Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

These consolidated appeals presented specific applications of the question of whether a defendant can, in a single trial, be prosecuted and punished cumulatively for a single act that violates more than one criminal statute. Specifically, these appeals presented the following questions: When the elements of both crimes are met, can a defendant who shoots and hits but fails to kill his victim be convicted of and punished for both attempted murder and battery? Also, if the defendant shoots and misses, can he be convicted of and punished for both attempted murder and assault? The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of conviction in both appeals after repeating the rule that if each statute contains an element that the other does not, then the offenses are different. The Court held that, in this case, Defendants' multiple convictions and punishments for attempted murder, assault, and battery in this case were statutorily authorized and further, did not offend the test set forth in Blockburger v. United States, which licenses multiple punishments unless, analyzed in terms of their elements, one charged offense is the same or a lesser-included offense of the other. View "Jackson v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioners, corporate entities and an individual that serviced and brokered loans for the acquisition and development of real property, faced a civil suit and a criminal investigation in connection with an alleged Ponzi scheme. Petitioners filed a motion with the district court in their civil case to stay any depositions and written discovery that would require their employees and officers to make testimonial statements, asserting that the evidence could be used by the FBI in their criminal investigation. The district court summarily denied the motion without prejudice. Petitioners subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus or prohibition directing the district court to grant their motion to stay. The Supreme Court denied the requested relief, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that, on balance, the interests of Petitioners in a stay did not outweigh the countervailing interests involved and in therefore denying the motion to stay. View "Aspen Fin. Servs. v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Supreme Court addressed a district court's discretion when resolving a petition for release from a special sentence of lifetime supervision. Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.0931(3), the statutory provision governing such petitions, provides that a district court "shall grant a petition for release from a special sentence of lifetime supervision" if certain requirements are met. Based on the plain language of the statute, the Court concluded that the district court has discretion to determine whether a petitioner has met the statutory requirements but lacks discretion to deny a petition for release from lifetime supervision if that court finds the statutory requirements were met. In this case, the district court denied the petition based on victim impact testimony and made no findings as to whether Appellant had complied with the statutory requirements. Thus, the Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded. View "Goudge v. State" on Justia Law

Respondent was adjudicated delinquent and committed to a state facility. While there, he allegedly battered a group supervisor. The State charged him as an adult with battery by a prisoner under Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.481(2)(f), a felony. Citing relevant statutes and Robinson v. State, which broadly holds that "prisoner" as used in section 200.481(2)(f) was meant to only apply in the criminal setting, the district court dismissed the charge, holding that because Respondent's detention was civil, not criminal, he was not a "prisoner" to whom section 200.481(2)(f) could apply. The State appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a juvenile detained for delinquency in a state facility is not a "prisoner" for purposes of section 200.481(2)(f). View "State v. Javier C." on Justia Law

Respondent was in custody in county jail when officers discovered a cell phone hidden in a box beneath his bed. The State charged Respondent under Nev. Rev. Stat. 212.093(1), which, in pertinent part, prohibits prisoners, including county jail inmates, from possessing "any key, picklock, bolt cutters, wire cutters, saw, digging tool, rope, ladder, hook or any other tool or item adapted, designed or commonly used for the purpose of escaping" from custody. After being bound over to the district court, Respondent filed a pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking to dismiss the charge, arguing that section 212.093(1) was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and that, by its terms, the statute does not prohibit the possession of cell phones. The district court agreed with Respondent and dismissed the charge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that by its plain and unambiguous language, section 212.093(1) does not prohibit county jail inmates from possessing cell phones. View "Pershing County Sheriff v. Andrews" on Justia Law

