Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was convicted of a crime and given a suspended prison sentence and placed on probation. When Defendant completed his probationary period, he was subject to a special sentence of lifetime supervision. After commencing lifetime supervision, Defendant filed a post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus, requesting that the district court release him from lifetime supervision or strike the lifetime supervision requirement. The district court denied Defendant’s petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a person who is subject only to lifetime supervision may not file a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge his judgment of conviction or sentence because that person is no longer under “sentence of death or imprisonment” as required by Nev. Rev. Stat. 34.724(1). View "Coleman v. State" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant with murder and other crimes, charging the murder count as willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder and, alternatively, as felony murder in the perpetration of burglary. During the jury trial, Appellant’s theory of defense was that the felony-murder rule did not apply because the underlying felony, burglary, was complete before the killing happened, and thus, the death did not occur “during the perpetration or attempted perpetration” of a felony under Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.030(1)(b). Appellant was subsequently convicted of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon, aggravated stalking, and burglary. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction even though the killing in this case occurred after the offense of burglary was complete because section 200.030(1)(b) holds felons strictly responsible for killings that result from their felonious actions. View "Sanchez-Dominguez v. State" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Nev. Rev. Stat. 50.315, which provides that the declaration of a person who collects a criminal defendant’s blood for evidentiary testing may be admitted at trial. The City of Reno charged Respondent with misdemeanor driving under the influence. At a bench trial, the City sought to introduce into evidence the declaration of a phlebotomist who collected Respondent’s blood for evidentiary testing after Respondent’s arrest. Respondent objected, and the municipal court excluded the declaration on Confrontation Clause grounds. The district court denied the City’s subsequent petition for a writ of mandamus, determining that admitting the phlebotomist’s declaration into evidence over Respondent’s objection would have violated Respondent’s right to confrontation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts requires the Court to overrule its prior decision in City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, where it held that Nev. Rev. Stat. 50.315(6) adequately protects the rights provided by the Confrontation Clause; and (2) section 50.315(6)’s requirement that a defendant establish a substantial and bona fide dispute regarding the facts in a declaration made and offered as evidence pursuant to section 50.315(4) impermissibly burdens the right to confrontation. View "City of Reno v. Howard" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with first-offense battery constituting domestic violence, a misdemeanor. Defendant filed a notice for a jury trial, which the justice court denied. Defendant was subsequently convicted of the charged offense. Thereafter, Defendant filed a petition for extraordinary relief, claiming that the offense of domestic battery was serious enough to warrant a jury trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was not entitled to a jury trial on the misdemeanor charge of domestic battery because he did not demonstrate that first-offense domestic battery is a serious offense for which he was entitled to a jury trial. View "Amezcua v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter with the use of a deadly weapon. Defendant appealed, raising several issues for the Supreme Court’s review. After consideration of the issues, the Supreme Court determined that only two had merit and held (1) the district court erred in failing to record numerous bench and in-chambers conferences; (2) the district court erred in failing to excuse for cause a prospective juror who was equivocal about her impartiality; but (3) the errors in this case did not prejudice Defendant and were therefore harmless. View "Preciado v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was twice convicted in municipal courts of riding a motorcycle without wearing proper headgear. Appellant appealed, seeking a trial de novo. The prosecution subsequently dismissed the charges with prejudice. The district court issued remittiturs, returning the cases to the municipal courts. Thereafter, Appellant filed a motion for his attorney fees and court costs, arguing that Nevada's helmet law is unconstitutionally indeterminate and that his ticketing and prosecution were without probable cause and malicious, entitling him to recover attorney fees as "costs of the action" under Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.115. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeals, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Appellant's cases where, because they originated in the municipal courts and were heard on appeal by the district court, the district court's appellate jurisdiction was final. View "Stilwell v. City of N. Las Vegas" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with trafficking, possession for sale, and possession of controlled substances. Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the warrantless search of his car that uncovered illegal drugs was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. The search was conducted after a highway patrol officer saw Appellant run a red light and followed him into a parking lot to issue him a ticket. While the ticket was being processed, a drug detection dog was summoned, and the dog alerted for the presence of drugs in Appellant's car. The district court concluded that for a warrantless automobile search to pass muster under Nevada law, both probable cause and exigency beyond the exigency inherent in a car's ready mobility must be shown. Because the State did not prove exigent circumstances beyond the car's mobility, the district court suppressed the evidence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) exigency is not a separate requirement of the automobile exception to the constitutional warrant requirement; and (2) the drug detection dog's alert provided probable cause to search Appellant's car. Remanded. View "State v. Lloyd" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of attempted burglary. The following year, Appellant was honorably discharged from probation. More than a decade later, Appellant filed a petition for a writ of coram nobis seeking relief from the judgment of conviction because his trial counsel did not inform him of the immigration consequences of his plea. The State argued that the writ of coram nobis was abolished by statute. The district court construed Appellant's petition to be a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus and denied relief. At issue on appeal was whether the writ of coram nobis exists in Nevada. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision to deny the petition, holding (1) the common-law writ of coram nobis is available in Nevada only for petitioners who are no longer in custody on the judgment being challenged and may be granted only to address errors of fact outside the record that were not known to the court entering the judgment, could not have been raised earlier, and affect the validity and regularity of the decision itself in that they would have precluded the judgment from being rendered; and (2) the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim raised by Appellant was not within that limited scope. View " Trujillo v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and robbery. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) the district court did not err in admitting inflammatory lyrics to a rap song Defendant wrote in jail awaiting extradition to Nevada; (2) the district court did not plainly err in admitting a coconspirator's out-of-court statement that Defendant "went off" and "just started shooting"; (3) the district court did not err in failing to suppress a statement Defendant made to Nevada detectives during a non-custodial interrogation; and (4) Defendant's remaining assignments of error also failed. View " Holmes v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary while in the possession of a deadly weapon and related counts. The Supreme Court identified certain errors in Defendant's sentence on direct appeal and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. After Defendant was resentenced, he filed five successive post-conviction petitions for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court granted Defendant's untimely and successive fifth petition, concluding that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his resentencing hearing and ordering a new sentencing hearing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in determining that Defendant established good cause sufficient to excuse the procedural bars to a consideration of his habeas petition on the merits. Remanded. View " State v. Greene" on Justia Law