Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellants guaranteed a promissory note executed in favor of Respondent, which was secured by land in Arizona. The guaranties were executed in Nevada and contained a Nevada choice-of-law provision. After default on the note, Respondent filed a complaint in Nevada and then initiated foreclosure proceedings in Arizona. Respondent sought a deficiency judgment on the guaranty through its initially filed complaint. The district court concluded that because the property was located in Arizona and sold pursuant to Arizona law, neither Arizona’s nor Nevada’s limitations period applied for seeking a deficiency judgment, and therefore, the deficiency judgment could proceed. Judgment was entered in Respondent’s favor for $929,224. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) because of the choice-of-law provision in the promissory note, Nevada law - particularly Nevada’s limitations period - applied in this case; and (2) Respondent failed to comply with Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.455(1) because it did not apply for a deficiency judgment within six months of the foreclosure sale, and therefore, the district court erred when it denied Appellants’ motion to dismiss the complaint as time-barred. View "Mardian v. Greenberg Family Trust" on Justia Law

Appellant, a Utah-based credit union, loaned an amount of money secured by real property in Mesquite Nevada to Respondents. Respondents later defaulted. Appellant held a trustee’s sale, resulting in a deficiency on the loan balance. Appellant sued Respondents in Clark County to recover the deficiency. Respondents filed a motion to dismiss the action under Nev. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), alleging that Appellant could not sue to recover the deficiency in Nevada. The district court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that the note and loan agreement contained language clearly expressing the parties’ intent to submit litigation relating to the note and agreement to the jurisdiction of the State of Utah. At issue on appeal was whether forum selection clauses in the loan agreement and note were mandatory or permissive. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the contract clauses stating that the parties shall “submit themselves to the jurisdiction of” Utah were permissive forum selection clauses, and therefore, the district court erred when it found that Utah was the sole forum for any controversy and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Am. First Fed. Credit Union v. Soro" on Justia Law

Stephen Hansen was injured when Brad Aguilar struck Hansen’s vehicle. Hansen sued Aguilar, who was insured by State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company. State Farm agreed to defend Aguilar under a reservation of rights. Aguilar agreed to a settlement with Hansen in which he assigned his rights against State Farm to Hansen. Hansen filed this action in federal district court alleging, among other claims, that State Farm breached a contract in its representation of Aguilar. The federal district court concluded that State Farm breached its contractual duty to defend Aguilar because it did not provide Aguilar with independent counsel of his choosing. State Farm moved for reconsideration. The federal district court granted the motion in part and certified two questions to the Supreme Court concerning Nevada’s conflict-of-interest rules in insurance litigation. The Supreme Court answered (1) Nevada law requires an insurer to provide independent counsel for its insured when a conflict of interest exists between the insurer and its insured; and (2) an insurer is only obligated to provide independent counsel when an actual of conflict exists, and a reservation of rights letter does not create a per se conflict of interest. View "State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Hansen" on Justia Law

This appeal arose from a failed land sale contract between Plaintiff and Defendant. Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendant, asserting claims for, inter alia, breach of contract and recession based on mutual mistake. Defendant counterclaimed for, inter alia, breach of contract, abuse of process, and nuisance. After a trial, the jury returned a unanimous verdict for Defendant on its nuisance and abuse of process counterclaims. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on its mutual mistake rescission claim, as a mutual mistake will not provide a ground for rescission where one of the parties bears the risk of mistake; (2) an abuse of process claim may not be supported by a complaint to an administrative agency instead of one involving a legal process, and therefore, Defendant failed to establish the elements of abuse of process; and (3) a nuisance claim seeking only emotional distress damages does not require proof of physical harm, and the facts in this case supported the damages award arising under Defendant’s nuisance counterclaim. View "Land Baron Invs., Inc. v. Bonnie Springs Family LP" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants alleging breach of contract and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Defendants counterclaimed for breach of contract, intentional misrepresentation, and abuse of process. After a second jury trial, the jury returned a verdict for damages on Plaintiffs’ claims. Defendants appealed from the denial of a variety of motions and an award of costs and attorney fees to Plaintiffs. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the filing of a post-judgment motion that tolls the time to appeal also tolls Nev. R. Civ. P. 54(d)(2)(B)’s twenty-day deadline to move for attorney fees; (2) the district court erred in finding that the $100,000 offset in Defendants’ favor from the first trial was extinguished by this Court’s previous order of reversal and remand; (3) the district court erred in finding that all Defendants, rather than just a real estate agency, were liable for attorney fees; and (4) the district court’s judgment is otherwise affirmed. View "Barbara Ann Hollier Trust v. Shack" on Justia Law

