Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant’s conviction under Nev. Rev. Stat. 205.067 of home invasion, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in instructing the jury and that the sentence was constitutional.Defendant’s was convicted of home invasion for entering his wife’s second home. The district court sentenced him to a maximum term of ninety-six months in prison. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the district court abused its discretion in refusing his proposed jury instruction defining the word “resides” as used in the definition of “inhabited dwelling” in Nevada’s home invasion statute, Nev. Rev. Stat. 205.067(5)(b) as requiring the “owner or other lawful occupant” to dwell permanently or continuously. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) an owner need not permanently or continuously dwell in a house for the house to be an inhabited dwelling; and (2) Defendant’s sentence did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment. View "Dunham v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that law enforcement officers cannot justify a warrantless search of a bedroom inside a home by relying on the consent of a third party when the third party did not have authority to consent and the officers have little to no information about that third party’s authority over the bedroom.At issue in this appeal was whether law enforcement officers cannot rely on the consent of a third party to search a room within a residence without making sufficient inquiries about the parties’ living arrangements within that residence before conducting a warrantless search. The Supreme Court answered in the negative, holding that the district court erred in denying part Defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the illegal entry in this case and that the error was not harmless. The Court further directed law enforcement to gather sufficient information about the living arrangements inside the home to establish an objectively reasonable belief that the third party has authority to consent to a search before proceeding with that search without a warrant. View "Lastine v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the district court to deny Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence discovered during a search of his bedroom after Defendant’s mother opened his locked bedroom door while a law enforcement officer stood nearby, holding that the mother’s decision to open Defendant’s locked bedroom door was private conduct to which the Fourth Amendment’s protections were inapplicable.In the presence of a sheriff’s deputy but without the deputy’s request that she open the door or suggestion that he wanted to see inside the bedroom, Defendant’s mother opened Defendant’s locked bedroom door. The deputy saw firearms and bomb-making materials inside the room once the door was open. The district court denied Defendant’s motion to suppress. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant’s mother’s actions were insufficiently connected or related to governmental action to implicate the protections of the Fourth Amendment. View "Mooney v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s conviction of child abuse, neglect or endangerment with substantial harm, holding that the district court abused its discretion in excluding Defendant’s expert witness and in rejecting his proffered jury instruction, and Defendant was denied a fair trial because these errors were not harmless.Defendant’s conviction stemmed from an incident involving a two-year-old, who incurred burns on his hands while Defendant was babysitting him and his sibling. As a defense, Defendant maintained that the burns happened accidentally. Defendant attempted to have a biomechanics expert testify to rebut the State’s theory that Defendant intentionally burned the child and to testify about the mechanism of the child’s injuries. The district court excluded Defendant’s expert witness and rejected his proffered jury instruction on his theory of the case. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court improperly disqualified Defendant’s expert under Nev. Rev. Stat. 50.275 and abused its discretion in rejecting Defendant’s proffered jury instruction, and the errors were not harmless. View "Mathews v. State" on Justia Law

In clarifying the definition of statutory nonhearsay pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 51.035, the Supreme Court held that in order for a statement to be excluded from the definition of hearsay either as a prior inconsistent statement or a prior identification made soon after perceiving a person, the declarant must have testified and have been subject to cross-examination concerning the out-of-court statement.After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of conspiracy to commit robbery and other crimes. On appeal, Defendant argued that certain hearsay statements and two of his statements to police were improperly admitted. The Supreme Court affirmed the convictions, holding (1) the challenged statements were not properly admitted either as prior inconsistent statements or as prior identifications pursuant to section 51.035, but such errors were harmless in light of other evidence in the case; and (2) substantial evidence supported the district court’s determination that the two statements Defendant made to police were voluntary. View "Richard v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part the district court’s denial of Appellant’s second postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus in a death penalty case, holding that an evidentiary hearing was required as to Appellant’s judicial bias claim.Appellant’s petition challenging his conviction for two first-degree murders and death sentences was both untimely and successive. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s denial of the petition as procedurally barred, concluding that Appellant did not show good cause and prejudice to excuse the procedural bars to his petition. The United States Supreme Court vacated the Supreme Court’s opinion and remanded for further proceedings, concluding that the Court applied the wrong legal standard as to Appellant’s judicial bias claim. On reconsideration of the judicial bias claim, the Supreme Court held that an evidentiary hearing was required with respect to several issues related to the claim. The Court remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the judicial bias claim and affirmed the remainder of the district court’s order. View "Rippo v. State" on Justia Law

