Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was charged with a felony DUI, pleaded not guilty and went to trial where a jury convicted him. At issue was Nev. Rev. Stat. 484C.340, which allows a defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere to a first felony DUI to undergo treatment. The appellant argued that Nev. Rev. Stat. 484C.340 is unconstitutional because it impermissibly burdens exercise of the right to a trial and treats defendants differently based on their exercise of that right in violation of due process and equal protection. The district court determined that while there is a fundamental right to a jury trial for serious criminal offenses, there is no fundamental right to participate in an alcohol treatment diversion program. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the possibility of entering an alcohol treatment program is a form of leniency available in exchange for a guilty plea and does not penalize a defendant for exercising the fundamental right to a jury trial; and (2) all defendants charged with felony DUI are given the same protection of the law enjoyed by other classes in like circumstances, and therefore the statute does not violate equal protection. View "Aguilar-Raygoza v. State" on Justia Law

Confronting a statewide budget crisis, the Nevada Legislature undertook several revenue-adjustment and cost cutting measures in an effort to balance the State's budget. Those measures were codified in Assembly Bill 6 (AB 6). In this appeal, the Supreme Court was asked whether parts of AB 6 violated the Nevada Constitution. The disputed section of the bill applied only to Appellant Clean Water Coalition (CWC), and converted money collected as user fees into a tax. The CWC used moneys it collected from households and businesses to implement the Systems Conveyance and Operations Program (SCOP) which involved the planning, design, financing, construction, operation and maintenance of a regional system to convey effluent from existing and future wastewater treatment facilities to its outfall in the Colorado River system. The CWC collected fees from 2002 until 2010. SCOP was tabled, and the funds collected for the wastewater facilities were transferred to the State's General Fund. M Resort and other businesses that had paid the fees sued the State, challenging the conversion of the CWC fees into what they argued was essentially a special tax. "Special taxes" are prohibited by the state constitution. The Supreme Court held that because AB 6 "burdens only the CWC in its efforts to raise revenue for the state, it is an impermissible local and special tax" under the state constitution. The Court found AB 6 unconstitutional.

The district courts reached different conclusions regarding whether inmates were entitled to due process protections related to their parole release hearings. In 2007, Respondent Richard Morrow was certified as not being a "high risk to reoffend" and granted parole. Before being released, the Parole Board's Psychological Review Panel assessed him as a "Tier III" sex offender which precluded Morrow from being released. Due to the new assessment, the Parole Board ultimately decided to defer Morrow's parole for two years. Morrow challenged the Parole Board's procedure by filing a writ of mandamus at the district court seeking a new parole hearing. Morrow argued that the Board violated his due process rights because it did not notify him of the reconsideration, and it denied him access to the documents it relied on when it deferred his parole. The district court granted the writ and directed the Board to schedule a new hearing. The Board appealed that decision. Appellant Brian Kamedula was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole. In 2008, the Parole Board denied Kamedula parole, and he appealed to the district court. Kamedula argued that the Board violated his due process rights by denying him the ability to present evidence or cross-examine witnesses during the parole hearing. The Board moved to dismiss the appeal, which the district court granted. Kamedula appealed that decision. In considering the issue on appeal, the Supreme Court noted that no statutory due process protections applied in these particular cases because the possibility of release on parole is not a protectable liberty interest for an inmate. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court in Morrow's case, and affirmed the court in Kamedula's case.

Patricia McClain was at a nail salon having her nails done when Defendant Timothy Hobbs entered and became belligerent. After an argument between the two, Defendant left the salon, only to return later. He spit in Ms. McClainâs face, and threw a rock through her vehicleâs windshield. The State charged Defendant with domestic battery, injury to property and requested a âhabitual criminalâ sentence enhancement. Ultimately the district court convicted Defendant and sentenced him to 10 to 25 years in prison for domestic battery with an additional year for property damage. Defendant appealed, challenging whether spitting on another constituted battery under state law. Furthermore, Defendant challenged whether the evidence introduced against him at trial was sufficient to support the enhanced sentence. The Supreme Court ruled that spitting does constitute battery under state law, and that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support his conviction and the sentence he received. The Court affirmed the district courtâs decision.

