Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case involves an appeal from a judgment of conviction for second-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon. The appellant, Jamel Gibbs, was convicted following a trial during which a recorded phone call between him and a defense investigator was admitted as evidence. Gibbs was in pretrial detention at the time of the call, which was made on a recorded line using another inmate's phone access code and a three-way calling system.Gibbs argued that the recorded phone call was protected by attorney-client privilege and should not have been admitted into evidence. The district court ruled against him, reasoning that the conversation was not privileged because Gibbs violated jail policy by using another inmate's phone access code and making a three-way call.On appeal, the Supreme Court of the State of Nevada disagreed with the district court's ruling. The court held that a defendant’s call to a defense investigator, even if made through a three-way call, does not, on its own, amount to a waiver of the attorney-client privilege unless it can be shown that the third party remained present during the conversation. The court also found that violating jail telephone policies does not automatically result in a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. As such, the district court erred in admitting the recorded phone call into evidence.Furthermore, the Supreme Court concluded that this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, as the recorded phone call directly undermined Gibbs's planned defense strategy and necessitated a change in strategy at the start of trial. Therefore, the judgment of conviction was reversed and the case was remanded for a new trial. View "Gibbs v. State" on Justia Law

In an appeal from a judgment of conviction for leaving the scene of an accident involving personal injury, the Court of Appeals of the State of Nevada affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellant was convicted of leaving the scene of an accident after he hit a child with his vehicle and did not stop or return to the scene. He appealed on the grounds that the district court abused its discretion by admitting evidence of his alcohol consumption prior to the accident and his apparent intoxication, and his threat to a witness and gang affiliation. The Court of Appeals held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by admitting evidence of the appellant's alcohol consumption and intoxication, as it was relevant to his motive to flee the scene of the accident. The court also ruled that when the defendant directly introduces evidence of bad acts, it is the defendant's responsibility to request an instruction limiting the consideration of that evidence. The court concluded that the defendant had failed to establish any grounds for reversing his conviction, and thus affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Chadwick v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals of the State of Nevada was reviewing a petition for a writ of certiorari challenging an order from the district court. Petitioner Lina Marie Willson had been convicted of obstructing a public officer. This conviction arose from an incident where Willson had yelled at police officers from her front yard while they were attending to a separate incident involving a potentially suicidal juvenile. Willson appealed her conviction, arguing that the law under which she was convicted, NRS 197.190, was unconstitutionally vague or overly broad.The court held that NRS 197.190 was not unconstitutionally vague or overly broad, either on its face or as applied to Willson. The court interpreted the law to apply only to physical conduct or fighting words that are specifically intended to hinder, delay, or obstruct a public officer in the performance of their duties. Although the court found that Willson's claims failed, it did acknowledge that her claims implicated the sufficiency of the evidence in relation to the court's interpretation of NRS 197.190.The court therefore granted the petition and directed the clerk of the court to issue a writ of certiorari upholding the constitutionality of NRS 197.190 and instructing the district court to reconsider Willson's direct appeal. The purpose of this reconsideration was to determine whether, given the court's interpretation of NRS 197.190, sufficient evidence existed to support Willson's conviction. View "Willson v. First Jud. Dist. Ct." on Justia Law

A criminal defendant in Nevada, Jamie Marie Chittenden, filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the district court, seeking the dismissal of charges against her because her preliminary hearing was scheduled 76 days after her initial appearance, while she remained in custody. The district court denied the petition because it found that good cause existed for this delay. Chittenden appealed this decision, arguing that the delay violated her statutory right to a preliminary hearing within 15 days. The Court of Appeals of Nevada concluded that the district court abused its discretion when it found good cause for the extreme delay in scheduling Chittenden’s preliminary hearing. However, the appellate court affirmed the district court’s denial of Chittenden’s petition for a writ of mandamus on other grounds. The court held that when deciding whether good cause exists to delay a preliminary hearing, the justice court must balance the defendant’s constitutional right to conditional pretrial liberty against the interests of the State and the needs of the court. The court also must make findings on the record to justify any delay of the preliminary hearing and undertake efforts to ensure that the hearing is held as soon as practicable. View "Chittenden v. Justice Court of Pahrump Township" on Justia Law

