Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Appellant's postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, holding that the district court did not err in rejecting Appellant's argument that the credits Appellant earns under Nev. Rev. Stat. 209.4465 must be applied to the minimum term of his enhancement sentence.In denying Appellant's habeas petition, the district court held that the applicable sentencing statute specified a minimum term that Appellant had to serve before becoming eligible for parole, and therefore, section 209.4465(7)(b) precluded Respondent from applying the statutory credits to the minimum term of Appellant's enhancement sentence. On appeal, Appellant argued that the sentencing statute is silent as to parole eligibility, and therefore, the district court erred. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute that specified the sentence for Defendant's primary offense of second-degree murder also specified the sentence for the weapon enhancement, and that statute specified a minimum term that Appellant had to serve before becoming eligible for parole. View "Perez v. Warden" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction for sexual assault but upheld his remaining convictions for other sexually-related counts, including attempted sexual assault, holding that there was insufficient evidence for the sexual assault conviction.On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the district court erred when it allowed the victim to testify by two-way audiovisual transmission in violation of his rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment and that the district court erred in convicting him of both sexual assault and attempted sexual assault because they were based on the same underlying conduct. The Supreme Court held (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the victim, who was admitted to an out-of-state residential treatment center, to testify by two-way audiovisual transmission at trial; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in proceeding to trial without holding a competency hearing; and (3) the State should have charged the sexual assault and attempted sexual assault counts in the alternative, which it did not, and the district court compounded the error by convicting Defendant of both counts. View "Lipsitz v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant's procedurally barred postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus asserting that he was entitled to a new penalty hearing, holding that Defendant failed to demonstrate good cause to excuse the procedural bars.Defendant claimed that he demonstrated good cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural bars based on Hurst v. Florida, 477 U.S. __ (2016). Specifically, Defendant that Hurst established that the weighing component of Nevada's death penalty procedures is a "fact" that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt and that Hurst clarified that all eligibility determinations are subject to the beyond the reasonable doubt standard. The Supreme Court previously rejected the first argument in Jeremais v. State, 412 P.3d 43 (Nev. 2018), and rejected the second argument in Nunnery v. State, 263 P.3d 235 (Nev. 2011). The Supreme Court held that the district court correctly denied Defendant's petition because Defendant failed to demonstrate that these prior decisions were incorrect or that Hurst compelled a different result. View "Castillo v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction resulting in Defendant receiving a longer sentence after successfully appealing his first conviction, holding that the presumption of vindictiveness does not apply when a different judge imposes a more severe sentence.On appeal from his first conviction Defendant received a new trial and sentencing hearing before a new district court judge. Following the second trial the judge imposed a longer sentence on some counts than the original judge had. Defendant appealed, arguing that the more severe sentence violated his due process rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because a different judge presided over Defendant's second trial and at sentencing, due process did not require a presumption of vindictiveness. View "Bowser v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court permitting the State to introduce evidence of prior, uncharged sexual acts committed by Appellant in the instant prosecution for a sexual offense for purposes of showing propensity under Nev. Rev. Stat. 48.045(3), holding that the district court did not plainly err by permitting the State to introuce evidence of Appellant’s prior conduct for propensity purposes.Specifically, the Court held (1) the plain language of section 48.045(3) permits the district court to admit evidence of a separate sexual offense for purposes of proving propensity in a sexual offense prosecution; (2) while such evidence may be admitted without the district court holding a Petrocelli hearing, evidence of separate acts constituting sexual offenses must be evaluated for relevance and heightened risk of unfair prejudice; and (3) the district court did not commit plain error by allowing the State to introduce evidence of Appellant’s prior sexual acts for propensity purposes. View "Franks v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed and remanded this criminal case for a new trial, holding that the district court clearly erred when it found that Defendant had not made out a prima facie case of discrimination in challenging the State’s use of peremptory challenges to remove two African-American women during jury selection.Defendant was charged with child abuse, neglect, or endangerment and other offenses. Defendant objected to the State’s exercise of two of its peremptory challenges to remove two African-Americans from the jury. The district court denied Defendant’s Batson challenge. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court clearly erred when it terminated the Batson analysis at step one of the three-step analysis and that the record did not clearly support the denial of Defendant’s objection. View "Cooper v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury verdict, of three count of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon and other offenses, holding that the admission of photographs of the victims was an abuse of the district court’s discretion, but the error was harmless, and none of Defendant’s other claims warranted relief.After Defendant shot and killed a motorist, the motorist’s car struck a taxicab, killing the driver and a passenger. On appeal, Defendant challenged the district court’s admission at trial of photographs of the taxicab victims. The Supreme Court held (1) the challenged photographs, including images of the taxicab victims’ bodies disfigured by fire and subsequent autopsies, should have been excluded because they added little to the State’s case but did create a significant risk of inflaming the jury, but the admission of the photographs was harmless; and (2) Defendant’s remaining claims on appeal were unavailing. View "Harris v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court dismissed the State’s interlocutory appeal from a district court order granting a motion to suppress evidence, holding that the State failed to demonstrate “good cause” as contemplated by Nev. Rev. Stat. 177.015(2).At issue was the district court’s suppression order suppressing Defendant’s incriminating statements made during a recorded interrogation on the ground that the statements were involuntary. The State appealed. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the State failed to establish that a miscarriage of justice would result if the Court did not entertain its appeal. View "State v. Brown" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s conviction for exploitation of a vulnerable person and theft, holding that the district court erred by instructing the jury that a person’s status as a joint account holder does not by itself provide lawful authority to use or transfer another's assets for their own benefit and that the error was not harmless.On appeal, Defendant argued, in part, that the instruction was a misstatement of law because it directly contradicts Nev. Rev. Stat. 100.085. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed, holding (1) the instruction was inconsistent with section 100.085 and did not accurately and completely reflect the reasoning and conclusion in Walch v. State, 909 P.2d 1184 (1996); and (2) therefore, the jury instruction was not a correct statement of the law, and the error in giving the instruction was not harmless. View "Natko v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the district court that Glenn Miller Doolin was not entitled to the application of credit to his parole eligibility and minimum term for a sentence imposed pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 207.010, holding that Nev. Rev. Stat. 209.4465(8)(d) precluded application of statutory credit.In so holding, the Court reasoned that both the sentence and category of conviction are enhanced when an offender is adjudicated a habitual criminal pursuant to section 207.010, and because such an adjudication will always enhance a conviction for a lower category felony to either a category A or B felony, section 209.4465(8)(d) precludes application of the statutory credit to the offender’s parole eligibility and minimum term. The Court then held that where Doolin was adjudicated a habitual criminal pursuant to section 207.010(1)(a), he was not entitled to the application of credit to his parole eligibility and minimum term. View "Doolin v. State, Department of Correction" on Justia Law