Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court reversed the order of the district court denying Petitioner's petition to seal criminal records, holding that because the parties did not cite all of the proper statutes governing Petitioner's petition and the district court did not apply all of the controlling statutes the court erred in concluding that all of Petitioner's convictions were ineligible for sealing.At issue in this appeal was whether, if enough time elapses so that a petitioner's later conviction is sealed and deemed never to have occurred, that makes an earlier conviction eligible also to be sealed since it is no longer chronologically followed by another later conviction, even though it would not have been eligible prior to sealing the later conviction. The Supreme Court held (1) district courts have discretion to evaluate successive convictions in reverse chronological order, thereby potentially sealing earlier convictions that would not have been eligible had the court instead considered the convictions in forward chronological order; and (2) even if a later conviction has been sealed, the district court may still consider it in deciding whether earlier convictions should be sealed or not and in concluding whether the petitioner was truly rehabilitated. View "In re Application of Finley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury verdict, of two counts of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon and other crimes, holding that the district court erred in precluding Defendant from asserting duress as a defense to the charged crimes which were not punishable with death.Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon, conspiracy to commit murder, and burglary while in possession of a deadly weapon. At issue on appeal was whether the language in Nev. Rev. Stat. 194.010(8) stating that duress cannot be asserted as a defense to a crime that "is punishable with death" can be interpreted to include crimes that are not punishable with death but require proof of intent to commit a crime that is punishable by death. The Supreme Court held (1) section 194.010(8) cannot be interpreted to limit the duress defense with respect to crimes that are not punishable with death regardless of the relationship between those crimes and another crime that is punishable with death; and (2) the district court's error in precluding Defendant from asserting duress as a defense to the crimes not punishable by death was not harmless. View "Cabrera v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court denying a prisoner's petition for judicial review challenging the amount of compensation he received, upon his release, in connection with the industrial injury he suffered while incarcerated, holding that the administrative appeals officer properly affirmed the calculation of the prisoner's average monthly wage.Appellant was injured while working for Nevada Division of Forestry while he was incarcerated. Respondent accepted Appellant's workers' compensation claim. After Appellant was released he sought to have the benefits calculated at the minimum wage guaranteed under the Nevada Constitution. Under the modified workers' compensation program for prisoners, however, the amount of compensation a prisoner may receive upon release is based on the average monthly wage the prisoner actually received as of the date of the injury. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's order denying Appellant's petition for judicial review, holding that an administrative appeals officer is not permitted to recalculate the average monthly wage at an amount the prisoner did not actually receive while incarcerated. View "White v. State, Division of Forestry" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision applying the pre-2007 version of Nev. Rev. Stat. 209.4465 to Defendant's criminal conduct in this case, holding that the 2007 amendment to Nev. Rev. Stat. 209.4465 applies when the charged offense is continuous in nature but that attempted lewdness with a child under fourteen is not a continuing offense.Defendant was convicted of two counts of attempted lewdness with a child under fourteen and was alleged to have committed the offenses between 2006 and 2013. The district court applied the 2003 version of section 209.4465. On appeal, the State argued that section 209.4465(8)(2007) applied to Defendant's offenses because the attempted lewdness counts were charged as continuing offenses through 2013. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) attempted lewdness with a child under the age of fourteen is not a continuing offense; and (2) the district court properly relied on the 2003 version of section 209.4465 and applied Defendant's earned credits to his parole eligibility. View "High Desert State Prison v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court granting Respondent's pretrial motion to dismiss the indictment for violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial, holding that Respondent properly invoked his speedy-trial right, Respondent was entitled to a presumption of prejudice, and the State failed to rebut that presumption.The district court concluded that the State violated Respondent's right to a speedy trial because the State's gross negligence caused a twenty-six-month delay between the filing of charges and Respondent's arrest, and the State failed to rebut the presumption that the delay prejudiced Respondent. