Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s judgment convicting Defendant of second-degree murder. On appeal, Defendant argued in part that the district court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct and his motion for a new trial based on juror misconduct. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant failed to establish any prejudicial prosecutorial misconduct; (2) Defendant’s trial counsel failed adequately to develop the record to assess whether he was prejudiced by juror misconduct; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to provide the jury with a supplemental clarifying instruction on malice aforethought. View "Jeffries v. State" on Justia Law

Under the circumstances of this case, where the evidence indicated both juror misconduct during voir dire and resulting prejudice, the district court abused its discretion in denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial.After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of lewdness with a minor. Defendant filed a motion for new trial on the basis of juror misconduct. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Defendant had failed to demonstrate prejudice arising from the alleged misconduct of the juror at issue. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the evidence indicated that the juror failed honestly to answer a material question during voir dire, and truthful disclosure could have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause; and (2) therefore, the district court erred in denying Appellant’s motion for a new trial on the basis of juror misconduct. View "Brioady v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court granted Petitioner’s petition for extraordinary relief requesting the Nevada Parole Board to reconsider its decision to deny parole, holding that Petitioner was entitled to a new parole hearing because the Board infringed upon Petitioner’s statutory right to receive proper consideration for parole by basing its decision in part on an inapplicable aggravating factor. The court held that, while Nevada inmates have no protectable liberty interest in release on parole, eligible Nevada inmates nevertheless do have a statutory right to be considered for parole by the Board, and when the Board misapplies its own internal guidelines in assessing whether to grant parole, it cannot be said that the inmate received the consideration to which he was statutorily entitled. View "Anselmo v. Bisbee" on Justia Law

Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.450 - which provides that if any person, “upon previous concert and agreement,” fights with any and person and one person dies in the fight, the surviving fighter is guilty of first-degree murder - is not vague or overbroad.Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder with use of a deadly weapon. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 200.450 is neither vague nor overbroad; (2) the district court properly instructed the jury regarding self-defense and its inapplicability to challenge-to-fight murder theory; (3) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his claim that the presence in the courtroom of the State’s expert witness violated the exclusionary rule; and (4) the State’s expert witness impermissibly exceeded her scope as an expert witness, but the error was harmless. View "Pimentel v. State" on Justia Law

When a minor is arrested solely for solicitation or prostitution but is charged in juvenile court with offenses other than prostitution or solicitation, Nev. Rev. Stat. 62C.240 applies, precluding formal adjudication of delinquency and ensuring counseling and medical treatment services as part of a consent decree.Petitioner, a juvenile, was arrested for soliciting prostitution and loitering for the purpose of prostitution and was charged with obstructing an officer. Petitioner was adjudicated as a delinquent. The State subsequently filed several petitions alleging violations of Petitioner’s probation. The juvenile court committed Petitioner to placement at the Claliente Youth Center. Petitioner petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus or prohibition directing the juvenile court to vacate its orders adjudicating her as a delinquent and apply the provisions of section 62C.240. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner’s petition, holding that A.J. was entitled to protections afforded under 62C.240 and that the juvenile court arbitrarily and capriciously abused its discretion by adjudicating her as a delinquent. View "A.J. v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his convictions for conspiracy to commit robbery, burglary, robbery, and first-degree kidnapping, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction of both robbery and kidnapping and that the Miranda warning given by the police prior to questioning was legally insufficient. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence to support Defendant’s convictions for kidnapping and robbery; and (2) Defendant received an adequate Miranda warning prior to making statements to police and thus did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress those statements. View "Stewart v. State" on Justia Law

My Entertainment TV (MET) filmed Michael Solid’s first-degree murder trial for use in a television “docudrama.” Solid filed this writ petition seeking interpretation of the Supreme Court Rules involving media in the courtroom. The Supreme Court denied Solid’s writ petition, holding (1) MET is a “news reporter” under these rules; (2) MET is using the footage for educational or informational purposes, as opposed to unrelated advertising; (3) the district court did not err in allowing MET to film the trial because Solid did not overcome the presumption in favor of electronic coverage; and (4) the terms of MET’s television series agreement with the Clark County District Attorney did not require the consent of Solid’s trial counsel. View "Solid v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of thirty-six felony offenses and sentenced to a total term of life with the possibility of parole after eighty-five years. The conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. Thereafter, Appellant filed a pro se postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus and moved for appointment of counsel. The district court denied the petition following a hearing at which Appellant was not present. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion in declining to appoint postconviction counsel to represent Appellant in light of the severity of the consequences that Appellant faces, the potential need for discovery, and Appellant’s questionable proficiency with the English language. Remanded. View "Renteria-Novoa v. State" on Justia Law

An amended criminal complaint was filed charging Maria Escalante and Ramiro Funez (collectively, Escalante) each with one count of trespass in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 207.200(1)(a). Escalante moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that section 207.200(1)(a) is unconstitutionally vague. The Nevada Office of the Attorney General (AG) was not notified of the constitutional challenge to the statute. The justice court granted the motion to dismiss in part, determining that the “vex or annoy” intent requirement in the statute was void for vagueness. When it received notification of the justice court’s order, the AG filed a “motion to place on calendar,” arguing that the AG was entitled to notice of the constitutional challenge under Nev. Rev. Stat. 30.130. The justice court denied the AG’s motion, concluding that section 30.130 applies only to declaratory relief actions and has no applicability to criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 30.130 does not entitle the AG to notice and opportunity to be heard in criminal cases; and (2) Escalante was not required to notify the AG of their constitutional challenge to section 207.200(1)(a). View "Office of the Attorney General v. Justice Court" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with murder under three theories. Petitioner pleaded guilty to murder but only to two of the three theories alleged. After the district court accepted the plea, problems arose because the State was not informed and did not understand that Petitioner was not pleading guilty to premeditated murder. The district court subsequently revoked its acceptance of the guilty plea and set the murder count for trial, concluding that it lacked authority to accept the guilty plea because it did not conform to the indictment, and the State had not consented to amending it. Petitioner sought a writ of prohibition or mandamus directing the district court to enforce his plea. The Supreme Court denied writ relief, holding that the guilty plea was defective, and therefore the district court appropriately set it aside. View "Righetti v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law