Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was charged with sexual assault of a minor and lewdness with a child. The jury acquitted Petitioner of the lewdness count and deadlocked on the sexual assault count. The district court declared a mistrial on the sexual assault count and set a date for a new trial. Petitioner moved to dismiss the information, arguing that the double jeopardy clause and the doctrine of collateral estoppel prohibited a second trial for sexual assault because he was acquitted of lewdness, and both offenses were based upon the same event. The district court denied the motion based on the jury's inability to reach of verdict on the sexual assault count. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for writ of mandamus, holding (1) in determining whether an issue of ultimate fact has been decided and cannot be relitigated in a subsequent trial, the district court must examine the record of the first trial and determine whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict on some other issue of fact; (2) in conducting this analysis, the court may not consider the jury's inability to reach a verdict on the other counts; and (3) in this case, the district court improperly analyzed Petitioner's double jeopardy claim. View "Gonzalez v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of invasion of a home in violation of a temporary protective order (TPO). Defendant did not file a motion with the district court regarding the TPO's validity and did not address the issue during his sentencing. Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the procurement of the TPO violated the procedure set forth in Nev. Rev. Stat. 33.020(5) and violated Defendant's due process rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant may not collaterally attack the TPO's validity in a subsequent prosecution for violating the TPO; and (2) the other issues Defendant raised on appeal also lacked merit. View " Truesdell v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of conspiracy to commit murder, murder with the use of a deadly weapon, and discharging a firearm at or into a vehicle. Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when he was denied his counsel of choice at his preliminary hearing before the justice court. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the justice court's denial of Defendant's request to be represented by retained counsel at the preliminary hearing violated Defendant's qualified right to counsel of his choice; but (2) the denial of Defendant's counsel of choice at the preliminary hearing was harmless error. View " Patterson v. State" on Justia Law

A criminal complaint was filed against Petitioner, and Richard Tannery was appointed to represent Petitioner. A notice of intent to seek an indictment was served by facsimile transmission to Tannery's office. The grand jury ultimately returned an indictment against Petitioner. Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the indictment for lack of reasonable notice. The district court denied the motion. Petitioner subsequently filed this petition for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the State's facsimile service of the grand jury notice was inadequate. The Supreme Court denied the petition, holding that a facsimile service of a notice of intent to seek an indictment constitutes adequate service under Nev. Rev. Stat. 172.241(2), as section 172.241(2) does not require personal service, and Nev. Rev. Sat. 178.589(1) permits facsimile transmission of motions, notices, and other legal documents where personal service is not required. View "Davis v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to attempted sexual assault in an Alford plea. Before sentencing, John Pacult, a licensed social worker, performed a psychosexual evaluation of Appellant. After conducting a series of assessments, Pacult concluded that Appellant had a high risk to reoffend. Appellant filed a motion to strike the psychosexual evaluation and to order a new psychosexual evaluation and presentence investigation (PSI) report. The district court denied Appellant's motion and sentenced him to prison. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for the district court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on whether Pacult's evaluation comported with currently accepted standards of assessment. After a hearing, the district court held that Pacult's evaluation was proper. The court then denied Appellant's request for a new psychosexual evaluation and reinstated the judgment of conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the evidence supported the district court's conclusion that the evaluation was based upon currently accepted standards of assessment. View "Blackburn v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to attempted robbery, and the district court entered a judgment of conviction. Appellant subsequently filed a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court granted the petition in part, finding that Appellant had been deprived of his right to a direct appeal due to ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court clerk filed a notice of entry of the decision and order and, on the same day, prepared and filed a notice of appeal on Appellant's behalf. At issue on appeal was whether the district court clerk had the authority to file the notice of appeal on Appellant's behalf. The Supreme Court held that the clerk did not have the authority in this case, as the notice of appeal did not specify the judgment of conviction, and the court clerk may not prepare and file a notice of appeal from the denial of a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal with instructions to the court clerk to prepare and file a notice of appeal on Appellant's behalf from the judgment of conviction, as directed by the district court pursuant to Nev. R. App. P. 4(c). View "Abdullah v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged via criminal complaint with sex offender failure to notify appropriate agencies of change of address. Appellant's counsel filed a motion to dismiss. The State did not file an opposition, and the justice court dismissed the case due to the lack of an opposition. Subsequently, the State obtained an indictment against Appellant for the same offense charged in the criminal complaint. Appellant filed a pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the State willfully failed to comply with important procedural rules and acted with conscious indifference to his procedural rights when it failed to oppose the motion to dismiss. Appellant argued that this conscious indifference barred a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. The district court concluded that the State did not exhibit willful or conscious indifference to Appellant's rights. Thereafter, Appellant was convicted as charged. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in denying Appellant' pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as the State acted with conscious indifference to important procedural rules. View "Woods v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of robbery with the use of a deadly weapon and first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon and was sentenced to death. Appellant subsequently filed numerous post-conviction motions. This appeal involved the denial of Appellant's fourth post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction and sentence. Appellant's counsel sought to file a substitution of counsel motion under seal. The motion was filed under seal. The State opposed the motion and moved to unseal it. Appellant responded by filing a motion to seal the State's opposition. The Supreme Court denied the State's motion and granted Appellant's motion. The State filed a motion for reconsideration of that order. Appellant then filed a motion to seal the reconsideration motion and any pleadings related to the substitution. Later, Appellant filed a motion to strike the motion for reconsideration and to direct the State's conduct respecting the various pleadings filed regarding the substitution motion. The Supreme Court granted the State's motion for reconsideration and denied Appellant's competing motions, holding that the documents Appellant sought to have sealed did not meet the requirements for sealing. View "Howard v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary, grand larceny, conspiracy to commit kidnapping, first-degree kidnapping, conspiracy to commit murder, and first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon. At issue on appeal was whether the district court erred by dismissing a prospective juror before conducting a Batson hearing, and whether sufficient evidence supported the kidnapping conviction. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) because Defendant asserted a Batson violation, it was a structural error to dismiss the challenged juror prior to conducting the Batson hearing because it showed the district court predetermined the challenge before actually hearing it; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the kidnapping conviction. View "Brass v. State" on Justia Law

Respondent pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit a felony under the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. The State later filed a motion requesting that the justice court grant Respondent immunity in exchange for her testimony against another defendant, Gary Taylor, which was granted. Prior to sentencing in her own case, Respondent involuntarily testified at Taylor's preliminary hearing. Respondent then filed motions to dismiss the criminal complaint filed against her and to withdraw her guilty plea, arguing that because the justice court granted her transactional immunity, the State could no longer prosecute her for any actions discussed in her testimony. The district court granted the motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Nevada's immunity statutes do confer transactional immunity where a defendant is forced to testify; and (2) the grant of transactional immunity to a defendant in exchange for testimony, even after entering a guilty plea, immunizes a defendant from further prosecution, including sentencing. View "State v. Tricas" on Justia Law