At issue in this criminal case was whether the defense must place intent or absence of mistake at issue before prior act evidence may be admitted under Nev. Rev. Stat. 48.045(2).Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery, burglary, robbery with use of a deadly weapon, and other crimes. During trial, the court admitted evidence concerning Defendant’s prior residential burglary conviction to prove intent and absence of mistake. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of conviction, holding (1) the defense need not place intent or absence of mistake at issue before the State may seek admission of prior act evidence if the evidence is relevant to prove an element of the offense; but (2) because the evidence of Defendant’s prior residential burglary conviction had little relevance or probative value as to his intent or absence of mistake when compared to the danger of unfair prejudice resulting from its propensity inference, the district court manifestly abused its discretion in admitting the evidence, and the error was not harmless. View "Hubbard v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that double jeopardy did not prohibit Defendant’s retrial under the circumstances of this case because Defendant impliedly consented to the district court’s declaration of a mistrial, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding manifest necessity to declare a mistrial.Defendant stood trial on charges of murder and battery with substantial bodily harm. The district court declared a mistrial after a juror conducted extrinsic legal research and shared that information with other jurors after a weekend recess in jury deliberations. The district court dismissed Defendant’s motion to dismiss the charges based on double jeopardy and set the matter for a new trial. Defendant petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus directing the district court to grant his motion to dismiss and bar his re-prosecution. The Supreme Court denied the petition on the merits, holding that a second prosecution was not barred by double jeopardy where Defendant did not object to the mistrial, Defendant agreed with the court’s analysis of juror misconduct, Defendant gave his implied consent to mistrial, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding manifest necessity to declare a mistrial. View "Granda-Ruiz v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court held that the Parole Board’s use of the Static-99R recidivism risk assessment comports with Nev. Rev. Stat. 213.1214’s assessment requirements, that changes to parole procedures do not constitute an ex post facto violation, and that the use of the Static-99R assessment does not violate an inmate’s due process rights.As part of Appellant’s parole review, his recidivism risk was assessed with the Static-99R risk assessment. The assessment classified Appellant as a high risk to recidivate, and the Parole Board denied parole. Appellant filed a petition for declaratory judgment challenging the Static-99R assessment. The district court granted the State’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Appellant’s claim that the Static-99R assessment was not formally adopted as or determined to be a “currently accepted standard of assessment” for use in Appellant’s parole hearing; (2) because Appellant failed to show that changes to the parole statute enacted after his conviction created a risk of prolonged imprisonment, they did not constitute impermissible ex post facto punishment; and (3) the district court did not err in denying Appellant’s claim that the use of the Static-99R violated his due process rights. View "Coles v. Bisbee" on Justia Law

At issue was whether the Supreme Court should adopt a rule of admissibility that would limit the use of a probationer’s testimony at a revocation hearing in a subsequent criminal proceeding. The issue stemmed from the tension between the due process right to have an opportunity to be heard and present mitigating evidence at a revocation hearing and the right against self-incrimination as to criminal charges related to the alleged probation violation.The Supreme Court invoked its supervisory powers and adopted an admissibility rule in the interest of basic fairness and the administration of justice to limit the use of a probation’s testimony given at a probation revocation hearing. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court’s revocation of Defendant’s probation and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Cooper v. State" on Justia Law