Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Joseph Francis incurred a $2 million debt at Wynn Las Vegas, a casino. When unable to collect on the debt, Wynn sued Francis for, among other things, breach of contract, conversion, and unjust enrichment. When Wynn deposed Francis during discovery, Wynn invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to nearly every question. Wynn eventually filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted after refusing to permit Francis to withdraw his invocation and denying his request to reopen discovery. At issue on appeal was how, in response to a civil litigant's request for accommodation of his Fifth Amendment privilege, the district court should proceed in order to prevent the opposing party from being unfairly disadvantaged. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in response to a civil litigant's request for accommodation of his privilege, the district court should balance the interests of the invoking party and the opposing party's right to fair treatment; and (2) after reviewing the particular considerations in the instant case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit Appellant to withdraw his invocation or in denying his request to reopen discovery. View "Francis v. Wynn Las Vegas, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Respondent Aaron Hughes faced several criminal charges for allegedly creating three digital videos of himself engaging in sexual intercourse with a seventeen-year-old. The district court granted Hughes' motion to dismiss one of the charges against him for child pornography, pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.710, after finding that the statute was vague and that it only applied to production of pornography involving individuals under sixteen years of age. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the term "minor" in the statute is not constitutionally vague because it has a well-settled and ordinarily understood meaning as an individual under eighteen years of age; and (2) under section 200.710, it is unlawful to use a person under eighteen years of age in producing a pornographic performance. Remanded. View "State v. Hughes" on Justia Law

Jerome Ford was convicted of pandering of prostitution pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 201.300(1)(a), which criminalizes the act of soliciting another person with the specific intent that, in response to the solicitation, she become a prostitute or continue to engage in prostitution. Ford appealed, contending that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the statute does not criminalize such a substantial amount of protected expressive activity as to be unconstitutionally overbroad, and statute is not impermissibly vague; (2) the statute applies even when the target is an undercover police officer who disavows having been or intending to become a prostitute; but (3) the jury instructions in this case did not adequately describe the specific intent required for pandering, and the error affected Ford's substantial rights. Remanded for a new trial. View "Ford v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant Ramon Adam was convicted of trafficking in a controlled substance. During trial, Appellant sought a jury instruction on the procuring agent defense, which generally provides that if a defendant is an agent of the purchaser, then the defendant should only be held as culpable as the purchaser. The district court rejected the instruction. The Supreme Court affirmed after reviewing the trafficking statute and prior caselaw, holding that the district court reached the correct result, albeit for the wrong reasons, when it refused to instruct the jury on the procuring agent defense. The Court further held (1) the procuring agent defense is inapplicable to trafficking charges, regardless of the theory the defendant is charged under, whether sale, manufacture, delivery, or actual constructive possession; and (2) any prior precedent inconsistent with this opinion was overruled. View "Adam v. State" on Justia Law

Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) was named as a defendant in an action alleging civil rights violations. LVMPD had an insurance policy with respondent Coregis Insurance to protect against liability for police officer actions when the damages exceeded a certain amount. Coregis denied LVMPD coverage for the civil rights claims because LVMPD did not notify Coregis of its potential liability until ten years after the incident that led to the lawsuit. After settling the action, LVMPD filed a declaratory-judgment action seeking a judicial determination that Coregis was required to defend and indemnify LVMPD for damages related to the civil rights claims. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of Coregis, concluding that LVMPD's notice was clearly late and that Coregis was prejudiced by the late notice. The Supreme Court reversed the summary judgment, holding (1) when an insurer denies coverage of a claim because the insured party failed to provide timely notice of the claim, the insurer must demonstrate that notice was late and that it was prejudiced by the late notice in order to assert a late-notice defense to coverage; and (2) there were genuine issues of material fact regarding the timeliness of LVMPD's notice. Remanded. View "Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep't v. Coregis Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Appellant Collie Hawkins was convicted, pursuant to a jury verdict, of conspiracy to violate the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. On appeal, Hawkins contended that the district court erred by rejecting his challenges to the State's peremptory challenges of three jurors as impermissible race discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding that the district court did not err by rejecting Hawkins' challenge because Hawkins (1) failed to show purposeful discrimination or pretext or to offer any analysis of the relevant considerations, and (2) offered no relevant argument on appeal other than a summary conclusion that the prosecutor's reasons for removing the jurors were pretextual. View "Hawkins v. State" on Justia Law

