Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a general contractor (Perini) was sued in connection with alleged reinforcing steel defects on commercial construction project, Perini filed a counterclaim against the steel installer (Century) and the company to whom the steel installer assigned its assets (PCS). Century and PCS in turn filed third- and fourth-party complaints against several entities, including the company that provided structural engineering services for the project (Halcrow), alleging negligence, indemnity, contribution, an declaratory relief. Halcrow moved to dismiss the third- and fourth-party complaints, arguing that unintentional tort claims against design professionals in commercial construction projects are barred when the claimant incurs purely economic losses. The district court granted Halcrow's motion. The district court subsequently granted Century's and PCS's motions to amend their complaints to allege a claim for negligent misrepresentation. Halcrow then filed this petition for extraordinary relief. The Supreme Court issued the writ and directed the district court to vacate its order granting PCS and Century leave to amend their third- and fourth-party complaints, holding that, in commercial construction defect litigation, the economic loss doctrine applies to bar claims against design professionals for negligent misrepresentation where the damages alleged are purely economic. View "Halcrow, Inc. v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

This dispute arose out of a written option contract under which Respondent had the right to purchase real property from Appellants for $8 million. The property was subject to a deed of trust securing approximately $1.3 million in debt. At issue was whether the Respondent or Appellants were required to pay off the $1.3 million debt. The district court granted summary judgment for Respondent, concluding that the option contract required Appellants to deliver clear title, meaning Appellants were required to remove the $1.3 encumbrance for a net $6.7 option price. Appellants appealed, arguing that the option contract contemplated that Respondent take title subject to preexisting encumbrances, so that Appellants received the full $8 million option price. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly interpreted the option contract and that the contract placed responsibility for the $1.3 million debt on Appellants' side of the ledger. View " Galardi v. Naples Polaris, LLC" on Justia Law

Respondents were involved in the development and construction of Holcomb Condominiums (Condos). Appellant was the homeowners' association for Condos. Appellant filed, on behalf of itself and all condominium homeowners, a constructional defect complaint against Respondents, alleging a variety of defects and claims for negligence and breach of warranty. The district court dismissed Appellant's complaint as time-barred by the two-year contractual limitations period found in nearly identical arbitration agreements attached to each of the homeowners' purchase contracts. The court also denied as futile Appellant's request to amend its complaint to add causes of action for willful misconduct and fraudulent concealment based on missing roof underlayment, finding that the claim would also be time-barred by the contractual limitations period. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) arbitration agreements containing a reduced limitations period that are attached to and incorporated into purchase contracts are unlawful; (2) the district court erred in finding Appellants' negligence-based claims and breach of warranty claims were time-barred; and (3) because the contractual limitations provision was unenforceable, the district court's denial of the motion to amend on this basis was improper. View "Holcomb Condo. Homeowners' Ass'n v. Stewart Venture, LLC" on Justia Law

Appellant was the beneficiary of three life insurance policies insuring her husband. After the death of Appellant's husband, Appellant and one of the insurers (Insurer) disputed how the policy proceeds would be paid to Appellant. Appellant, a Nevada domiciliary, filed a complaint against Insurer on behalf of herself and a nationwide class of similarly situated persons in federal court in New Jersey, asserting claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and unjust enrichment. Sitting in diversity, the U.S. district court granted Insurer's motion to dismiss without prejudice. Appellant subsequently filed this action against Insurer in a Nevada state court, asserting claims for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of duties arising from a confidential relationship, and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The district court dismissed all of Appellant's claims on issue preclusion grounds. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) here, New Jersey preclusion law applies under the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Semtek International Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.; and (2) under New Jersey law, Appellant would be precluded from relitigating her claims in Nevada. View "Garcia v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am." on Justia Law

Respondents brought an action against Appellants, alleging breach of contract and fraud- and tort-based claims based on their purchase of two furniture stores from Appellants. The district court entered judgment for Respondents. The court allowed Respondents to rescind the agreement and awarded them damages. Although they appealed the judgment, Appellants did not obtain a stay of execution. Thus, despite the pending appeal, Respondents obtained a writ of execution on the judgment, allowing them to execute against one appellant's personal property. Respondents subsequently purchased Appellants' rights and interests in the district court action. Respondents moved to substitute as real parties in interest and dismiss the appeal on the basis that they acquired Appellants' claims and defenses at the sheriff's sale. The Supreme Court denied Respondents' motion, holding that Nevada's judgment execution statutes do not include the right to execute on a party's defenses to an action, as permitting a judgment creditor to execute on a judgment in such a way would cut of a debtor's defenses in a manner inconsistent with due process principles. View "Butwinick v. Hepner" on Justia Law

Appellant contracted to provide traffic control on a road improvement project coordinated and facilitated by Respondent. The parties' contract required Appellant to indemnify, defend, and hold harmless Respondent to the extent that Appellant caused any injury or damage. After a woman was injured in connection with the road improvement project and sued the parties for negligence, Respondent sought indemnification and defense from Appellant. Appellant, however, denied that it was obligated to provide indemnification and defense. After a jury trial in which the jury found Appellant did not proximately cause the underlying accident, the district court granted Respondent's motion to enforce indemnification, concluding that Appellant presented no evidence to suggest a lack of its potential liability under the contract. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) a plain reading of the contractual indemnity language imposed a causal limitation on Appellant's duty to indemnify and defendant Respondent; and (2) because the jury found Appellant did not proximately cause the underlying accident, Appellant did not have a duty to indemnify or defend Respondent. View "United Rentals Highway Techs. v. Wells Cargo Inc." on Justia Law