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in concluding that Respondent was entitled to a presumption o prejudice under the facts enunciated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), and Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647 (1992); and (2) the State did not rebut this presumption or explain on appeal how Respondent was not prejudiced by the delay. View "State v. Inzunza" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury verdict, of seven counts of robbery with the use of a deadly weapon and other offenses, holding that Defendant made specific factual allegations that could be sufficient to establish a prima facie violation of the requirement that a Defendant choose from a fair cross section of the community and those allegations were not disproved, and therefore, the district court abused its discretion by denying Defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing.At issue in this case was when an evidentiary hearing may be warranted on a fair-cross-section claim. The Supreme Court held (1) an evidentiary hearing is warranted on a fair-cross-section challenge when a defendant makes specific allegations that, if true, would be sufficient to establish a prima facie violation of the fair-cross-section requirement; (2) the district court abused its discretion in denying Defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing on his fair-cross-section challenge; and (3) none of Defendant's other arguments required a new trial. View "Valentine v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court admitting certain out-of-court statements after finding that the witness was unavailable and that Defendant had intentionally deterred the witness from appearing at trial, holding that the district court correctly concluded that the State met its burden under the preponderance of the evidence standard.Defendant was charged with attempted murder with use of a deadly weapon and other crimes. When the State sought to admit Defendant's daughter's out-of-court statements to a district court's office investigator Defendant asserted his right to confrontation. The trial court admitted the statements, finding that the witness was unavailable and that Defendant had intentionally deterred the witness from appearing at trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) when invoking the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the Confrontation Clause the preponderance of the evidence standard is the appropriate burden of proof; and (2) the district court applied the correct standard, and the court did not err in its application of the exception. View "Anderson v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court declined to reconsider well-settled Nevada law that when a district court imposes a sentence in a criminal case it must give a defendant credit for any time the defendant was spent in presentence confinement absent an express statutory provision making the defendant ineligible for such credit and remanded the case with instructions for the district court to give Appellant the required credit for time served in presentence confinement.Defendant pleaded guilty to grand larceny of an automobile, less than $3,500, and unlawful taking of a motor vehicle. After she was sentenced Defendant appealed, arguing that the distrixt court erred by failing to give her credit for time served in presentence confinement. The State urged the Supreme Court to overrule established precedent holding that sentencing courts must award credit for time served in presentence confinement. The Supreme Court concluded that there was no compelling reason to overturn precedent, and based on that precedent, held that the district court erred in forfeiting Defendant's presentence credit as a condition of probation. View "Poasa v. State" on Justia Law

In this appeal from the denial of a postconviction habeas petition, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that Appellant was not allowed to raise direct appeal issues related to his 1995 capital trial in this appeal from an amended judgment of conviction entered in 2017.In 1995, Appellant was sentenced to death for first-degree murder. Amended judgments required Appellant to pay an indeterminate portion of restitution. Appellant litigated the judgment of conviction for more than two decades with a direct appeal and various state and federal court proceedings. In the instant proceeding, Appellant filed in 2017 a petition for a writ of habeas corpus asserting that his conviction was not final because the judgment of conviction contained an indeterminate restitution provision. The district court denied the petition but amended the judgment of conviction to delete the indeterminate part of the restitution provision. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) where for a dozen years Appellant treated the judgment of conviction as a final judgment, Appellant was estopped from now arguing that the judgment was not final; and (2) although the amended judgment of conviction is appealable, the appeal is limited in scope to issues stemming from the amendment. View "Witter v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted in part Defendant's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a district court order denying his pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus and motion to dismiss the indictment with prejudice, holding that evidence that has been suppressed in justice court proceedings on a felony complaint is not "legal evidence" that may be presented to the grand jury in support of an indictment.The State filed a criminal complaint charging Defendant with murder with use of a deadly weapon and possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. Before the preliminary hearing, Defendant moved to suppress his statements to the police and the gun. The justice court granted the motion. The State thendismissed the criminal complaint and went to the grand jury on the charge of possession of a firearm by a prohibited person, presenting the evidence that the justice court had suppressed. The grand jury indicted Defendant on the charge. After Defendant filed a pretrial petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the indictment, without success, he brought this action seeking a writ of mandamus. The Supreme Court granted the petition in part, holding that the State was precluded from presenting the suppressed evidence to the grand jury. View "Gathrite v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law