Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Electrical problems at a plastic bag manufacturing plant led to an increased number of defective bags being produced. A dispute arose between the manufacturer and its insurer regarding what provision of the policy covered the losses associated with the defective bags and regarding what policy limit should apply to the manufacturer’s property loss. The district court submitted both issues to the jury. The jury awarded the manufacturer damages for breach of the insurance contract. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in sending the two questions to the jury because (1) categorizing the insured’s loss under the policy is a question of law and not a question of fact, and (2) determining which policy limit applies presents a question of law. Remanded. View "Fed. Ins. Co. v. Coast Converters, Inc." on Justia Law

A stock transfer agent gave a stockholder an allegedly incomplete and misleading answer to a question about its requirements for removing a restrictive legend on the stockholder’s stock. The stockholder sued the transfer agent, asserting claims for violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 104.8401 and 104.8407, negligent and fraudulent misrepresentation, aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty, and conspiracy. Under sections 104.8401 and 104.8407, a transfer agent must, on proper request, register a transfer of securities without unreasonable delay. The district court granted the transfer agent’s motion for summary judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) sections 104.8401 and 104.8407 did not support liability in this case because the stockholder did not ask the transfer agent to remove the legend and reissue him clean shares, and because the stockholder never submitted a transfer request, the agent’s statutory duty to register a requested transfer did not arise; and (2) the stockholder’s common law claims failed on the grounds that they were not supported by competent evidence. View "Guilfoyle v. Olde Monmouth Stock Transfer" on Justia Law

Appellant leased commercial real property from Respondent. Appellant vacated the property and ceased paying rent after a significant water intrusion event. Respondent filed a complaint alleging that Appellant breached the lease. Appellant counterclaimed that Respondent constructively evicted Appellant by failing to maintain the roof. The district court entered judgment in favor of Respondent, concluding (1) severe water intrusion justified Appellant’s vacating the property; but (2) the lease obligated Appellant to provide Respondent written notice of and thirty days to cure the water intrusion before exercising any other potential remedies, and Appellant did comply with the notice and cure provision. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court’s factual findings did not support Appellant’s argument that it was constructively evicted, and therefore, the Court did not need to address whether Appellant was required to comply with the lease’s notice and cure provision in order to successfully assert constructive eviction. View "Mason-McDuffie Real Estate, Inc. v. Villa Fiore Dev., LLC" on Justia Law

Steven C. Jacobs, the former chief executive officer of Sands China Ltd., filed a complaint against his former employer, alleging, among other things, that Sands breached his employment contract. At issue in this case was Jacobs’ possession of purportedly privileged documents in the form of e-mails and other communications that he gathered on the day he was terminated. The district court ordered Jacobs to turn over the copies of the documents to an independent vendor. The district court granted Jacobs’ motion for the return of the documents, concluding that Jacobs was among the “class of persons” legally entitled to view and use privileged documents that pertained to his tenure at Sands. Sands then filed this original petition for writ of prohibition or mandamus. The Supreme Court granted the petition in part, holding (1) a corporation’s current management is the sole holder of its attorney-client privilege, and thus, Nevada law does not allow for a judicially created class of persons exception to attorney-client privilege; and (2) the district court erred in ruling that Jacobs, based solely on his former executive position with Sands, was legally allowed to use the purportedly privileged documents over Sands’s claim of privilege. View "Las Vegas Sands Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Steven Jacobs, the former chief executive officer of Sands China Ltd., filed a complaint against his former employer, alleging, among other things, breach of contract claims. Throughout discovery on the issue of whether Sands was subject to personal jurisdiction in Nevada, Sands maintained that it could not disclose any documents containing personal information that are located in Macau due to restrictions within the Macau Personal Data Protection Act (MPDPA). The district court subsequently issued an order precluding Sands from raising the MPDPA as an objection or defense to disclosure of any documents. Thereafter, Jacobs moved for Nev. R. Civ. P. 37 sanctions, arguing that Sands had violated the district court’s order by redacting personal data contained in its Macau-related document production based on MPDPA restrictions. The Supreme Court denied Sands’s petition for a writ of prohibition or mandamus, holding (1) the mere presence of a foreign international privacy statute does not itself preclude Nevada district courts from ordering litigants to comply with Nevada discovery rules; and (2) in this case, the district court properly found that the existence of a foreign international privacy statute did not excuse Petitioners from complying with the district court’s discovery order. View "Las Vegas Sands Corp. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Daisy Monzo gifted a condominium that she owned to an irrevocable trust for the benefit of her daughter, Charron Monzo. Daisy subsequently signed another deed transferring the condo back into her own name. Charron filed a petition seeking an order requiring Daisy to transfer the condo back to the trust. The district court granted partial summary judgment for Daisy, concluding that Daisy’s execution of the deed transferring title to the condo into the trust was based on unilateral mistakes. Charron then filed this original writ petition challenging the district court’s partial summary judgment order. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding (1) a donor may obtain relief from an erroneous gift if she proves by clear and convincing evidence that her intent was mistaken and not in accord with the donative transfer; (2) remedies available to correct such mistakes depend on the nature of the unilateral mistake in question; and (3) because it was uncertain what Daisy’s donative intent was at the time of the donative transfer, genuine issues of fact remained as to whether unilateral mistakes affected Daisy’s execution of the deed transferring the condo into the trust, and therefore, partial summary judgment was improper. View "In re Irrevocable Trust Agreement of 1979" on Justia Law