During a routine traffic stop, police officers developed what the district court found was a reasonable suspicion that the car's passenger, appellant Arturo Cortes, was armed and dangerous. The police ordered Cortes out of the car and subjected him to a patdown search, which produced the evidence underlying the conviction for possession of a controlled substance. Arturo appealed the conviction, urging the Supreme Court to reject the district court's finding of reasonable suspicion or to interpret the Nevada constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures more strictly than the Supreme Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment in Arizona v. Johnson. The Court saw no basis for departing from Johnson's application of Terry v. Ohio to traffic-stop frisks and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Cortes v. State" on Justia Law

David Saletta was found guilty by a jury of indecent exposure. After the verdict was published and in response to Saletta's request for a jury poll, the district court polled the jury. During the poll, the seventh juror dissented from the verdict, after which the district court continued its poll. The court then questioned the seventh juror about her reasons for changing her mind. Saletta moved for a mistrial, which the district court denied. The jury was ordered to resume deliberation, and a subsequent jury poll resulted in a unanimous verdict. Saletta appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that (1) the district court's polling method was not coercive under the three factors identified in U.S. v. Gambino; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by continuing to poll the jury after a juror retreated from the verdict under Nev. Rev. Stat. 175.531; and (3) the district court erred by questioning the dissenting juror, the error was plain, and it affected Saletta's substantial rights. Remanded. View "Saletta v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant Joonsong Jitnan and his wife instituted a personal injury action against Ryan Oliver for injuries arising out of an automobile accident. During the voir dire, appellants exercised a challenge for cause to a prospective juror. The district court denied the challenge for cause, and appellants subsequently exercised a peremptory challenge on the prospective juror. After the trial, Jitnan appealed, arguing (1) the district court abused its discretion denying the challenge for cause to the prospective juror, and (2) the court's erroneous denial of the challenge for cause required reversal because in using a peremptory challenge to cure the district court's error, appellants lost one of their peremptory challenges, which was prejudicial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when a prospective juror expresses a potentially disqualifying bias or prejudice and is inconsistent in his or her responses regarding that preconception upon further inquiry, the district court must set forth the reasons for its grant or denial of the challenge for cause; and (2) although the district court in this case failed to set forth its reasons for denying the challenge for cause, there was no prejudicial error requiring reversal because the jury that decided appellants' case was fair and impartial. View "Jitnan v. Oliver" on Justia Law

In 2006, appellant’s vehicle was stolen from respondent hotel’s valet parking lot. Appellant’s insurer issued a check to appellant for the cost of the vehicle but not including the cost of customizations. Appellant filed a lawsuit in district court against respondent, alleging negligence and breach of a bailment contract and seeking damages exceeding $10,000. The district court determined that Nev. Rev. Stat. 651.101(1) shielded respondent from liability and entered summary judgment in favor of respondent. Appellant appealed, and the Supreme Court reversed. The Court found as a threshold matter appellant to be a real party in interest with standing to sue because appellant was not fully compensated by his insurer for his losses and thus the principle of total subrogation did not apply. The Court also held that Nev. Rev. Stat. 651.101(1) did not protect respondent against liability arising out of the theft of appellant’s vehicle because the statute, which limits the liability of hotels for the theft or destruction of any property brought by a patron upon the premises or "left in a motor vehicle upon the premises," unambiguously places motor vehicles outside of its scope. View "Arguello v. Sunset Station, Inc." on Justia Law