Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of attempted sexual assault. Before sentencing, Defendant moved to withdraw his plea, which allows a defendant who has pleaded guilty, but has not been sentenced, to petition to withdraw his plea. The district court denied the motion pursuant to Crawford v. State, concluding that Defendant’s plea was entered into knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently. Defendant appealed, arguing that Crawford’s exclusive focus on the validity of the plea lacks foundation in Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.165. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Crawford’s exclusive focus on the validity of the plea is not supported by section 176.165, and therefore, the district court may grant a defendant’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea before sentencing for permitting withdrawal would be fair and just; but (2) Appellant failed to present a fair and just reason favoring withdrawal of his plea. View "Stevenson v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of various criminal offenses. During trial, the jury was permitted to hear testimony regarding an out-of-court “show-up” identification during which Defendant was identified by the victims as the perpetrator of the offenses. In addition, the victims testified at trial and identified Defendant in court as one of the perpetrators. On appeal, Defendant argued (1) the show-up was improperly conducted in violation of his constitutional due process rights, and (2) he was improperly sentenced as a habitual criminal. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction and sentence, holding (1) the identification procedure used in this case was not unnecessarily suggestive, and the identification was reliable, and therefore, the trial court did not plainly err by admitting the identification testimony into evidence; and (2) the district court properly exercised its discretion to sentence Defendant as a habitual criminal. View "Johnson v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of first-degree murder, child abuse and neglect with the use of a deadly weapon, and two counts of child abuse and neglect. Before sentencing, Defendant filed a timely motion for a new trial. The district court granted the motion. The State appealed from the order granting the motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court ordered the State to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the Court held in State v. Lewis that Nev. Rev. Stat. 177.015(1)(b) only permits appeals from district court orders resolving post-conviction motions for a new trial. The Supreme Court held that it had jurisdiction to consider the State’s appeal from an order granting a prejudgment motion for a new trial, holding (1) the plain language of section 177.015(1)(b) clearly authorizes an appeal from a prejudgment order granting a motion for a new trial; and (2) Lewis is overruled to the extent that it prohibits the State from pursuing its statutory right to appeal a prejudgment order granting a motion for a new trial. View "State v. Harris" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of sexually assaulting a minor under fourteen years of age. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court committed structural error requiring reversal when it failed to administer an oath to the jury venire, pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 16.030(5), prior to commencing voir dire. The Supreme Court agreed with Defendant and reversed, holding (1) a district court commits structural error when it fails to administer the oath to potential jurors pursuant to section 16.030(5); and (2) therefore, Defendant in this case was denied due process and was entitled to a new trial. View "Barral v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery, burglary while in possession of a firearm, robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, and first-degree kidnapping with the use of a deadly weapon. Because he was non-native English speaker, Defendant asked on appeal that the Supreme Court adopt the test set forth by the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Garibay to find that his confession should not have been admitted at trial because he was not provided with the assistance of an interpreter during his police interrogation. The Supreme Court affirmed after declining to adopt the Garibay test as an comprehensive inquiry that always must be applied by district courts whenever an interrogated suspect is a non-native English speaker, holding (1) the district court did not err in concluding that Appellant’s confession was admissible; (2) the district court did not err in admitting documents proffered to tie Defendant to the scene; and (3) the evidence presented in this case was sufficient to sustain the convictions of kidnapping and robbery arising from the same course of conduct. View "Gonzales v. State" on Justia Law

Nev. Rev. Stat. 172.241 affords the target of a grand jury investigation the opportunity to testify before them. To facilitate exercise of that right, the statute requires that the target be given reasonable notice of the grand jury proceeding unless, after holding a closed hearing on the matter, the district court determines that adequate cause exists to withhold target notice. In this case, as grounds for withholding target notice from Defendant, the district attorney filed a written request and supporting affidavit asserting that Defendant would threaten or harm the victim and/or her family to prevent the victim from testifying. The district judge supervising the grand jury entered an order authorizing the State to withhold target notice without conducting a face-to-face hearing. The district judge to whom the criminal case was assigned after the indictment was entered granted Defendant’s motion to dismiss, concluding that the failure to hold the hearing rendered the indictment procedurally defective. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that section 172.241’s procedure for withholding notice is met if the State presents sufficient evidence to the district court, through written application and/or at oral argument, to allow the court to conclude by written order that adequate cause to withhold notice of the grand jury proceedings exists. View "State v. Beaudion" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and related crimes. Defendant was sentenced to death. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the district court did not err by admitting testimony related to cell phone records and cell phone signal transmissions because, even though the State did not notice as an expert the cell phone company employee, who gave testimony relating to the transmission of cell phone signals, the error did not require reversal of the judgment of conviction; (2) the district court erroneously instructed the jury that the State had the burden of proving the “material elements” of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt without defining “material elements,” but the instruction did not warrant reversal; and (3) Defendant’s prior conviction for attempted battery with substantial bodily harm did not constitute a felony involving the use or threat of violence to the person of another for purposes of the aggravating circumstance set forth in Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.033(2)(b), but the jury’s consideration of this invalid aggravating circumstance did not warrant reversal of the death sentence. View "Burnside v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was found guilty of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon. Appellant was sentenced to death. Appellant filed a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus that was untimely and successive. The district court dismissed the petition as procedurally barred. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s order dismissing the petition, holding that Appellant was not entitled to a writ of habeas corpus where (1) Appellant failed to demonstrate good cause to excuse his procedurally barred post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus; and (2) Appellant failed to demonstrate that he was actually innocent of either the crime or the death penalty. View "Lisle v. State" on Justia Law

William Plise, a judgment debtor, did not attend his scheduled debtor’s examinations in the district court. Eliot Alper, the judgment creditor, sought an order to show cause why Plise should not be held in contempt of court. Before the hearing on that motion, Plise filed a bankruptcy petition. Alper participated in the bankruptcy proceeding and obtained an order from the bankruptcy court granting relief from the automatic stay and allowing the district court to conduct a hearing and enter an order with regard to Plise’s alleged criminal contempt. The district court found Plise guilty of contempt of court and sentenced him to twenty-one days incarceration. The court, however, conditionally allowed Plise to avoid criminal contempt punishment. Alper filed this petition seeking a writ of prohibition arguing that the district court exceeded the scope of the bankruptcy court’s order granting relief from the automatic stay when it allowed him to avoid incarceration by participating in a debtor’s examination. The Supreme Court granted the writ of prohibition, concluding that the district court’s order exceeded the scope of the bankruptcy court’s lift stay order because a contempt order that permits a judgment debtor to purge incarceration is civil, rather than criminal, in nature. View "Alper v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Appellant, an inmate, filed a civil rights complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against Respondents, the Lovelock Correctional Center law library supervisor and an inmate library clerk, alleging that Respondents failed to mail his confidential legal mail and retaliated against him for filing a grievance. The district court dismissed Appellant’s entire complaint without prejudice based on Appellant's failure to exhaust his administrative remedies. In reaching its decision, the court concluded that the federal Prison Litigation Reform Act’s (PLRA) exhaustion requirement applied to Appellant’s section 1983 claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) because the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to any inmate section 1983 civil rights claims regarding prison conditions, even if the complaint is filed in state court, the district court properly applied the exhaustion requirement in this case; and (2) because Appellant’s complaint alleged federal civil rights claims and not state tort claims, the district court did not have the discretion to stay the case to allow Appellant to exhaust his administrative remedies. View "Berry v. Feil" on Justia Law