Petitioners were sued by Investors who alleged that Petitioners had breached various statutory, contractual, and fiduciary duties. Petitioners filed numerous counterclaims alleging (1) Dana Gentry, a local television reporter, helped Investors investigate and prepare their lawsuit in order to manufacture news stories intended to embarrass Petitioners; and (2) Gentry received personal favors from Investors in connection with the news stories. During discovery, Petitioners served a subpoena on Gentry requesting information relating to Gentry's relationship with Investors. Gentry filed a motion to quash the subpoena, arguing that the information sought was protected by Nevada's news shield statute, which protects journalists from being required to reveal information gathered in their professional capacities in the course of developing news stories. The district court granted the motion to quash. The Supreme Court denied Petitioners' petition for extraordinary relief, concluding that Gentry's motion to quash the subpoena properly asserted the news shield privilege and that Petitioners failed to overcome this privilege.View "Aspen Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

In 2007, Sandpointe Apartments obtained a loan secured by a deed of trust to real property. Stacy Yahraus-Lewis personally guaranteed the loan. After Sandpointe defaulted on the loan, the interest in the loan and guarantee was transferred to CML-NV Sandpointe, LLC. In 2011, CML-NV pursued its rights under the deed of trust's power of sale provision and purchased the property securing the loan at a trustee's sale. Thereafter, the Legislature enacted Nev. Rev. Stat. 40.459(1)(c), which limits the amount of a deficiency judgment that can be recovered by persons who acquired the right to obtain the judgment from someone else who held that right. Subsequently, CML-NV filed a complaint against Sandpointe and Yahraus-Lewis for deficiency and breach of guaranty. Yahraus-Lewis moved for partial summary judgment, requesting that the district court apply the limitation contained in section 40.459(1)(c) to CML-NV's action. The district court concluded that the statute applies only to loans entered into after June 10, 2011. Sandpointe and Yahraus-Lewis subsequently petitioned for a writ of mandamus or prohibition. The Supreme Court denied the writ, concluding that the statute may not apply retroactively, and therefore, the statute's limitations did not apply in this case.View "Sandpointe Apartments, LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Real parties in interest in this case were the owners and developers (collectively, P&R) and the general contractor (PCS) of a construction site in Las Vegas. Petitioner, an architecture firm, designed a housing project at the site. After a fatal automobile accident occurred at the site, Plaintiffs and/or their estates filed complaints against P&R, PCS, and Petitioner. Petitioner and Plaintiffs settled, and the district court determined the settlement was made in good faith. P&R subsequently filed a third-party complaint against Petitioner for breach of contract, professional negligence, and express indemnity, among other claims. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that they were barred as "de facto" contribution and/or equitable indemnity claims. The district court granted the motion in part and dismissed P&R's claim for professional negligence. Petitioner then filed this petition for a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court granted the petition and directed the district court to dismiss P&R's remaining third-party claims against Petitioner, holding (1) Nev. Rev. Stat. 17.245(1)(b) bars all claims that seek contribution and/or equitable indemnity when the settlement is determined to be in good faith; and (2) P&R's remaining third-party claims here were "de facto" contribution claims and were thus barred by section 17.245(1)(b). View "Otak Nev., LLC v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

After four people died from carbon monoxide poisoning while sleeping in a room above a pool heater in a motel, the motel sought coverage for the deaths from its insurer. The insurer denied coverage based on two provisions of the motel’s general liability policy, the absolute pollution exclusion and the indoor air quality air quality exclusion. The federal district court determined that the policy exclusions were ambiguous and interpreted the ambiguity in the motel’s favor. On appeal, the federal court of appeals certified questions of Nevada law to the Nevada Supreme Court. The Court answered the questions in the negative, concluding that neither the pollution exclusion nor the indoor air quality exclusion clearly excluded coverage for carbon monoxide exposure under the circumstances of this case. View "Century Sur. Co. v. Casino W., Inc." on Justia Law