Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with attempted sexual assault of a child under fourteen and related charges. Defendant faced strong evidence, including his own admissions, that he had sexual contact with his daughter. During trial, defense counsel made a strategic decision to concede there had been some sexual contact between Defendant and his daughter. The jury found Defendant guilty of all the charges. Defendant appealed, asserting that the district court's canvass concerning his counsel's concession strategy was inadequate, and therefore, his consent was involuntary and unknowing. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) although the district court's inquiry did not fully comply with Hernandez v. State, which provides that a court, when faced with a concession of guilt by defense counsel during trial, must canvass the defendant to determine whether he knowingly and voluntarily consented to the concession of guilt, the rationale underlying Hernandez is unsound and the opinion therefore must be overruled; (2) a concession-of-guilt strategy is not the equivalent of a guilty plea and, therefore, the trial judge has no obligation to canvass a defendant concerning a concession-of-guilt strategy; and (3) consequently, any deficiencies in the canvass conducted in this case did not warrant relief. View " Armenta-Carpio v. State" on Justia Law

A grand jury indicted Petitioner for two counts of child abuse and neglect stemming from incidents in which Petitioner slapped and hit his pregnant sixteen-year-old girlfriend. Petitioner filed a pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the indictment, contending (1) the State failed to prove that abuse or neglect occurred, and (2) the State failed to comply with Nev. Rev. Stat. 172.095(2) by not instructing the jury on the definition of "physical injury" as used in the child-abuse-and-neglect statute. The district court denied the petition. Petitioner subsequently filed this petition for a writ of mandamus or prohibition challenging the district court's petition. The Supreme Court granted the petition as to one of the two counts of child abuse, concluding (1) when alleged "abuse or neglect" is based on a nonaccidental physical injury, the district attorney must inform the grand jurors of the statutory definition of "physical injury"; and (2) the State's failure to inform the grand jurors of the statutory definition of "physical injury" likely caused the grand jury to return an indictment on less than probable cause for one of the two counts of child abuse. View "Clay v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with trafficking, possession for sale, and possession of controlled substances. Defendant moved to suppress the evidence of contraband seized during a traffic stop. The police officer stopped Defendant for speeding, issued a warning, and then ordered Defendant to remain until a drug-sniffing dog and handler team could arrive. Defendant contended that the officer unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop, unlawfully seizing him, and that exigent circumstances did not justify the warrantless search. The district court suppressed the evidence based on the warrantless search. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) a traffic stop that is legitimate when initiated becomes illegitimate when the officer detains the driver beyond the time required to process the traffic offense unless the extended detention is de minimis, consensual, or justified by a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity; and (2) the prolonged stop in this case met none of these exceptions and was therefore unconstitutional. View " State v. Beckman" on Justia Law

The State sought an indictment against Petitioner on charges of sexual assault and lewdness involving a child. During the grand jury proceedings, the State presented the child-victim's out-of-court statements describing the alleged sexual conduct. The grand jury ultimately returned a true bill. Petitioner subsequently filed a pretrial motion for a writ of habeas corpus, contending that the indictment was based on hearsay in violation of Nevada law. After a hearing, the district court denied the petition, concluding that the victim's statements were not hearsay because they were prior inconsistent statements, and if they were hearsay, they were admissible under Nev. Rev. Stat. 51.385, which excepts from the hearsay rule trustworthy statements by a child-victim of sexual assault. Petitioner then filed this original petition for extraordinary relief. The Supreme Court granted the petition, holding that the grand jury could not consider the disputed statements, as (1) the statements were hearsay, and (2) the exception in section 51.385 does not apply to grand jury proceedings. Consequently, there was not sufficient legal evidence to support a finding of probable cause and the indictment could not stand. View "Rugamas v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court" on Justia Law

