Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of thirty-six felony offenses and sentenced to a total term of life with the possibility of parole after eighty-five years. The conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. Thereafter, Appellant filed a pro se postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus and moved for appointment of counsel. The district court denied the petition following a hearing at which Appellant was not present. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court abused its discretion in declining to appoint postconviction counsel to represent Appellant in light of the severity of the consequences that Appellant faces, the potential need for discovery, and Appellant’s questionable proficiency with the English language. Remanded. View "Renteria-Novoa v. State" on Justia Law

An amended criminal complaint was filed charging Maria Escalante and Ramiro Funez (collectively, Escalante) each with one count of trespass in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 207.200(1)(a). Escalante moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that section 207.200(1)(a) is unconstitutionally vague. The Nevada Office of the Attorney General (AG) was not notified of the constitutional challenge to the statute. The justice court granted the motion to dismiss in part, determining that the “vex or annoy” intent requirement in the statute was void for vagueness. When it received notification of the justice court’s order, the AG filed a “motion to place on calendar,” arguing that the AG was entitled to notice of the constitutional challenge under Nev. Rev. Stat. 30.130. The justice court denied the AG’s motion, concluding that section 30.130 applies only to declaratory relief actions and has no applicability to criminal proceedings. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 30.130 does not entitle the AG to notice and opportunity to be heard in criminal cases; and (2) Escalante was not required to notify the AG of their constitutional challenge to section 207.200(1)(a). View "Office of the Attorney General v. Justice Court" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with murder under three theories. Petitioner pleaded guilty to murder but only to two of the three theories alleged. After the district court accepted the plea, problems arose because the State was not informed and did not understand that Petitioner was not pleading guilty to premeditated murder. The district court subsequently revoked its acceptance of the guilty plea and set the murder count for trial, concluding that it lacked authority to accept the guilty plea because it did not conform to the indictment, and the State had not consented to amending it. Petitioner sought a writ of prohibition or mandamus directing the district court to enforce his plea. The Supreme Court denied writ relief, holding that the guilty plea was defective, and therefore the district court appropriately set it aside. View "Righetti v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

In 2015, more than twenty-five years after remittitur issued from Appellant’s direct appeal in 1989, Appellant filed a petition for postconviction relief. The petition was both successive and untimely filed. The district court denied the petition, concluding that the petition was procedurally barred and that Appellant failed to demonstrate the good cause and prejudice required for consideration of the petition. Appellant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in failing to consider his good cause argument regarding Riley v. McDaniel. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that, even assuming that Riley would provide good cause, Appellant did not establish prejudice because he did not demonstrate that the result of trial would have been different had a different instruction been given. View "Leavitt v. State" on Justia Law

The Clark County grand jury indicted Defendant for the murder of his wife. Prior to trial, Defendant sought to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the district attorney violated Nev. Rev. Stat. 172.145(2) by failing to submit exculpatory evidence in the State’s file to the grand jury. Specifically, Defendant asserted that the district attorney improperly failed to present to the grand jury two notes from his deceased wife’s hospital chart. The district court denied relief, concluding that no violation of section 172.145(2) occurred because the district attorney was not aware of the notes and their potential exculpatory value when he presented the case to the grand jury. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district attorney did not violate section 172.145(2). View "Mayo v. Eighth Judicial District Court" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of one count of trafficking in a controlled substance. During a break in deliberations, two jurors individually conducted experiments testing the parties’ theories of the case. The next morning, the jury returned a unanimous guilty verdict. Defendant filed a motion to declare a mistrial and order a new trial due to juror misconduct. The district court denied the motion, concluding that there was no reasonable probability that the verdict was affected by the two jurors’ independent experiments. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in denying Appellant’s motion for a new trial because (1) the juror misconduct in this case was prejudicial, and (2) the trial court’s failure to give a jury instruction prohibiting jurors from conducting independent investigations or experiments constituted a reversible error. Remanded. View "Bowman v. State" on Justia Law

In 2002, Defendant was cited in Utah for driving under the influence of alcohol. The offense was a third-degree felony under Utah law. In 2004, Defendant pleaded guilty to the offense. In 2013, Defendant was arrested in Nevada for suspicion of driving under the influence. The State subsequently charged Defendant with felony DUI because of her 2004 Utah felony conviction. The district court adjudicated the offense as a category B felony, determining that Defendant’s 2004 felony DUI conviction in Utah was a violation involving “the same or similar conduct” as Nevada’s felony DUI statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Utah’s DUI laws contain a longer recidivism window but punish the same or similar conduct as Nevada’s DUI laws, and therefore, the district court correctly adjudicated Defendant’s instant offense as a felony; and (2) Defendant’s prosecutorial misconduct claims were without merit. View "Sindelar v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of battery with intent to commit a crime. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred when it failed to give his proffered instruction on battery as a lesser-included offense of battery with intent to commit a crime. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed Defendant’s judgment of conviction, holding (1) Defendant was entitled to an instruction on battery as a lesser-included offense of battery with intent to commit a crime, and the district court erroneously declined to give such an instruction; and (2) the error was not harmless. Remanded for a new trial. View "Manning v. State" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was found guilty of vehicular manslaughter in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 484B.657(1). Defendant appealed, arguing that certain phrases in the statute rendered section 484B.657(1) void for vagueness. The district court upheld Defendant’s conviction without addressing Defendant’s arguments concerning the vagueness of the phrases at issue. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the constitutionality of section 484B.657(1). The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding (1) section 484B.657(1) is not unconstitutionally void for vagueness and does not violate due process; but (2) the district court erred in upholding the constitutionality of the statute without interpreting the challenged phrases. View "Cornella v. Justice Court" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, the justice court convicted Jennifer Schneider of misdemeanor driving under the influence. The district court reversed Schneider’s conviction and sentence and remanded the matter for a new trial, concluding that the justice court’s comments at sentencing showed bias that undermined Schneider’s sentence and her right to a fair trial. The State filed an original writ petition challenging the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court granted the petition in part, holding (1) the district court did not err when it found the justice court’s comments at sentencing indicated a bias against Schneider; but (2) because there was no showing that the bias toward Schneider at sentencing interfered with her right to a fair trial, the district court erred in fashioning a remedy without accounting for the state of the evidence of Schneider’s guilt. View "State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law