Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of domestic battery, felony possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of sale, felony possession of a controlled substance, and other crimes. The district court determined that the habitual criminal enhancement applied based on Defendant’s five prior felony convictions and sentenced Defendant accordingly. The Supreme Court (1) reversed Defendant’s conviction for possession of a controlled substance because the conviction was a lesser-included offense of possession of a controlled substance for the purpose of sale, and Defendant could not be punished for both crimes; and (2) affirmed the remainder of the judgment of conviction, including the adjudication of Defendant as a habitual criminal. View "LaChance v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with a felony DUI after he was pulled over for driving a vehicle with a cracked windshield. Defendant filed a motion to suppress on the ground that Deputy Wendy Jason, the investigating officer, made a mistake of law that invalidated the investigatory traffic stop under the Fourth Amendment. Specifically, Jason testified that she stopped Defendant because his cracked windshield violated Nev. Rev. Stat. 484D.435. The district court granted Defendant’s motion because section 484D.435 does not prohibit operating a vehicle with a cracked windshield, even though the cracked windshield could violate another statute. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that a police officer’s citation to an incorrect statute is not a mistake of law that invalidates an investigatory stop under the Fourth Amendment if another statute nonetheless prohibits the suspected conduct. Remanded. View "State v. Cantsee" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of first-degree murder by child abuse following the death of an infant, Tristen Hilburn. Tristen was the victim of multiple injuries. Appellant argued that the injuries were inflicted by Crystal Gaynor, Tristen’s mother, or others associated with her, and that Appellant was innocent. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of conviction, holding that the district court, in applying Nev. Rev. Stat. 51.345, the statement-against-interest exception to the hearsay bar, abused its discretion by refusing to permit two defense witnesses to testify about admissions made by Gaynor concerning a methamphetamine explosion and resulting burns to Tristen’s body. View "Coleman v. State" on Justia Law

Randall Angel, then an inmate, filed a civil rights complaint against corrections officer Michael Cruse, in his individual capacity, alleging that Cruse violated his civil rights by filing a disciplinary charge against him and by having him placed in administrative segregation in retaliation for Angel’s attempt to file a grievance against Cruse. The district court granted summary judgment to Cruse, finding that the evidence demonstrated that Angel had actually threatened Cruse, and in the alternative, Cruse was entitled to qualified immunity because he could not have known that the adverse action violated Angel’s constitutional rights. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed with regard to each of the disputed elements of the retaliation claim and with regard to Cruse’s entitlement to qualified immunity. Remanded. View "Angel v. Cruse" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was found guilty of battery with use of a deadly weapon resulting in substantial bodily harm. Defendant appealed, arguing that the district court erred in denying his proposed instructions regarding self-defense. The Supreme Court reversed Defendant’s conviction, holding (1) Defendant was entitled to self-defense instructions because there was competent evidence of self-defense; (2) Defendant’s proposed jury instructions did not misstate Nevada law; (3) Defendant’s justifiable battery theory was not substantially covered by other instructions; and (4) the district court’s rejection of Defendant’s proposed jury instructions was not harmless and constituted reversible error. Remanded for a new trial. View "Davis v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of a crime and given a suspended prison sentence and placed on probation. When Defendant completed his probationary period, he was subject to a special sentence of lifetime supervision. After commencing lifetime supervision, Defendant filed a post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus, requesting that the district court release him from lifetime supervision or strike the lifetime supervision requirement. The district court denied Defendant’s petition. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a person who is subject only to lifetime supervision may not file a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus to challenge his judgment of conviction or sentence because that person is no longer under “sentence of death or imprisonment” as required by Nev. Rev. Stat. 34.724(1). View "Coleman v. State" on Justia Law

The State charged Defendant with murder and other crimes, charging the murder count as willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder and, alternatively, as felony murder in the perpetration of burglary. During the jury trial, Appellant’s theory of defense was that the felony-murder rule did not apply because the underlying felony, burglary, was complete before the killing happened, and thus, the death did not occur “during the perpetration or attempted perpetration” of a felony under Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.030(1)(b). Appellant was subsequently convicted of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon, aggravated stalking, and burglary. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction even though the killing in this case occurred after the offense of burglary was complete because section 200.030(1)(b) holds felons strictly responsible for killings that result from their felonious actions. View "Sanchez-Dominguez v. State" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Nev. Rev. Stat. 50.315, which provides that the declaration of a person who collects a criminal defendant’s blood for evidentiary testing may be admitted at trial. The City of Reno charged Respondent with misdemeanor driving under the influence. At a bench trial, the City sought to introduce into evidence the declaration of a phlebotomist who collected Respondent’s blood for evidentiary testing after Respondent’s arrest. Respondent objected, and the municipal court excluded the declaration on Confrontation Clause grounds. The district court denied the City’s subsequent petition for a writ of mandamus, determining that admitting the phlebotomist’s declaration into evidence over Respondent’s objection would have violated Respondent’s right to confrontation. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts requires the Court to overrule its prior decision in City of Las Vegas v. Walsh, where it held that Nev. Rev. Stat. 50.315(6) adequately protects the rights provided by the Confrontation Clause; and (2) section 50.315(6)’s requirement that a defendant establish a substantial and bona fide dispute regarding the facts in a declaration made and offered as evidence pursuant to section 50.315(4) impermissibly burdens the right to confrontation. View "City of Reno v. Howard" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with first-offense battery constituting domestic violence, a misdemeanor. Defendant filed a notice for a jury trial, which the justice court denied. Defendant was subsequently convicted of the charged offense. Thereafter, Defendant filed a petition for extraordinary relief, claiming that the offense of domestic battery was serious enough to warrant a jury trial. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Defendant was not entitled to a jury trial on the misdemeanor charge of domestic battery because he did not demonstrate that first-offense domestic battery is a serious offense for which he was entitled to a jury trial. View "Amezcua v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter with the use of a deadly weapon. Defendant appealed, raising several issues for the Supreme Court’s review. After consideration of the issues, the Supreme Court determined that only two had merit and held (1) the district court erred in failing to record numerous bench and in-chambers conferences; (2) the district court erred in failing to excuse for cause a prospective juror who was equivocal about her impartiality; but (3) the errors in this case did not prejudice Defendant and were therefore harmless. View "Preciado v. State" on Justia Law