Justia Nevada Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the district court in this child custody matter, holding that when parents with court-ordered joint legal custody of a minor child disagree on medical decisions concerning that child, the district court breaks the tie by determining which course of action is in the child's best interest.The divorced parents in this case, who had joint legal custody of their eleven-year-old child, disagreed whether the child should be vaccinated against COVID-19. The court took note of government and professional groups' guidelines and research results regarding the safety of the COVID-19, accepted the child's pediatrician's recommendation, and found that vaccination was in the child's best interest. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the district court's finding of best interest aligned with the factors adopted in this opinion. View "Kelley v. Kelley" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court accepting Appellant's plea of no contest to two counts of attempted lewdness with a child and imposed the special condition of probation mandated by Nev. Rev. Stat. 176A.410(1)(q), holding subsection (q) is unconstitutional under the First Amendment.Upon accepting Appellant's no contest plea the district court placed him on probation and imposed the special condition mandated by subsection (q), which prohibits a defendant on probation for a sexual offense from accessing the internet without his probation officer's permission. On appeal, Appellant argued that the mandatory internet ban failed intermediate scrutiny under the First Amendment. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment as to the mandatory internet ban and otherwise affirmed, holding that because Nev. Rev. Stat. 176A.410(1)(q) is both mandatory and restricts more speech than necessary to serve the government's interest with no tailoring mechanism it is facially unconstitutional. View "Aldape v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied the writ petition filed by Petitioner challenging the decision of the Las Vegas Municipal Court denying Petitioner's request for attorney fees and litigation expenses after criminal charges against him were dismissed and withdrawn, holding that the municipal court correctly determined that it lacked authority to award attorney fees and litigation expenses.Petitioner was arrested and charged with obstructing a police officer and a traffic violation. Petitioner successfully moved to dismiss the obstruction charge, and the traffic violation charge was subsequently withdrawn. Petitioner then filed an application for attorney fees and litigation expenses pursuant to Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.0393. The municipal court denied the request for lack of authority. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that municipal courts lack authority under section 41.0393 to award attorney fees and litigation expenses to the prevailing party in a criminal action. View "Patterson v. Las Vegas Municipal Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the district court granting Defendant's motion to dismiss the charge against him for violation of his due process rights, holding that Defendant's due process rights were violated, but the district court abused its discretion in granting the extreme remedy of dismissal under the facts of this case.After Defendant was charged with sexual assault the district court found him to be incompetent to stand trial and ordered him remanded to a psychiatric hospital for competency restoration treatment. After a delay of over 160 days during which he remained in jail, Defendant was transferred to the hospital. Defendant moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that his continued detention in jail violated his due process rights. The district court granted the motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) this Court's precedent did not support the district court's conclusion that aggravated circumstances warranted dismissing the complaint against Defendant with prejudice; and (2) the district court neglected to balance the deterrent objectives of dismissal against society's interest in prosecuting criminal acts. View "State v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for a writ of certiorari or mandamus in this matter arising from district court orders holding Petitioner, the Nevada Division of Public and Behavioral Health, in contempt for vacating competency court orders, holding that Petitioner failed to meet its burden of demonstrating the need for extraordinary relief.The competency orders were issued in relation to eleven criminal defendants in Nevada who were all deemed incompetent to assist in their own defense and ordered to psychiatric treatment (collectively, Defendants). Defendants moved to dismiss their cases or, alternatively, for Petitioner to show cause as to why it should not be held in contempt after significant delays in accepting Defendants for treatment. The district court found Petitioner in contempt for failing to comply with the court orders and issued sanctions. Petitioner then filed the instant petition. The Supreme Court denied relief, holding that the district court had jurisdiction to hold Petitioner in contempt and did not manifestly or capriciously abuse its discretion in doing so. View "State, Dep't of Health v. District Court" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the district court denying Appellants' return-of-property motion and Appellants' request to quash and unseal search warrants, holding that Nevada's return-of-property