Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant Joseph Francis incurred a $2 million debt at Wynn Las Vegas, a casino. When unable to collect on the debt, Wynn sued Francis for, among other things, breach of contract, conversion, and unjust enrichment. When Wynn deposed Francis during discovery, Wynn invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination to nearly every question. Wynn eventually filed a motion for summary judgment, which the district court granted after refusing to permit Francis to withdraw his invocation and denying his request to reopen discovery. At issue on appeal was how, in response to a civil litigant's request for accommodation of his Fifth Amendment privilege, the district court should proceed in order to prevent the opposing party from being unfairly disadvantaged. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) in response to a civil litigant's request for accommodation of his privilege, the district court should balance the interests of the invoking party and the opposing party's right to fair treatment; and (2) after reviewing the particular considerations in the instant case, the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit Appellant to withdraw his invocation or in denying his request to reopen discovery. View "Francis v. Wynn Las Vegas, L.L.C." on Justia Law

Respondent Aaron Hughes faced several criminal charges for allegedly creating three digital videos of himself engaging in sexual intercourse with a seventeen-year-old. The district court granted Hughes' motion to dismiss one of the charges against him for child pornography, pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 200.710, after finding that the statute was vague and that it only applied to production of pornography involving individuals under sixteen years of age. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the term "minor" in the statute is not constitutionally vague because it has a well-settled and ordinarily understood meaning as an individual under eighteen years of age; and (2) under section 200.710, it is unlawful to use a person under eighteen years of age in producing a pornographic performance. Remanded. View "State v. Hughes" on Justia Law

Jerome Ford was convicted of pandering of prostitution pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 201.300(1)(a), which criminalizes the act of soliciting another person with the specific intent that, in response to the solicitation, she become a prostitute or continue to engage in prostitution. Ford appealed, contending that the statute was unconstitutionally overbroad and vague. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the statute does not criminalize such a substantial amount of protected expressive activity as to be unconstitutionally overbroad, and statute is not impermissibly vague; (2) the statute applies even when the target is an undercover police officer who disavows having been or intending to become a prostitute; but (3) the jury instructions in this case did not adequately describe the specific intent required for pandering, and the error affected Ford's substantial rights. Remanded for a new trial. View "Ford v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Appellant Ramon Adam was convicted of trafficking in a controlled substance. During trial, Appellant sought a jury instruction on the procuring agent defense, which generally provides that if a defendant is an agent of the purchaser, then the defendant should only be held as culpable as the purchaser. The district court rejected the instruction. The Supreme Court affirmed after reviewing the trafficking statute and prior caselaw, holding that the district court reached the correct result, albeit for the wrong reasons, when it refused to instruct the jury on the procuring agent defense. The Court further held (1) the procuring agent defense is inapplicable to trafficking charges, regardless of the theory the defendant is charged under, whether sale, manufacture, delivery, or actual constructive possession; and (2) any prior precedent inconsistent with this opinion was overruled. View "Adam v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant Collie Hawkins was convicted, pursuant to a jury verdict, of conspiracy to violate the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. On appeal, Hawkins contended that the district court erred by rejecting his challenges to the State's peremptory challenges of three jurors as impermissible race discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding that the district court did not err by rejecting Hawkins' challenge because Hawkins (1) failed to show purposeful discrimination or pretext or to offer any analysis of the relevant considerations, and (2) offered no relevant argument on appeal other than a summary conclusion that the prosecutor's reasons for removing the jurors were pretextual. View "Hawkins v. State" on Justia Law

Brian Rose was convicted of second-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon. During the trial, the State relied on the felony-murder rule as one of its theories for second-degree murder. On appeal, Rose contended that assault with a deadly weapon cannot not be used as a predicate felony to obtain a second-degree murder conviction under the felony-murder rule because it merges with the homicide and thus is barred by the merger doctrine. Therefore, Rose argued that the State's reliance on this theory and its instructions regarding second-degree felony murder were improper. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) assaultive-type felonies that involve a threat of immediate violent injury merge with a charged homicide for purposes of second-degree felony murder and therefore cannot be used as the basis for a second-degree felony-murder conviction; (2) because the crime at issue in this case could be assaultive based on the manner in which it was committed, the district court erred when it failed to instruct the jury to determine whether the felony underlying the second-degree felony-murder theory was assaultive; and (3) the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in this case. Remanded. View "Rose v. State" on Justia Law

During a routine traffic stop, police officers developed what the district court found was a reasonable suspicion that the car's passenger, appellant Arturo Cortes, was armed and dangerous. The police ordered Cortes out of the car and subjected him to a patdown search, which produced the evidence underlying the conviction for possession of a controlled substance. Arturo appealed the conviction, urging the Supreme Court to reject the district court's finding of reasonable suspicion or to interpret the Nevada constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures more strictly than the Supreme Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment in Arizona v. Johnson. The Court saw no basis for departing from Johnson's application of Terry v. Ohio to traffic-stop frisks and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Cortes v. State" on Justia Law

Jessica Winkle pleaded guilty to causing the death of another by driving under the influence of alcohol, in violation of the statute currently codified as Nev. Rev. Stat. 484C.430. Winkle was sentenced to two to five years in state prison. Before the expiration of her minimum term, Winkle was released to a program for alcohol treatment and residential confinement. After determining that Winkle was still in residential confinement and had not served in minimum two-year term, Howard Skolnik, Director of the Department of Corrections, directed that Winkle be rearrested and returned to incarceration. Winkle sought a writ of mandamus directing respondents, Skolnik and the warden of the Jean Conservation Camp, to release her to the program. The Supreme Court granted the writ, concluding that (1) the express language of Nev. Rev. Stat. 209.427 and Nev. Rev. Stat. 209.429 mandates release of qualified offenders to the program for alcohol treatment and residential confinement; and (2) the express language of section 209.429(4)(a) deems an assignment to the program as "imprisonment" for the purposes of section 484C.430 and not a release on parole. View "Winkle v. Foster" on Justia Law

David Saletta was found guilty by a jury of indecent exposure. After the verdict was published and in response to Saletta's request for a jury poll, the district court polled the jury. During the poll, the seventh juror dissented from the verdict, after which the district court continued its poll. The court then questioned the seventh juror about her reasons for changing her mind. Saletta moved for a mistrial, which the district court denied. The jury was ordered to resume deliberation, and a subsequent jury poll resulted in a unanimous verdict. Saletta appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that (1) the district court's polling method was not coercive under the three factors identified in U.S. v. Gambino; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by continuing to poll the jury after a juror retreated from the verdict under Nev. Rev. Stat. 175.531; and (3) the district court erred by questioning the dissenting juror, the error was plain, and it affected Saletta's substantial rights. Remanded. View "Saletta v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted by a jury of driving under the influence of a controlled substance causing substantial bodily harm. Part of the evidence heard by the jury came from a paramedic who took appellant by ambulance to the hospital. The paramedic testified that appellant confided he had smoked marijuana before the accident. Appellant argued that his statement to the paramedic was inadmissible because it was protected by Nevada’s doctor-patient privilege. The district court rejected the argument. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the term “doctor,” as defined in Nev. Rev. Stat. 49.215(2), does not include EMTs or paramedics, and thus the doctor-patient relationship required for the privilege to attach did not arise simply because appellant spoke to the paramedic in confidence. The Court also held that the statement was not privileged under Nev. Rev. Stat. 49.225, which protects communications among the patient and persons “under direction of the doctor” because the paramedic was acting as an independent EMT and not under the supervision or direction of a doctor in a doctor-patient relationship with appellant. View "Rogers v. State" on Justia Law