Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant was twice convicted in municipal courts of riding a motorcycle without wearing proper headgear. Appellant appealed, seeking a trial de novo. The prosecution subsequently dismissed the charges with prejudice. The district court issued remittiturs, returning the cases to the municipal courts. Thereafter, Appellant filed a motion for his attorney fees and court costs, arguing that Nevada's helmet law is unconstitutionally indeterminate and that his ticketing and prosecution were without probable cause and malicious, entitling him to recover attorney fees as "costs of the action" under Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.115. The district court denied the motion. The Supreme Court dismissed Appellant's appeals, holding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Appellant's cases where, because they originated in the municipal courts and were heard on appeal by the district court, the district court's appellate jurisdiction was final. View "Stilwell v. City of N. Las Vegas" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with trafficking, possession for sale, and possession of controlled substances. Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence, arguing that the warrantless search of his car that uncovered illegal drugs was prohibited by the Fourth Amendment. The search was conducted after a highway patrol officer saw Appellant run a red light and followed him into a parking lot to issue him a ticket. While the ticket was being processed, a drug detection dog was summoned, and the dog alerted for the presence of drugs in Appellant's car. The district court concluded that for a warrantless automobile search to pass muster under Nevada law, both probable cause and exigency beyond the exigency inherent in a car's ready mobility must be shown. Because the State did not prove exigent circumstances beyond the car's mobility, the district court suppressed the evidence. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) exigency is not a separate requirement of the automobile exception to the constitutional warrant requirement; and (2) the drug detection dog's alert provided probable cause to search Appellant's car. Remanded. View "State v. Lloyd" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of attempted burglary. The following year, Appellant was honorably discharged from probation. More than a decade later, Appellant filed a petition for a writ of coram nobis seeking relief from the judgment of conviction because his trial counsel did not inform him of the immigration consequences of his plea. The State argued that the writ of coram nobis was abolished by statute. The district court construed Appellant's petition to be a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus and denied relief. At issue on appeal was whether the writ of coram nobis exists in Nevada. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's decision to deny the petition, holding (1) the common-law writ of coram nobis is available in Nevada only for petitioners who are no longer in custody on the judgment being challenged and may be granted only to address errors of fact outside the record that were not known to the court entering the judgment, could not have been raised earlier, and affect the validity and regularity of the decision itself in that they would have precluded the judgment from being rendered; and (2) the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim raised by Appellant was not within that limited scope. View " Trujillo v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and robbery. The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's convictions, holding (1) the district court did not err in admitting inflammatory lyrics to a rap song Defendant wrote in jail awaiting extradition to Nevada; (2) the district court did not plainly err in admitting a coconspirator's out-of-court statement that Defendant "went off" and "just started shooting"; (3) the district court did not err in failing to suppress a statement Defendant made to Nevada detectives during a non-custodial interrogation; and (4) Defendant's remaining assignments of error also failed. View " Holmes v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary while in the possession of a deadly weapon and related counts. The Supreme Court identified certain errors in Defendant's sentence on direct appeal and remanded for a new sentencing hearing. After Defendant was resentenced, he filed five successive post-conviction petitions for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court granted Defendant's untimely and successive fifth petition, concluding that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his resentencing hearing and ordering a new sentencing hearing. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in determining that Defendant established good cause sufficient to excuse the procedural bars to a consideration of his habeas petition on the merits. Remanded. View " State v. Greene" on Justia Law

Defendant in this case was in custody awaiting trial on a charge of murder with the use of a deadly weapon. Defendant successfully litigated a motion to suppress his incriminating statement to police based on his assertion that his statement was obtained through the use of extrinsic falsehoods. The State appealed the denial of the motion to suppress. The district court subsequently set a trial date and denied the State's request to stay the trial pending resolution of its appeal. The State subsequently renewed its motion with the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court granted the State's request for a stay, holding (1) four factors govern the Court's exercise of discretion in ruling on a stay motion of a criminal proceeding pending resolution of an interlocutory suppression appeal; and (2) the factors weighed in favor of granting the state's motion in this case and staying the trial pending resolution of the State's appeal. View " State v. Robles-Nieves" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon and related charges. Defendant timely appealed but died before his appeal was decided. Defendant's attorney filed a suggestion of death and a motion for abatement, arguing that the district court should abate the conviction and remand with instructions to dismiss the charging document. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether an attorney may file a substantive motion on a deceased client's behalf in a criminal case when, as in this case, a personal representative has not been substituted as a party to the appeal. The Court denied counsel's motion for abatement, holding (1) the attorney lacked authority to act on Defendant's behalf in these circumstances; (2) if a party dies pending a review of his appeal, the appeal will be dismissed unless the decedent's personal representative is substituted in as a party to the appeal within ninety days of the decedent's death; and (3) because the court's process caused the delay in filing the motion for substitution, in this instance only, the time for filing the substitution motion shall be extended. View " Brass v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with attempted sexual assault of a child under fourteen and related charges. Defendant faced strong evidence, including his own admissions, that he had sexual contact with his daughter. During trial, defense counsel made a strategic decision to concede there had been some sexual contact between Defendant and his daughter. The jury found Defendant guilty of all the charges. Defendant appealed, asserting that the district court's canvass concerning his counsel's concession strategy was inadequate, and therefore, his consent was involuntary and unknowing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) although the district court's inquiry did not fully comply with Hernandez v. State, which provides that a court, when faced with a concession of guilt by defense counsel during trial, must canvass the defendant to determine whether he knowingly and voluntarily consented to the concession of guilt, the rationale underlying Hernandez is unsound and the opinion therefore must be overruled; (2) a concession-of-guilt strategy is not the equivalent of a guilty plea and, therefore, the trial judge has no obligation to canvass a defendant concerning a concession-of-guilt strategy; and (3) consequently, any deficiencies in the canvass conducted in this case did not warrant relief. View " Armenta-Carpio v. State" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Petitioner for two counts of child abuse and neglect stemming from incidents in which Petitioner slapped and hit his pregnant sixteen-year-old girlfriend. Petitioner filed a pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the indictment, contending (1) the State failed to prove that abuse or neglect occurred, and (2) the State failed to comply with Nev. Rev. Stat. 172.095(2) by not instructing the jury on the definition of "physical injury" as used in the child-abuse-and-neglect statute. The district court denied the petition. Petitioner subsequently filed this petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition challenging the district court's petition. The Supreme Court granted the petition as to one of the two counts of child abuse, concluding (1) when alleged "abuse or neglect" is based on a nonaccidental physical injury, the district attorney must inform the grand jurors of the statutory definition of "physical injury"; and (2) the State's failure to inform the grand jurors of the statutory definition of "physical injury" likely caused the grand jury to return an indictment on less than probable cause for one of the two counts of child abuse. View "Clay v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with trafficking, possession for sale, and possession of controlled substances. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence of contraband seized during a traffic stop. The police officer stopped Defendant for speeding, issued a warning, and then ordered Defendant to remain until a drug-sniffing dog and handler team could arrive. Defendant contended that the officer unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop, unlawfully seizing him, and that exigent circumstances did not justify the warrantless search. The district court suppressed the evidence based on the warrantless search. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a traffic stop that is legitimate when initiated becomes illegitimate when the officer detains the driver beyond the time required to process the traffic offense unless the extended detention is de minimis, consensual, or justified by a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity; and (2) the prolonged stop in this case met none of these exceptions and was therefore unconstitutional. View " State v. Beckman" on Justia Law