This is a criminal appeal of a murder and sexual assault conviction. The appellant, Bryce Edward Dickey, was convicted for the murder and sexual assault of sixteen-year-old Gabrielle Ujlaky. He claimed that the trial court erred in admitting certain testimonies and evidence. The Supreme Court of Nevada, however, disagreed and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court found that the trial court's admission of testimony from Dickey's ex-girlfriend, who testified that Dickey choked her during otherwise consensual sex, was not error because it was relevant to Dickey's intent. The court also concluded that the trial court's failure to conduct a complete analysis regarding the qualification of a witness as an expert was harmless. Additionally, the court found that there was sufficient evidence to support Dickey's sexual assault conviction, despite Dickey's argument that there was insufficient evidence of forced penetration. The court concluded that the cumulative impact of the identified errors did not warrant reversal since they did not deprive Dickey of a fair trial. View "Dickey v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Nevada reviewed a case involving appellant David McCord, who was stopped by law enforcement due to a license plate frame partially covering the word "NEVADA." Law enforcement subsequently found contraband in McCord's car, leading to his conviction for trafficking in a controlled substance. McCord contested the legality of the traffic stop, arguing that the license plate frame did not constitute "foreign materials" as outlined in NRS 482.275(4), and that his license plate was "clearly legible" as the statute requires.The court held that a license plate frame does not constitute "foreign materials" under NRS 482.275(4), and that a license plate is "clearly legible" if the required registration information is readily identifiable. The court reasoned that the term "foreign materials" should not be interpreted to include all license plate frames, as this could potentially lead to arbitrary or pretextual traffic stops. It also determined that even though the license plate frame partially covered the word "NEVADA," the license plate was still legible as the essential information was readily identifiable.The court concluded that the law enforcement officer lacked probable cause to justify the traffic stop for a violation of NRS 482.275(4). Consequently, the district court had erred in finding that the traffic stop was reasonable and in denying the motion to suppress evidence seized during the stop. The court reversed the judgment of conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "MCCORD VS. STATE" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court of Nevada upheld a judgment from a lower court in a case involving extortion claims related to cryptocurrency. The case involves Christopher Terry, who sued Ava Blige, alleging she extorted cryptocurrency and money from him under threat of publishing his personal information. Blige failed to respond to court-ordered discovery requests, leading the district court to enter a default judgment in favor of Terry. The court found that Terry had established a prima facie case for conversion, unjust enrichment, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, awarding him damages accordingly. The court also found that the factual allegations supported a claim for extortion, even though it was not specifically pleaded in the complaint. On appeal, Blige argued that the district court erroneously determined that she had impliedly consented to being sued under the unpleaded legal theory of extortion. The Supreme Court of Nevada agreed with Blige on this issue, stating that a defaulting party cannot be found to have impliedly consented to try claims that were not pleaded in the complaint. However, the court affirmed the lower court's judgment, concluding that Blige wrongfully dispossessed Terry of the cryptocurrency and money for cars through extortive acts under the theories of conversion, unjust enrichment, and caused him emotional distress. View "BLIGE VS. TERRY" on Justia Law

In this case, Tashami J. Sims, the appellant, had pleaded guilty to assault with the use of a deadly weapon in the Eighth Judicial District Court. At one of his sentencing hearings, Sims expressed a desire to represent himself, stating, "I'll go pro per." However, the district court did not allow him to do so at that time. Sims did not reiterate his request at subsequent hearings, and he was eventually sentenced to 20 to 72 months in prison.On appeal to the Court of Appeals of the State of Nevada, Sims argued that the district court erred by not conducting a canvass to determine whether he had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel, as required by the Supreme Court's decision in Faretta v. California. The Court of Appeals, in a decision of first impression, held that a defendant can abandon an unequivocal request to represent themselves where the district court has not conclusively denied the request and the totality of the circumstances, including the defendant's conduct, demonstrates that the defendant has abandoned their request.Applying this standard, the court found that Sims had abandoned his request to represent himself. In reaching this conclusion, the court considered factors such as Sims' failure to reassert his request at subsequent hearings, his collaboration with his counsel to obtain his mental health records, and the fact that he waited until after his conviction to raise the issue. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of conviction. View "Sims v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction but vacated his sentence as to restitution and the cost of a psychosexual evaluation and remanded this case for resentencing, holding that the district court erred by not undertaking an investigative inquiry prior to ordering Defendant to pay extradition restitution and by not addressing Defendant's alleged inability to pay the psychosexual evaluation cost.Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of attempted lewdness with a child under the age of fourteen years. At the sentencing hearing, the State requested that the court impose restitution for the cost of having Defendant extradited from Michigan to Nevada as well as the cost of Defendant's psychosexual evaluation, to which he agreed in plea negotiations. Defendant objected to both the extradition restitution and psychosexual evaluation cost on the grounds of his inability to pay. The district court imposed both the extradition restitution and psychosexual evaluation cost in full. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) erred by imposing extradition restitution without conducting the investigate inquiry required under Nev. Rev. Stat. 179.225(2); and (2) abused its discretion by imposing the cost of the psychosexual evaluation in full before making findings as to Defendant's ability to pay. View "Bolden v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the order of the district court dismissing Appellant's complaint alleging that Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.355, Nevada's statute providing that an execution must be effectuated by injection of a lethal drug, is unconstitutional because it gives the Director of the Nevada Department of Corrections discretion to determine the process by which a lethal injection is administered, holding that there was no error.Appellant, a death-row inmate, argued that section 176.355 lacked suitable standards because it afforded the Director complete discretion to determine the types, dosages, and sequencing of drugs to be used in the execution. The district court dismissed the challenge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the statute, combined with the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, provided the Director with suitable standards to determine the process by which a lethal injection is to be administered. View "Floyd v. State, Dep't of Correction" on Justia Law