The State charged Respondent with misdemeanor and felony crimes stemming from a domestic violence incident. A justice of the peace, who was sitting as a district court hearing master pursuant to Eighth Judicial District Court Rule (EDCR) 1.48, which allows justices of the peace to serve as district court hearing masters, presided over Defendant's preliminary hearing. Respondent pleaded guilty to a misdemeanor charge of battery, and the judge sentenced him on that charge. The judge then accepted Respondent's plea to the felony charge. Respondent subsequently filed a motion to withdraw his felony plea on the ground that it was accepted by a justice of the peace, who lacks jurisdiction to accept a felony plea. The district court granted Respondent's motion. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that when a justice of the peace who has been appointed as a hearing master performs the duties set forth in EDCR 1.48(k), she is acting pursuant to her authority under EDCR 1.48, not as part of her jurisdiction as a justice of the peace. View " State v. Frederick" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted burglary while in possession of a firearm, robbery with the use of a deadly weapon, and coercion. Defendant moved to suppress the confession he made while at the police station, claiming that interrogation began after he invoked his right to counsel. After an evidentiary hearing, the district court found that Defendant asked "Can I get an attorney?" but denied the motion to suppress, concluding that Defendant's statement was ambiguous and that there was no substantive questioning until after Defendant was given a second set of Miranda warnings at the police station and waived his right to counsel. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the question "Can I get an attorney?" is an unequivocal request for the aid of counsel, triggering the requirement that all interrogation immediately cease; (2) once a suspect invokes his right to counsel, there may be no further interrogation unless the suspect reinitiates contact with the police, there is a sufficient break in custody, or the suspect is provided the aid of the counsel that he requested; and (3) Appellant's confession was inadmissible, and the error in admitting the confession was not harmless. Remanded. View " Carter v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant pleaded guilty to one count of lewdness with a child under fourteen years of age. The district court determined that restitution should be imposed as part of the sentence but did not set an amount of restitution. Instead the court ordered Appellant to appear within sixty days after his release from prison to have the court determine the restitution at that time. Appellant appealed, arguing that Nevada law requires that the district court set an amount of restitution when it determines that restitution is appropriate as part of a sentence. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that because the judgment of conviction contemplated restitution in an uncertain amount, it was not final and therefore was not appealable. View " Slaatte v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant was convicted of willfully endangering a child as a result of child abuse, a gross misdemeanor, and battery by strangulation, a felony. Appellant's defense was parental discipline privilege as to the child abuse charge and self-defense as to the battery charge. Appellant challenged (1) the district court's admission of evidence that Appellant had struck one of his sons in public and that Defendant got into an argument with nursing staff about his son, and (2) the court's admission of testimony from a witness reporting that she also had a heated exchange with Appellant over his disciplining a young boy. Appellant alleged the admission of this evidence violated Nev. Rev. Stat. 48.045's prohibition against using character or prior-bad-act evidence to prove criminal propensity. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) one of the episodes involving one of Defendant's sons was properly admitted to refute Appellant's claim of parental privilege; and (2) the district court abused its discretion in admitting the testimony about the incident involving Appellant's discipline of the young boy, but the error was harmless. View " Newman v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with sexual assault of a minor and lewdness with a child. The jury acquitted Petitioner of the lewdness count and deadlocked on the sexual assault count. The district court declared a mistrial on the sexual assault count and set a date for a new trial. Petitioner moved to dismiss the information, arguing that the double jeopardy clause and the doctrine of collateral estoppel prohibited a second trial for sexual assault because he was acquitted of lewdness, and both offenses were based upon the same event. The district court denied the motion based on the jury's inability to reach of verdict on the sexual assault count. The Supreme Court granted Petitioner's petition for writ of mandamus, holding (1) in determining whether an issue of ultimate fact has been decided and cannot be relitigated in a subsequent trial, the district court must examine the record of the first trial and determine whether a rational jury could have grounded its verdict on some other issue of fact; (2) in conducting this analysis, the court may not consider the jury's inability to reach a verdict on the other counts; and (3) in this case, the district court improperly analyzed Petitioner's double jeopardy claim. View "Gonzalez v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of invasion of a home in violation of a temporary protective order (TPO). Defendant did not file a motion with the district court regarding the TPO's validity and did not address the issue during his sentencing. Defendant appealed, arguing, inter alia, that the procurement of the TPO violated the procedure set forth in Nev. Rev. Stat. 33.020(5) and violated Defendant's due process rights. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Defendant may not collaterally attack the TPO's validity in a subsequent prosecution for violating the TPO; and (2) the other issues Defendant raised on appeal also lacked merit. View " Truesdell v. State" on Justia Law