In 1996, the developer of Double Diamond Ranch Master Association (Association) entered into a maintenance agreement with the City of Reno. In 2012, the Association gave notice to the City that it was terminating the contract pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 116.3105(2), which permits a homeowners’ association that provides at least ninety days’ notice to terminate “any contract…that is not in good faith or was unconscionable to the units’ owners at the time entered into.” The City rejected the Association’s notice of termination. Approximately twenty months later, the City brought an action against the Association seeking specific performance of the maintenance agreement. The Association filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that section 116.3105(2) required the City to file suit within ninety days. The district court denied the Association’s motion to dismiss. The Association subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus or prohibition directing the district court to vacate its order denying the Association’s motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that section 116.3105(2) does not act as a statute of limitations, and a recipient of an association’s notice of termination of a contract is not required to take legal action within ninety days. View "Double Diamond Ranch Master Ass’n v. Second Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Krista Gilmore was employed by Excellence Community Management (ECM), an LLC, and signed an employment agreement containing restrictive covenants. The owners and operators of ECM later sold 100 percent of their membership interest in the LLC to First Services Residential Management Nevada (FSRM). Thereafter, Gilmore’s employment with ECM terminated, and Gilmore began working for Mesa Management, LLC. ECM sent Gilmore a cease-and-desist letter alleging that Gilmore violated her employment agreement by contacting ECM’s clients and soliciting them to hire Mesa. ECM filed a complaint seeking damages and injunctive relief against Gilmore and Mesa (collectively, Respondents). The district court denied ECM’s motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that the agreement was not assignable to FSRM without Gilmore consenting to the assignment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the sale of 100 percent of the membership interest in an LLC does not affect the enforcement of an employee’s employment contract containing a restrictive covenant because such a sale does not create a new entity, and therefore, ECM may enforce a restrictive covenant in Gilmore’s employment contract without Gilmore’s consent of assignment; but (2) ECM failed to show that it would suffer irreparable harm for which compensatory damages were not an adequate remedy if the district court did not enter a preliminary injunction. View "Excellence Cmty. Mgmt. v. Gilmore" on Justia Law

Coyote Springs Investment, LLC and BrightSource Energy, Inc. entered into a lease. One year later, BrightSource sought to terminate the lease. Coyote Springs sued BrightSource, claiming that the lease’s termination was ineffective without payment of the termination fee. Before trial, the parties deposed Harvey Whittemore, the former co-owner and manager of Coyote Springs. During the deposition, Coyote Springs requested a recess in order to conduct a private conference with Whittemore. The trial commenced, and during cross-examination of Whittemore, BrightSource’s counsel inquired as to what was discussed at the deposition conference. Coyote Springs objected based on attorney-client privilege. The trial court overruled the objection, determining that the communication was not privileged. Coyote Springs petitioned for extraordinary writ relief on the deposition issue. The Supreme Court denied the writ, holding that the communications between Whittemore and counsel for Coyote Springs during the break in Whittemore’s deposition were discoverable because Coyote Springs requested the recess in the deposition and failed to make a sufficient, contemporaneous record of the conference so as to preserve the attorney-client privilege. View "Coyote Springs Inv., LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Electrical problems at a plastic bag manufacturing plant led to an increased number of defective bags being produced. A dispute arose between the manufacturer and its insurer regarding what provision of the policy covered the losses associated with the defective bags and regarding what policy limit should apply to the manufacturer’s property loss. The district court submitted both issues to the jury. The jury awarded the manufacturer damages for breach of the insurance contract. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in sending the two questions to the jury because (1) categorizing the insured’s loss under the policy is a question of law and not a question of fact, and (2) determining which policy limit applies presents a question of law. Remanded. View "Fed. Ins. Co. v. Coast Converters, Inc." on Justia Law

A stock transfer agent gave a stockholder an allegedly incomplete and misleading answer to a question about its requirements for removing a restrictive legend on the stockholder’s stock. The stockholder sued the transfer agent, asserting claims for violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 104.8401 and 104.8407, negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation, aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, and conspiracy. Under sections 104.8401 and 104.8407, a transfer agent must, on proper request, register a transfer of securities without unreasonable delay. The district court granted the transfer agent’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) sections 104.8401 and 104.8407 did not support liability in this case because the stockholder did not ask the transfer agent to remove the legend and reissue him clean shares, and because the stockholder never submitted a transfer request, the agent’s statutory duty to register a requested transfer did not arise; and (2) the stockholder’s common law claims failed on the grounds that they were not supported by competent evidence. View "Guilfoyle v. Olde Monmouth Stock Transfer" on Justia Law