Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant pleaded guilty to attempted robbery, and the district court entered a judgment of conviction. Appellant subsequently filed a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The district court granted the petition in part, finding that Appellant had been deprived of his right to a direct appeal due to ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court clerk filed a notice of entry of the decision and order and, on the same day, prepared and filed a notice of appeal on Appellant's behalf. At issue on appeal was whether the district court clerk had the authority to file the notice of appeal on Appellant's behalf. The Supreme Court held that the clerk did not have the authority in this case, as the notice of appeal did not specify the judgment of conviction, and the court clerk may not prepare and file a notice of appeal from the denial of a post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal with instructions to the court clerk to prepare and file a notice of appeal on Appellant's behalf from the judgment of conviction, as directed by the district court pursuant to Nev. R. App. P. 4(c). View "Abdullah v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged via criminal complaint with sex offender failure to notify appropriate agencies of change of address. Appellant's counsel filed a motion to dismiss. The State did not file an opposition, and the justice court dismissed the case due to the lack of an opposition. Subsequently, the State obtained an indictment against Appellant for the same offense charged in the criminal complaint. Appellant filed a pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the State willfully failed to comply with important procedural rules and acted with conscious indifference to his procedural rights when it failed to oppose the motion to dismiss. Appellant argued that this conscious indifference barred a subsequent prosecution for the same offense. The district court concluded that the State did not exhibit willful or conscious indifference to Appellant's rights. Thereafter, Appellant was convicted as charged. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district court erred in denying Appellant' pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus, as the State acted with conscious indifference to important procedural rules. View "Woods v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted of robbery with the use of a deadly weapon and first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon and was sentenced to death. Appellant subsequently filed numerous post-conviction motions. This appeal involved the denial of Appellant's fourth post-conviction petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction and sentence. Appellant's counsel sought to file a substitution of counsel motion under seal. The motion was filed under seal. The State opposed the motion and moved to unseal it. Appellant responded by filing a motion to seal the State's opposition. The Supreme Court denied the State's motion and granted Appellant's motion. The State filed a motion for reconsideration of that order. Appellant then filed a motion to seal the reconsideration motion and any pleadings related to the substitution. Later, Appellant filed a motion to strike the motion for reconsideration and to direct the State's conduct respecting the various pleadings filed regarding the substitution motion. The Supreme Court granted the State's motion for reconsideration and denied Appellant's competing motions, holding that the documents Appellant sought to have sealed did not meet the requirements for sealing. View "Howard v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of burglary, grand larceny, conspiracy to commit kidnapping, first-degree kidnapping, conspiracy to commit murder, and first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon. At issue on appeal was whether the district court erred by dismissing a prospective juror before conducting a Batson hearing, and whether sufficient evidence supported the kidnapping conviction. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding (1) because Defendant asserted a Batson violation, it was a structural error to dismiss the challenged juror prior to conducting the Batson hearing because it showed the district court predetermined the challenge before actually hearing it; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the kidnapping conviction. View "Brass v. State" on Justia Law

Respondent pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit a felony under the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. The State later filed a motion requesting that the justice court grant Respondent immunity in exchange for her testimony against another defendant, Gary Taylor, which was granted. Prior to sentencing in her own case, Respondent involuntarily testified at Taylor's preliminary hearing. Respondent then filed motions to dismiss the criminal complaint filed against her and to withdraw her guilty plea, arguing that because the justice court granted her transactional immunity, the State could no longer prosecute her for any actions discussed in her testimony. The district court granted the motions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Nevada's immunity statutes do confer transactional immunity where a defendant is forced to testify; and (2) the grant of transactional immunity to a defendant in exchange for testimony, even after entering a guilty plea, immunizes a defendant from further prosecution, including sentencing. View "State v. Tricas" on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals presented specific applications of the question of whether a defendant can, in a single trial, be prosecuted and punished cumulatively for a single act that violates more than one criminal statute. Specifically, these appeals presented the following questions: When the elements of both crimes are met, can a defendant who shoots and hits but fails to kill his victim be convicted of and punished for both attempted murder and battery? Also, if the defendant shoots and misses, can he be convicted of and punished for both attempted murder and assault? The Supreme Court affirmed the judgments of conviction in both appeals after repeating the rule that if each statute contains an element that the other does not, then the offenses are different. The Court held that, in this case, Defendants' multiple convictions and punishments for attempted murder, assault, and battery in this case were statutorily authorized and further, did not offend the test set forth in Blockburger v. United States, which licenses multiple punishments unless, analyzed in terms of their elements, one charged offense is the same or a lesser-included offense of the other. View "Jackson v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioners, corporate entities and an individual that serviced and brokered loans for the acquisition and development of real property, faced a civil suit and a criminal investigation in connection with an alleged Ponzi scheme. Petitioners filed a motion with the district court in their civil case to stay any depositions and written discovery that would require their employees and officers to make testimonial statements, asserting that the evidence could be used by the FBI in their criminal investigation. The district court summarily denied the motion without prejudice. Petitioners subsequently petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of mandamus or prohibition directing the district court to grant their motion to stay. The Supreme Court denied the requested relief, holding that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that, on balance, the interests of Petitioners in a stay did not outweigh the countervailing interests involved and in therefore denying the motion to stay. View "Aspen Fin. Servs. v. Dist. Court" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the Supreme Court addressed a district court's discretion when resolving a petition for release from a special sentence of lifetime supervision. Nev. Rev. Stat. 176.0931(3), the statutory provision governing such petitions, provides that a district court "shall grant a petition for release from a special sentence of lifetime supervision" if certain requirements are met. Based on the plain language of the statute, the Court concluded that the district court has discretion to determine whether a petitioner has met the statutory requirements but lacks discretion to deny a petition for release from lifetime supervision if that court finds the statutory requirements were met. In this case, the district court denied the petition based on victim impact testimony and made no findings as to whether Appellant had complied with the statutory requirements. Thus, the Court reversed the district court's judgment and remanded. View "Goudge v. State" on Justia Law

Respondent was adjudicated delinquent and committed to a state facility. While there, he allegedly battered a group supervisor. The State charged him as an adult with battery by a prisoner under Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.481(2)(f), a felony. Citing relevant statutes and Robinson v. State, which broadly holds that "prisoner" as used in section 200.481(2)(f) was meant to only apply in the criminal setting, the district court dismissed the charge, holding that because Respondent's detention was civil, not criminal, he was not a "prisoner" to whom section 200.481(2)(f) could apply. The State appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a juvenile detained for delinquency in a state facility is not a "prisoner" for purposes of section 200.481(2)(f). View "State v. Javier C." on Justia Law

Respondent was in custody in county jail when officers discovered a cell phone hidden in a box beneath his bed. The State charged Respondent under Nev. Rev. Stat. 212.093(1), which, in pertinent part, prohibits prisoners, including county jail inmates, from possessing "any key, picklock, bolt cutters, wire cutters, saw, digging tool, rope, ladder, hook or any other tool or item adapted, designed or commonly used for the purpose of escaping" from custody. After being bound over to the district court, Respondent filed a pretrial petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking to dismiss the charge, arguing that section 212.093(1) was unconstitutionally vague and overbroad, and that, by its terms, the statute does not prohibit the possession of cell phones. The district court agreed with Respondent and dismissed the charge. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that by its plain and unambiguous language, section 212.093(1) does not prohibit county jail inmates from possessing cell phones. View "Pershing County Sheriff v. Andrews" on Justia Law