Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Constitutional Law
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Appellant Beau Maestas pleaded guilty to several charges, and a jury sentenced him to death for first-degree murder. Appellant subsequently sought a new penalty trial based on allegations of juror misconduct and bias, but the district court denied the motion. In these consolidated appeals, Appellant challenged the judgment of conviction and the order denying the motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding principally that (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 175.556 does not violate the Eighth Amendment because the relevant jurisprudence focuses on whether a capital sentencing scheme sufficiently channels the sentencer's discretion to impose a death sentence and does not afford the district court the discretion to impose a death sentence; and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant's motion for a new trial because no misconduct or bias was proved. View "Maestas v. State" on Justia Law

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Appellant Donald Bigpond was charged with battery constituting domestic violence. Before trial, the State filed a motion to admit evidence of prior incidents of domestic violence involving Bigpond and the victim. The district court reserved judgment on the State's motion until trial. During direct examination, the victim recanted her previous statements. The district court decided to admit the victim's prior allegations of domestic violence against Bigpond, determining that they were relevant to explain the relationship between the victim and Bigpond and provide a possible explanation for her recantation. Bigpond was convicted as charged. At issue on appeal was whether evidence of "other crimes, wrongs or acts" may be admitted for a nonpropensity purpose other than those listed in Nev. Rev. Stat. 48.045(2). The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the disputed evidence, as the victim's pretrial accusations against Bigpond placed their relationship in context and provided a possible explanation for the recantation, which assisted the jury in evaluating the victim's credibility. View "Bigpond v. State" on Justia Law

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Michael Pohlabel pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 202.360. In doing so, he reserved the right to argue on appeal, as he did unsuccessfully in the district court, that his conviction violated the right to keep and bear arms secured by the state and federal constitutions. At issue on appeal was whether Pohlabel, despite his felon status, had a constitutional right to possess a black powder rifle. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 202.360(1)(a) does not violate either the state or federal constitutions; (2) while federal law currently permits felons to possess black powder rifles, that does not mandate that Nevada follow suit; and (3) the Legislature used the word "citizen" in Nev. Const. art. I, 11(1) to refer to those persons who are members of the political community, and thus, unpardoned felons are not included among those to whom the Nevada Constitution guarantees the right to keep and bear arms. View "Pohlabel v. State" on Justia Law

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Appellant Anthony Toston pleaded guilty to first-degree kidnapping and robbery. Toston subsequently filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging, inter alia, that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by misadvising him about the right to appeal from a judgment of conviction based on a guilty plea and failing to file an appeal when Toston expressed dissatisfaction at the sentencing hearing. The district court denied the petition. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding (1) counsel's affirmative misinformation about the right to appeal from a judgment of conviction from a guilty plea may fall below an objective standard of reasonableness and therefore be deficient; (2) trial counsel has a duty to file an appeal when, based on the totality of the circumstances, the defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was interested in challenging his conviction or sentence; and (3) because Toston's allegations in his petition were not belied by the record and would entitle Toston to relief if true, Toston was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his appeal-deprivation claims. Remanded. View "Toston v. State" on Justia Law

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After real party in interest Bobby Armstrong's vehicle collided with another vehicle, the State charged Armstrong with driving under the influence causing death and/or substantial bodily harm. A single blood sample was taken from Armstrong more than two hours after the collision. The district court granted Armstrong's motion to exclude the blood alcohol test in part, concluding that the retrograde extrapolation that the State would have to use to determine Armstrong's blood alcohol level at the time was driving would be unfairly prejudicial in this case. The State subsequently filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to compel the district court to admit the excluded evidence. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding (1) although retrograde extrapolation evidence is relevant in a prosecution for driving under the influence, under certain circumstances such evidence may be unfairly prejudicial and therefore inadmissible; and (2) under the circumstances of this case, the district court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in excluding the retrograde extrapolation. View "State v. Dist. Court (Armstrong) " on Justia Law

