Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was convicted of battery with a deadly weapon, assault with a deadly weapon, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant argued on appeal that the district court erred at sentencing by failing to pronounce the aggregate minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment as required by statute. The court concluded that it was error for the district court not to aggregate the sentences in the judgment of conviction but that error does not warrant a new sentencing hearing as it does not affect the sentences imposed for each offense. Because defendant failed to demonstrate that his convictions or sentences are infirm, the court affirmed the conviction. However, the court remanded for the district court to correct the judgment of conviction to include the aggregate minimum and maximum terms of his consecutive sentences as required by NRS 176.035(1). View "Mason v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon and robbery with the use of a deadly weapon. Defendant was sentenced to death for felony murder. Defendant's two codefendants were also convicted on the same charges but received life sentences without the possibility of parole. The court previously held in Flanagan v. State that a district court does not abuse its discretion when it allows evidence of the codefendants' sentences. The court reaffirmed its holding in Flanagan, concluding, specifically, that the district court has discretion to admit evidence of a codefendant's sentence in a first-degree murder sentencing hearing. The court further concluded that defendant's challenge to the district court's ruling allowing the State to argue twice during closing arguments at the penalty hearing lacks merit. Defendant's contention that his sentence is excessive also lacks merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence. View "Harte v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of trafficking in a controlled substance. Defendant moved to declare a mistrial and order a new trial due to juror misconduct, arguing that there was a reasonable probability that the verdict was affected by independent experiments conducted by two jurors to test theories of the case advanced at trial. The district court denied Defendant’s motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred by denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial because the independent experiments conducted by the jurors constituted prejudicial misconduct; and (2) the district court committed plain error by failing to provide a jury instruction admonishing jurors against conducting independent research, investigations, and experiments. View "Bowman v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant entered a guilty plea to conspiracy to commit grand larceny. While on probation, Appellant was charged with and pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance. Instead of imposing a sentence in that case, the court suspended the proceedings and placed Appellant on probation with special conditions. Appellant later admitted to violating the special conditions of her probation. The district court ultimately revoked Appellant’s probation in the conspiracy to commit grand larceny case and executed the original sentence of nine months with credit for time served. The district court then sentenced Appellant to twelve to thirty-two months’ imprisonment in the possession of a controlled substance case. The court ordered the sentences to run consecutively. Appellant appealed, arguing that the district court plainly erred when it considered her status as a pregnant drug addict in deciding to impose a consecutive sentence in the controlled substance case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it considered Appellant’s status as a pregnant addict at the time of sentencing because Appellant raised the issue of her status as a pregnant addict at the sentencing hearing. View "Newman v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with felony eluding a police officer and misdemeanor reckless driving based on the same incident. Appellant pleaded no contest to misdemeanor reckless driving and then moved to dismiss the felony eluding a police officer charge on the basis of double jeopardy. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that misdemeanor reckless driving did not constitute a lesser included offense of felony eluding. Appellant subsequently pleaded guilty to felony eluding. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the offense of reckless driving is a lesser included offense of felony eluding as charged in this case, and therefore, Appellant’s conviction for felony eluding a police officer violated double jeopardy. View "Kelley v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of child abuse and first-degree kidnapping in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.310(1). Section 200.310(1) makes it a category A felony to lead, take, entice, or carry away or detain any minor “with the intent to keep,” imprison, or confine the minor from any person having lawful custody of the minor. Defendant appealed, arguing that the statute’s “intent to keep” language is ambiguous and that, under the proper interpretation of that requirement, there was insufficient evidence to support his kidnapping conviction. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s first-degree kidnapping conviction, holding (1) section 200.310(1)’s “intent to keep” language is ambiguous; (2) pursuant to the canons of statutory interpretation, section 200.310(1) requires an intent to keep the minor for a protracted period of time or permanently; and (3) under the proper legal standard, there was insufficient evidence to support Defendant’s kidnapping conviction. View "Schofield v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary while in possession of a firearm, conspiracy to commit robbery, robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, and murder with the use of a deadly weapon. Defendant appealed, arguing that the State’s warrantless access of historical cell site location data obtained from his cell phone service provider pursuant to the Stored Communications Act violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a defendant does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in historical cell site location information data because it is a part of the business records made, kept, and owned by cell phone providers, and therefore, a search warrant is not required to obtain such historical cell site location information; (2) certain out-of-court and in-court identifications did not violate Defendant’s constitutional right to due process of law; (3) prosecutorial conduct and statements during closing arguments did not violate Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial or Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination; and (4) there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions. View "Taylor v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder with the use of a deadly weapon and conspiracy to commit murder. The district court sentenced Defendant to life with the possibility of parole for the first-degree murder conviction. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the district court erred when it admitted Defendant’s inculpatory statements to detectives because he was not advised of his Miranda rights and was subject to an alleged custodial interrogation. The State, in response, claimed that Defendant spoke voluntarily with the police and, therefore, Miranda warnings were unnecessary. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress because the police subjected him to a custodial interrogation without advising him of his Miranda rights, but the error was harmless; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting recordings taken by Defendant, who wore a wire and spoke with others involved in the murder to corroborate his story; and (3) the State presented sufficient evidence to convicted Defendant of conspiracy and murder. View "Carroll v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon, one count of conspiracy to commit murder, and related crimes. Defendant was sentenced to death for each murder. The district court denied Defendant’s motion so suppress statements he made in two interviews with police after his initial appearance before a magistrate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress, as his Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached at his initial appearance before the magistrate, but Defendant waived his right to have counsel present at the subsequent interviews; but (2) the district court clearly erred when it rejected Defendant’s objection under Batson v. Kentucky to the State’s use of a peremptory challenge to remove an African American from the venire during jury selection. Remanded. View "McCarty v. State" on Justia Law

In 2014, Respondent applied to the Division of Parole and Probation for a change in his probation discharge status under a set of regulations adopted pursuant to a statute (referred to as Section 16) that sunsetted in 2008. The Division denied Respondent’s request due to Respondent’s failure to satisfy his parole obligation of community service. Respondent urged the Division to comply with Section 16, but the Division maintained that Section 16 expired in 2008. Respondent filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to compel the Division to comply with Section 16 and grant his application, arguing that the Division acted arbitrarily and capriciously and denying his application because the Division granted two other applications after 2008. The district court agreed with Respondent and granted the writ. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in concluding that the Division acted arbitrarily and capriciously, such that mandamus relief was necessary, because Respondent did not show that, post-2008, the Division was granting applications for individuals who, like Respondent, failed to satisfy probation obligations. View "Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Coley" on Justia Law