In 2008, the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now, Inc. (ACORN) hired voter registration canvassers in Las Vegas. Under an incentive program, ACORN paid canvassers $5 a bonus if the canvasser returned twenty-one or more voter registration applications. The State subsequently charged ACORN and the supervisor of ACORN's field director for Nevada with several counts of violating Nev. Rev. Stat. 293.805, which prohibits providing compensation to voter registration canvassers based upon the total number of voters a canvasser registers. The supervisor entered an Alford plea to two counts of conspiracy to commit the crime of compensation for registration of voters, and was adjudged guilty. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 293.805 triggers a less exacting standard of review than strict scrutiny; (2) the State demonstrated an interest sufficiently weighty to justify the limitation imposed on canvassing activities, and therefore, section 293.805 does not violate the First Amendment; and (3) section 293.805 is not unconstitutionally vague. View "Busefink v. State" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the Supreme Court was the relationship between two statutory provisions, enacted in 2009, that govern the extent of the juvenile court’s jurisdiction: NRS 62B.330(3)(e)(1) and NRS 62B.335. Both provisions address a person who has been charged with committing an offense when the person was between 16 and 18 years of age that would be a category A or B felony if committed by an adult. In those circumstances, NRS 62B.330(3)(e)(1) provides that the act is not a "delinquent act" and divests the juvenile court of jurisdiction if the person is identified and charged between the ages of 20 years, 3 months and 21 years. Pursuant to NRS 62B.335, if a person charged with a delinquent act that would have been a category A or B felony if committed by an adult is identified before reaching 21 years of age but is not apprehended until after reaching 21 years of age, then the juvenile court retains jurisdiction to conduct a hearing. The matter came before the Court in the case of "George J." who was seventeen years old when he allegedly committed: (1) home invasion, (2) burglary, (3) grand larceny, (4) grand larceny of an automobile, and (5) burglary of an automobile. Reading the statutes together, the Supreme Court concluded that NRS 62B.335 only applied to delinquent acts and therefore does not apply to acts that are "deemed not to be a delinquent act" under NRS 62B.330(3). "Thus, if the case is excluded from the juvenile court’s jurisdiction under NRS 62B.330(3), then the juvenile court does not obtain jurisdiction by virtue of NRS 62B.335." Here, the juvenile court lacked jurisdiction under NRS 62B.330(3)(e)(1). The Court nonetheless affirmed because the juvenile court reached the correct result by transferring the case to the district court for adult criminal proceedings. View "In re George J." on Justia Law

In this opinion, the issue before the Supreme Court centered on the applicability of NRS 62B.330(3)(e)(2), a statutory provision that divests a juvenile court of jurisdiction over a person who commits a class A or B felony between 16 and 18 years of age but is not identified until after reaching 21 years of age. Defendant Gregory Barren was seventeen years old when he allegedly kidnapped and secually assaulted a woman in 2005. Police identified Defendant from DNA evidence left from bodily fluids at the scene. Defendant was twenty-one when police made the DNA match. Upon review, the Supreme Court concluded that this statutory provision governs jurisdiction over any proceedings initiated after the provision went into effect on October 1, 2009, regardless of when the offense was committed. Because NRS 62B.330(3)(e)(2) was in effect when the State initiated proceedings against Defendant, the Court concluded that the district court, not the juvenile court, had jurisdiction over his criminal case. View "Nevada v. Barren" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jonathon Whitehead pleaded guilty to DUI causing death and DUI causing substantial bodily harm and subsequently filed a post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus. A panel of the Supreme Court affirmed the district court's dismissal of Whitehead's petition as untimely. Whitehead filed a petition for rehearing, which the panel denied. Whitehead subsequently petitioned for en banc reconsideration. The Supreme Court reversed, concluding that reconsideration was warranted, holding (1) a judgment of conviction that imposes restitution but does not set an amount of restitution, in violation of Nevada statutes, is not final and therefore does not trigger the one-year time limit for filing a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus; and (2) Whitehead's post-conviction petition was timely under this analysis. View "Whitehead v. State" on Justia Law

Charles Huebler was convicted, pursuant to a guilty plea, of lewdness with a child under fourteen years of age. Huebler subsequently filed an untimely post-conviction petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that he had good cause for his delay in filing the petition because the State improperly withheld surveillance videotapes that were exculpatory, which rendered his guilty plea involuntary. The district court granted relief to Huebler. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the State is required under Brady v. Maryland to disclose material exculpatory evidence within its possession to the defense before the entry of a guilty plea; (2) a defendant may challenge the validity of the guilty on the basis of the State's failure to make the required disclosure, but to succeed, the defendant must demonstrate the three components of a Brady violation in the context of a guilty plea; (3) as to the materiality component, the test is whether there is a reasonable probability that but for the State's failure to disclose the evidence the defendant would have refused to plead guilty and would have gone to trial; and (4) Huebler failed to demonstrate that the evidence was material under the materiality component. View "State v. Huebler" on Justia Law