Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Father and Mother divorced in 2011. In 2013, the district court ordered Father to pay additional child support for failing to previously pay child support. In 2014, Mother filed a motion to modify custody and enforce the 2013 order. After a hearing, at which Father represented himself, the district court awarded Mother primary physical custody of the child. The district court then held Father in contempt of court for failing to pay child support. The court sentenced Father to a total of eighty days in jail and stayed the contempt sentence on the condition that Father “follow the Orders of the Court.” The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) a contempt order that does not contain a purge clause is criminal in nature, and because the district court’s contempt order did not contain a purge clause, the district court violated Appellant’s constitutional rights by imposing a criminal sentence without providing Appellant with counsel; and (2) the district court abused its discretion by basing its decision to modify custody on Appellant’s failure to comply with a court order and by failing to consider and set forth its findings as to the Nev. Rev. Stat. 125.480(4) factors for determining the child’s best interest. View "Lewis v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Norman Dupree was arrested and incarcerated in county jail. Justin Bros Bail Bonds and International Fidelity Insurance Company (collectively, Justin Bros) posted Dupree’s bond (bond number one). Dupree was later remanded to custody based on a pretrial supervision violation. Bonafide Bail Bonds posted bond (bond number two). Dupree failed to appear for his arraignment but later surrendered himself. Justin Bros posted another bond (bond number three). Dupree failed to appear for the arraignment. The district court entered a judgment of forfeiture for bond number one. Justin Bros filed a motion for reconsideration. While the motion was pending, Dupree surrendered. The district court denied the motion. After Dupree pled guilty and was sentenced, Justin Bros filed a motion to set aside the bond forfeiture judgment or to exonerate bond number one. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court denied mandamus relief, holding (1) because Dupree failed to appear for his arraignments, he breached the agreement to answer the charges specified and to be amenable to the court process; and (2) consequently, the district court was prohibited from exonerating bond number one unless one of Nev. Rev. Stat. 178.509(1)’s enumerated conditions materialized, which did not occur in this case. View "Justin v. Second Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for 15 counts of possession of child pornography. Defendant argued that 14 of his 15 convictions for possessing child pornography must be vacated because NRS 200.730 penalizes possession, and the State proved only "a singular act of digital possession of items seized on the day the police took the computers into police custody." The court held, consistent with case law and the rule of lenity established in its law, that defendant's simultaneous possession at one time and place of 15 images depicting child pornography constituted a single violation of NRS 200.730. Therefore, the State proved one, not 15, violations. The court concluded that defendant's remaining claims are either meritless or harmless. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for entry of an amended judgment of conviction. View "Castaneda v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted in municipal court of failing to stop his vehicle at a stop sign, a misdemeanor offense. At issue on appeal is whether NRS 189.030(1) confers a duty on a municipal court, rather than a misdemeanor appellant, to provide a transcript for a defendant's misdemeanor appeal and whether a district court may dismiss an appeal for an appellant's failure to obtain transcripts from the municipal court. The court held that a misdemeanor appellant is responsible for requesting transcripts and, if not indigent, paying for those transcripts. Furthermore, the court held that the district court has the inherent authority to dismiss a misdemeanor appeal where the appellant fails to prosecute an appeal or comply with the court's orders. Although the district court has that authority, dismissal is an extreme remedy, and therefore, the better practice is to allow the appeal to proceed and to decide the case based upon the documents submitted and any briefs filed. In this case, the district court acted within its jurisdiction and did not exercise its discretion in an arbitrary or capricious manner. Accordingly, the court denied the pro se petition for writ of mandamus, writ of prohibition, and writ of certiorari. View "Sparks v. Bare" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of battery with a deadly weapon, assault with a deadly weapon, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. Defendant argued on appeal that the district court erred at sentencing by failing to pronounce the aggregate minimum and maximum terms of imprisonment as required by statute. The court concluded that it was error for the district court not to aggregate the sentences in the judgment of conviction but that error does not warrant a new sentencing hearing as it does not affect the sentences imposed for each offense. Because defendant failed to demonstrate that his convictions or sentences are infirm, the court affirmed the conviction. However, the court remanded for the district court to correct the judgment of conviction to include the aggregate minimum and maximum terms of his consecutive sentences as required by NRS 176.035(1). View "Mason v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon and robbery with the use of a deadly weapon. Defendant was sentenced to death for felony murder. Defendant's two codefendants were also convicted on the same charges but received life sentences without the possibility of parole. The court previously held in Flanagan v. State that a district court does not abuse its discretion when it allows evidence of the codefendants' sentences. The court reaffirmed its holding in Flanagan, concluding, specifically, that the district court has discretion to admit evidence of a codefendant's sentence in a first-degree murder sentencing hearing. The court further concluded that defendant's challenge to the district court's ruling allowing the State to argue twice during closing arguments at the penalty hearing lacks merit. Defendant's contention that his sentence is excessive also lacks merit. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence. View "Harte v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of one count of trafficking in a controlled substance. Defendant moved to declare a mistrial and order a new trial due to juror misconduct, arguing that there was a reasonable probability that the verdict was affected by independent experiments conducted by two jurors to test theories of the case advanced at trial. The district court denied Defendant’s motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court erred by denying Defendant’s motion for a new trial because the independent experiments conducted by the jurors constituted prejudicial misconduct; and (2) the district court committed plain error by failing to provide a jury instruction admonishing jurors against conducting independent research, investigations, and experiments. View "Bowman v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant entered a guilty plea to conspiracy to commit grand larceny. While on probation, Appellant was charged with and pleaded guilty to possession of a controlled substance. Instead of imposing a sentence in that case, the court suspended the proceedings and placed Appellant on probation with special conditions. Appellant later admitted to violating the special conditions of her probation. The district court ultimately revoked Appellant’s probation in the conspiracy to commit grand larceny case and executed the original sentence of nine months with credit for time served. The district court then sentenced Appellant to twelve to thirty-two months’ imprisonment in the possession of a controlled substance case. The court ordered the sentences to run consecutively. Appellant appealed, arguing that the district court plainly erred when it considered her status as a pregnant drug addict in deciding to impose a consecutive sentence in the controlled substance case. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court did not err when it considered Appellant’s status as a pregnant addict at the time of sentencing because Appellant raised the issue of her status as a pregnant addict at the sentencing hearing. View "Newman v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with felony eluding a police officer and misdemeanor reckless driving based on the same incident. Appellant pleaded no contest to misdemeanor reckless driving and then moved to dismiss the felony eluding a police officer charge on the basis of double jeopardy. The district court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that misdemeanor reckless driving did not constitute a lesser included offense of felony eluding. Appellant subsequently pleaded guilty to felony eluding. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the offense of reckless driving is a lesser included offense of felony eluding as charged in this case, and therefore, Appellant’s conviction for felony eluding a police officer violated double jeopardy. View "Kelley v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of child abuse and first-degree kidnapping in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.310(1). Section 200.310(1) makes it a category A felony to lead, take, entice, or carry away or detain any minor “with the intent to keep,” imprison, or confine the minor from any person having lawful custody of the minor. Defendant appealed, arguing that the statute’s “intent to keep” language is ambiguous and that, under the proper interpretation of that requirement, there was insufficient evidence to support his kidnapping conviction. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s first-degree kidnapping conviction, holding (1) section 200.310(1)’s “intent to keep” language is ambiguous; (2) pursuant to the canons of statutory interpretation, section 200.310(1) requires an intent to keep the minor for a protracted period of time or permanently; and (3) under the proper legal standard, there was insufficient evidence to support Defendant’s kidnapping conviction. View "Schofield v. State" on Justia Law