Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Appellant Ramon Adam was convicted of trafficking in a controlled substance. During trial, Appellant sought a jury instruction on the procuring agent defense, which generally provides that if a defendant is an agent of the purchaser, then the defendant should only be held as culpable as the purchaser. The district court rejected the instruction. The Supreme Court affirmed after reviewing the trafficking statute and prior caselaw, holding that the district court reached the correct result, albeit for the wrong reasons, when it refused to instruct the jury on the procuring agent defense. The Court further held (1) the procuring agent defense is inapplicable to trafficking charges, regardless of the theory the defendant is charged under, whether sale, manufacture, delivery, or actual constructive possession; and (2) any prior precedent inconsistent with this opinion was overruled. View "Adam v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant Collie Hawkins was convicted, pursuant to a jury verdict, of conspiracy to violate the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. On appeal, Hawkins contended that the district court erred by rejecting his challenges to the State's peremptory challenges of three jurors as impermissible race discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of conviction, holding that the district court did not err by rejecting Hawkins' challenge because Hawkins (1) failed to show purposeful discrimination or pretext or to offer any analysis of the relevant considerations, and (2) offered no relevant argument on appeal other than a summary conclusion that the prosecutor's reasons for removing the jurors were pretextual. View "Hawkins v. State" on Justia Law

Brian Rose was convicted of second-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon. During the trial, the State relied on the felony-murder rule as one of its theories for second-degree murder. On appeal, Rose contended that assault with a deadly weapon cannot not be used as a predicate felony to obtain a second-degree murder conviction under the felony-murder rule because it merges with the homicide and thus is barred by the merger doctrine. Therefore, Rose argued that the State's reliance on this theory and its instructions regarding second-degree felony murder were improper. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) assaultive-type felonies that involve a threat of immediate violent injury merge with a charged homicide for purposes of second-degree felony murder and therefore cannot be used as the basis for a second-degree felony-murder conviction; (2) because the crime at issue in this case could be assaultive based on the manner in which it was committed, the district court erred when it failed to instruct the jury to determine whether the felony underlying the second-degree felony-murder theory was assaultive; and (3) the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt in this case. Remanded. View "Rose v. State" on Justia Law

During a routine traffic stop, police officers developed what the district court found was a reasonable suspicion that the car's passenger, appellant Arturo Cortes, was armed and dangerous. The police ordered Cortes out of the car and subjected him to a patdown search, which produced the evidence underlying the conviction for possession of a controlled substance. Arturo appealed the conviction, urging the Supreme Court to reject the district court's finding of reasonable suspicion or to interpret the Nevada constitutional guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures more strictly than the Supreme Court interpreted the Fourth Amendment in Arizona v. Johnson. The Court saw no basis for departing from Johnson's application of Terry v. Ohio to traffic-stop frisks and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Cortes v. State" on Justia Law

Jessica Winkle pleaded guilty to causing the death of another by driving under the influence of alcohol, in violation of the statute currently codified as Nev. Rev. Stat. 484C.430. Winkle was sentenced to two to five years in state prison. Before the expiration of her minimum term, Winkle was released to a program for alcohol treatment and residential confinement. After determining that Winkle was still in residential confinement and had not served in minimum two-year term, Howard Skolnik, Director of the Department of Corrections, directed that Winkle be rearrested and returned to incarceration. Winkle sought a writ of mandamus directing respondents, Skolnik and the warden of the Jean Conservation Camp, to release her to the program. The Supreme Court granted the writ, concluding that (1) the express language of Nev. Rev. Stat. 209.427 and Nev. Rev. Stat. 209.429 mandates release of qualified offenders to the program for alcohol treatment and residential confinement; and (2) the express language of section 209.429(4)(a) deems an assignment to the program as "imprisonment" for the purposes of section 484C.430 and not a release on parole. View "Winkle v. Foster" on Justia Law