Appellant Lazario Ruiz was a City of North Las Vegas police officer. While off duty, Appellant got into an argument with his brother and a business associate. An investigation was launched. Based on what it perceived to be a lack of truthfulness and unprofessional conduct, the North Las Vegas Police Department (NLVPD) terminated Appellantâs employment. Following his termination and pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement (CBA), the police Union filed a grievance on behalf of Appellant. The Unionâs grievance asserted several specific violations of Appellantâs rights from the interview the NLVPD conducted. The grievance was sent to arbitration pursuant to the CBA. After a hearing, the arbitrator concluded that the NLVPD had just cause to terminate Appellant. The Union then assigned its right to challenge the arbitratorâs decision back to Appellant, and Appellant individually petitioned the district court to vacate the decision. The City moved to dismiss, arguing that Appellantâs right to challenge the arbitratorâs decision was not assignable. The City argued that Appellant lacked standing to bring a lawsuit since it was the Union who was a party to the arbitration, and not Appellant. The district court dismissed Appellantâs case, and Appellant appealed to the Supreme Court. After a careful review of the CBA, the Supreme Court concluded that Appellant did have standing to sue the City in district court following arbitration. The Court reversed the district courtâs judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings.

In 1990, Appellant Robert Stockmeier pled guilty to sexually assaulting a nine-year-old boy. Appellantâs pre-sentence investigation report (PSI) stated that Appellant used a weapon during the course of the offense, but the record at trial did not reflect that a weapon was used. Appellant objected to the statement pertaining to the weapon in his PSI. The sentencing court noted Appellantâs objections to the PSI, but did not rule on them. The court then sentenced Appellant to two consecutive life sentences, to which Appellant did not directly appeal. Instead, Appellant filed two post-conviction petitions in an attempt to set the PSIâs record straight. At a hearing, the district court stated that it believed that any inaccuracies in the PSI should be corrected. The State and Appellant conferred to adjust the PSIâs wording to better reflect the facts of his case, but they could not agree on the terms. The court stepped in to make the necessary amendments to the PSI, but refused the make the changes pertaining to use of a weapon. Years later, Appellant was eligible for parole. The Parole Board denied Appellantâs parole based in part on the factually incorrect PSI. Appellant petitioned the Supreme Court for review of the entire record. The Supreme Court held that because Nevada lacked a statutory or administrative process by which a prisoner may challenge alleged inaccuracies in a PSI, the prisoner must petition the district court for relief. If the matter cannot be resolved at the district court, then a prisoner may petition the Supreme Court. In Appellantâs case, the Court found that neither the appellate court nor the Parole Board had authority to amend Appellantâs PSI. Only after the PSI is set as accurate can the Parole Board rely on it to make future determinations of a prisonerâs parole. Therefore, the Court remanded Appellantâs case for further proceedings.

In May, 2008, Real-Party-In-Interest Roxanne Cagnina arrived at Centennial Hills Hospital for medical treatment. During her stay, she was allegedly sexually assaulted by a member of the hospital staff. She brought a civil suit against the staff member and his employer, Petitioner Valley Health System. During discovery, Cagnina sought to have Valley Health produce records of other incidents or complaints of improper conduct by employees or staff or others. Valley Health objected, and Cagnina filed a motion to compel a response. The motion was heard before a discovery commissioner who recommended to the trial court that Cagninaâs motion be granted. The court affirmed the commissionerâs recommendation, but Valley Health still objected. It sought a writ of mandamus from the Supreme Court, arguing that the records were privileged, and that the district court erred by affirming the discovery commissionerâs recommendation to hand over the records. On review, the Supreme Court found that Valley Health failed to raise its privilege argument before the discovery commissioner. The Court dismissed Valley Healthâs application for a writ of mandamus, and affirmed the decision of the lower court.

In 1985, Appellant Eugene Donlan was sentenced to probation by a California court for lewd and lascivious behavior involving a child. He was required to register as a sex offender. In 2005, Appellant moved to Nevada. Appellant had regularly registered as a sex offender since moving to Nevada. Almost 25 years after his conviction, California terminated Appellantâs registration requirement. Appellant then petitioned the district court in Nevada to terminate his registration requirement here. After a hearing, the district court denied Appellantâs petition. Appellant argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion in denying his petition. The Supreme Court concluded that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not require Nevada to disregard its own mechanism for protecting its citizens just because California terminated its registration requirement. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the district courtâs order that denied Appellantâs petition to stop registering as a sex offender in Nevada.