Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court granted the Nevada Board of Parole Commissioners' petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the district court's decision denying the Parole Board's petition for modification of Marlin Thompson's sentence pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.033(2), holding that the district court misapplied the law.In 1992, Thompson, who was convicted of first-degree murder, was granted parole and has remained on parole since. In 2017, the Parole Board petitioned to modify Thompson's sentence. The district attorney's office opposed the petition, asserting that the minimum term for first-degree murder at the time of Thompson's offense was a life term, and therefore, the court could not reduce Thompson's maximum term. The district court agreed and denied the petition. The Parole Board filed a petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the court's order. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding (1) the parole eligibility term prescribed by the penal statute sets the limit for reducing the life sentence under section 176.033(2); and (2) the district court relied on a misunderstanding of the law in denying the Parole Board's petition. View "State Board of Parole Commissioners v. Second Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction of first-degree murder and affirmed the judgment of conviction as to the other charges for which Defendant was convicted, holding that the district court abused its discretion by declining to instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter.Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, two counts of child abuse, neglect or endangerment, and ownership or possession of a firearm by a prohibited person. The Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded for a new trial on the murder charge, holding (1) a district court must instruct the jury on voluntary manslaughter when requested so long as the instruction is supported by some evidence, even if that evidence is circumstantial; (2) because the circumstantial evidence in this case strongly suggested the killing occurred in a sudden heat of passion upon provocation the district court abused its discretion by refusing to give a jury instruction on voluntary manslaughter; and (3) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his remaining allegations of error. View "Newson v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the district court's decision affirming his conviction and disagreeing with Petitioner's argument that he was erroneously denied the right to a jury trial, holding that the offense of misdemeanor battery constituting domestic violence is a serious offense such that the right to a jury trial is triggered.Petitioner was charged with first-offense battery constituting domestic violence, a misdemeanor. Petitioner made a demand for a jury trial, but the municipal court denied the demand. Petitioner then entered a no contest plea to the domestic battery charge. Before the Supreme Court Petitioner argued that recent changes by the legislature made the offense a serious one. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that because statutes now limit the right to bear arms for a person who has been convicted of misdemeanor battery constituting a domestic violence and because the Legislature has determined that the offense is a serious one, a jury trial is required. View "Andersen v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of multiple sex offenses against children and related offenses, holding that the trial judge's behavior and statements during voir dire constituted judicial misconduct and that the misconduct interfered with Defendant's right to an impartial jury.During the second day of voir dire in this case, a prospective juror stated that she did not think she could be unbiased toward Defendant. Thereafter, the trial judge threw a book against the wall, cursed, and berated, yelled at, and threatened that prospective juror. After a trial, the jury returned guilty verdicts on most of the counts with which Defendant was charged. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court's misconduct during voir dire and the denial of his request for a new venire violated his right to a fair trial by an impartial jury. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the judicial misconduct in this case deprived Defendant of his constitutional right to a fair trial before an impartial jury. View "Azucena v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court admitting certain out-of-court statements after finding that the witness was unavailable and that Defendant had intentionally deterred the witness from appearing at trial, holding that the record supported the court's conclusion that the State met its burden of proof in invoking the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the Confrontation Clause.Relying on the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception the trial court admitted the out-of-court statements despite Defendant's assertion of his right to confrontation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the preponderance of the evidence standard is the appropriate burden of proof for purposes of the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to the Confrontation Clause; and (2) the trial court did not err in its application of the forfeiture by wrongdoing exception to admit the witness's out-of-court statements. View "Anderson v. State" on Justia Law

In this case where Defendant was convicted of six counts of violating Nev. Rev. Stat. 202.360, which makes it a felony for certain categories of prohibited person to possess a firearm, the Supreme Court reversed the judgment of conviction as to counts one through three and reversed and remanded for a new trial as to counts four through six, holding that the State did not satisfy the status elements of the two groups of crimes Defendant was convicted of.Counts one through three charged Defendant with violating section 202.360(2)(a) for possessing firearms as a person who has "been adjudicated as mentally ill" by a state or federal court. The remaining counts charged Defendant with illegally possessing firearms based on his status as a person who is "an unlawful user" of a controlled substance. The Supreme Court held (1) Defendant's assignment to and completion of a Nevada mental health court diversion program did not constitute an adjudication of mental illness that made his subsequent possession of a firearm a felony; and (2) the court erred in instructing the jury by theoretically allowing Defendant to be convicted of illegal possession of a firearm by an "unlawful user" of a controlled substance based on a single current use of the substance. View "Hager v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Appellant of two counts of first-degree murder with a deadly weapon after adopting a framework for analyzing the appropriateness of juror anonymity, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it empaneled an anonymous jury by withholding the jurors' names and addresses from counsel.Due to concerns about juror privacy, the district court decided to impanel an anonymous jury and redact the jurors' names and addresses from juror questionnaires. After a trial, the empaneled jury found Defendant guilty of two counts of murder and found that Defendant had used a deadly weapon in the commission of the crimes. The district court sentenced Defendant to life without parole on each count. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in empaneling an anonymous jury, and its use satisfied the rule adopted today; (2) a district court has no statutory obligation to instruct a jury about the consequences of a deadly weapon enhancement; and (3) the district court did not err when it admitted as consciousness-of-guilt evidence two recorded conversations during which Defendant asked his associates to threaten a key witness. View "Menendez-Cordero v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for a writ of mandamus challenging the judgment of the district court increasing Petitioner's bail from $25,000 to $100,000, holding that the district court failed to engage in a meaningful analysis to determine whether good cause was shown.In his petition, Petitioner argued that the district court lacked good cause to support the increase of his bail. The Supreme Court held that writ relief was warranted because (1) the district court increased the bail after making an initial bail determination, and therefore, the court was required to make a finding of good cause under Nev. Rev. Stat. 178.499(1) for the subsequent increase in bail; and (2) the district court acted arbitrarily and capriciously in increasing Petitioner's bail without explaining the good cause shown. View "Cameron v. District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the district court did not err in rejecting Appellant's argument that the credits Appellant earns under Nev. Rev. Stat. 209.4465 must be applied to the minimum term of his enhancement sentence.In denying Appellant's habeas petition, the district court held that the applicable sentencing statute specified a minimum term that Appellant had to serve before becoming eligible for parole, and therefore, section 209.4465(7)(b) precluded Respondent from applying the statutory credits to the minimum term of Appellant's enhancement sentence. On appeal, Appellant argued that the sentencing statute is silent as to parole eligibility, and therefore, the district court erred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute that specified the sentence for Defendant's primary offense of second-degree murder also specified the sentence for the weapon enhancement, and that statute specified a minimum term that Appellant had to serve before becoming eligible for parole. View "Perez v. Warden" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction for sexual assault but upheld his remaining convictions for other sexually-related counts, including attempted sexual assault, holding that there was insufficient evidence for the sexual assault conviction.On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the district court erred when it allowed the victim to testify by two-way audiovisual transmission in violation of his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and that the district court erred in convicting him of both sexual assault and attempted sexual assault because they were based on the same underlying conduct. The Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the victim, who was admitted to an out-of-state residential treatment center, to testify by two-way audiovisual transmission at trial; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in proceeding to trial without holding a competency hearing; and (3) the State should have charged the sexual assault and attempted sexual assault counts in the alternative, which it did not, and the district court compounded the error by convicting Defendant of both counts. View "Lipsitz v. State" on Justia Law