David Saletta was found guilty by a jury of indecent exposure. After the verdict was published and in response to Saletta's request for a jury poll, the district court polled the jury. During the poll, the seventh juror dissented from the verdict, after which the district court continued its poll. The court then questioned the seventh juror about her reasons for changing her mind. Saletta moved for a mistrial, which the district court denied. The jury was ordered to resume deliberation, and a subsequent jury poll resulted in a unanimous verdict. Saletta appealed. The Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that (1) the district court's polling method was not coercive under the three factors identified in U.S. v. Gambino; (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion by continuing to poll the jury after a juror retreated from the verdict under Nev. Rev. Stat. 175.531; and (3) the district court erred by questioning the dissenting juror, the error was plain, and it affected Saletta's substantial rights. Remanded. View "Saletta v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was convicted by a jury of driving under the influence of a controlled substance causing substantial bodily harm. Part of the evidence heard by the jury came from a paramedic who took appellant by ambulance to the hospital. The paramedic testified that appellant confided he had smoked marijuana before the accident. Appellant argued that his statement to the paramedic was inadmissible because it was protected by Nevada’s doctor-patient privilege. The district court rejected the argument. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the term “doctor,” as defined in Nev. Rev. Stat. 49.215(2), does not include EMTs or paramedics, and thus the doctor-patient relationship required for the privilege to attach did not arise simply because appellant spoke to the paramedic in confidence. The Court also held that the statement was not privileged under Nev. Rev. Stat. 49.225, which protects communications among the patient and persons “under direction of the doctor” because the paramedic was acting as an independent EMT and not under the supervision or direction of a doctor in a doctor-patient relationship with appellant. View "Rogers v. State" on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with a felony DUI, pleaded not guilty and went to trial where a jury convicted him. At issue was Nev. Rev. Stat. 484C.340, which allows a defendant who pleads guilty or nolo contendere to a first felony DUI to undergo treatment. The appellant argued that Nev. Rev. Stat. 484C.340 is unconstitutional because it impermissibly burdens exercise of the right to a trial and treats defendants differently based on their exercise of that right in violation of due process and equal protection. The district court determined that while there is a fundamental right to a jury trial for serious criminal offenses, there is no fundamental right to participate in an alcohol treatment diversion program. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the possibility of entering an alcohol treatment program is a form of leniency available in exchange for a guilty plea and does not penalize a defendant for exercising the fundamental right to a jury trial; and (2) all defendants charged with felony DUI are given the same protection of the law enjoyed by other classes in like circumstances, and therefore the statute does not violate equal protection. View "Aguilar-Raygoza v. State" on Justia Law

The district courts reached different conclusions regarding whether inmates were entitled to due process protections related to their parole release hearings. In 2007, Respondent Richard Morrow was certified as not being a "high risk to reoffend" and granted parole. Before being released, the Parole Board's Psychological Review Panel assessed him as a "Tier III" sex offender which precluded Morrow from being released. Due to the new assessment, the Parole Board ultimately decided to defer Morrow's parole for two years. Morrow challenged the Parole Board's procedure by filing a writ of mandamus at the district court seeking a new parole hearing. Morrow argued that the Board violated his due process rights because it did not notify him of the reconsideration, and it denied him access to the documents it relied on when it deferred his parole. The district court granted the writ and directed the Board to schedule a new hearing. The Board appealed that decision. Appellant Brian Kamedula was sentenced to life with the possibility of parole. In 2008, the Parole Board denied Kamedula parole, and he appealed to the district court. Kamedula argued that the Board violated his due process rights by denying him the ability to present evidence or cross-examine witnesses during the parole hearing. The Board moved to dismiss the appeal, which the district court granted. Kamedula appealed that decision. In considering the issue on appeal, the Supreme Court noted that no statutory due process protections applied in these particular cases because the possibility of release on parole is not a protectable liberty interest for an inmate. Accordingly, the Court reversed the district court in Morrow's case, and affirmed the court in Kamedula's case.

Patricia McClain was at a nail salon having her nails done when Defendant Timothy Hobbs entered and became belligerent. After an argument between the two, Defendant left the salon, only to return later. He spit in Ms. McClainâs face, and threw a rock through her vehicleâs windshield. The State charged Defendant with domestic battery, injury to property and requested a âhabitual criminalâ sentence enhancement. Ultimately the district court convicted Defendant and sentenced him to 10 to 25 years in prison for domestic battery with an additional year for property damage. Defendant appealed, challenging whether spitting on another constituted battery under state law. Furthermore, Defendant challenged whether the evidence introduced against him at trial was sufficient to support the enhanced sentence. The Supreme Court ruled that spitting does constitute battery under state law, and that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support his conviction and the sentence he received. The Court affirmed the district courtâs decision.