Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary while in possession of a firearm, conspiracy to commit robbery, robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, and murder with the use of a deadly weapon. Defendant appealed, arguing that the State’s warrantless access of historical cell site location data obtained from his cell phone service provider pursuant to the Stored Communications Act violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a defendant does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in historical cell site location information data because it is a part of the business records made, kept, and owned by cell phone providers, and therefore, a search warrant is not required to obtain such historical cell site location information; (2) certain out-of-court and in-court identifications did not violate Defendant’s constitutional right to due process of law; (3) prosecutorial conduct and statements during closing arguments did not violate Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial or Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination; and (4) there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions. View "Taylor v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of murder with the use of a deadly weapon and conspiracy to commit murder. The district court sentenced Defendant to life with the possibility of parole for the first-degree murder conviction. Defendant appealed, arguing, among other things, that the district court erred when it admitted Defendant’s inculpatory statements to detectives because he was not advised of his Miranda rights and was subject to an alleged custodial interrogation. The State, in response, claimed that Defendant spoke voluntarily with the police and, therefore, Miranda warnings were unnecessary. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court erred in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress because the police subjected him to a custodial interrogation without advising him of his Miranda rights, but the error was harmless; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting recordings taken by Defendant, who wore a wire and spoke with others involved in the murder to corroborate his story; and (3) the State presented sufficient evidence to convicted Defendant of conspiracy and murder. View "Carroll v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon, one count of conspiracy to commit murder, and related crimes. Defendant was sentenced to death for each murder. The district court denied Defendant’s motion so suppress statements he made in two interviews with police after his initial appearance before a magistrate. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the district court did not err in denying Defendant’s motion to suppress, as his Sixth Amendment right to counsel attached at his initial appearance before the magistrate, but Defendant waived his right to have counsel present at the subsequent interviews; but (2) the district court clearly erred when it rejected Defendant’s objection under Batson v. Kentucky to the State’s use of a peremptory challenge to remove an African American from the venire during jury selection. Remanded. View "McCarty v. State" on Justia Law

In 2014, Respondent applied to the Division of Parole and Probation for a change in his probation discharge status under a set of regulations adopted pursuant to a statute (referred to as Section 16) that sunsetted in 2008. The Division denied Respondent’s request due to Respondent’s failure to satisfy his parole obligation of community service. Respondent urged the Division to comply with Section 16, but the Division maintained that Section 16 expired in 2008. Respondent filed a petition for writ of mandamus seeking to compel the Division to comply with Section 16 and grant his application, arguing that the Division acted arbitrarily and capriciously and denying his application because the Division granted two other applications after 2008. The district court agreed with Respondent and granted the writ. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in concluding that the Division acted arbitrarily and capriciously, such that mandamus relief was necessary, because Respondent did not show that, post-2008, the Division was granting applications for individuals who, like Respondent, failed to satisfy probation obligations. View "Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Coley" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of two counts of first-degree murder and related felonies. Defendant was sentenced to death. Defendant filed a postconviction habeas proceeding but was denied relief. Defendant then filed a second postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the ineffective assistance of the attorney who represented him in the first postconviction proceeding excused the procedural bars to claims raised in his second petition. The district court denied the petition as both untimely and successive. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court properly denied the petition as procedurally barred because, although Defendant filed his petition within a reasonable time after the postconviction-counsel claims became available, those claims lacked merit, and therefore, Defendant had not demonstrated good cause for an untimely petition or good cause and prejudice for a second petition. View "Rippo v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty, pursuant to Alford, to voluntary manslaughter and child abuse, neglect, or endangerment with substantial bodily harm. After entry of Appellant’s guilty plea, but before sentencing, the State obtained an affidavit relevant to Appellant’s case. The State did not disclose the affidavit to Appellant but used the affidavit at Appellant’s sentencing hearing to impeach Appellant’s girlfriend after she provided a favorable oral statement to the court on Appellant’s behalf. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding (1) because the affidavit was not favorable to Appellant, there was no Brady violation; (2) the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by failing to disclose the affidavit in accordance with the State’s open-file discovery policy, but the misconduct did not warrant a new sentencing hearing; and (3) the district court erred by not issuing a written order granting a media outlet’s request to record Appellant’s sentencing hearing and by not making the requisite particularized findings on the record, but the errors were harmless. View "Quisano v. State" on Justia Law

On May 12, 2009, the State filed a juvenile delinquency petition charging Appellant with burglary and grand larceny. On August 16, 2010, the State filed a petition to certify Appellant for criminal proceedings as an adult. The juvenile court granted the State’s petition and certified Appellant for criminal proceedings as an adult. After a trial, Appellant was found guilty. The Supreme Court reversed the district court’s judgment of conviction, holding (1) the juvenile court maintains jurisdiction over a juvenile even if it does not make its final disposition of the case within the one-year period provided by statute; but (2) there was insufficient evidence to convict Appellant of burglary and grand larceny. View "Barber v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant, who was a juvenile at the time he committed his crimes, was sentenced to serve fourteen consecutive life terms with the possibility of parole plus a consecutive term of ninety-two years in prison. In 2011, Defendant filed a pro se post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment pursuant to Graham v. Florida. The district court granted Defendant’s petition and ordered a new sentencing hearing, determining (1) Graham prohibited aggregate sentences that were the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole, and (2) Graham also provided good cause and prejudice to overcome the procedural bar of Defendant’s untimely and successive petition. Although the Supreme Court agreed that Graham precludes aggregate sentences that constitute the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole against nonhomicide juvenile offenders and that the decision in Graham provides good cause and actual prejudice for Defendant’s untimely and successive petition, the Court nonetheless vacated the district court’s order, holding that A.B. 267 remedies Defendant’s unconstitutional sentence. View "State v. Boston" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder and related crimes for the death of a member of a motorcycle gang after a brawl between two motorcycle gangs. The Supreme Court reversed Appellant’s judgment of conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding (1) the district court abused its discretion when it refused to answer two questions from the jury during deliberations; (2) the district court abused its discretion when it refused to bifurcate the gang-enhancement portion of the trial from the guilt phase; and (3) the cumulative effect of these and other errors deprived Appellant of his right to a fair trial. View "Gonzalez v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of violating Carson City Municipal Code (CCMC) 3.04.050. CCMC 3.04.050(1) makes it “unlawful for any person to hinder, obstruct, resist, delay, molest or threaten to hinder, obstruct, resist, delay or molest any…member of the sheriff’s office…in the discharge of his official duties.” Petitioner appealed, arguing that CCMC 3.04.050(1) is unconstitutionally overbroad and vague because it restricts constitutional speech. The district court affirmed. The Supreme Court held that CCMC 3.04.050(1) is unconstitutionally overboard because is not narrowly tailored to prohibit only disorderly conduct or fighting words and is unconstitutionally vague because it lacks sufficient guidelines and gives the sheriff too much discretion in its enforcement. Remanded to the district court with instructions to enter an order reversing Petitioner’s conviction in part on the grounds that CCMC 8.04.050(1) is unconstitutional on its face and to determine whether Petitioner may properly be charged under the remainder of CCMC 8.04.050. View "Scott v. First Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law