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Appellant was convicted of three counts of sexual assault and three counts of sexual assault with the use of a deadly weapon causing substantial bodily harm. Appellant was sentenced to six sentences of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for three of the counts, with each sentence to be served consecutively. Appellant subsequently filed an untimely petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his sentences and the manner in which they were imposed amounted to cruel and unusual punishment. The district court (1) granted the petition in part, determining that the petition was procedurally barred because the petition was untimely filed, but that new caselaw applied retroactively and provided good cause to excuse the procedural default; and (2) imposed three consecutive life sentences with the possibility of parole after ten years had been served. The Supreme Court reversed in part the district court's partial denial of Appellant' petition, holding that the court abused its discretion in failing to appoint counsel to assist Appellant in the post-conviction proceeding given the severity of the consequences, Appellant's indigency, and the difficulty of the issues presented related to the applicability and scope of the holding in Graham v. Florida. Remanded. View "Rogers v. State" on Justia Law

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Paul Choy filed a complaint in district court alleging various tort claims against respondent Ameristar Casinos. According to the complaint, Choy was gambling at the Ameristar Casino Hotel Kansas City when he was handcuffed by casino security guards and his belongings were searched. Ameristar subsequently filed a motion for summary judgment on the basis that it was not properly named as a party because Ameristar did not own or operate the Ameristar Casino Hotel Kansas City. In his opposition to Ameristar's motion, Appellant sought a continuance under Nev. R. Civ. P. 56(f) to allow discovery before granting Ameristar's motion. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Ameristar and denied Choy's request for a continuance. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Choy did not comply with rule 56(f) because he did not attach an affidavit explaining why he sought a continuance of the summary judgment motion to conduct further discovery, and therefore, the district court properly denied Choy's request for a continuance; and (2) the district court properly granted Ameristar's motion for summary judgment because Choy failed to present any evidence demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue regarding Ameristar's ownership or operation or Ameristar Casino Hotel Kansas City. View "Choy v. Ameristar Casinos, Inc." on Justia Law

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Appellant Edward Wilson pleaded guilty to first-degree murder and related felonies in the killing of an undercover police officer in 1979. A three-judge panel sentenced Wilson to death for the murder. In 2005, Wilson filed his third post-conviction petition, raising several claims for relief. The district court dismissed the petition, concluding that Wilson's claims was procedurally defaulted and that he failed to demonstrate good cause and prejudice. At issue on appeal was whether the Supreme Court's decision in McConnell v. State (McConnell I) in 2004 invalidated two of the aggravating circumstances used to make Wilson eligible for the death penalty. The Supreme Court concluded that McConnell I did not preclude the State from relying on the same predicate felony to support felony murder and felony aggravating circumstances when Appellant had pleaded guilty to first-degree murder based on both premeditated and deliberate murder and felony murder. Because the Court concluded that this and Wilson's remaining claims did not warrant relief, it affirmed the district court's order. View "Wilson v. State" on Justia Law

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A jury found Appellant Eugene Nunnery guilty of multiple charges and sentenced him to death for a first-degree murder conviction. Nunnery appealed, raising numerous claims of error at the guilt and penalty phases of his trial and challenging his death sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding (1) the district court may allow an untimely notice of evidence in aggravation under Nev. Sup. Ct. R. 250(4)(f) upon a showing of good cause and that the relevant factors include the danger of prejudice to the defense in its preparation as a result of the untimely notice; (2) the confidentiality provision in Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.156 does not preclude the admission of presentence investigation reports at penalty hearings, and the admission of information in the reports is in the discretion of the trial judge; (3) the district court in this case did not err in declining to instruct the jury that it must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating circumstances before it could find Petitioner eligible for the death penalty; and (4) the death sentence in this case was not excessive. View "Nunnery v. State" on Justia Law

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Appellant Stuard Stephans and a companion stole six bottles of men's cologne from a retail department store. At trial, the State relied on the store's loss prevention officer to prove both theft and value. The officer testified, over the defense's foundation, hearsay, and best evidence objections, that the stolen goods he recovered bore price tags adding up to $477. Neither the price tags nor duplicates of them were offered or admitted. In order to establish grand larceny, the State needed to prove that the stolen goods had a value of $250 or more. A jury convicted Stephans of grand larceny and burglary, both felonies, and conspiracy to commit larceny, a gross misdemeanor. The Supreme Court (1) reversed and remanded for a new trial on the grand larceny charge, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the officer's testimony, and the defense objections to the testimony should have been sustained; and (2) affirmed the judgment of conviction as to conspiracy and burglary. View "Stephans v. State" on Justia Law