Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2002, Defendant was cited in Utah for driving under the influence of alcohol. The offense was a third-degree felony under Utah law. In 2004, Defendant pleaded guilty to the offense. In 2013, Defendant was arrested in Nevada for suspicion of driving under the influence. The State subsequently charged Defendant with felony DUI because of her 2004 Utah felony conviction. The district court adjudicated the offense as a category B felony, determining that Defendant’s 2004 felony DUI conviction in Utah was a violation involving “the same or similar conduct” as Nevada’s felony DUI statute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Utah’s DUI laws contain a longer recidivism window but punish the same or similar conduct as Nevada’s DUI laws, and therefore, the district court correctly adjudicated Defendant’s instant offense as a felony; and (2) Defendant’s prosecutorial misconduct claims were without merit. View "Sindelar v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of battery with intent to commit a crime. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred when it failed to give his proffered instruction on battery as a lesser-included offense of battery with intent to commit a crime. The Supreme Court agreed and reversed Defendant’s judgment of conviction, holding (1) Defendant was entitled to an instruction on battery as a lesser-included offense of battery with intent to commit a crime, and the district court erroneously declined to give such an instruction; and (2) the error was not harmless. Remanded for a new trial. View "Manning v. State" on Justia Law

After a trial, Defendant was found guilty of vehicular manslaughter in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 484B.657(1). Defendant appealed, arguing that certain phrases in the statute rendered section 484B.657(1) void for vagueness. The district court upheld Defendant’s conviction without addressing Defendant’s arguments concerning the vagueness of the phrases at issue. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging the constitutionality of section 484B.657(1). The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding (1) section 484B.657(1) is not unconstitutionally void for vagueness and does not violate due process; but (2) the district court erred in upholding the constitutionality of the statute without interpreting the challenged phrases. View "Cornella v. Justice Court" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, the justice court convicted Jennifer Schneider of misdemeanor driving under the influence. The district court reversed Schneider’s conviction and sentence and remanded the matter for a new trial, concluding that the justice court’s comments at sentencing showed bias that undermined Schneider’s sentence and her right to a fair trial. The State filed an original writ petition challenging the district court’s decision. The Supreme Court granted the petition in part, holding (1) the district court did not err when it found the justice court’s comments at sentencing indicated a bias against Schneider; but (2) because there was no showing that the bias toward Schneider at sentencing interfered with her right to a fair trial, the district court erred in fashioning a remedy without accounting for the state of the evidence of Schneider’s guilt. View "State v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of first-degree kidnapping with substantial bodily harm and possession of a controlled substance. Appellant appealed, arguing that Nevada lacked territorial jurisdiction to prosecute him for first-degree kidnapping with substantial bodily harm because the offenses originated in Illinois. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Nevada had territorial jurisdiction over both the kidnapping charge and the substantial bodily harm enhancement because, while the kidnapping began in Illinois, it continued in Nevada, where Appellant restricted the victim from seeking medical treatment, causing the victim prolonged physical pain; (2) the State gave proper notice of grand jury proceedings; and (3) the district court’s mistake in failing to include second-degree kidnapping on the verdict form was not reversible error. View "McNamara v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was found guilty of assault with a deadly weapon. While he was still imprisoned, Appellant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and appeal deprivation. The district court granted the petition in part, concluding that Appellant was wrongfully deprived of an appeal. The court did not address Appellant’s other claims. Appellant then appealed from the judgment of conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction. After Appellant was released from physical custody, he filed a supplement to his petition for writ of habeas corpus, again alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court dismissed the petition as moot because Appellant was no longer in custody, on probation, or on parole. The Supreme Court reversed, (1) a habeas petition challenging the validity of a judgment of conviction filed while the petitioner is imprisoned or under supervision as a probationer or parolee does not become moot when the petitioner is released if there are continuing collateral consequences stemming from that conviction; (2) a criminal conviction creates a presumption that collateral consequences exist; and (3) therefore, the district court erred in summarily dismissing the petition in this case as moot. View "Martinez-Hernandez v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of, among other offenses, murder with the use of a deadly weapon and ten counts of discharging a firearm at or into a structure. On appeal, Appellant’s argued, inter alia, that double jeopardy precludes multiple convictions for discharging a firearm are impermissible based on multiple discharges that occurred in quick succession. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the word “discharges,” as used in Nev. Rev. Stat. 202.285(1) unambiguously allows for a separate conviction each time a bullet leaves the gun, and therefore, Appellant’s ten convictions for discharging a firearm were not redundant; (2) sufficient evidence supported Defendant’s convictions for first-degree murder, attempted murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and discharging a firearm into an occupied structure; and (3) the criminal information was not defective because it did not name the identity of a coconspirator. View "Washington v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was a convicted sex offender on lifetime supervision. When Appellant had been on lifetime supervision for five years, the State Board of Parole Commissioners imposed additional conditions that were not enumerated in Nev. Rev. Stat. 213.1243. The State later filed a complaint charging Appellant with violation of conditions of lifetime supervision and prohibited acts by a sex offender. The jury found Appellant guilty of violating the conditions of his lifetime supervision. On appeal, Appellant argued that section 213.1243 does not delegate authority to the Board to impose additional supervision conditions not enumerated in the statute, and therefore, he did not violate the statute even if he violated the additional conditions imposed by the Board. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the plain language of section 213.1243 does not grant the Board authority to impose additional conditions, and this omission was intentional; and (2) because the Board-imposed conditions were unlawful and any Board violations cannot be separated from any section 213.1243 violations, the case must be remanded for a new trial. View "McNeill v. State" on Justia Law

In making sentencing recommendations to district courts in a Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) the Division of Parole and Probation uses a Probation Success Probability (PSP) form that places the defendant within a range of sentences on a Sentence Recommendation Selection Scale and provides the basis for the PSI’s sentence recommendation. At issue in these two appeals was whether scoring errors in Defendants’ PSPs adversely influenced the Division’s sentencing recommendations in the PSIs. The Supreme Court held (1) in the first case, the scoring error in the PSP resulted in a flawed PSI recommendation, and Defendant’s sentence was prejudiced as a result; and (2) in the second case, Defendant’s sentence was not prejudiced by potential errors. View "Blankenship v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with possession of a controlled substance. At his preliminary hearing, Petitioner moved to suppress evidence he argued was obtained as the result of an unlawful arrest. The State opposed the motion, arguing that the justice court lacked the authority to hear and rule on the motion to suppress. The justice court concluded that it had authority to rule on suppression issues and suppressed the evidence, concluding that the search was unlawful. The court then dismissed the case against Petitioner for lack of probable cause. The district court remanded the case, ruling that Nevada’s justice courts are limited jurisdiction courts without the power to adjudicate suppression issues in the context of a preliminary hearing. Petitioner subsequently filed this petition seeking a writ directing the district court to vacate its order. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that justice courts have express and limited inherent authority to suppress illegally obtained evidence during preliminary hearings. View "Grace v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law