In this divorce action, Appellant Michael Grisham and Respondent Susie Grisham negotiated based on a draft property settlement agreement (PSA). At the end of an uncontested divorce prove-up hearing, the district court orally accepted the settlement. Michael, however, refused to sign the PSA. After several months, Susie moved for entry of a divorce decree based on the PSA. The district court entered a final written decree incorporating the PSA and denied Michael's motion for mistrial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court's procedure complied with applicable district court rules, which obviated any issue as to the statute of frauds, and the PSA otherwise met the requirements for an enforceable contract. View "Grisham v. Grisham" on Justia Law

In the second of two lawsuits brought by appellant Francie Bonnell against her daughter and son-in-law, respondents Sabrina and Steven Lawrence, Appellant appealed the grant of summary judgment from the first suit, along with its associated fee award. The underlying case arose from a $135,000 payment that Bonnell made to retire the mortgage debt on her daughter’s home ("Lindell premises"). Bonnell saw the payment as an advance on what her daughter would eventually inherit anyway, but with a catch: She expected, in return, a life estate in the premises, allowing her to live in the home, rent-free, for the rest of her life. The daughter acknowledged the $135,000 payment. However, she viewed it as a loan (which she and her husband repaid when they deeded Bonnell a different home with equity of $135,000). No writing memorialized the latter agreement, and the facts of the case questioned whether there was one. In her first suit, Bonnell asserted a variety of legal and equitable claims, all premised on her claimed life estate in the Lindell premises. Bonnell's attorney had withdrawn, and she continued in proper person. She received the motion for summary judgment, but she did not file a written opposition to it, and it was granted by written order. More than a year later, Bonnell obtained new counsel, who filed this second suit on her behalf. Although filed in the same judicial district and repeating the claims in the first suit, the second suit went to a new district court judge. The Lawrences moved to dismiss the second suit for failure to state a claim under NRCP 12(b)(5). They argued that res judicata barred relitigation of Bonnell’s claims and that, to the extent Bonnell identified grounds for avoiding the prior summary judgment, she could and should have asserted them by motion under NRCP 60(b)(1)-(3) within the six-month deadline specified in the rule. The district court credited the Lawrences’ arguments, rejected Bonnell’s, and dismissed the second suit with prejudice. Upon review, the Supreme Court affirmed. View "Bonnell v. Lawrence" on Justia Law

Respondent/cross-appellant Precision Construction, Inc. solicited bids from subcontractors for the design and installation of an early suppression, fast response sprinkler system. Certified Fire Protection, Inc. submitted a bid. Precision notified Certified that it won the bid, and Precision entered into a contract with the owner to complete the project. Certified obtained a copy of the subcontract along with a set of construction plans and sprinkler system specifications. The subcontract’s provisions required Certified to complete the preliminary design drawings of the sprinkler system within two weeks and to obtain a certificate naming Precision as an additional insured. Over the next few weeks, Precision asked Certified several times to sign the subcontract and provide the additional-insured certificate. Certified objected to the subcontract as imposing terms that differed from the bid specifications. It complained that the unanticipated terms changed the scope of work and that it would have to amend its bid accordingly. Certified also took exception to some of the generic contractual provisions, including the additional-insured requirement. Nonetheless, Certified hired specialists to work on the Precision contract, and began work. Precision and Certified communicated several more times about getting the subcontract signed. Eventually Precision terminated its relationship with Certified for refusing to sign the subcontract, for not providing the additional-insured endorsement, and for incorrect designs. At Precision’s request, Certified submitted an itemized billing for the work it had performed; its bill reported costs of $25,185.04, which included design work and permit fees for the project. Precision deemed the costs too high and never paid. Certified placed a mechanic’s lien on the property and sued to recover for its design-related work. Certified’s complaint sought to foreclose the mechanic’s lien and damages for unjust enrichment, quantum meruit, and breach of contract. On appeal, Certified argued that the district court failed to determine whether a contract for the design-only work existed but conceded that the parties never reached agreement on the full design and installation contract. Certified also asserted that the district court erred in concluding that Precision was neither unjustly enriched nor liable to Certified in quantum meruit because Precision did not benefit from the work performed. On cross-appeal, Precision argued that the district court abused its discretion in denying Precision’s motion for attorney fees. Because the Supreme Court agreed with the district court that Certified did not provide sufficient evidence to establish either an implied-in-fact contract or unjust enrichment, the Court affirmed. Additionally, the Court affirmed on cross-appeal the district court’s order denying attorney fees. View "Certified Fire Prot. v. Precision Constr." on Justia Law

In consolidated appeals, the Supreme Court addressed whether a claim for fraud in the inducement was available when the basis for the claim contradicts the very language of the contract at issue in the parties’ dispute. Upon review of the facts of this case, the Court concluded that when a fraudulent inducement claim contradicts the express terms of the parties’ integrated contract, it fails as a matter of law. Additionally, the Court addressed the propriety of the damages awarded by the jury under a separate claim for breach of contract. The Court affirmed the compensatory damages award in this case, but reversed the punitive damages award, as the Court reversed the finding of fraud on which the punitive damages were based. View "Road & Highway Builders v. N. Nev. Rebar" on Justia Law