acts and therefore does not apply to acts that are "deemed not to be a delinquent act" under NRS 62B.330(3). "Thus, if the case is excluded from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction under NRS 62B.330(3), then the juvenile court does not obtain jurisdiction by virtue of NRS 62B.335." Here, the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction under NRS 62B.330(3)(e)(1). The Court nonetheless affirmed because the juvenile court reached the correct result by transferring the case to the district court for adult criminal proceedings. View "In re George J." on Justia Law

This appeal involved the interpretation of a claims-made professional liability insurance policy that Appellant Physicians Insurance Company of Wisconsin, Inc., d.b.a. PIC Wisconsin (PIC), issued to nonparty dentist Hamid Ahmadi, D.D.S. The policy covered dental malpractice claims made against Dr. Ahmadi and reported to PIC during the policy period. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court determined that PIC received constructive notice of Respondent Glenn Williams’s malpractice claim against Dr. Ahmadi while the policy was in force and held that this was enough to trigger coverage. Upon review, the Supreme Court reversed, finding that a "report" of a potential demand for damages to qualify as a "claim" required sufficient specificity to alert the insurer’s claim department to the existence of a potential demand for damages arising out of an identifiable incident, involving an identified or identifiable claimant or claimants, with actual or anticipated injuries. The Court did not find an ambiguity that would permit the PIC policy to have been triggered by the report of a default judgment against the doctor filed in public records. As such, the Court remanded the case with instructions to enter summary judgment in favor of PIC. View "Physicians Insurance Co. v. Williams" on Justia Law

The issue before the Supreme Court was whether proof of California workers’ compensation payments could be admitted into evidence in a personal injury action in Nevada. Because Nevada, the forum state, and California, the state in which the payments were made, both have statutes that permit proof of workers' compensation payments to be allowed into evidence in personal injury actions, the Court concluded that Nevada law governed. Applying Nevada law, the Court held that evidence of the actual amount of workers' compensation benefits paid should have been admitted and that a clarifying jury instruction provided by statute should have been given. The Court therefore reversed the judgment of the lower court and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Tri-County Equipment & Leasing v. Klinke" on Justia Law