Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The State charged Defendant in a criminal complaint with a category C felony under Nev. Rev. Stat. 453.337(2)(b) but did not allege a prior conviction as required by statute. The justice court concluded that the State did not meet its burden of proof for the category C felony and discharged Defendant. The State moved for leave to file an information by affidavit and included a proposed information charging Defendant with a category D felony under Nev. Rev. Stat. 453.337(2)(a). The motion was filed sixty-three days after the justice court discharged Defendant. The district court granted the State’s motion, concluding that the State’s delay in filing the motion did not prejudice Defendant. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not abuse its discretion by finding that Defendant failed to demonstrate actual prejudice by the State’s delay in filing the motion to file an information by affidavit; and (2) the district court did not err by allowing the State to file the information by affidavit based on a finding that the justice court committed egregious error that resulted in Defendant’s discharge. View "Moultrie v. State" on Justia Law

During a criminal investigation, the State had located and seized approximately $125,000 from bank accounts kept by Bryan Fergason at Bank of America. The State filed a complaint against the seized money pleading a single cause of action in forfeiture and alleging that the seized money represented proceeds attributable to the commission or attempted commission of a felony. Following the Supreme Court’s affirmance of Fergason’s criminal proceedings, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the State. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court improperly granted summary judgment because the State failed to present sufficient evidence to satisfy its burden of showing an absence of genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the funds seized from Fergason’s bank accounts were subject to forfeiture as proceeds attributable to the commission of a felony, and therefore, the burden of production did not shift to Fergason. Remanded. View "Fergason v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t" on Justia Law

Appellant was found guilty by a jury of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon, burglary, and robbery. The Supreme Court affirmed. Appellant later filed a third postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging newly discovered evidence and asserting nine claims. Appellant supported his petition with declarations that, if true, may establish a gateway claim of actual innocence. The district court dismissed Appellant’s petition without allowing discovery or conducting an evidentiary hearing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court improperly discounted the declarations offered in support of Appellant’s petition, which presented specific factual allegations of Appellant’s innocence that were not belied by the record and were sufficient to merit discovery and an evidentiary hearing on Appellant’s gateway actual innocence claim. View "Berry v. State" on Justia Law

Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.160 states that homicide is justified in response to a reasonable apprehension of the commission of a felony or in the actual resistance of an attempted felony, but the statute does not specify the type of felony. Defendant was charged with battery with the use of a deadly weapon and attempted assault with the use of a deadly weapon for lighting the victim on fire during an altercation at a gas station. At trial, Defendant claimed that his actions were a justifiable battery because he reasonably believed the victim was committing felony coercion against him at the time of the incident. The jury found Defendant guilty. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court gave a jury instruction that was an incorrect statement of Nevada law and that his conviction for attempted assault was legally impossible. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the use of deadly force in response to a felony is justified only when the person poses a threat of serious bodily injury, and the amount of force used must be reasonable and necessary under the circumstances; and (2) attempted assault under Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.471(1)(a)(2) is not legally impossible. View "Newell v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of entering a pawn shop with the intent to obtain money under false pretenses for selling stolen property through the retractable sliding tray of a pawn shop’s drive-through window. The Supreme Court vacated the conviction, holding that no reasonable person could conclude that the sliding tray fell within the outer boundary of the building that housed the pawn shop. Therefore, the evidence admitted at trial was insufficient to demonstrate that Appellant committed an unlawful entry of the building, as defined in the burglary statutes. View "Merlino v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded no contest to one count of child abuse resulting in substantial bodily harm. Defendant filed a timely post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that he should be allowed to withdraw his plea because it was coerced and thus involuntary. The district court partially granted the petition, concluding that the actions of the Washoe County Department of Social Services (DSS) coerced Defendant into pleading no contest and that Defendant was entitled to withdraw his plea. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the State failed to demonstrate that the district court abused its discretion in partially granting the petition. View "State v. Smith" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to coercion and preventing or dissuading a person from testifying. Appellant requested the district court to defer sentencing and assign him to a treatment program for alcohol abuse under Nev. Rev. Stat. 458 rather than impose a term of incarceration. The district court determined that the acts underlying the crime involved domestic violence but concluded that Appellant was ineligible for a treatment program. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court (1) erred by ruling that Appellant was not eligible for alcohol treatment under chapter 458 but did not abuse its discretion by denying Appellant’s request for assignment to a treatment program, as sentencing is ultimately left to the sound discretion of the district court; and (2) did not commit prejudicial error in regard to the remaining issues raised appeal, with the exception of the sentence imposed on the conviction for preventing or dissuading a person from testifying, as the sentence was illegal. View "Cassinelli v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted sexual assault. Before sentencing, Defendant moved to withdraw his plea, which allows a defendant who has pleaded guilty, but has not been sentenced, to petition to withdraw his plea. The district court denied the motion pursuant to Crawford v. State, concluding that Defendant’s plea was entered into knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Defendant appealed, arguing that Crawford’s exclusive focus on the validity of the plea lacks foundation in Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.165. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Crawford’s exclusive focus on the validity of the plea is not supported by section 176.165, and therefore, the district court may grant a defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing for permitting withdrawal would be fair and just; but (2) Appellant failed to present a fair and just reason favoring withdrawal of his plea. View "Stevenson v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of various criminal offenses. During trial, the jury was permitted to hear testimony regarding an out-of-court “show-up” identification during which Defendant was identified by the victims as the perpetrator of the offenses. In addition, the victims testified at trial and identified Defendant in court as one of the perpetrators. On appeal, Defendant argued (1) the show-up was improperly conducted in violation of his constitutional due process rights, and (2) he was improperly sentenced as a habitual criminal. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence, holding (1) the identification procedure used in this case was not unnecessarily suggestive, and the identification was reliable, and therefore, the trial court did not plainly err by admitting the identification testimony into evidence; and (2) the district court properly exercised its discretion to sentence Defendant as a habitual criminal. View "Johnson v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder, child abuse and neglect with the use of a deadly weapon, and two counts of child abuse and neglect. Before sentencing, Defendant filed a timely motion for a new trial. The district court granted the motion. The State appealed from the order granting the motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court ordered the State to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the Court held in State v. Lewis that Nev. Rev. Stat. 177.015(1)(b) only permits appeals from district court orders resolving post-conviction motions for a new trial. The Supreme Court held that it had jurisdiction to consider the State’s appeal from an order granting a prejudgment motion for a new trial, holding (1) the plain language of section 177.015(1)(b) clearly authorizes an appeal from a prejudgment order granting a motion for a new trial; and (2) Lewis is overruled to the extent that it prohibits the State from pursuing its statutory right to appeal a prejudgment order granting a motion for a new trial. View "State v. Harris" on Justia Law