statute, Nev. Rev. Stat. 179.085, allows a property owner to seek the return of privileged materials that were seized pursuant to a valid search warrant even when the government has an ongoing investigation.Appellants moved under section 179.085 for the return of the various documents and electronic devices seized at Appellants' business establishments on the basis that the property contained privileged materials. Appellant also sought to quash and unseal the warrants. The district court denied the motion, determining that it was not unreasonable for LVMPD to retain the property during an ongoing investigation and that the search protocol proposed by LVMPD was a reasonable resolution of the privilege issue. The Supreme Court reversed in part, holding that the district court (1) properly denied Appellants' request to quash and unseal the warrants; (2) erred when it denied Appellants' return-of-property motion without giving Appellants an opportunity to demonstrate privilege; and (3) erred by adopting LVMPD's proposed search protocol. View "In re Search Warrants re Seizure of Documents" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court reversed Defendant's conviction on one lewdness count as redundant to sexual assault involving the same episode but otherwise affirmed his convictions, holding that the two other errors identified by Defendant on appeal were harmless.Following a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of seven counts of sexual assault against a child under fourteen and three counts of lewdness with a child under fourteen. The district court imposed the maximum sentence allowed by law for an aggregate total of 275 years to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the lewdness convictions must be reversed as redundant to a sexual assault involving the same episode; (2) the district court erred in admitting two uncharged bad acts, but the error was harmless; (3) the district court erred in issuing a jury instruction defining "lewdness" separate from the statutory definition provided by Nev. Rev. Stat. 201.230, but the error was harmless; (4) the sentence imposed was within statutory limits and was not constitutionally disproportionate; and (5) Defendant was not entitled to relief on his cumulative error claim. View "Alfaro v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction as to all counts except count two and reversed and remanded for the district court to strike count two from the judgment and enter an amended judgment, holding that the district court gave an incorrect jury instruction as to the larceny-from-the-person charges, and therefore, Defendant's conviction under count two must be reversed.Defendant was convicted of twenty counts of burglary, larceny, and fraudulent use of a credit or debit card. The Supreme Court largely affirmed, holding that the district court (1) did not erroneously admit evidence of uncharged bad acts; (2) erred in admitting a certain detective's statement, but the error was not reversible; (3) did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's motion for a mistrial and by not excusing a seated juror for his expression of sympathy to victims who testified during trial; and (4) misstated the law in instruction number ten, and therefore, the conviction for count two should be reversed. View "Young v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed Defendant's conviction of first-degree murder with the use of a deadly weapon, holding that a district court's invocation of general, as opposed to case-specific, concerns related to the COVID-19 pandemic does not justify dispensing with a defendant's right to in-person confrontation.Appellant fatally shot his girlfriend in a car in which two children were present. During the jury trial, the district court permitted two witnesses to testify remotely via video. On appeal, Defendant argued that his constitutional right to confrontation was violated because the witnesses' convenience did not justify permitting remote testimony and that the district court should have made case-specific findings before summarily ordering that the witnesses may appear remotely. The Supreme Court agreed, holding that because the court did not make the required findings of necessity before allowing the two witnesses to testify remotely Defendant's right to confrontation was violated, but the constitutional error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Newson v. State" on Justia Law

The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the juvenile court certifying Appellant, a juvenile defendant, to stand trial as an adult, holding that nothing in the 2015 amendment to Nev. Rev. Stat. 201.230 limited the juvenile court's authority to certify Appellant charged with violating section 201.230 to be tried as an adult.The State filed a delinquency petition alleging that B.J. committed five counts of lewdness with a child under the age of fourteen. The State filed a certification asking the juvenile court to transfer the case to criminal court. After a hearing, the juvenile court certified B.J. for criminal proceedings as an adult. B.J. appealed, arguing that under section 201.230(5), juveniles who commit lewd acts on children under the age of fourteen cannot be certified as adults for criminal prosecutions. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) nothing in the 2015 amendments expressly barred the juvenile court from certifying B.J. charged under section 201.230 as an adult; and (2) the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by certifying B.J. as an adult. View "In re B.J.W.-A." on Justia Law